O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24 (2019)

Payment of court’s contingent expenses

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Any contingent expenses incurred in holding any session of the superior court, including lights, fuel, stationery, rent, publication of grand jury presentments when ordered published, and similar items, such as taking down testimony in felony cases, etc., shall be paid out of the county treasury of such county upon the certificate of the judge of the superior court and without further order. (b) Any costs incurred in providing defense services pursuant to Chapter 12 of Title 17, the ‘‘Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003,’’ for persons accused of crimes shall not be considered contingent expenses of the superior court for purposes of this Code section.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 3617; Code 1868, § 3642; Code 1873, § 3692;

Code 1882, § 3692; Ga. L. 1889, p. 156, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4341; Civil Code

1910, § 4872; Code 1933, § 24-3005; Ga. L. 2007, p. 183, § 1/HB 586.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2007, p. 183, § 3/HB 586, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act shall ap-

ply to all costs and fees incurred or counsel appointed on or after July 1, 2007. Law reviews. - For survey article on local government law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS County’s filing of a protest over an expenditure ordered by the superior court judge to whom the case was assigned did not divest the court of the court’s jurisdiction over the case. DeKalb County v. Adams, 272 Ga. 401, 529 S.E.2d 610 (2000). Payment of committee appointed under Penal Code 1895, §§ 837 and 838 to examine county officers was authorized by former Civil Code 1895, § 4341 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24). Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121, 47 S.E. 634 (1904). Former Penal Code 1895, §§ 841, 842 and 843 contemplated services by resident individuals composing committees appointed by grand juries, and compensation for such services, and, considered in connection with former Civil Code 1895, § 4872 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24), authorized payment by the county of compensation for such services of the committee by order of the court as a part of the expenses of the court. Watkins v. Tift, 177 Ga. 640, 170 S.E. 918 (1933). Contingent expenses. - In an indigent criminal defendant’s death penalty case, a county was improperly ordered to pay the costs, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24, of transcribing telephone conversations made by or to the criminal defendant at the jail or presenting demonstrative evidence in the courtroom in a digital format as those were not expenses typically incurred at trial. Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 651 S.E.2d 679 (2007). Necessity for the installation of fire sprinklers for a ten-story building is not within the judge’s unique knowledge about the functioning of his or her court. In re DeKalb County Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys., 265 Ga. 96, 454 S.E.2d 126 (1995). Payment of fees of appointed attorneys. - Legislature, by authorizing pay-

ment of certain fees and expenses of appointed attorneys in capital-felony cases, has created an expense of court, and the judges of the superior courts have the inherent power and authority to order the expenses paid out of the county treasury. Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955). Payments of fees of accountants in criminal case. - Fees or charges of expert accountants, employed on behalf of the state in a criminal case by the solicitor general (now district attorney), with the approval of the trial judge, were not such contingent expenses in the holding of any and all sessions of the superior court as were within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 24-3005 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24). Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142, 169 S.E. 882 (1933). Statute did not confer power upon the grand jury or the court to employ expert accountants, whose compensation was to be paid out of the county treasury, to render services under direction of the committee in performing the duties imposed upon that body. Watkins v. Tift, 177 Ga. 640, 170 S.E. 918 (1933). One claiming right to money must show authority. - Counties have only such powers as may be prescribed by law, and that one who claims the right to receive money from the treasury of the county must show the law which authorizes the expenditure. Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142, 169 S.E. 882 (1933). Certificate approving payment of court reporter. - Order of judge including in the judge’s approval of compensation certain work done by the person assisting the court reporter becomes a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, and not being void on the judgment’s face cannot be collaterally attacked. Walden v. Smith, 203 Ga. 207, 45 S.E.2d 660 (1947), overruled on other grounds,

McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court, 260 Ga. 315, 392 S.E.2d 707 (1990). Certificate of the judge of the superior court approving bills for compensation to the court reporter is a judgment of that court and cannot be collaterally attacked. Nichols v. Floyd County, 76 Ga. App. 792, 47 S.E.2d 163 (1948). Transcript costs for indigents. - It was error to hold that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-34 of the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council was required to pay for indigent defendants’ costs of transcripts in criminal cases; under laws existing before the act, counties were required to pay for such transcripts, and the act does not repeal these laws by implication. Ga. Public Defender Stds. Council v. State of Ga., 284 Ga. App. 660, 644 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

