O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25 (2019)

Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 761, 669 S.E.2d 735 (2008). Testimony of an arresting officer that the defendant acted as if the defendant were going to flee and generally refused to cooperate with police, and that this con-

duct hindered the officer in making the arrest was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of an officer. Frasier v. State, 295 Ga. App. 596, 672 S.E.2d 668 (2009). With regard to a defendant’s convictions for obstruction of a police officer and other related crimes, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the single testimony of the officer involved. Because it was the function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh any conflict in the evidence, the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact; therefore, the testimony of the police officer who was involved in the altercation with the defendant was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant. Whatley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009). Threats as sufficient for obstruction. - As a defendant offered to do violence to police officers when the defendant threatened to kill the officers while being searched, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of felony obstruction of an officer. Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009). An officer arrested the defendant, whose vehicle was stopped on a road, for refusing to comply with the officer’s order to leave the area. The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) as the state proved that the officer was engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer’s duties with evidence that the officer was responding to a 9-1-1 call reporting that the defendant had followed the frightened caller’s vehicle to the caller’s home. West v. State, 296 Ga. App. 58, 673 S.E.2d 558 (2009). An officer’s testimony that the defendant struggled with both the officer and a second officer at a jail before the officers could restrain the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of obstructing the non-testifying officer. Mackey v. State, 296 Ga. App. 675, 675 S.E.2d 567 (2009). Obstruction by failing to come out of home. - Defendant was a suspect in a

shooting. Evidence that, when police went to the defendant’s home, the defendant hid in a closet and refused police orders to come outside was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of obstruction. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009). Failure to obey officer’s orders. - Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor obstruction was supported by the evidence which showed that after learning that the defendant’s girlfriend had been detained for shoplifting and being told by the off-duty police officer who had detained the girlfriend that the defendant should not move the girlfriend’s car as the officer needed the car for the officer’s investigation, the defendant had a whispered conversation with the girlfriend after which the defendant had a friend remove the car from the parking lot, and that it took over an hour for the defendant to have the car returned as directed by the officer; the state was not required to prove forcible resistance or a threat of violence. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). With regard to a defendant’s convictions for improper lane change, serious injury by vehicle while driving under the influence, and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the state disproving the defendant’s affirmative defense of accident that the bad weather and alleged malfunctioning brakes caused the single-car crash, an officer’s testimony that the defendant attempted to leave the scene several times, and the evidence of the defendant’s vehicle passenger suffering a severe injury to the left eye after the eye was forced out of the eye socket. It was unnecessary to show that the passenger’s eye was permanently rendered useless. Wells v. State, 297 Ga. App. 153, 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009). Obstruction of prison guards. - Evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find an inmate guilty of two counts of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 beyond a reasonable doubt because, during a prison disciplinary report hearing, the inmate became loud and agitated and two officers were instructed to remove the

inmate from the hearing room and place the inmate in a nearby holding cell; the inmate resisted by pulling from side to side, and then resisted being placed in the holding cell by repeatedly kicking the officers, causing the officers to wrestle the inmate to the floor to subdue the inmate. Cobble v. State, 297 Ga. App. 423, 677 S.E.2d 439 (2009). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of an officer as officers shouted to the defendant to show the officers the defendant’s hands, but the defendant did not respond. The defendant resisted when officers tried to put handcuffs on the defendant and the officers were forced to wrestle the defendant to the ground before the officers could handcuff the defendant. Dulcio v. State, 297 Ga. App. 600, 677 S.E.2d 758 (2009). Evidence that after being arrested, the defendant head-butted an officer in the face and yelled death threats at the officer was sufficient to convict the defendant of obstruction of an officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), and terroristic threats, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (2009). Officer who responded to a 9-1-1 call regarding a victim being harassed by the defendant testified that the officer repeatedly instructed the defendant to calm down, to stop being loud and irate, and to step back from where the officer was interviewing the victim; the defendant was arrested for not complying. As the jury was entitled to find that the defendant’s refusal to obey the officer’s commands hindered or obstructed the officer, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Mayhew v. State, 299 Ga. App. 313, 682 S.E.2d 594 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2059, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 786 (Ga. 2009). Use of rake to obstruct officer. - Evidence supported the defendant’s felony conviction for obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). The defendant offered to do violence to the person of an officer by swinging a rake at the officer in a threatening manner when the officer sought to approach the defendant to have the defendant move from blocking the officer’s vehicle. Wilcox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 108 (2009).

