Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 15-18-66 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-18-66 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-18-66

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 18. Prosecuting Attorneys, 15-18-1 through 15-18-99.

ARTICLE 3 SOLICITORS-GENERAL OF STATE COURTS

15-18-66. Duties; authority.

  1. The duties of the solicitors-general within their respective counties are:
    1. To attend each session of the state court when criminal cases are to be heard unless excused by the judge thereof and to remain until the business of the state is disposed of;
    2. To administer the oaths required by law to the bailiffs or other officers of the court and otherwise to aid the presiding judge in organizing the court as may be necessary;
    3. To file accusations on such criminal cases deemed prosecutable and, subject to paragraph (10) of subsection (b) of this Code section, to prosecute all accused offenses;
    4. To attend before the appellate courts when any criminal case in which the solicitor-general represents the state is heard, to argue the same, and to perform any other duty therein which the interest of the state may require; and
    5. To perform such other duties as are or may be required by law or which necessarily appertain to their office.
  2. The authority of the solicitors-general shall include but is not limited to the following:
    1. To review and, if necessary, investigate all criminal cases which may be prosecuted in state court;
    2. When authorized by law, to represent the interests of the state in all courts of inquiry within the county in any matter wherein misdemeanor offenses are heard;
    3. When authorized by the local governing authority, to be the prosecuting attorney of any municipal court, recorder's court, or probate court;
    4. To prosecute civil actions to enforce any civil penalty set forth in Code Section 40-6-163 and when authorized by law to prosecute or defend any civil action in the state court in the prosecution or defense of which the state is interested, unless otherwise specially provided for;
    5. To reduce to judgment any fine, forfeiture, or restitution imposed by the state court as part of a sentence in a criminal case or forfeiture of a recognizance which is not paid in accordance with the order of the court. The solicitor-general may institute such civil or criminal action in the courts of this state or of the United States or any of the several states, to enforce said judgment against the property of the defendant;
    6. To prosecute on behalf of the state any criminal action which is removed from the state court to a United States district court pursuant to Chapter 89 of Title 28 of the United States Code. The expenses incurred by the solicitor-general as actual costs in the prosecution of any such case shall be paid by the county;
    7. To represent the state or any officer or agent of the county in a superior court in any habeas corpus action arising out of any criminal proceeding in the state court, except in those cases in which the commissioner of public safety is named as a party;
    8. At the request of any district attorney or solicitor-general, to prosecute or assist in the prosecution of any criminal or civil action and when acting in such capacity a solicitor-general shall have the same authority and power as the requesting prosecutor;
    9. To request and utilize the assistance of any solicitor-general, assistant solicitor-general, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or other attorney employed by an agency of this state or its political subdivisions or authorities in the prosecution of any criminal or civil action;
    10. To enter a nolle prosequi on any accusation, citation, or summons filed and pending or on any indictment pending in the state court as provided by law. No accusation, citation, or summons shall be considered filed unless such filing has been done with the consent, direction, or approval of the solicitor-general. Further, no notice of arraignment shall be given prior to such filing without the solicitor-general's consent, direction, or approval. Prior to the filing of an accusation, citation, or summons, the solicitor-general shall have the same authority and discretion as district attorneys over criminal cases within their jurisdiction;
    11. To request the magistrate to schedule within a reasonable time a preliminary probable cause hearing in any pending misdemeanor case prior to the filing of an accusation and to represent the interests of the state at such hearing; and
    12. To exercise such authority as may be permitted by law or which necessarily appertains to their office.
  3. The provisions of this Code section shall not be deemed to restrict, limit, or diminish any authority or power granted to a solicitor-general by local Act.

(Code 1981, §15-18-66, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 748, § 2; Ga. L. 2012, p. 53, § 2/SB 352; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 15/HB 942.)

U.S. Code.

- Chapter 89, Title 28 of the United States Code, referred to in this Code section, governs district courts and the removal of cases from state courts, and is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Nolle prosequi.

