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2018 Georgia Code 16-15-4 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 15. Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention, 16-15-1 through 16-15-11.

ARTICLE 5 SANCTIONS AGAINST LICENSED PERSONS FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES OR MARIJUANA

16-15-4. Participation in criminal gang activity prohibited.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person to commit any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3 with the intent to obtain or earn membership or maintain or increase his or her status or position in a criminal street gang.
  3. It shall be unlawful for any person to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, through criminal gang activity or proceeds derived therefrom any interest in or control of any real or personal property of any nature, including money.
  4. It shall be unlawful for any person who occupies a position of organizer, supervisory position, or any other position of management or leadership with regard to a criminal street gang to engage in, directly or indirectly, or conspire to engage in criminal gang activity.
  5. It shall be unlawful for any person to cause, encourage, solicit, recruit, or coerce another to become a member or associate of a criminal street gang, to participate in a criminal street gang, or to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity.
  6. It shall be unlawful for any person to communicate, directly or indirectly, with another any threat of injury or damage to the person or property of the other person or of any associate or relative of the other person with the intent to deter such person from assisting a member or associate of a criminal street gang to withdraw from such criminal street gang.
  7. It shall be unlawful for any person to communicate, directly or indirectly, with another any threat of injury or damage to the person or property of the other person or of any associate or relative of the other person with the intent to punish or retaliate against such person for having withdrawn from a criminal street gang.
  8. It shall be unlawful for any person to communicate, directly or indirectly, with another any threat of injury or damage to the person or property of the other person or of any associate or relative of the other person with the intent to punish or retaliate against such person for refusing to or encouraging another to refuse to become or obtain the status of a member or associate of a criminal street gang.
  9. It shall be unlawful for any person to communicate, directly or indirectly, with another any threat of injury or damage to the person or property of the other person or of any associate or relative of the other person with the intent to punish or retaliate against such person for providing statements or testimony against criminal street gangs or any criminal street gang member or associate.
  10. In addition to the prohibitions set forth in Code Section 16-10-93, it shall be unlawful for any person to communicate, directly or indirectly, with another any threat of injury or damage to the person or property of the other person or of any associate or relative of the other person with the intent to intimidate, deter, or prevent such person from communicating to any law enforcement or corrections officer, prosecuting attorney, or judge information relating to criminal street gangs, criminal street gang members or associates, or criminal gang activity.
    1. Any person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, in addition to any other penalty imposed, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for five years but not more than 20 years or pay a fine of not less than $10,000.00 nor more than $15,000.00, or both.
    2. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this Code section through the commission of a violation of Code Section 42-5-18 shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, in addition to any other penalty imposed, shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years but not more than 20 years which shall be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed, and no portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court.
    3. Any person who violates subsection (d) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, in addition to any other penalty imposed, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for five years but not more than 20 years which shall be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed.
    4. Any person who violates subsection (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, in addition to any other penalty imposed, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for five years but not more than 20 years.
  11. In addition to any other penalty provided by this Code section, all sentences imposed under this Code section shall require as a special condition of the sentence that the person sentenced shall not knowingly have contact of any kind or character with any other member or associate of a criminal street gang, shall not participate in any criminal gang activity, and, in cases involving a victim, shall not knowingly have contact of any kind or character with any such victim or any member of any such victim's family or household.
  12. Any crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense.

(Code 1981, §16-15-4, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 3236, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 270, § 8; Ga. L. 2006, p. 519, § 2/HB 1302; Ga. L. 2010, p. 230, § 3/HB 1015; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 16/HB 142; Ga. L. 2016, p. 811, § 4/HB 874.)

The 2016 amendment, effective May 3, 2016, rewrote subsection (k).

Cross references.

- Admission of criminal gang activity evidence, § 24-4-418.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2006, p. 519, § 7/HB 1302, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2006 amendment shall be effective July 1, 2006, and shall be applicable to all crimes committed on or after such date, and also provided that: "Any offense committed before July 1, 2006, shall be punishable as provided by the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed."

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004). For annual survey on criminal law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 93 (2016).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- Trial court properly denied the appellants' motion to dismiss various counts charging the appellants with gang-related crimes under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., since properly construed O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) did not directly or indirectly infringe upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association as, to support a conviction, gang conduct or participation was required. Further, reading § 16-15-4(a) according to the natural and obvious import of the statute's language and in conjunction with the specific definitions in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3, the statute provided a sufficiently definite warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct and was not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, thus, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (2009).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39. - There is no legal authority to support the proposition that the Georgia Street Gang and Terrorism Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39, two very differently worded statutory provisions, are equivalent; thus, defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, if the armed robbery of September 17, 1999, and the murder of December 28, 1999, are considered as part of the "pattern of criminal street gang activity" for purposes of violating the Street Gang Act, they must necessarily also be considered "offenses occurring in the same series of acts" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39(c) failed. Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448 (2005).

Statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

- Appellant, a juvenile, was not entitled to the dismissal of two counts of street gang activity based on the juvenile's assertion that O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) failed to inform ordinary citizens of what associations with a criminal street gang were prohibited under the statute; the statute required that a defendant's association with a group be active and include the commission of an enumerated offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-13(1), and that provided a sufficiently definite warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct. In re K.R.S., 284 Ga. 853, 672 S.E.2d 622 (2009).

O.C.G.A.

§ 16-5-9, allowing absent gang members convictions to serve as proof of gang, violated confrontation right. - O.C.G.A. § 16-15-9 was declared unconstitutional on the statute's face under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause to the extent that the statute authorized the admission of the convictions of non-testifying non-parties as evidence of a criminal street gang; the exclusion of other alleged gang members' convictions in the defendant's trial was upheld. State v. Jefferson, 302 Ga. 435, 807 S.E.2d 387 (2017).

Indictment

Indictment sufficient.

- It was not necessary for an indictment for violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., to contain a specific allegation that the gang existed prior to the commission of any of the enumerated offenses; the indictment tracked the language of the statute and gave a date certain for each of the enumerated offenses. State v. Hood, 307 Ga. App. 439, 706 S.E.2d 566 (2010).

Indictment insufficient when state unable to identify dates.

- Trial court did not err in granting the defendants' special demurrer to an indictment charging the defendants with participating in criminal street gang activity in violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4, because absent some showing by the state that the state's evidence did not permit the state to identify the exact dates the gang came into existence, the indictment was imperfect and subject to special demurrer; although in most cases of this type it may not be possible for the state to show an exact date a criminal street gang came into existence, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the state to make some showing as to why the state can not determine that date, and ultimately, while the state may in fact be unable to pinpoint the particular dates of the alleged crimes, an appellate court cannot speculate about such a matter, but instead, the appellate court, like the trial court, is bound by the record before the court. State v. Hood, 307 Ga. App. 439, 706 S.E.2d 566 (2010).

Indictment not required to allege date the gang came into existence.

- Indictment for criminal street gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) was sufficient to withstand 12 defendants' general and special demurrers. Although the indictment did not allege a date that the gang came into existence, the indictment sufficiently alleged that the gang existed at the time of each of the enumerated predicate offenses. State v. Hood, 307 Ga. App. 439, 706 S.E.2d 566 (2010).

Application

Evidence of connection to gang.

- State presented sufficient evidence to connect the defendant to a gang, including extensive evidence of the defendant's association with other gang members and Facebook posts which displayed distinguishing characteristics associated with the gang, such as hand signs, language, and tattoos. Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 797 S.E.2d 207 (2017).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's alleged membership in a gang because the evidence of gang membership was relevant to and probative of motive based on two witnesses testifying as to the defendant's gang affiliation. Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 806 S.E.2d 573 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the three defendants of unlawful participation in criminal gang activity through the commission of an aggravated assault and an aggravated battery and felony murder predicated upon criminal gang activity involving a simple battery because the defendants wore red clothing and were associated with a criminal street gang; the victim waved a blue bandana and started talking about a rival gang; the three defendants participated in beating the victim; they followed the victim into the road, and beat the victim until the victim lost consciousness; the victim was almost immediately struck by a car and killed; and the witnesses testified that the three defendants were among the men who left the victim lying on the road. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

Unlawful participation in criminal gang activity through commission of simply battery.

- When the three defendants were found guilty of felony murder predicated on the defendants' unlawful participation in criminal gang activity through the commission of a simple battery, and the defendants were also found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court properly convicted the defendants of felony murder because unlawful participation in criminal gang activity through the commission of a simple battery was not just a simple battery as it involved a nexus between the simple battery and the activities of the criminal street gang; and the culpability for unlawful participation in criminal gang activity was generally not susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation and passion that voluntary manslaughter involved. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

Merger of criminal gang activity convictions.