Application (Cont’d) Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b): the defendant, incarcerated in a county jail, repeatedly refused to obey a corrections officer’s commands to take only one food tray at meal time, struck the officer, wrestled the officer to the floor, and choked the officer until the defendant was tasered. Williams v. State, 301 Ga. App. 731, 688 S.E.2d 650 (2009). Evidence that the defendant, age 35, met a girl online whom the defendant believed was 15, that the defendant made numerous comments about how the defendant could get in trouble or go to jail, that the defendant engaged in sexually explicit conversations and directed the child to pornography sites showing black men having sex with white women, that the defendant drove to an arranged meeting place, and, that, when officers appeared, the defendant fled, was sufficient to convict defendant of violating O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 (attempt), 16-6-4 (child molestation), 16-6-5 (enticement of a child), and 16-10-24 (obstruction). Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 301, 702 S.E.2d 211 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant obstructed an officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) when the arresting officer observed defendant waiving a weapon around inside a bar, near a waitress and eventually near the officer personally, defendant disobeyed the officer’s commands to drop the weapon and only complied when the officer engaged the defendant with a threat of force, and when the officer attempted to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, defendant resisted. Moreover, defendant’s behavior was threatening enough to compel the officer to draw a weapon and to order defendant to lie on the floor, facts from which the court could have inferred the officer was in reasonable fear of injury and thus had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, despite the lack of testimony from the bar owner or the waitress. Zeger v. State, 306 Ga. App. 474, 702 S.E.2d 474 (2010).

Elbowing an officer as obstruction. - Officer’s second-tier Terry frisk of defendant did not constitute an illegal detention considering all of the circumstances including the defendant’s repeated refusal to keep the defendant’s hands away from the pockets of the defendant’s baggy clothes at the officer’s request, defendant’s nervous demeanor, the presence of two companions, and the officer’s knowledge of violent crime in the area. Therefore, the defendant was not justified in elbowing the officer and resisting arrest. Santos v. State, 306 Ga. App. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (2010). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 because the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant had obstructed or hindered two officers; there was evidence that although the defendant had been informed of the purpose of the encounter, the defendant persisted in refusing to provide a driver’s license, assumed a physically aggressive stance, and refused to comply with commands to stop fighting or resisting, and there also was evidence that after being informed that the defendant was under arrest for obstruction, the defendant physically resisted the arrest. Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. App. 569, 707 S.E.2d 917 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) because the defendant bit two officers and kicked one several times in the abdomen as the officers were attempting to arrest the defendant; so, the evidence clearly established that the defendant was ‘‘offering or doing violence’’ to the officers at the time of the obstruction. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011). Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), was supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant was advised by an officer that the defendant was under arrest, whereupon the defendant resisted the officer’s handcuffing attempts, ran from the officer, and failed to comply with the directive to

stop. Jenkins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 811, 714 S.E.2d 410 (2011). Evidence that police responded to a home to investigate a crime after speaking to an injured man, that the officer saw the defendant standing with the defendant’s hands concealed in a baggy jacket and instructed the defendant, whom the officer thought might be armed, to display the defendant’s hands, and that the defendant failed to comply and attacked the officer supported the defendant’s conviction for felony obstruction of an officer. Alvarez v. State, 312 Ga. App. 552, 718 S.E.2d 884 (2011). Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of obstructing a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), because defendant impeded the officer in the discharge of the officer’s duties, and the defendant hindered the officer not just by the defendant’s arguments and obstinacy, but also by placing both defendant’s and the officer’s safety at risk by refusing to return to defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop. Timberlake v. State, 315 Ga. App. 693, 727 S.E.2d 516 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for felony obstruction of an officer because the record showed that the defendant pushed the officer and that the officer suffered scratches on a hand and knee as a result. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 798, 728 S.E.2d 317 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of an officer as the officer testified that the officer was unable to complete the search of the defendant prior to the defendant’s arrest because the defendant had been swinging at the officer’s head and the officer needed to gain control of the situation; there was no indication that the officer was acting unlawfully. Brown v. State, 320 Ga. App. 12, 739 S.E.2d 32 (2013). Defendant’s conviction for obstruction was supported by evidence the defendant fled and thereby knowingly and wilfully hindered police officers in the lawful discharge of the officers’ official duties. Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for obstructing an officer based on the evidence that showed that the defendant failed to follow the officer’s instructions in that the defendant refused to exit the truck when told to do so; the defendant locked the door, rolled up the window and indicated calling 9-1-1; and, after the officers pulled the defendant out of the truck, the defendant struggled with the officers, refused to be handcuffed, and tried to get up from the ground. Taylor v. State, 326 Ga. App. 27, 755 S.E.2d 839 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer because the defendant jumped on the officer’s back and began choking the officer after the officer, in an effort to avoid being hit, took the defendant’s son to the ground and placed a hand on the back of the son’s neck; and, as the officer released the son and secured the defendant, the defendant struck the officer twice in the face and once in the neck. McMullen v. State, 325 Ga. App. 757, 754 S.E.2d 798 (2014). Based on evidence that the defendant’s conduct in hollering and cursing outside the house prevented an officer from continuing to photograph the scene and going inside to collect evidence and caused another officer to stop the officer’s activities inside the house and come outside to assist, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant knowingly and willingly hindered the officer in the lawful charge of duties for purposes of a conviction for obstruction of an officer. Johnson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 75, 766 S.E.2d 533 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction, possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, and disorderly conduct because the defendant slammed the refrigerator door twice, breaking items stored in the door; the victim called 9-1-1 seeking assistance for a domestic dispute in progress; when one of the responding officers told the defendant that the defendant would have to leave the house as the victim did not want the defendant living there, the defendant told the officer that the officer could not make the defendant leave; and,