- Second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 15-18-66(b)(10) modifies the first sentence of the subsection to mean that solicitors are authorized to enter nolle prosequis on those accusations that have been filed with the trial courts at their direction; thus, the trial court erred in relying upon the subsection to rule that uniform traffic citations were not officially filed for purposes of the accused's right to file a speedy trial demand. Hayek v. State, 269 Ga. 728, 506 S.E.2d 372 (1998).

Solicitor general is representative of the state.

- Petitioner had at least one basis for claiming that an application for writ of habeas corpus was properly served as the petitioner served the petition on the solicitor general of the county where the misdemeanor conviction was entered and the solicitor general of the state court was the proper representative of the state in an action attacking such a conviction by means of an application for writ of habeas corpus; thus, the trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the petition for insufficiency of service. State v. Jaramillo, 279 Ga. 691, 620 S.E.2d 798 (2005).

Cited in State v. Rish, 222 Ga. App. 729, 476 S.E.2d 50 (1996); Shire v. State, 225 Ga. App. 306, 483 S.E.2d 694 (1997); Meservey v. State, 230 Ga. App. 382, 496 S.E.2d 518 (1998); State v. Johnson, 257 Ga. App. 162, 570 S.E.2d 627 (2002).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-18-66

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

State v. Jaramillo, 620 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 3, 2005 | 279 Ga. 691

...State, 234 Ga. 390, 392, 216 S.E.2d 111 (1975). The solicitor-general of the state court in which a misdemeanor conviction occurred is the proper representative of the State in an action attacking the conviction by means of a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 15-18-66(b)(7) (the solicitor-general of a state court is authorized "[t]o represent the state or any officer or agent of the county in a superior court in any habeas corpus action arising out of any criminal proceeding in the state court, except in those cases in which the commissioner of public safety is named as a party")....
Copy

Gwinnett Cnty. v. Blaney, 572 S.E.2d 553 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 2002 | 275 Ga. 696

...702, 703, 410 S.E.2d 721 (1991); Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 670, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968). But Blaney has not shown that he had either the express, implicit, or inherent power as Solicitor to employ counsel with county funds to represent himself in the Worton litigation. See OCGA § 15-18-66; Stephenson v....
Copy

State v. Rowe, 843 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2020 | 308 Ga. 806

...Appeals and to perform such other duties as shall be required by law.”); OCGA §§ 5-7-1 (a) (5) (B) (referring to the “prosecuting attorney”); 15-18-6 (4), (6) (describing the prosecutorial and appellate duties of the district attorneys); 15-18-66 (a) (3), (4) (describing the prosecutorial and appellate duties of the solicitors-general); 45-15-3 (3), (5), 45-15-10 (describing the prosecutorial and appellate duties of the Attorney General)....
Copy

Hayek v. State, 506 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 14, 1998 | 269 Ga. 728

...which case his speedy trial demand must be asserted, or if the State intends to file a formal accusation at a later date, in which case a speedy trial should be forestalled. 4. The State contends that the trial court's ruling was authorized by OCGA § 15-18-66(b)(10)'s provision that solicitors are authorized to "enter nolle prosequi on any accusation, citation or summons filed and pending in the state court as provided by law....
...ice in March 1997 at the solicitor's direction, the State argues that this statutory language establishes that the filing did not implicate Hayek's speedy trial rights. We disagree. As it is written, it is ambiguous whether the second sentence of subsection 15-18-66(b)(10) ("No accusation, summons or citation shall be considered filed unless the filing has been done with the consent, direction, or approval of the solicitor-general") is intended (1) to modify the first sentence of the subsection,...
..., as well as basic tenants of fundamental fairness. Whenever possible, a statute must be construed so as to affirm its constitutionally, and to uphold the due process rights of affected parties. [9] Accordingly, we construe the second sentence of subsection 15-18-66(b)(10) as modifying the first sentence of the subsection, to mean that solicitors are authorized to enter nolle prosequis on those accusations that have been filed with the trial courts at their direction....
...382, 496 S.E.2d 518 (1998), is factually distinguishable, as that opinion does not state that the UTC at issue was stamped as having been filed in the court clerk's office. Furthermore, because of our ruling in Division Four, we need not consider appellant's constitutional vagueness challenge to OCGA § 15-18-66(b)(10).