- After the three defendants were properly found guilty of felony murder predicated upon criminal gang activity involving a simple battery, the trial court erred when the court failed to merge the defendants' criminal gang activity involving an aggravated assault and criminal gang activity involving an aggravated battery convictions into the felony murder conviction because all of the unlawful participation in criminal gang activity of which the three defendants were found guilty occurred at the same location, occurred at the same time, and was directed against the same victim. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient for conviction under former paragraph (b)(1) based on defendant's statement at the sheriff's office that the robbery and killing of the victim was undertaken in furtherance of defendant's participation in a criminal street gang, for the purpose of increasing defendant's own rank and influence within the gang, and to perpetuate the gang and its rank structure. Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 191, 528 S.E.2d 232 (2000); Warren v. State, 245 Ga. App. 768, 538 S.E.2d 840 (2000).

Defendant juvenile was properly found to have committed the crime of participation in criminal street gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) because the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was part of a criminal street gang under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(2) based on the colors the defendant wore and the statement as to the removal of a gang tattoo and because the defendant committed the enumerated offenses of carrying a concealed weapon and theft by shoplifting as referenced by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-14-3 and16-15-3(1)(A), (J) and apparently stole a flare gun with the intent to further gang activity. In the Interest of C.P., 296 Ga. App. 572, 675 S.E.2d 287 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of participation in criminal street gang activity. The evidence showed that the defendant was a member of an established street gang; additionally, the evidence that the defendant committed simple battery and less than a week later committed aggravated assault and aggravated battery against rival gang members showed a pattern of criminal gang activity. Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 677 S.E.2d 776 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and participation in criminal street gang activity. The defendant and fellow gang members walked toward a group of teenagers in a front yard while yelling and making gang signals; the defendant fired once into the crowd, killing the victim, who was unarmed; and the defendant, who fled the scene, was the only person who fired a weapon and was identified to police as the shooter by witnesses who knew the defendant by name. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 25, 727 S.E.2d 120 (2012).

Testimony that the defendant was a member of a gang and that the defendant touted that affiliation with the gang to two of the victims a few weeks earlier, permitted the jury to find that the defendant was a member of a street gang and supported the defendant's conviction for participating in criminal street-gang activity. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012).

Evidence including testimony as to the gang's criminal activities, corroborating the defendant's participation in the armed robberies; the defendant's admission to participating in two murders; and a gun the defendant used in the attempted armed robbery of the first victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for criminal street gang activity, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 682, 746 S.E.2d 162 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant admitted to associating with a gang; the defendant referenced gangs on a Facebook page associated with the defendant's street name; the defendant possessed a firearm, the defendant was found near the residence of the suspected shooter shortly after the shooting; and that gang members were often sought to retaliate for prior acts of violence supported the conviction for participation in criminal gang activity. In the Interest of L. P., 324 Ga. App. 78, 749 S.E.2d 389 (2013).

Testimony that the defendants wore colors associated with a criminal street gang at the time of the robbery, talked about the defendants' gang membership and indicated that the defendants wanted to do some robberies to make money to get back home, and that the defendants continued to communicate about the crimes in jail was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions for criminal street gang activity. Alston v. State, 329 Ga. App. 44, 763 S.E.2d 504 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for participation in criminal gang activity because the defendant claimed affiliation with a gang by hanging out with the gang, and the defendant and several others took guns with them to a rival gang neighborhood where a shooting erupted. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

State introduced evidence from which a jury would be authorized to find a nexus between the defendants' actions in seeking out and beating up the victim and the defendants' intent to further gang activity by ensuring that the gang responded strongly to the victim's disrespect of a gang member's offer of association and, thus, the evidence supported the gang activity convictions. Zamudio v. State, 332 Ga. App. 37, 771 S.E.2d 733 (2015).

Evidence that the defendant met with the codefendants and set forth a plan to rob the victim, the defendant directed the plan to rob the victim to get respect from the victim and take over the victim's marijuana territory, and a codefendant was supposed to get an increase in rank in the gang for driving a car occupied by the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for conducting criminal gang activity. Nolley v. State, 335 Ga. App. 539, 782 S.E.2d 446 (2016).

Sufficient evidence, including expert testimony, supported the appellants' convictions because the evidence established that the appellants were associated with a criminal street gang and that the armed robbery and aggravated assault the appellants engaged in constituted criminal street gang activity and were intended to further the interests of the gang. Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was insufficient to adjudicate a juvenile a delinquent for actively and willingly causing or coercing another to participate in a gang in the commission of a felony, with knowledge that the gang's members had engaged in a pattern of criminal street gang activity, under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(d), because there was no evidence the juvenile caused or coerced another person to participate in the commission of a crime. In the Interest of N.L.G., 267 Ga. App. 428, 600 S.E.2d 401 (2004).

