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(Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, § 2.)
- For article discussing the proposed Georgia plan for specialization in the legal field, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 171 (1976). For comment, "The Officer Has No Robes: A Formalist Solution to the Expansion of Quasi-Judicial Immunity," see 66 Emory L.J. 123 (2016).
Supreme Court has the inherent power to govern the practice of law in this state. Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904, 101 S. Ct. 278, 66 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1980).
- Occupational tax ordinance levied on professionals and requiring registration and a fee payment at the beginning of each year, prior to the transaction of business, operated as an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law. Sexton v. City of Jonesboro, 267 Ga. 571, 481 S.E.2d 818 (1997).
- Ordinance of the City of Savannah which purported to license attorneys at law practicing in that city was regulatory in nature and contravened Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), for the reason that the power to license and regulate attorneys at law is vested in the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia and administered through that court and through the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-30 and15-19-31). Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41, 186 S.E.2d 447 (1971).
- Since it was the Georgia Supreme Court, and not the State Bar, that ordered the suspension of the plaintiff, the act was clearly a judicial act within the constitutional power of the State Supreme Court and the State Bar was entitled to judicial immunity from liability for damages. Cohran v. State Bar, 790 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
- No municipality may, by regulatory licensing ordinance, regulate the legal profession, although a municipality may levy an occupational or license tax upon the practice of law within its municipal limits. Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41, 186 S.E.2d 447 (1971).
Cited in State Bar v. Ellis, 116 Ga. App. 721, 158 S.E.2d 280 (1967); Zagoria v. DuBose Enters., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 880, 296 S.E.2d 353 (1982).
- 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 7.
- 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 43.
- Misconduct of one partner in a law firm as a factor in disbarment or other disciplinary proceedings against other partner, 157 A.L.R. 613.
No results found for Georgia Code 15-19-31.