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2018 Georgia Code 9-7-2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 7. Auditors, 9-7-1 through 9-7-23.

ARTICLE 4 QUO WARRANTO

9-7-2. When facts referred to auditor; on application and notice; on court's own motion.

Upon application of either party, after notice to the opposite party, the judge of the superior court, in equitable proceedings if the case shall require it, may refer any part of the facts to an auditor to investigate and report the result to the court. Furthermore, the judge may, upon his own motion, when in his judgment the facts and circumstances of any such case require it, refer the same to an auditor.

(Ga. L. 1894, p. 123, § 3; Ga. L. 1895, p. 47, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4581; Civil Code 1910, § 5127; Code 1933, § 10-101.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "Special Master; Mastering the Pretrial Discovery Process," see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 22 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Whether auditor shall be appointed is, as general rule, in discretion of court; and, unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, the appointment by the court of an auditor will not be disturbed. Ten-Fifty Ponce De Leon Co. v. Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank, 170 Ga. 642, 153 S.E. 751 (1930).

Proper case may be referred to auditor over objections of parties. Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158, 33 S.E. 958 (1899).

Causes properly referable to auditors are those involving long and complicated commercial transactions supposed to require too much time for careful investigation and accurate computations to be properly referred to a jury. Barber v. Southern Serv. Corp., 182 Ga. 124, 185 S.E. 93 (1936).

Party who prays for reference to auditor will not thereafter be heard to complain that cause was so referred; nor is it within the right of any party to select or reject any particular person to be appointed by the court. Edwards v. National Fin. Co., 172 Ga. 884, 159 S.E. 256 (1931).

Judge is not required to submit entire case to auditor. Branch v. Branch, 194 Ga. 575, 22 S.E.2d 124 (1942).

All or any part of facts may be referred to auditor, but such a reference is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the court, and the exercise of such discretion will not be interfered with unless abused. Mobley v. Faulk, 42 Ga. App. 314, 156 S.E. 40 (1930).

Question of prejudice to be raised before auditor.

- The auditor having been appointed by the court in the exercise of its prerogative, the question of prejudice, bias, or other disqualification of the auditor should have been raised before the auditor personally and before the auditor's decision in the first instance. Edwards v. National Fin. Co., 172 Ga. 884, 159 S.E. 256 (1931).

Suit for losses due to alleged mismanagement.

- Where the suit was against bank directors for losses due to alleged mismanagement, it was not an abuse of discretion for the presiding judge to overrule a motion to refer the proceeding to an auditor, and submit the case to a jury. Mobley v. Faulk, 42 Ga. App. 314, 156 S.E. 40 (1930).

Appointment of auditor in divorce proceeding where jury trial requested.

- Where one spouse made a proper demand for a jury trial which was not otherwise waived, it was reversible error for the court to enter a final judgment based upon the findings of an auditor, without a trial by jury. Franklin v. Franklin, 267 Ga. 82, 475 S.E.2d 890 (1996).

Cited in Mitchem v. Georgia Cotton Oil Co., 139 Ga. 519, 77 S.E. 627 (1913); Henderson v. Lott, 170 Ga. 261, 152 S.E. 98 (1930); Howell v. Jackson, 171 Ga. 245, 155 S.E. 26 (1930); Candler v. Bryan, 189 Ga. 851, 8 S.E.2d 81 (1940); Henry v. Century Fin. Co., 110 Ga. App. 498, 139 S.E.2d 123 (1964); Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 49, 643 S.E.2d 333 (2007); Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Establishment of special master to hear divorce matters improper.

- Establishing a special master, employed by the court to hear evidence in a divorce settlement and paid from court funds, is not permissible in view of the mechanisms capable of handling this type of problem already in place under O.C.G.A. § 9-7-2 and in view of the lack of specific statutory basis for such an expense of court under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-19.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 226 et seq.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-7-2

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 6 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1939).

