O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-6-19 (2019)

Length of terms of courts

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned.

History

Ga. L. 1887, p. 58, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4346; Ga. L. 1896, p. 47, § 1; Ga. L. 1909, p. 97, § 1; Civil Code 1910,

§ 4877; Code 1933, § 24-3010; Ga. L. 1972, p. 713, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section was directory, and not mandatory. Horkan v. Beasley, 11 Ga. App. 273, 75 S.E. 341 (1912); Luke v. Luke, 32 Ga. App. 738, 124 S.E. 556 (1924). Motion for new trial goes to next term. - Preceding term of the court stands adjourned by operation of law five days prior to the commencement of the succeeding term; and a motion for new trial made in one term automatically goes over to the next regular term, and the judge is without jurisdiction to dismiss the motion in vacation. Marshall v. State, 34 Ga. App. 434, 129 S.E. 665 (1925) (decided prior to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. VIII; see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI). Power to modify final judgment during term. - Trial court has the power to modify a final judgment including a fee award in a divorce case during the term in which the judgment was entered. Haim v. Haim, 251 Ga. 618, 308 S.E.2d 179 (1983). Attempt to retain jurisdiction of final order beyond term. - Attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity. Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 278 S.E.2d 370 (1981). No power to modify merits of decree after term. - After the expiration of the term at which a decree was entered, it is out of the power of the court to modify and revise the decree in any matter of substance or in any manner affecting the merits. Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 278 S.E.2d 370 (1981). Continuation of term until five days before next scheduled term. - Term of the superior court of a county at which an original divorce and alimony decree is entered continues until five days before commencement of the next regularly scheduled term, unless adjourned. Dover

v. Dover, 205 Ga. 241, 53 S.E.2d 492 (1949) (decided prior to the 1972 amendment to this Code section). Extra trial week scheduled during a term of court does not create a new term of court; terms of court are created by statute. Proveaux v. State, 198 Ga. App. 119, 401 S.E.2d 12 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 12 (1991). Release of jurors not adjournment. - Mere fact that the court released the jurors in a criminal case did not amount to an express adjournment of the term, especially since the trial court indicated at the hearing on defendant’s motion for acquittal that, by releasing the jurors, the court did not intend to adjourn the term prematurely. Bailey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 390, 433 S.E.2d 610 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012). Cited in Carder v. Arundel Mtg. Co., 177 Ga. 74, 169 S.E. 302 (1933); Carder v. Arundel Mtg. Co., 47 Ga. App. 309, 170 S.E. 312 (1933); Cahoon v. Wills, 179 Ga. 195, 175 S.E. 563 (1934); Hall v. Hall, 185 Ga. 502, 195 S.E. 731 (1938); Adams v. Seay, 62 Ga. App. 589, 9 S.E.2d 117 (1940); Shivers v. Shivers, 206 Ga. 552, 57 S.E.2d 660 (1950); Bryning v. State, 86 Ga. App. 35, 70 S.E.2d 779 (1952); Armour & Co. v. Youngblood, 107 Ga. App. 505, 130 S.E.2d 786 (1963); Thornton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 113 Ga. App. 43, 147 S.E.2d 21 (1966); Grage v. Venable, 114 Ga. App. 570, 151 S.E.2d 926 (1966); Stores, Inc. v. Kalfin, 226 Ga. 145, 173 S.E.2d 219 (1970); Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988); Kirk v. State, 194 Ga. App. 801, 392 S.E.2d 249 (1990); Campbell v. State, 199 Ga. App. 25, 403 S.E.2d 882 (1991); Aspinwall v. State, 201 Ga. App. 203, 410 S.E.2d 388 (1991); McKnight v. State, 215 Ga. App. 899, 453 S.E.2d 38 (1994); Smith v. State, 263 Ga. App. 414, 587 S.E.2d 787 (2003); Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 195, 590 S.E.2d 145 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, §§ 20, 21.

C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 133 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1983–2003 · leading case: McKnight v. State, 453 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
McKnight v. State, 453 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 15-6-19. The regular term of court following the July 1993 term of court did not begin until the second and third Mondays in October 1993.”
Wade v. State, 368 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “The length of these terms is specified in OCGA § 15-6-19: “The regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned.”
Wilson v. State, 352 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “See OCGA §§ 15-6-19 and 15-6-20. "[T]he word `qualified,' as used in the statute [OCGA § 17-7-170 (b)], relates to the general qualifications of the panels, .”
Bailey v. State, 433 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× ““The length of these terms is specified in OCGA § 15-6-19: The regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned.”
Kirk v. State, 392 S.E.2d 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-6-19. An indictment was returned during the November term, charging possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-31 (a), and less than an ounce of marijuana, OCGA § 16-13-30, and a motion to inspect and test the physical evidence was filed.”
Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Murray, 524 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-6-19 provides that the regular terms of the superior courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular court term.”
Johnson v. State, 590 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “…courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned.” OCGA § 15-6-19.”
Brooks v. State, 571 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-6-19 provides that “[t]he regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned.”
Barkley v. State, 348 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 15-6-19; Marshall v. State, 34 Ga.”
Proveaux v. State, 401 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 15-6-19. An extra trial week scheduled during a term of court does not create a new term of *120 court because terms of court are created by statute.”
Aspinwall v. State, 410 S.E.2d 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 15-6-19. It follows that only one term of court had passed in the interval between defendant’s demand for trial and the superior court’s ruling on defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal.”
Haim v. Haim, 308 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 2× “34, 35; OCGA § 15-6-19 (Code Ann. § 24-3010). 2. The trial court has the power to modify a final judgment during the term in which the judgment was entered.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.