Defendant's adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on a charge that the defendant was violating the terms of probation by associating with gang members had to be reversed; the state failed to prove the predicate acts of a count charging the defendant with participation in criminal street gang activity, and the state admitted that the probation violation count did not contain sufficient factual details to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense charged. In the Interest of L.J.L., 284 Ga. App. 801, 645 S.E.2d 371 (2007).

State failed to establish that a "criminal street gang" was involved in a battery for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a). The investigating officer's testimony merely established that the juveniles were members of gangs, not the gangs' activities, and therefore was insufficient to show that the gangs were involved in criminal gang activity. In the Interest of A. D., 311 Ga. App. 384, 715 S.E.2d 787 (2011).

Conviction for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., was reversed because there was no evidence beyond the bandanas and a notebook to link the juveniles to membership in a criminal street gang. To sustain a conviction, the state had to prove that the criminal gang activity or plans for the gang's continuation was ongoing at the time of the commission of the indicted offenses; in other words, the commission of an enumerated offense by the juveniles was not itself sufficient to prove the existence of a criminal street gang. In the Interest of A. G., 317 Ga. App. 165, 730 S.E.2d 187 (2012).

Defendant's conviction under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., had to be reversed as the state did not present evidence of the necessary nexus between the defendant's drug crimes and an intent to further gang interests because, while the defendant might have intended, by distributing marijuana, to further the interests of individual gang members in obtaining small quantities of marijuana for personal use, the state did not show that the defendant meant to further the interests of the gang as an entity; and there was no evidence that the defendant's distribution of personal-use amounts of marijuana to individual gang members benefitted the gang itself through monetary profit, enhanced reputation, or other means. Randolph v. State, 334 Ga. App. 475, 780 S.E.2d 19 (2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for engaging in a criminal street gang because the state did not present any evidence that the defendant committed the burglary to further the interest of a gang it was alleged the defendant was a part of, nor did the state present any evidence showing that the victims of the burglary or any witnesses were aware that the crime was committed by gang members. In the Interest of W. B., 342 Ga. App. 277, 801 S.E.2d 595 (2017).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain the three defendants' conviction for criminal gang activity involving an affray because an affray requires a fight between willing participants; and there was no evidence that the victim willingly fought the assailants, only that the victim was beaten by the assailants, tried to retreat, and then was beaten some more. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

Evidence was insufficient to adjudicate the defendant juvenile delinquent based on the offense of participation in criminal street gang activity because the only evidence that the defendant was involved with a criminal street gang was that the defendant was in the presence of two people who had previously been adjudicated as gang members and that the defendant possessed a gun that belonged to a gang member; and the state presented no evidence that the defendant was wearing any colors or attire that were uniquely associated with the gang, that the defendant had ever displayed signs or symbols affiliated with gang membership, or that the defendant had previously spent time with members of the gang. In the Interest of T. W., 344 Ga. App. 338, 810 S.E.2d 582 (2018).

Evidence of gang activity.

- State's failure to indict defendant under the statute did not bar the introduction of gang related evidence. There is no requirement that the state charge a defendant with violating the prohibition of participation in criminal street gang activity in order to admit otherwise relevant evidence of gang activity. Wolfe v. State, 273 Ga. 670, 544 S.E.2d 148 (2001).

Delinquency petition properly charged that a juvenile participated in criminal street gang activity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(e) because the petition stated that the juvenile did engage in, directly or indirectly, criminal gang activity, a crime of violence in the State of Georgia, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(1)(J), and the juvenile was also adjudicated delinquent for organizing and promoting an affray in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-32, which fell within the criminal conduct contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 16-15- 3(1)(J); the juvenile instructed a student on becoming a gang member, organized a fight for the student, and gave the student a booklet containing gang history and jargon, and there was also evidence that the student paid the juvenile a "gang tax" and that the juvenile referenced being a lieutenant in the gang. In re X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 688 S.E.2d 646 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that a juvenile committed an act which, had the juvenile been an adult, would have resulted in a conviction of participation in criminal street gang activity because the juvenile and gang investigator for a police department testified about the juvenile's familiarity with the gang and stated that there were more than three members of the gang, and a student testified that the juvenile facilitated an affray to further a gang activity, specifically the student's membership in the gang. In re X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 688 S.E.2d 646 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for participation in criminal street gang activity in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4 because the evidence established that the defendant was a gang member and that there was a nexus between the shooting and an intent to further gang activity; the defendant admitted that the defendant was a member of the gang, and a police detective, who was qualified as an expert in gang investigations, testified that the defendant was a known member of the gang, that the defendant had previously admitted to the detective that the defendant was a member of that gang, that a black bandana was attire associated with the gang, and that wearing such a bandana during a shooting was particularly significant because the bandana proclaimed to the world that the defendant was a member and that the shooting was a gang act. In the Interest of D. M., 307 Ga. App. 751, 706 S.E.2d 683 (2011).