Application (Cont’d) when the officer unsnapped a taser from the taser’s holster and approached the defendant, the defendant grabbed a knife with an eight-inch blade and threatened the officers with the knife. Owens v. State, 329 Ga. App. 455, 765 S.E.2d 653 (2014). Officer’s testimony that the defendant’s heel grazed from the officer’s knee cap down the officer’s leg to the ankle, leaving a red mark and causing the officer’s leg to sting, supported the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177, 779 S.E.2d 767 (2015), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 300 Ga. 128 793 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of felony obstruction because a jury could reasonably conclude that, when the defendant cried out immediately after the single shot was fired by the defendant’s grandfather, the defendant was encouraging the grandfather to discharge the revolver for a second time at or near the officers before they had succeeded in returning to safety, and was thus offering violence to those officers; and, when the defendant shouted out immediately after the single shot was fired, the arresting deputies were forced to extinguish their flashlights so as to prevent being seen and shot by the grandfather, thus hindering their efforts to secure the defendant’s arrest. Hoglen v. State, 336 Ga. App. 471, 784 S.E.2d 832 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer because, by resisting the officers as the officers performed the officers’ duty of investigating the domestic disturbance call, the defendant obstructed or hindered the officers. Haygood v. State, 338 Ga. App. 189, 789 S.E.2d 404 (2016). Evidence insufficient to support conviction. - Since the defendant made neither a verbal nor physical threat of violence to the officer but was merely obnoxious and contemptuous, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer. Moccia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (1985).

Since there was no evidence showing that defendant’s arrest was lawful, defendant had the right to resist with all force necessary for that purpose, and defendant’s conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was not authorized. Woodward v. State, 219 Ga. App. 329, 465 S.E.2d 511 (1995). Although the defendant fled at the sight of the police, there was no evidence that the officers called out to the defendant to halt or that defendant failed to submit to a show of lawful authority; therefore, conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was not warranted. Porter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 276, 480 S.E.2d 291 (1997). When the evidence established that the officer never had the opportunity to turn on the officer’s emergency lights or siren when following defendant’s vehicle, to issue a verbal command within earshot of defendant, or otherwise to communicate a command for defendant to halt, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for obstruction of an officer. Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (2004). Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of obstructing a law enforcement officer; the officer, though following the defendant in a marked patrol car, had never activated the car’s emergency lights or siren or attempted to stop the defendant, and once the defendant stopped the car the defendant was driving and ran, the officer did not order the defendant to stop. Williams v. State, 285 Ga. App. 190, 645 S.E.2d 676 (2007). Evidence did not support the defendant’s conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer since the only evidence of obstruction was that the defendant did not open the door to police officers fast enough when the officers they came to the defendant’s house to look for a missing juvenile; there was no evidence that the defendant knew of an ongoing investigation or that the defendant was attempting ‘‘knowingly and willfully’’ to impede such an investigation. Beckom v. State, 286 Ga. App. 38, 648 S.E.2d 656 (2007). On a summary judgment motion, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force plaintiff arrestee’s version of the facts, taking the

