O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-19-4 (2019)

Duties of attorneys

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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It is the duty of attorneys at law: (1) To maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers; (2) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are consistent with truth and never to seek to mislead the judges or juries by any artifice or false statement of the law; (3) To maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients; (4) To abstain from all offensive personalities and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged; (5) To encourage neither the commencement nor the continuance of an action or proceeding from any motives of passion or interest; and (6) Never to reject, for a consideration personal to themselves, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 391; Code 1868, § 452; Code 1873, § 417; Code 1882, § 417; Civil Code 1895, § 4427; Civil Code 1910, § 4965; Code 1933, § 9-601.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Establishment of attorney-client privilege, § 24-5-501. Editor’s notes. - In light of the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate the bar, this section is directory only. See Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969) and Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969). See also the Code of Professional Responsibility in the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia. Administrative rules and regula-

tions. - Appearance by attorneys; signing of pleadings, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Office of State Administrative Hearings, Administrative Rules of Procedure, Rule 616-1-2-.34. Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty,’’ see 29 Emory L.J. 909 (1981). For note, ‘‘Conflicts of Interest in the Liability Insurance Setting,’’ 13 Ga. L. Rev. 973 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action. - Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973). Purpose of section. - Purpose of this section is to provide ethical guidelines for attorneys in their capacity as officers of the court, violation of which is within the inherent power of the courts to handle through contempt proceedings. Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973). Applicability of section to competency of attorney as witness. - Former Code 1933, §§ 9-501, 38-418, and 38-1605 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-4, former 24-9-21, and former 24-9-25 [see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501]) have no application to competency of attorney as witness with respect to essential facts attending the execution of a will. Manley v. Combs, 197 Ga. 768, 30 S.E.2d 485 (1944). Attorney at law may testify as a witness with respect to essential facts attending the execution of a will. Manley v. Combs, 197 Ga. 768, 30 S.E.2d 485 (1944). Patently false statement by an attorney in a pleading. - Counsel’s statement in a legal malpractice complaint that an expert affidavit that was required to be filed with the complaint was not obtainable due to time constraints as the limitations period was about to expire was patently false and a sham pleading and violated counsel’s duty as an attorney to employ only such means as were consistent with the truth when the complaint had twice previously been filed and voluntarily dismissed for failure to include the

affidavit. Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 254 Ga. App. 355, 562 S.E.2d 725 (2002). Exercise of exemplary fiducial conduct by attorneys. - Attorneys are expected to exercise exemplary fiducial conduct on behalf of their clients and toward the courts. McCoy v. McSorley, 119 Ga. App. 603, 168 S.E.2d 202 (1969). Lawyer’s refusal of case given by judge. - Lawyer, except in unusual circumstances, has no right and will make no effort to refuse a case which the lawyer is requested to take by a judge of the court before whom the lawyer regularly appears, and such request is tantamount to a demand. Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966). Lawyer’s duty never to reject cause of defenseless. - Lawyers undertake certain professional obligations over and above those demanded in some of the other professions, among the obligations being never to reject, for a consideration personal to themselves, the cause of the defenseless. Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966). Attorney’s services and work product not constitutionally compensable. - Request by a judge of a trial court that an attorney represent an indigent defendant in a criminal case is tantamount to a demand with which the attorney must necessarily comply, but the attorney’s professional services, work

product, and necessary out-of-pocket expenses in providing competent representation are not required by the Constitution to be compensated. Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966). Provision of counsel to indigents. - While former Ga. L. 1968, p. 999, § 1 et seq. (see now the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, O.C.G.A. § 17-12-1 et seq.) should provide effective means of affording counsel to indigent defendants, it was not the exclusive method for accomplishing that end. Perry v. State, 120 Ga. App. 304, 170 S.E.2d 350 (1969). Defense counsel’s statement foreclosing defense was not improper. - Defense counsel in murder trial gave away no right of counsel’s client, nor did any injury to defendant’s cause, in frankly stating to the court that counsel did not take the position that the defense of justifiable homicide was involved. Anderson v. State, 196 Ga. 468, 26 S.E.2d 755 (1943). Prejudice not shown if knowledge could be imputed to plaintiff. - If a party in a divorce action, who was an attorney, was fully aware of a fiduciary