Cited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 16, 1939 | 189 Ga. 458

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E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Waters, 695 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2010 | 287 Ga. 235, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1753

...masters may be appointed only in non-equity cases concerning condemnation (OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq.), quiet title actions (OCGA § 23-3-63), and lawyer disciplinary proceedings (Ga.Bar Rule 4-106). The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding: Under OCGA § 9-7-2, the superior court is authorized to appoint an auditor in cases where the plaintiff invokes the court's equitable powers by praying for an injunction or other form of equitable relief. Once appointed under OCGA § 9-7-2, an auditor has the power to hear motions, pass on questions of law and fact, and compel the production of documents....
...under the circumstances of this case. Waters's complaint prayed for equitable relief, including the imposition of injunctions and a constructive trust. The superior court, therefore, was entitled to invoke its powers to appoint an auditor under OCGA § 9-7-2....
...In conclusion, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, although we base our opinion on the precepts of Rule 46, not OCGA § 9-7-1 et seq. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 9-7-2 provides: Upon application of either party, after notice to the opposite party, the judge of the superior court, in equitable proceedings if the case shall require it, may refer any part of the facts to an auditor to investigate and report the result to the court....
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Franklin v. Franklin, 475 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 1996 | 267 Ga. 82, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3215

...t waiver, a jury trial in a divorce case is available to a spouse if a written demand is made on or before the call of the case. See Owen v. Lewis, 264 Ga. 109, 443 S.E.2d 850 (1994); compare Ivey v. Ivey, 264 Ga. 435(1), 445 S.E.2d 258 (1994). OCGA § 9-7-2 addresses when an equitable case may be referred to an auditor to investigate specific matters identified by a superior court....
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Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 7, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 402

...elating to the appointment and payment of special masters, to find that Davis’ failure to pay the special master fees before filing her appeal required that the appeal be dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned: OCGA § 9-7-22 (c) provides that the “fees of the auditor shall be assessed as court costs and shall be paid prior to the filing of any appeal from the judgment of the court....
...aster.’ ” E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waters[, 298 Ga. App. 843, 845 (1), n. 2 (681 SE2d 651) (2009)]. See OCGA § 9-7-1 (“[t]he duties heretofore performed by a master in the superior court shall be performed by an auditor”). Under OCGA § 9-7-22 (c), the requirement to pay the assessed auditor fees before filing an appeal “is mandatory and jurisdictional.” Sorrentino v....
...As an initial matter, the special master was appointed pursuant to the Quiet Title *94Act (see OCGA §§ 23-3-43 and 23-3-63), which is entirely separate from the Code provisions relating to the appointment of auditors under Title 9 of the Georgia Code. See OCGA §§ 9-7-2 and 9-7-3. The Quiet Title Act has its own, self-contained set of provisions for the appointment of special masters that are separate and apart from those relating to the appointment of auditors under Title 9. Furthermore, whereas OCGA § 9-7-22 (c) requires that the fees of an auditor “shall be paid prior to the filing of any appeal from the judgment of the court[,]” there is no such stated requirement in the Quiet Title Act with respect to the payment of fees for a special master appointed under the terms of that Act....
...105, 106 (231 SE2d 345) (1976) (where specific statute under Quiet Title Act contained “no provision for filing exceptions to the special master’s report, the failure to file exceptions [was] not cause for dismissal of the appeal”). Accordingly, we find that the provisions of OCGA § 9-7-22 (c) requiring the payment of auditors’ fees prior to the filing of an appeal do not apply to special masters appointed under the Quiet Title Act....
...Caskey, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. By this ruling, we offer no judgment at this time as to whether the Court of Appeals’s opinion is correct with respect to the appellate consequences of the failure to pay an auditor’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-7-22 (c). We note that, based on our decision in Community II, the instant case does not present a situation where the party with a defeasible interest in a property retained title or the tax deed to the property in question notwithstanding th...