facts in the light most favorable to the arrestee as a non-movant, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) because: (1) ten minutes elapsed since the alleged aggressor in the domestic violence dispute had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car; (2) the arrestee patiently waited after approaching an officer standing outside for a few minutes before making a request that law enforcement vehicles be moved and then requested to speak with the officer in charge; (3) throughout the exchange the arrestee maintained a calm voice and demeanor; and (4) the arrestee did not impede or hinder the officer in the performance of the officer’s police duties; though the arrestee may have refused to obey an order to leave the scene by attempting to approach another officer, an arrest for obstruction could not be predicated upon such a refusal to obey a command to clear the general area entirely beyond the zone of police operation, which, in the circumstances described, was clearly an overly broad and unreasonable demand that exceeded reasonable law enforcement procedure and needs. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008). An officer testified that if the officer determined, after completing the officer’s consent frisk, that the defendant had no weapons, the defendant was free to leave. As the defendant had no weapons, and the drugs the officer removed from the defendant’s pockets were illegally seized, the defendant’s act of fleeing from the officer did not constitute obstructing an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008). Conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), was not supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which a deputy investigating an armed robbery stopped the defendant’s car, but then chased the defendant’s passenger who had exited the car and fled, and the defendant then drove away from the scene; although the defendant drove away after being stopped, the encounter with the deputy apparently had ended and the defendant had not been

instructed to remain on the scene. Further, the defendant had not been made aware that the defendant was going to be arrested for the robbery being investigated by the deputy. Connelly v. State, 298 Ga. App. 223, 679 S.E.2d 790 (2009). Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for obstruction of an officer because the defendant was charged with knowingly and wilfully obstructing and hindering a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of official duties by running from the officer as the officer attempted to take the defendant into custody; although the evidence established that the officer saw the defendant running and followed the defendant in a marked patrol car, the officer’s own testimony established that the defendant stopped immediately upon seeing the police vehicle and that the defendant immediately complied with the officer’s order to stop. Lackey v. State, 286 Ga. 163, 686 S.E.2d 112 (2009). Evidence was not sufficient as to the obstruction count as there was no evidence that the officer commanded, rather than requested, that the defendant stop. The evidence established only that the officer asked the defendant to come over here to talk to the officer, which was not a command. Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 746 S.E.2d 216 (2013). Probable cause not shown to arrest. - After an arrestee followed an officer to the police car after a traffic stop, leaned over the hood with a pen in hand ready to write the officer’s name down, and was arrested, the wrongful arrest claim survived summary judgment because the officer lacked arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) since a reasonable officer could not have interpreted the conduct as a knowing and willful act of hindrance or obstruction or as a threat to officer safety. Turner v. Jones, No. 10-14547, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3760 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011) (Unpublished). When the defendant refused to answer an officer’s questions and instead exercised the right to walk away, the officer lacked probable cause to justify an arrest for obstruction, even after the defendant

Application (Cont’d) began running because the defendant had the right to avoid the first-tier police-citizen encounter. Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 727 S.E.2d 257 (2012). When an arrestee allegedly called an officer ‘‘a fucking asshole’’ and was arrested, the officer was properly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the arrestee’s claims under the Fourth Amendment because the officer did not have arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for obstructing an officer since the arrestee was within the arrestee’s rights to hold the arrestee’s arms stiffly because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the arrestee for disorderly conduct. Merenda v. Tabor, No. 12-12562, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2351 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Unpublished). Rule of lenity not applicable. - Because the defendant could commit felony obstruction only if the defendant offered violence against an officer while the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties and felony obstruction could occur regardless of whether it involved the use of an offensive weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, unlike aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2), the two offenses were not proved by the same evidence and the rule of lenity did not apply. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016). Sentence not unconstitutional. - Defendant’s sentence for obstruction of a law enforcement officer of 12 months confinement to be served on probation following 60 days of confinement, $1,500 in fines, 100 hours of community service, and a mental health evaluation was within the statutory limits set by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-24(b), 40-2-20(c), and 40-6-10(b), and did not shock the conscience. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. 184, 715 S.E.2d 434 (2011). Potential to facilitate obstruction of officer justified enhanced sentence. - U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement was proper as the defendant concealed a gun in the defendant’s pants during the police encounter, and attempted to reach for the gun when the gun fell; the offense was ‘‘in