agreement which covered certificates of deposit identified as assets in the divorce action, and failed to show any damages resulting from the disclosure to her husband’s attorney of the fact that her new counsel had requested delivery of the proceeds of those certificates to him, summary judgment was properly awarded against her. Cagle v. Davis, 236 Ga. App. 657, 513 S.E.2d 16 (1999). Out-of-state order prohibiting unprivileged testimony. - Michigan order, by facially prohibiting former corporate litigation consultant from testifying as to matters outside the scope of any privilege, violated Georgia public policy; therefore, the full faith and credit clause did not require the federal district court in Georgia to give full effect to the Michigan court order. Williams v. GMC, 147 F.R.D. 270 (S.D. Ga. 1993). Cited in Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873); Kennedy v. Redwine, 59 Ga. 327 (1877); Parker v. Wellons, 43 Ga. App. 721, 160 S.E. 109 (1931); McRae v. Boykin, 50 Ga. App. 866, 179 S.E. 535 (1935); United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973); Roan v. Cranston, 173 Ga. App. 747, 327 S.E.2d 856 (1985); Lucas v. Bob Hurst Mazda-Peugeot Autos., 174 Ga. App. 212, 329 S.E.2d 593 (1985).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 3 et seq., 139. C.J.S. - 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 4. 7A C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 234 et seq. ALR. - Agreement for contingent fee as assignment of interest in judgment, 2 ALR 454; 19 ALR 399. Privilege of communication to attorney as affected by termination of employment, 5 ALR 728. Privilege of communication to attorney by client in attempt to establish false claim, 5 ALR 977; 9 ALR 1081. Agreement or understanding between attorney and client to use money for unlawful purposes as affecting their rights inter se, 26 ALR 98. Aspersing character or reputation of litigant as ground for disbarment of attorney, 41 ALR 494. Propriety and effect of attorney repre-

senting interest adverse to that of former client, 51 ALR 1307; 52 ALR2d 1243. Attorney’s liability for failure to follow client’s instructions, 56 ALR 962. Refusal of attorney to disclose identity of, whereabouts of, or other information relating to, his client as contempt, 101 ALR 470. Attorney’s comment on opposing party’s refusal to permit introduction of, or to offer, privileged testimony, or to permit privileged witness to testify, 116 ALR 1170. Duty of attorney to advise client regarding the work involved and the amount of his compensation, 117 ALR 1008. Attorney-client privilege as affected by wrongful or criminal character of contemplated acts or course of conduct, 125 ALR 508. Campaign or concerted action in interest of public by bar association or other

group against usurious or illegal practices, or for the investigation of business or other activities with which such practices may be associated, 132 ALR 1177. Attorney’s representation of parties adversely interested as affecting judgment or estoppel in respect thereof, 154 ALR 501. Duties, rights, and remedies between attorney and client where attorney purchases property of client at or through tax, execution, or judicial sale, 20 ALR2d 1280. Liability of attorney for loss of client’s money or personal property in his possession or entrusted to him, 26 ALR2d 1340. Waiver of attorney-client privilege by personal representative or heir of deceased client or by guardian of incompetent, 67 ALR2d 1268. Right of attorney to continue divorce or separation suit against wishes of his client, 92 ALR2d 1009. Attorney’s criticism of judicial acts as ground of disciplinary action, 12 ALR3d 1408. What constitutes representation of conflicting interests subjecting attorney to disciplinary action, 17 ALR3d 835. Right of attorney appointed by court for indigent accused to, and court’s power to award, compensation by public, in absence of statute or court rule, 21 ALR3d 819. Fabrication or suppression of evidence as ground of disciplinary action against attorney, 40 ALR3d 169. Attorney’s liability for malpractice in connection with defense of criminal case, 53 ALR3d 731. Rights and duties of attorney in a criminal prosecution where client informs him of intention to present perjured testimony, 64 ALR3d 385. Attorney’s liability for negligence in cases involving domestic relations, 78 ALR3d 255. Medical malpractice countersuits, 84 ALR3d 555. Right of clergyman appearing in court as professional attorney to be in clerical garb, 84 ALR3d 1143. Legal malpractice in settling or failing to settle client’s case, 87 ALR3d 168. Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor’s argument to jury indicating his