Review of certificates. - Certificates issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24 are reviewable through an appeal from a mandamus action filed by the party to whom the money was due, and may also be reviewed through the filing by the county of a protest to the certificate. McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court, 260 Ga. 315, 392 S.E.2d 707 (1990). Cited in Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga. 252, 10 S.E. 199 (1889); Cone v. Jones, 178 Ga. 189, 172 S.E. 465 (1934); Walden v. Nichols, 201 Ga. 568, 40 S.E.2d 644 (1946); Richter v. Thomas County Comm’n, 152 Ga. App. 332, 262 S.E.2d 604 (1979); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Cramer v. Spalding County, 261 Ga. 570, 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Equal treatment amongst judges for support services. - Fulton County’s obligation to accord equal treatment to all superior court judges of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit is applicable to all county funded support services, including staffing (e.g., law clerks, secretaries, court reporters, case managers and the like) and the operating budget required for a superior court judge to properly perform his or her constitutional and statutory duties. 2002 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U2002-6. Establishment of special master for divorce settlement improper. - Establishing a special master, employed by the court to hear evidence in a divorce settlement and paid from court funds, is not permissible in view of the mechanisms capable of handling this type of problem already in place under O.C.G.A. § 9-7-2

and in view of the lack of a specific statutory basis for such an expense of court under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24. 1984 Op. Att’y Gen. U84-19. Expenditure for presentence psychological evaluations. - Superior court may order psychological evaluations of criminal defendants prior to sentencing and at county expense. 1985 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U85-29. Expenditure for interpreter for indigent criminal defendant. - When the superior court exercises the court’s discretion to appoint an interpreter for an indigent criminal defendant who neither speaks nor understands English, the court has the inherent power to assess the cost of the interpreter against the county. 1989 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U89-24.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1990–2020 · leading case: McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court, 392 S.E.2d 707 (Ga. 1990).
McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court, 392 S.E.2d 707 (Ga. 1990). · cites it 12× “OCGA § 15-6-24 constitutes "legislative recognition of the power which the judicial branch must possess .”
Fulton Cnty. v. State, 651 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. 2007). · cites it 4× “It is argued that the costs in question are contingent expenses incurred in the course of a trial and that, therefore, they are to be paid by the county under OCGA § 15-6-24 (a). 2 We disagree. “ ‘Before an officer can be required to pay out public money, or be justified in…”
Cramer v. Cnty. of Spalding, 409 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 4× “315 ( 392 SE2d 707 ) (1990) (construing superior court’s order of payment as a certificate under OCGA § 15-6-24 that is not directly appealable).”
Georgia Pub. Def. Standards Council v. State, 644 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “, OCGA §§ 15-6-24 3 (taking down testimony in felony cases); 48-5-220 (5) (one purpose of county taxes is to pay court expenses); and 15-6-79 (transcripts for appellate courts under indigency affidavits shall be paid from county funds).”
In re DeKalb Cnty. Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys., 454 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 4× “The Certificate of Need process contemplated by OCGA § 15-6-24 is the procedural rule pursuant to which the power of the court is exercised.”
DeKalb Cnty. v. Adams, 529 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 2× “315 ( 392 SE2d 707 ) (1990) or OCGA § 15-6-24 supports DeKalb’s position that a superior court is divested of its jurisdiction over a case merely because a county chooses to file a protest over an expenditure ordered by the superior court judge to whom the case was assigned.”
In Re Declaration of Jud. Emergency (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 8× “The Chief Judge appointed receivers to manage the project “pursuant to OCGA § 9-8-3,”6 and ordered that the funds necessary to effectuate the directives be paid “out of the county registry, pursuant to OCGA § 15-6-24,” which, the Chief Judge asserted “requires payment of all…”
Willie Santonio Manders v. Thurman Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). “O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24. Although presiding in county courthouses, superior court judges perform state judicial functions.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.