connection with’’ another felony offense as the possession had a potential to facilitate obstruction of an officer with violence under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) when the defendant struggled with the officers over the vehicle. United States v. Linker, No. 12-12864, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4014 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2013) (Unpublished). Jury Instructions Jury instruction on ‘‘lawful discharge of official duties’’. - Trial court did not err in not defining further for the jury the phrase ‘‘lawful discharge of official duties’’ as that term was set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 as defendant did not make a specific request that the phrase be defined, and the trial court fully and accurately charged the jury on the statutory definition of the crime charged. Poe v. State, 254 Ga. App. 767, 563 S.E.2d 904 (2002). When the evidence showed completion of the greater offense of felony obstruction of an officer, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 436 S.E.2d 752 (1993). Instruction on offering to do or doing violence. - Because a count of the indictment stated that defendant committed obstruction ‘‘by offering or doing violence’’ to an officer ‘‘by hitting him on his face,’’ the count charged both means of committing obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 and the court did not err in charging both means to the jury. Hambrick v. State, 242 Ga. App. 550, 529 S.E.2d 381 (2000). In defendant’s trial for felony obstruction of an officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, the state did not introduce evidence that the defendant did violence to the officer on the date in question other than by striking the officer with a motor vehicle and, as such, no due process violation occurred in the giving of the jury instructions because there was no reasonable probability that the jury convicted the defendant for obstructing the police officer in a manner not specified in the indictment. Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga. App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Jury charge on term ‘‘obstruction’’. - Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in limiting the recharge of the jury to the statutory definition of ‘‘obstruction’’ rather than giving a more comprehensive instruction as there was no indication that the jury was confused or left with an erroneous impression of the law. Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (2002). Failure to charge jury on the felony offense of obstruction. - When defendant contended that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the felony offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, thereby precluding defendant’s counsel from arguing to the jury the absence of the elements of the offense, and when the record indicated that the trial court fully instructed the jury on the misdemeanor grade of the offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, since the defendant was not accused of committing the felony offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, it was unnecessary to so charge the jury. Williams v. State, 192 Ga. App. 350, 385 S.E.2d 28 (1989). When the defendant was not indicted nor tried for felony obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, and there was no evidence to support such a charge in law or in fact, the trial court did not err in refusing to deny defendant’s request to give a charge thereon. Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 474 S.E.2d 708 (1996); Stewart v. State, 243 Ga. App. 860, 534 S.E.2d 544 (2000). Reckless conduct charge not warranted as lesser-included offense in felony obstruction prosecution. - Given that the state adduced sufficient evidence establishing all the elements of the offense of felony obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request to charge on the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct. Helton v. State, 284 Ga. App. 777, 644 S.E.2d 896 (2007). Charge on misdemeanor obstruction was proper. - Trial court did not err in the court’s charge on felony obstruction of an officer merely because the court also included the elements of misdemeanor obstruction as the judge was au-

thorized to charge on a lesser crime if that was included in the indictment or accusation, and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer was a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of felony obstruction. Pugh v. State, 280 Ga. App. 137, 633 S.E.2d 439 (2006). Charge on the right to resist an unlawful arrest was not required since the jury was instructed, among other things, that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was acting in the lawful discharge of official duties. Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 774, 525 S.E.2d 154 (1999). On appeal from convictions entered against the defendant for misdemeanor battery on a police officer, and misdemeanor obstruction of that officer entered against the defendant’s parent, a charge that one could resist an unlawful arrest with reasonably necessary force was not required in either case as such was covered by the charge on the elements of the offense; moreover, as to the battery charge, because the defendant testified to never touching the officer, there was no requirement to charge on this affirmative defense. Curtis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 298, 645 S.E.2d 705 (2007). Charge on forcible resistance not required. - Trial court properly refused to give a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of the law. Forcible resistance was not required in a misdemeanor obstruction of an officer case. Wilcox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 108 (2009). Instruction not authorized by evidence. - In a prosecution for obstructing a law enforcement officer, it was reversible error for the trial court to give the jury a definition of ‘‘offering violence’’ containing a reference to threats of violence since there was no evidence that defendant used verbal threats. Strobhert v. State, 241 Ga. App. 354, 526 S.E.2d 863 (1999). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b), because such a charge was not warranted by the evidence; the evidence plainly showed the completion of

