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2018 Georgia Code 15-9-120 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-9-120 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-9-120

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 9. Probate Courts, 15-9-1 through 15-9-158.

ARTICLE 6 JURY TRIALS AND APPEALS

15-9-120. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. "Civil case" means those civil matters:
    1. Over which the judge of the probate court exercises judicial powers;
    2. Within the original, exclusive, or general subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court; and
    3. Which, if not for this article and Code Section 5-6-33, could be appealed to superior court for a de novo investigation with the right to a jury trial under Code Sections 5-3-2 and 5-3-29.
  2. "Probate court" means a probate court of a county having a population of more than 90,000 persons according to the United States decennial census of 2010 or any future such census in which the judge thereof has been admitted to the practice of law for at least seven years.

(Code 1981, §15-9-120, enacted by Ga. L. 1986, p. 982, § 6; Ga. L. 1988, p. 743, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 745, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 746, § 2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1665, § 2; Ga. L. 2012, p. 683, § 3/HB 534.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Statute was not an unconstitutional special law.

- O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2), granting the right to a jury trial in the probate courts of counties with a certain population according to the 1990 decennial census "or any future such census" was not an unconstitutional special law, under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because the statute's use of the disjunctive "or" gave the statute the elasticity required to make the statute a general law as this allowed counties to move into or out of this class of counties according to the latest census. Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 728 S.E.2d 200 (2012).

County that did not have a population of more than 100,000 persons according to either the 1980 or 1990 decennial census lacked authority to entertain a motion for new trial, and any such motion therefore being without legal force and effect before the county probate court would not serve to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under either O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20 or O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a). Jabaley v. Jabaley, 208 Ga. App. 179, 430 S.E.2d 119 (1993).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 5-3-30. - Because appeals from the probate court to the superior court continue without special limitations on the right to a jury trial and de novo appeals to the superior court from the probate court are tried by a jury unless the right to a jury trial is waived, the trial court erred in denying the widow's request for a jury trial. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 287 Ga. App. 77, 650 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

Dougherty County probate court allowed to hold jury trials.

- Dougherty County, Ga., Probate Court (Probate Court) had jurisdiction to hold jury trials because: (1) the 2010 census, which dropped the county's population below that required by O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2) to allow jury trials in probate court was not effective until July 1, 2012, under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(2)(D); and (2) a statutory amendment, effective on that date, decreased the population requirement. Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 728 S.E.2d 200 (2012).

Cited in Lawhorne v. Horace, 188 Ga. App. 427, 373 S.E.2d 263 (1988); In re E.P.M., 189 Ga. App. 770, 377 S.E.2d 535 (1989); In re Estate of Dasher, 259 Ga. App. 201, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002); In re Estate of Taylor, 270 Ga. App. 807, 608 S.E.2d 299 (2004); Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 284 Ga. 42, 663 S.E.2d 232 (2008); Mays v. Rancine-Kinchen, 291 Ga. 283, 729 S.E.2d 321 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

O.C.G.A. Art. 6, Ch. 9, T. 15 does not affect mental health cases heard by probate courts under O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-150,37-4-110, and37-7-150. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-18.

Right to jury trial in proceedings to appoint emergency guardian.

- If the appointment of an emergency guardian under former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-8 is only for that period of time pending the outcome either of the emergency guardianship hearing or the permanent guardianship hearing, the order would not be final or appealable to a jury in superior court under current law, and hence would not be subject to Ga. L. 1986, p. 982, affecting procedures before the probate court in certain counties; on the other hand, if the petition before the probate court seeks only an emergency guardian for a period not to exceed 45 days, as in a situation where immediate surgical or other medical consent is required for a seriously ill proposed ward, an order granting such a petition, which would leave nothing further to be decided by the probate court, would be final, appealable to a superior court jury under current law, and hence would be a "civil case" under the 1986 Act, giving a party a right to demand a jury trial. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-18.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120

Total Results: 11  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Bosma v. Gunter, 373 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 108 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 9, 1988 | 258 Ga. 664

...the estate. The probate court removed both parties as executors. Within 30 days of that judgment Bosma filed a notice of appeal to this court. After 30 days had lapsed, Bosma, relying on Porter v. Frazier, 257 Ga. 614 (361 SE2d 825) (1987) and OCGA § 15-9-120 et seq., filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Fulton County....
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Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 29, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 200, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1758