Gang-related evidence was admissible because the defendants were charged with engaging in criminal street gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4; moreover, even though the statements of gang activity placed the defendants' character in issue, the statements were admissible as res gestae of the crimes of gang activity and aggravated assault and battery. Morey v. State, 312 Ga. App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0451, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 592 (Ga. 2012).

On a charge of criminal street gang activity, the state was properly allowed to admit videotapes seized from the defendants' home that were made two years earlier as the videotapes depicted gang-related images and activities; the videotapes were relevant to show the existence of the gang and the defendants' affiliation with the gang. Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 746 S.E.2d 127 (2013).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's alleged membership in a gang because the evidence of gang membership was relevant to and probative of motive based on two witnesses testifying as to the defendant's gang affiliation. Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 806 S.E.2d 573 (2017).

When the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and participation in criminal gang activity, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that a police investigator, who was qualified as a gang expert, had seized a "book of knowledge" from the house of another gang member as the evidence was relevant to a material issue in the case because a conviction required that there be some nexus between the enumerated act and an intent to further street gang activity; and, based on the book and other information, gang members were required to possess firearms. Lang v. State, 344 Ga. App. 623, 812 S.E.2d 16 (2018).

In the defendants' trial for criminal gang activity under O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a), a photograph taken inside the courtroom and posted on social media by friends of the defendants with the caption "Free my FAM" was relevant to show that the defendants were members of a gang under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401 and was not unduly prejudicial under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403. Anthony v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Mar. 5, 2018).

Nexus between crime and furtherance of gang interest shown.

- Two defendants were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) in connection with the shooting death of a drug dealer in the defendants' gang territory; the evidence established a nexus between the robbery of the drug dealer and an intent to further the interests of the gang, based on expert testimony that the gang made most of the gang's money through armed robberies. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018).

Charge did not omit nexus between violence and gang activity.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and gang-related crimes, the trial court did not commit plain error with regard to the court's jury instructions because the trial court correctly stated the law by using the statutory language in the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a), in the court's charge to the jury, so the charge did not omit a nexus between the violence, and it was not possible for the jury to convict the defendant without finding that nexus. Skinner v. State, 318 Ga. App. 217, 733 S.E.2d 506 (2012).

Sentence

Sentence not void.

- Defendant's 10-year sentence for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and aggravated assault was not void as the sentence fell within the range of permitted sentences and, thus, did not amount to a punishment that the law did not allow. Garza v. State, 325 Ga. App. 505, 753 S.E.2d 651 (2014).

Sentence not cruel and unusual punishment.

- Defendant's sentences of 20 years in confinement for the aggravated assault on the deceased victim, followed by 20 years for the aggravated assault on the second victim (with five years in confinement and the remainder on probation), followed by an additional 15 years of probation for the charge of participation in criminal street gang activity and another five years' probation for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to run consecutively to the other sentences, were within the statutory range for those crimes, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

Merger of counts erroneous.

- Trial court erred by merging the guilty verdicts for armed robbery, burglary, and two counts of gang activity as armed robbery and burglary did not merge into malice murder. Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016).

Cited in Veal v. State, 242 Ga. App. 873, 531 S.E.2d 422 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity of criminal state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts and similar acts related to gang activity and the like, 58 A.L.R.6th 385.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Jackson v. State, 891 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 21, 2023 | 317 Ga. 95

...felon . . . by having in his possession . . . a firearm after having been convicted of the felony crime of aggravated assault” while “associated with Gangster Disciples, a criminal street gang.” See 10 OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-1...
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Blocker v. State, 889 S.E.2d 824 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 21, 2023 | 316 Ga. 568

...which is commonly used by gang members.”4 2. Appellant contends that the trial evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction for violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Gang Act”). See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a)....
...was associated with a gang and that he committed the underlying crimes to further the gang’s interests. See Dunn, 312 Ga. at 474 (1). A gang association can be established by proof that the defendant was “employed by” a gang or was otherwise “associated with” it. OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of [an enumerated offense].” (emphasis supplied))....
...Specifically, the jury was authorized to find that Appellant was “employed by” the Bloods gang to commit a murder for the gang, as Appellant told officers that Chanel offered to pay him a substantial sum of money to help her resolve an internal gang dispute by killing Smith, and that he had agreed to her terms. OCGA § 16-15-4 (a)....
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Pierce v. State, 907 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2024 | 319 Ga. 846

