Construction with O.C.G.A. 5-3-30.

- Because appeals from the probate court to the superior court continue without special limitations on the right to a jury trial and de novo appeals to the superior court from the probate court are tried by a jury unless the right to a jury trial is waived, the trial court erred in denying the widow's request for a jury trial. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 287 Ga. App. 77, 650 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

Based on the absence of a transcript of a hearing on the dismissal of a sibling's caveat to the petition to probate the decedent's will in solemn form, in which the probate court also held that the sibling lacked standing to proceed on that caveat, the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to hold that the probate court's orders were erroneous. Moreover, based on the probate court's finding that the sibling lacked standing, no jury trial was warranted. Smith v. Wyatt, 282 Ga. 902, 655 S.E.2d 581 (2008).

Timing of jury trial demand.

- In a probate proceeding wherein the ex-spouse of the decedent contested the appointment of the decedent's parent as the permanent administrator of the estate, the trial court did not err by denying the ex-spouse's demand for a jury trial because the ex-spouse failed to file a jury trial demand within the statutorily appointed time frame. In re Estate of Sands-Kadel, 292 Ga. App. 343, 665 S.E.2d 46 (2008).

Probate court erred when the court stated written demands for a jury trial filed more than 30 days after the filing of the petition for probate were untimely because O.C.G.A. § 15-9-121 provided for the filing of a timely demand for jury trial more than 30 days after the filing of the petition for probate. Simmons v. Harms, 287 Ga. 176, 695 S.E.2d 38 (2010).

Probate court did not err in denying as untimely a child's demand for a jury trial because the child was required to file the child's jury demand by June 29, which was 30 days after the child filed the child's first pleading on May 30, the child's caveat to probate in solemn form, making the child's written jury demand due by June 29, but the child did not file the demand for jury trial until July 16. Simmons v. Harms, 287 Ga. 176, 695 S.E.2d 38 (2010).

Beneficiary could not claim an intervening niece untimely demanded a jury in a probate case, under O.C.G.A. § 15-9-121(a), because: (1) the beneficiary did not object in the trial court on the grounds raised on appeal, waiving the grounds; (2) the niece was not a party until the niece was allowed to intervene, after which the niece timely demanded a jury; and (3) the niece's motion to intervene was not a "pleading" triggering the jury trial demand deadline. Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 728 S.E.2d 200 (2012).

Waiver of right to jury trial in probate proceeding.

- Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's decision under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(4)(E) to deny probate of the decedent's 1988 will and the parties' waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the will. Mosley v. Lancaster, 296 Ga. 862, 770 S.E.2d 873 (2015).

Cited in In re Woodall, 241 Ga. App. 196, 526 S.E.2d 69 (1999); Harvey v. Sullivan, 272 Ga. 392, 529 S.E.2d 889 (2000); Johnson v. Burrell, 294 Ga. 301, 751 S.E.2d 301 (2013).