Reversal required when venue not established.

- Although the evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication, the judgment was reversed where the testimony relating to the street where the fight occurred failed to specify either the municipality or the county in which the street was located and was not sufficient to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Interest of N.T.S., 242 Ga. App. 109, 528 S.E.2d 876 (2000).

It is essential to conviction of affray that fighting occurred in public place. Gamble v. State, 113 Ga. 701, 39 S.E. 301 (1901).

What constitutes a public place.

- See Gamble v. State, 113 Ga. 701, 39 S.E. 301 (1910).

Jail is not a public place.

- Defendant's conviction for affray in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-32 was reversed because the altercation occurred in the Hall County Jail, which was not a "public place" as required for conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-3(15) and16-6-8(d). Singletary v. State, 310 Ga. App. 570, 713 S.E.2d 698 (2011).

What acts in public place amount to affray.

- See Blackwell v. State, 119 Ga. 314, 46 S.E. 432 (1904).

Relationship between affray and mutual combat.

- See Cone v. State, 193 Ga. 420, 18 S.E.2d 850 (1942).

Intent.

- Despite defendant's claims that the evidence supported only one of two conclusions - that defendant attacked another, who responded in self-defense, or that the other person attacked defendant, who acted in self-defense - the jury was not required to conclude that either defendant or the other person acted entirely in self defense; thus, the jury could reasonably have determined that both intended to fight and that defendant was guilty of affray. Watson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 562, 583 S.E.2d 228 (2003).

Affray requires intent to fight on part of both parties, and trial court should so charge jury. Johnson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 360, 217 S.E.2d 618 (1975).

When evidence shows that one party acted entirely in self-defense, while the other assaulted and beat that party, the aggressor may be guilty of an assault and battery, but neither is guilty of an affray. Drake v. State, 159 Ga. App. 606, 284 S.E.2d 109 (1981).

Violation of the affray statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-32, requires an accompanying "intention to act." A jury charge which as a whole adequately and fairly conveyed that merely fighting to repel an unprovoked attack did not constitute the "combat by agreement" exception to justification was proper. O'Connor v. State, 255 Ga. App. 893, 567 S.E.2d 29 (2002).

Affray in violation of O.C.G.A.

§ 16-11-32 fell within the definition of criminal gang activity in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(1)(J). - Delinquency petition properly charged that a juvenile participated in criminal street gang activity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(e) because the petition stated that the juvenile did engage in, directly or indirectly, criminal gang activity, a crime of violence in the State of Georgia, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(1)(J), and the juvenile was also adjudicated delinquent for organizing and promoting an affray in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-32, which fell within the criminal conduct contemplated by § 16-15-3(1)(J); the juvenile instructed a student on becoming a gang member, organized a fight for them, and gave the student a booklet containing gang history and jargon, and there was also evidence that the student paid the juvenile a "gang tax" and that the juvenile referred to being a lieutenant in the gang. In re X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 688 S.E.2d 646 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile's conviction of participation in criminal street gang activity and the crime of affray because the juvenile told the investigating officer that the juvenile was a member of a gang and admitted to committing the affray with a student, and the investigating officer further testified that he was familiar with the gang, the gang was operating in the county, and that there were more than three people in the gang; the offense of affray meets the definition of criminal gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(1)(J) because the fact that the combatants consent to fight does not negate that fighting is an act of violence. In re X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 688 S.E.2d 646 (2009).

Cited in McElroy v. Williams Bros. Motors, 104 Ga. App. 435, 121 S.E.2d 917 (1961); Bert v. State, 169 Ga. App. 628, 314 S.E.2d 466 (1984); Rhodes v. State, 170 Ga. App. 473, 317 S.E.2d 285 (1984); State v. Perry, 261 Ga. App. 886, 583 S.E.2d 909 (2003).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct, § 17 et seq. 53A Am. Jur. 2d, Mobs and Riots, §§ 6, 9.

C.J.S.

- 2A C.J.S., Affray, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Sufficiency of evidence to establish criminal participation by individual involved in gang fight or assault, 24 A.L.R.4th 243.