...Act predicated on the aggravated assault of Suggs with a deadly weapon. The Gang Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . associated with a criminal street gang to . . . participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of” certain enumerated offenses. OCGA § 16-15-4 (a)....
...The State sought to introduce evidence of other gang members’ crimes as intrinsic evidence directly relevant to the elements of a Gang Act violation, including the existence of a criminal street gang that engaged in criminal gang activity by committing certain enumerated offenses. See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a); Rooks, 317 Ga....
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Monroe v. State, 884 S.E.2d 906 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 7, 2023 | 315 Ga. 767

...ndictment, the trial court properly sentenced Monroe on the rest of his Gang Act charges. Here, Monroe challenges the sentences he received for crimes committed pursuant to two subsections of the Gang Act: OCGA § 16- 15-4 (a) and (b). OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) 40 of Code Section 16-15-3.”13 Id. OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) makes it illegal “for any person to commit any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3 with the intent to obtain or earn membership or maintain or increase his or her status or position in a criminal street gang.” Id. Monroe contends that all of the crimes charged as violations of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) should have merged as a matter of fact into the crimes charged as violations of OCGA § 16- 15-4 (b) pursuant to the required evidence test of Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (636 SE2d 530) (2006). The State, however, contends that the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (m), which provides that “[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense,” 13 OCGA § 16-15-3 defines “criminal gang activity” as “the commission, attempted commission, c...
...question of whether the statute provides for the merger of a predicate offense into the separate Gang Act count. We concluded that it does not. See Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 404 (2) (b) n.7 (811 SE2d 399) (2018) (“We have also held that OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) allows separate punishment for both participation in criminal gang activity and for the predicate offense through which the participation in gang activity is established.”); Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 239 (1) (b) n.4 (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (noting that the language of subsection (m) “indicat[es] the General Assembly’s intent to impose separate punishment for conduct that violates both OCGA § 16-15-4 and another felony statute”).15 14 Monroe only asserts that the Gang Act crimes should merge under Drinkard and does not argue that the crimes should merge under any other theory. 15 For these same reasons, we reject Monroe’s claim that the trial court erred by not merging the predicate felonies listed in Counts 10, 12, 13, 16, 18 and 20 into one of the OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) violations. 42 However, the question of whether the language of subsection (m) provides for separate sentences for violations of different subsections of the Gang Act has not been addressed by this Court....
...170, 172-173 (1) (751 SE2d 337) (2013), while also giving meaning to all words in the statute, see Arby’s Restaurant Group v. McRae, 292 Ga. 243, 245 (1) (734 SE2d 55) (2012). When we construe a statute on appeal, our review is de novo. See Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693 (749 SE2d 726) (2013). OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) states that “[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense.” The plain language of this provision evidences the legislature’s clear 44 intent to designate certain crimes as “separate offense[s]” subject to separate punishments. OCGA § 16-15-4 (m). Those crimes that constitute separate offenses under subsection (m) are specifically “crime[s] committed in violation of this Code section.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Subsection (m) appears within “Code section” 16-15-4. Thus, subsection (m) indicates that the crimes which should be treated as “separate offense[s]” are those violations of law defined in OCGA § 16-15-4, including, as relevant here, violations of subsections (a) and (b), each of which specifies that “[i]t shall be unlawful” for a person to engage in certain conduct. OCGA § 16-15- 4 (a), (b). Because the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) indicates the legislature’s intent to punish as “separate offense[s]” violations of subsections (a) and (b), charged violations of those subsections cannot merge....
...does not merge with another separate offense under the Code section 45 or with any predicate offense listed in the Code section”). In this case, where Monroe was found guilty of numerous violations of both OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) and (b), the convictions for violating those two subsections do not merge for sentencing purposes.16 Consequently, Monroe’s 15 violations of OCGA § 16-15- 4 (a) found in Counts 6, 7, 22 through 33, and 46, do not merge into his six counts of violating OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) found in Counts 34, 35, 38, 39, 47, and 48. That said, we agree with Monroe that the trial court erred in 16 Monroe also alleges that the trial court should have merged the OCGA § 16-15-4 violations listed in Counts 22, 24, 26, and 30 through 42 into Count 8 for sentencing purposes....
...ubsection (a) violation, that claim also fails. The trial court merged the predicate offense of the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 4) into the malice murder of Cross (Count 1). Thereafter, the trial court purported to merge the violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) Gang Act charge for the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 8) into the violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) for the murder of Cross (Count 6)....
...at 403 (2) (a), Count 8 should have been vacated because, once the predicate offense for that Gang Act charge merged, there was “only one predicate crime to form the basis for unlawful participation in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a).” Anthony, 303 Ga....
...State, 287 Ga. 713, 714-715 (1) (a) (699 SE2d 291) (2010). 46 sentencing him on two counts. Count 47 charged that Monroe possessed the firearm “with the intent to maintain his status,” in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b), while Count 48 charged that Monroe possessed the firearm “with the intent to increase his status,” also in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b)....
...(Emphasis supplied.) We agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision in Nolley that there is “no statutory basis to conclude that the Legislature intended that proof of intent to ‘maintain’ status or position in the gang would constitute a separate ‘unit of prosecution’ [in OCGA § 16-15-4 (b)] from proof of intent to ‘increase’ status or position in the gang.” Nolley, 335 Ga. App....
...48, and remand for resentencing on only one of those counts. See State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 223 (6) (862 SE2d 125) (2021).17 17 We note that Count 38 charged that Monroe unlawfully participated in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) by committing aggravated assaults against Cross, Kenneth, Darius, Calhoun, Clark, Ellis, and Harris with the intent to maintain his status or position in said gang....
...However, when the trial court reached the weapons charges in Counts 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21, it determined that these charges were separate convictions triggering the enhancement provisions of OCGA § 16-11- Count 39 charged that Monroe unlawfully participated in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) by possessing a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assaults of Cross, Kenneth, Darius, Calhoun, Clark, Ellis, and Harris....
...the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 5) into other counts. Despite a portion of the predicate felonies listed in Counts 38 and 39 being merged, Monroe does not allege that the entirety of Counts 38 and 39 could or should have merged with the OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) counts charging Monroe with the murder of Cross and for possessing a firearm during the murder of Cross (Counts 34 and 35, respectively)....
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Rooks v. The State (two Cases), 317 Ga. 743 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 24, 2023

