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Call Now: 904-383-7448In recognition of the fact that attorneys are officers of the courts of this state; that they have the exclusive right to practice law and represent members of the public in connection with their legal affairs; that they are charged with important responsibilities in connection with the administration of justice both in and out of the courts; and that for these reasons a strong legal profession is in the public interest, the Supreme Court of this state is authorized to establish as an administrative arm of the court a unified self-governing bar association which shall be known as the "State Bar of Georgia," composed of all persons licensed to practice law in this state.
(Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, § 1.)
Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-19-30) does not violate Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III). Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- State Bar of Georgia is not a private corporation under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. V (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V); it is an administrative arm of the court. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- Authority given Supreme Court to create the State Bar of Georgia is not legislative power, but rather is a valid exercise of a judicial function. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- Judiciary cannot be circumscribed or restricted in performance of judiciary's power and judiciary's duty to regulate the practice of law, and this section is in aid of the judiciary in the performance of the judiciary's functions. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- Contention that this section is a special law on a subject for which provision has been made by a general law is without merit. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- This section manifests the General Assembly's approval, in the public interest, of creation of a unified state bar, but leaves the creation, organization, and government of the bar to this court. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969).
- Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, applied to complaints against an attorney before the State Bar of Georgia because State Bar proceedings were "official proceedings authorized by law" under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c). However, a hearing was required before the defense could be allowed. Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 728 S.E.2d 826 (2012).
- Ordinance of the City of Savannah which purported to license attorneys at law practicing in that city was regulatory in nature and contravened Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), for the reason that the power to license and regulate attorneys at law is vested in the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia and administered through that court and through the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-30 and15-19-31). Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41, 186 S.E.2d 447 (1971).
- City ordinance imposing an occupational tax on attorneys who maintained an office and practiced law in the city did not operate as an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law nor was an improper attempt to regulate the practice of law in violation of O.C.G.A. § 15-19-30 because the ordinance did not authorize the city to withhold a certificate from any attorney who failed to comply with the ordinance and attorneys were clearly exempted from regulatory treatment under the ordinance. Moss v. City of Dunwoody, 293 Ga. 858, 750 S.E.2d 326 (2013).
- No municipality may, by regulatory licensing ordinance, regulate the legal profession, although a municipality may levy occupational or license tax upon the practice of law within its municipal limits. Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41, 186 S.E.2d 447 (1971).
Cited in Brown v. City of Atlanta, 221 Ga. 121, 143 S.E.2d 388 (1965); Georgia Bar Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 222 Ga. 657, 151 S.E.2d 718 (1966); Huber v. State, 234 Ga. 357, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975); Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185 (1980).
- 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 7.
- 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 9.
- State bar created by act of legislature or rules of court; integrated bar, 114 A.L.R. 161; 151 A.L.R. 617.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-10-21
Citation: 293 Ga. 858, 750 S.E.2d 326, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3197, 2013 WL 5708063, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 868
Snippet: regulate the practice of law in violation of OCGA § 15-19-30 et seq., and (2) violates equal protection requirements
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-03-10
Citation: 481 S.E.2d 818, 267 Ga. 571, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 795, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 88
Snippet: Ga. Const., Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA § 15-19-30 et seq. The Jonesboro ordinance states that the