Jury Instructions (Cont’d) the greater offense, obstruction that involved ‘‘offering or doing violence’’ to an officer. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011). Trial court did not err by rejecting the defendant’s written request for a jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction because the evidence established that the defendant committed felony obstruction or no crime at all, thus, there was no evidentiary basis for the charge on the lesser included offense. Watson v. State, 328 Ga. App. 832, 763 S.E.2d 122 (2014). Requested jury instruction not warranted. - Because the defendant was neither indicted nor tried for felony obstruction of justice, the court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge that an accomplice was the one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or an accessory before the fact; moreover, the court’s own charge, which included pattern charges on parties to a crime, knowledge, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and mere association with others committing a crime, substantially covered the same legal principles as the requested charge. Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (2006). In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting jury charges on the law of abandonment and accessory after-the-fact as there was no evidence that the defendant abandoned the crime before an overt act occurred or that the defendant was an accessory after the fact rather than a party to the robbery. Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga. App. 486, 672 S.E.2d 459 (2009). Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that ‘‘Something more than mere disagreement or remonstrance must be shown.’’ The charge as a whole adequately covered the principle of law and allowed the defendant to argue that the defendant should have been acquitted because the state proved only disagreement or remonstrance. Kendrick v. State, 324 Ga. App. 45, 749 S.E.2d 45 (2013). Requested jury instruction on an un-

lawful arrest claim incorrectly stated the law; a statement that a detainee was not required to respond to an officer’s questions was contrary to Georgia law as failure to identify oneself could constitute obstruction. Williams v. Hudson, No. 14-12254, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2015) (Unpublished). Because the defendant did not admit to using any force against the officers, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the defendant’s allegedly justified use of reasonable force to resist the defendant’s arrest, and the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request for such an instruction. Haygood v. State, 338 Ga. App. 189, 789 S.E.2d 404 (2016). Failure to instruct on lesser-included offense did not amount to ineffective assistance. - Because trial counsel made a reasonable decision to pursue an all-or-nothing defense strategy based on counsel’s review of the evidence, the appellate court found no merit in the defendant’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance due to failure to request a charge on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense of felony obstruction of an officer. Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 732 S.E.2d 456 (2012). Charge on misdemeanor obstruction was not warranted. - Because the defendant decided to pursue an ‘‘all or nothing’’ defense, the trial court did not err in making the decision to not charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction, sua sponte, as such would have undermined that defense. Owens v. State, 288 Ga. App. 771, 655 S.E.2d 244 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 274 (Ga. 2008). Since the evidence showed completion of the greater offense of felony obstruction, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on misdemeanor obstruction as a lesser included offense. Carlson v. State, 329 Ga. App. 309, 764 S.E.2d 890 (2014). Charge on entire section not error. - Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a jury charge on the entire obstruction code section, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, although there was no evidence that the defendant offered or threatened violence. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence

in light of the charges in the indictment. Williams v. State, 309 Ga. App. 688, 710 S.E.2d 884 (2011). Curative instruction regarding use of other acts evidence. - Trial court did not err in failing to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s allegedly impermissible argument because the trial court immediately reminded the jury of the limited purpose for which the jury could consider the other acts evidence regarding two earlier instances in which the defendant obstructed a law enforcement officer and that reminder supplemented the other points in the trial when the trial court instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of the other acts evidence. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016). Jury question. - Whether actions hinder or impede officers in carrying out assigned duties is for jury determination. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975). Given the sheriff ’s uncontradicted statement that the sheriff ordered the streets cleared in the face of large scale rioting, and the evidence that the arrestees - later plaintiffs in a civil rights action - were among those who refused to obey the order and were arrested for obstructing the efforts of police officers to restore order, a jury issue was presented on whether their conduct hindered or impeded the sheriff in the lawful discharge of the sheriff ’s official duties.

Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985). Since the defendant had been indicted for felony obstruction of an officer, the trial court properly let the case go to the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in light of evidence demonstrating that the defendant did no more than grab the officer’s arm and say ‘‘no’’ as the officer tried to arrest the defendant’s spouse and put that spouse in a patrol car. Williams v. State, 196 Ga. App. 154, 395 S.E.2d 399 (1990). Whether or not the evidence established that actions taken by the defendant hindered or obstructed the officer in making the arrest is for the jury to decide. Cason v. State, 197 Ga. App. 308, 398 S.E.2d 292 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992). In a case involving charges of obstruction of an officer and attempting to elude, a motion for directed verdict was properly denied where the officer was investigating the defendant for driving under the influence and the defendant did not respond to the officer’s orders and forced the officer to get a warrant to effectuate an arrest. Reed v. State, 205 Ga. App. 209, 422 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, No. S92C1446, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 865 (1992). Although the defendant’s testimony deviated significantly from the officers’, such differences were matters for the jury to resolve. Jones v. State, 242 Ga. App. 357, 529 S.E.2d 644 (2000).