Nahmias, Justice. Appellant Donna Ellis appeals from the probate court’s ruling that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is not a special law in violation of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV (a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution....
...On February 10, 2011, the probate court granted Hash’s motion to intervene. The following day, Hash filed a demand for jury trial under OCGA § 15-9-121 (a), which grants the right to a jury trial in a “probate court” that meets the requirements set forth in OCGA § 15-9-120 (2). At that time, “[p]robate court” was defined in OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) as a probate court of a county having a population of more than 96,000 persons according to the United States decennial census of 1990 or any future such census in which the judge thereof has been admitted to the practice of law for...
...e parties to address whether it continued to have jurisdiction to hold jury trials in light of the 2010 decennial census, which showed that Dougherty County’s population had dropped below 96,000 (to 94,565). In response, Appellant argued that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) does permit the probate court to continue to hold jury trials even though Dougherty County has fallen below the population threshold but, because it does so, the statute is an unconstitutional special law. The probate court also construed OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) to say that once a county in which a probate court is located attains the population threshold set by the statute, the probate court will continue to have jurisdiction to hold jury trials even if the county’s population drops below the threshold in a future decennial census. But so construed, the probate court ruled, OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is still not an unconstitutional special law. *129After the probate court certified the case for immediate review, we granted Appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal. 2. Appellant suggests that the constitutional issue she raises is moot because of OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (2) (D), which provides that the 2010 decennial census will not become effective for purposes of OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) until July 1, 2012.2 However, Appellant’s complaint is that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is a special law, a contention which, if true, would mean that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) was never a valid law, regardless of what counties may come within its terms when the 2010 census takes effect....
...ng this one, before or after July 1, 2012. Thus, the constitutional issue presented is not moot, and we will proceed to consider it on the merits. See Scarbrough Group v. Worley, 290 Ga. 234, 236 (719 SE2d 430) (2011). 3. Appellant argues that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is an unconstitutional “special law.” Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV (a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides: Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law sh...
...ocal governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws. We have explained that a statute that defines its applicability by the population of counties or other governmental units, like OCGA § 15-9-120 (2), must meet three requirements to be considered a constitutional general law rather than an unconstitutional special law: 1....
...“[T]he classification by population must have some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the statute and a legitimate ground for differentiation.” Dougherty County v. Bush, 227 Ga. 137, 138 (179 SE2d 343) (1971) (citations omitted). The latter two requirements are not seriously contested in this case. OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is not so hedged and restricted as to apply to only one county....
...To the contrary, its population threshold applied to Georgia’s ten largest counties under the 1990 census, and it will apply to 27 counties when the 2010 census takes effect. Compare City of Atlanta, 216 Ga. at 372. And the parties agree that the statute has a rational basis. As the probate court explained, OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) eliminates the two-tiered lower court procedure (a probate court ruling followed by a de novo appeal to the superior court) “in those counties which are most heavily populated and consequently, administer the most estates”; the re...
...ces, expedites resolution of cases, and serves to reduce litigation expenses.” Appellant instead focuses on the first requirement of a general law, arguing — as the probate court held — that once a county meets the population threshold in OCGA § 15-9-120 (2), it remains covered by the statute forever....
...See, e.g., Walden v. Owens, 211 Ga. 884, 884-885 (89 SE2d492) (1955); Tift v. Bush, 209 Ga. 769, 771-772 (75 SE2d 805) (1953). In accordance with our longstanding interpretation of similar statutes, and contrary to the probate court’s construction, because OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) uses the disjunctive “or,” it does not freeze the counties that meet the population threshold authorizing probate court jury trials under the particular census listed but instead allows counties to move into and out of the class depending on their population in subsequent decennial censuses. Indeed, this understanding of how courts will interpret census-based statutory classifications is reflected in the General Assembly’s amendments to OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) to prevent counties — and in particular, Dougherty County — *132from falling out of the statute due to population declines shown in a later census. Such amendments would be unnecessary if the counties that met the population threshold in the original census were forever “frozen” in. As first enacted in 1986, the population threshold in OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) was 150,000....
...ith a population exceeding 100,000 in the 1980 census to fall below that threshold in the 1990 census; Dougherty County was also the only Georgia county with a population between 90,000 and 100,000 in 1990. In 1994, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) to lower the population threshold from 100,000 to 96,000 under the 1990 or any future census, thereby preventing Dougherty County from falling out of the defined class under Sumter County. See Ga. L. 1994, p. 1665, § 2. Similarly, this year, after the 2010 census showed that Dougherty County’s population had dropped to 94,565, the General Assembly again amended OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) to set the population threshold at 90,000 under the 2010 or any future census. See Ga. L. 2012, p. 683, §§ 3, 4 (2011 Bill Text GAH.B. 534) (signed by the Governor on May 1, 2012 and effective on July 1, 2012). For these reasons, OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) satisfies the elasticity requirement of a general law, and the probate court therefore erred in construing OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) to mean that a probate court always would have jurisdiction to hold jury trials once its county passed the population threshold, even if the county’s population dropped below the threshold in a future census. It also erred in ruling that, so construed, the statute would not be a special law. However, the probate court reached the right result, and so its ruling that OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) is a constitutional general law can be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. See Smith v. Lockridge, 288 Ga. 180, 183 (702 SE2d 858) (2010). 4. The Dougherty County Probate Court has jurisdiction to hold jury trials until July 1, 2012, because the 2010 census does not become effective for purposes of OCGA § 15-9-120 (2) until that date. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (2) (D). And after July 1,2012, the probate court will continue to have jurisdiction to hold jury trials, because the 2012 amendment to OCGA § 15-9-120 (2), which will take effect on July 1, dropped the population threshold to 90,000, keeping Dougherty County in the class....
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Williams v. the Stats, 315 Ga. 498 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2023