...The evidence also was constitutionally sufficient for a jury to find Rooks and Clark guilty of the criminal street gang crimes of which they were convicted. To establish that Rooks and Clark participated in criminal street gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State was required to prove four elements: (1) the existence of a “criminal street gang,” defined in OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) as “any organization, association, or group of three or more persons associated in fac...
...,” was a criminal street gang; photos showing the defendant making Slime hand signs; and evidence that the defendant killed the victim to retaliate against him for disrespecting Slime, sufficiently established the elements of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) and thus authorized the jury to find him guilty of participating in criminal street gang 27 activity).11 Contentions Raised Only by Clark 3....
...as intrinsic evidence and because it satisfied OCGA § 24-4-418 (“Rule 418”), which says that evidence of a defendant’s commission of criminal gang activity shall be admissible in a criminal proceeding in which he is accused of violating OCGA § 16-15-4, but that the State generally must provide notice of its intent to offer such evidence at least ten days before trial....
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Campbell v. The State (four Cases), 907 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 22, 2024 | 320 Ga. 333

...Thus, at a trial of Foley’s murder, evidence of Pastures’s murder would have been relevant to prove the gang charges because it showed the gang’s efforts to cover 17 up Foley’s murder, indicating that Foley’s murder was “criminal gang activity.” See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person ....
...See OCGA § 24-4-402 (“Evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.”). Campbell was charged with eight counts of violating the Gang Act. These counts alleged that Campbell participated in criminal gang activity “while associated with a criminal street gang, to wit: Bloods.” See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It 45 shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.”)....
...g, so evidence proving his membership in this gang was relevant, and the trial court did not err by admitting it. See Rooks, 317 Ga. at 753 (explaining that to prove that the defendants “participated in criminal street gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State was required to prove,” among other things, “the defendant’s association with the gang”) (citation and punctuation omitted).22 22 Campbell appears to argue that because the State did not prove that the crimes committed against Foley were meant to “further the interest of the gang,” see OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), evidence of his gang membership was not admissible. See Rooks, 317 Ga. at 753 (explaining that to prove a violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State was required to prove, among other things, that “the crime was intended to further the interest of the gang.”) (citation and punctuation omitted)....
...28, 34 (843 SE2d 806) (2020) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove a violation of the Gang Act where the evidence showed that the charged offense was committed “to retaliate for [one of the victims’] verbal and physical conduct that 32 To establish that a defendant violated OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State must prove (1) the existence of a “criminal street gang,” defined in OCGA § 16- 15-3 (3) as “any organization, association, or group of three or more persons associated in fact, whether formal or infor...
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Ruthenberg v. State, 892 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 6, 2023 | 317 Ga. 227