belief or knowledge as to guilt of accused - modern state cases, 88 ALR3d 449. Method employed in collecting debt due client as ground for disciplinary action against attorney, 93 ALR3d 880. Civil liability of attorney for abuse of process, 97 ALR3d 688. Attorney’s conviction in foreign or federal jurisdiction as ground for disciplinary action, 98 ALR3d 357. Failure to pay creditors as affecting applicant’s moral character for purposes of admission to the bar, 4 ALR4th 436. Applicability of attorney-client privilege to evidence or testimony in subsequent action between parties originally represented contemporaneously by same attorney, with reference to communication to or from one party, 4 ALR4th 765. Right of party litigant to defend or counterclaim on ground that opposing party or his attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of law, 7 ALR4th 1146. Attorney’s failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt, 13 ALR4th 122. Attorney’s fees: obduracy as basis for state-court award, 49 ALR4th 825. Legal malpractice liability for advising client to commit crime or unlawful act, 51 ALR4th 1227. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in matters involving formation or dissolution of business organization as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 63 ALR4th 656. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in matters involving real-estate transactions as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 65 ALR4th 24. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in tax matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 66 ALR4th 314. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling of client’s affairs in estate or probate matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 66 ALR4th 342. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in family law matters as

ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 67 ALR4th 415. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in personal injury or property damage actions as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 68 ALR4th 694. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in criminal matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 69 ALR4th 410. Attorney’s assertion of retaining lien as violation of ethical code or rules governing professional conduct, 69 ALR4th 974.

Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client’s affairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 70 ALR4th 786. Legal malpractice in handling or defending medical malpractice claim, 78 ALR4th 725. Legal malpractice in defense of criminal prosecution, 4 ALR5th 273. Criminal liability of attorney for tampering with evidence, 49 ALR5th 619. Engaging in offensive personality as ground for disciplinary action against attorney, 58 ALR5th 429.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1993–2023 · leading case: Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 562 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 562 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 4× “In this case, the trial court’s determination that Paragraph 157 was patently false and a sham pleading is amply supported by the record, which “clearly shows that time constraints did not prevent the affidavit from being filed with the complaint. [Counsel’s] statement to the…”
In Re Hadaway, 659 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “[Hadaway’s] counsel [Johnson] should also respond to whether she has violated OCGA § 15-19-4 (1) and (2) on duties of attorneys.”
Cagle v. Davis, 513 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Cagle’s response did not include any affidavits, but she asserted for the first time — citing no authority other than the general confidentiality statute, OCGA § 15-19-4 (3) — that Davis’s disclosure to Boyd of the fact that Cagle’s new counsel had requested delivery of the CD…”
Works v. Aupont, 465 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “The record clearly shows that time constraints did not prevent the affidavit from being filed with the complaint.”
Keefe v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 467 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “The court in effect relies for truthfulness on fulfillment of the attorney’s duty as provided in OCGA § 15-19-4 (2). See also Directory Rules 1-102 (A) (4), (5) and 7-102 (A) (5) of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility.”
White v. Orr Leasing, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “It is contended that the actions of the first attorney were in violation of OCGA §§ 15-19-4 through 15-19-6. The only evidence in the record here regarding the authority or lack thereof of the attorney is the affidavit of Ralph White that he had employed the attorney with regard…”
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270 (S.D. Ga. 1993). · cites it 2× “1992); O.C.G.A § 15-19-4(3); id. §§ 24-9-21(2), -24 & -25.”
In re D. K. M., 520 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 2× “See Code of Professional Responsibility, Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, Part III, Canons of Ethics, Chapter 1, DR 1-101, DR 1-102; see also OCGA § 15-19-4.”
Waters v. Stewart, 587 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-19-4 (2). OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) (plaintiff must have “good faith” basis for pleading under the statute).”
Danny Ray Dunn v. Caryn A. Dunn (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 15-19-4 (2). 10 permanent parenting plan as further set forth in this Code section; provided, however, that unless otherwise ordered by the court, a separate court order exclusively devoted to a parenting plan shall not be required.”
In Re Dkm, 520 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 2× “See Code of Professional Responsibility, Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, Part III, Canons of Ethics, Chapter 1, DR 1-101, DR 1-102; see also OCGA § 15-19-4.”
— 15-19-4(2) — 1 case
Works v. Aupont, 465 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). “The record clearly shows that time constraints did not prevent the affidavit from being filed with the complaint.”
— 15-19-4(3) — 1 case
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270 (S.D. Ga. 1993). “1992); O.C.G.A § 15-19-4(3); id. §§ 24-9-21(2), -24 & -25.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.