...it provides that “‘[c]ivil action’ means an action founded on private rights, arising either from contract or tort,” OCGA § 9-2-1, and the Georgia Code defines “civil case” in the context of probate courts as “those civil matters” that meet certain conditions. OCGA § 15-9-120 (1) (emphasis supplied). Here, the Electors’ Petition was not based on the violation of any private right; rather, it was based on the home rule power conferred on counties under the Home Rule Paragraph and the concomitant power...
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Mays v. Rancine-Kinchen, 291 Ga. 283 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 25, 2012 | 729 S.E.2d 321, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1974

...its.]” Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642 (1) (670 SE2d 425) (2008). Appellant contends the probate court’s order effectively denies the will for probate in solemn form, and, as such, he is entitled to a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-3-2 (b), 15-9-120, and 15-9-123 (a), which are statutes that generally allow appeals to be taken from the probate court....
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Tanksley v. Parker, 608 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 24, 2005 | 278 Ga. 877, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 208

...[and] the taking of testimony in [this] manner is sufficient for all purposes in the probate proceeding." [6] The subscribing witnesses in the present case testified by written interrogatory as permitted, and thus Tanksley's contention is without merit. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] See OCGA §§ 15-9-120(2), 15-9-123 (civil litigants in probate courts whose counties have populations exceeding 96,000 persons have right of appeal to this Court as provided by Chapter 6 of Title 5 of the Code)....
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Porter v. Frazier, 361 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 1987 | 257 Ga. 614

...Eastham, for appellant. Taylor & Gunter, Albert F. Taylor, Jr., John R. Shaw, Jr., John T. Webb, Harris, Phillips & Harris, R. Britt Harris, Jr., for appellees. HUNT, Justice. This case raises an interesting jurisdictional question arising from the passage of OCGA § 15-9-120 et seq., effective to all cases filed after July 1, 1986....
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Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 663 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2008 | 284 Ga. 42, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2144

...[5] OCGA § 5-3-2(a) reads: An appeal shall lie to the superior court from any decision made by the probate court, except an order appointing a temporary administrator. [6] It is undisputed that the Probate Court of Wilkinson County is not one empowered to issue declaratory judgments in such matters. See OCGA §§ 15-9-120(2) and 15-9-127.
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Walker v. Yarus, 369 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 23, 1988 | 258 Ga. 346

...Gibson & Deal, John W. Gibson, Cheeley & Chandler, Richard *347 B. Chandler, Jr., for appellant. Weekes & Chandler, Gary M. Sams, F. Jackson Rhodes, Jr., for appellee. HUNT, Justice. This appeal involves the question of the applicable date of OCGA § 15-9-120 et seq., effective to all cases filed after July 1, 1986....
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Britt v. Sands Et Al., 294 Ga. 426 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 21, 2014 | 754 S.E.2d 58, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 52

...Moreover, “[t]his Court will not set aside the probate court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, meaning that they will be upheld if there is any evidence to sustain them.” Parker v. Kelley, 290 Ga. 454, 455 (721 SE2d 828) (2012). 2 OCGA §§ 15-9-120 (2) and 15-9-123 provide the right to appeal directly to the appropriate appellate court, rather than to the superior court, decisions from a probate court in a county with a population exceeding 90,000, like Gwinnett County....
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Singley v. Clower, 257 Ga. 528 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 22, 1987 | 362 S.E.2d 767

...This case comes to us pursuant to OCGA § 15-9-123 (a), effective July 1, 1986, authorizing appeals to this court and to the Court of Appeals from judgments in civil cases of probate courts of counties having a population of more than 150,000 persons. OCGA § 15-9-120 (2).1 Contrary to appellant’s contention, the evidence, though conflicting, supports the finding that the deceased possessed the necessary testamentary capacity. Appellant’s remaining enumerations are without merit. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. OCGA §§ 15-9-120; 15-9-123, and 5-3-29, all effective July 1, 1986, eliminated the de novo appeal to superior court from judgments in civil cases of probate courts of counties having a population of more than 150,000 persons.

Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt, Judge (Ga. 2023).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2023 | 362 S.E.2d 767

...that “‘[c]ivil action’ means an action founded on private rights, arising either from contract or tort,” OCGA § 9-2-1, and the Georgia Code defines “civil case” in the context of probate courts as “those civil matters” that meet certain conditions. OCGA § 15-9-120 (1). Here, the Electors’ Petition was not based on the violation of any private right; rather, it was based on the home rule power conferred on counties under the Home Rule Paragraph and the concomitant power conferred on the ele...