...t’s arguments focus on the battery convictions. 3 OCGA § 24-4-418 states: (a) In a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of conducting or participating in criminal gang activity in violation of Code Section 16-15-4, evidence of the accused’s commission of criminal gang activity, as such term is defined in Code Section 16-15-3, shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant....
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Saylor v. State, 887 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 2, 2023 | 316 Ga. 225

...based its verdict on one of the vacated or merged counts. The record does not support Saylor’s claim, so it fails. 16 Count 18 charged Saylor with the offense of criminal street gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) by participating in gang activity through the commission of at least one of several enumerated offenses....
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Hassan v. State, 899 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 19, 2024 | 318 Ga. 673

...the Crips, for the murder of Ramey, a fellow member of the shooters’ gang, SKBG. See Overstreet v. State, 312 Ga. 565, 574 (1) (b) (864 9 SE2d 14) (2021) (To establish participation in criminal street gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4, the State must show “some nexus” between the alleged predicate acts and an intent to further the interests of the gang.)....
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McKinney v. State, 899 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2024 | 318 Ga. 566

...pt to introduce evidence of other acts by McKinney through Rule 418. Rule 418 (a) provides: In a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of conducting or participating in criminal gang activity in violation of Code Section 16-15-4, evidence of the accused’s commission of criminal gang activity, as such term is defined in Code Section 16-15-3, shall be 2 admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any...
...OCGA § 24-4-418 (c). OCGA § 16-15-3, referenced in Rule 418, is the definition section for Georgia’s Gang Act. OCGA § 16-15-3 enumerates certain offenses the commission of which constitutes “criminal gang activity.” See OCGA § 16-15-3 (1), (2). OCGA § 16-15-4, also referenced in Rule 418, makes various forms of criminal gang activity additional separate crimes; for instance, subsection (a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal stree...
...acts at issue here are not admissible under OCGA § 16-15-9. 4 court relied upon this Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803 (671 SE2d 497) (2009), in which we construed a prior version of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) as requiring a nexus between the defendant’s act and an intent to further a gang’s purposes....
...Reading Rodriguez to establish “the necessity of reading the various sections of [Georgia’s Gang Act] in conjunction with one another,” the trial court concluded that “in reading OCGA § 24-4-418 and its reference to OCGA §§ 16-15-3 and 16-15-4 and those statutes in conjunction with one another that a nexus between the prior act and an intent to further gang activity must be established for the evidence to be admissible under OCGA § 24-4-418 in this case.” The State appe...
...bearing on the issue” presented in this case, because Rodriguez “was interpreting only the definition of the crime found in OCGA § 16-15- 4, not the language found in OCGA § 16-15-3 or Rule 418[,]” and “Rule 418 contains no such language similar to that found in OCGA § 16-15-4[.]” McKinney, 366 Ga....
...or furthering the interest of a gang. McKinney argues that the trial court correctly concluded that, consistent with Rodriguez, Rule 418 must be construed in the light 8 of both OCGA § 16-15-3 and OCGA § 16-15-4. But Rule 418 turns on the definition of “criminal gang activity” found in OCGA § 16-15-3. Rodriguez, on the other hand, turned on nexus-creating language in OCGA § 16-15-4 that was at issue there but is not present in OCGA § 16-15-3 or Rule 418. See Rodriguez, 284 Ga. at 805-807 (1). Rodriguez considered OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), which at the time made it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.” The Court noted that “OCGA § 16-15-4 must be read in conjunction with the definitions of ‘criminal gang activity’ and ‘criminal street gang’ in OCGA § 16-15- 3.” Rodriguez, 284 Ga. at 805 (1). But of course that was true, given that OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) used at least one term, “criminal street gang,” that was defined in OCGA § 16-15-3. That does not necessarily mean that the converse is true, i.e., that OCGA § 16-15-3 must be read in the light of OCGA § 16-15-4. Rodriguez reasoned that “the use of the verbs ‘conduct’ and 9 ‘participate’ confirm that the middle portion of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) is referring to the ‘activity’ of the group” and that in the context of the statute “both of these words imply the presence of others who are managed, controlled, led or guided in the ‘criminal street gang activity’ by the defendant or who take part in or share in that activity with the defendant.” 284 Ga. at 806 (1). And the Court said that requiring no showing of a nexus with gang interests in order to secure a conviction under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) would render “meaningless or redundant” the phrase in the then-existing language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), “to conduct or participate in criminal street gang activity[.]” 284 Ga. at 805-806 (1). Limiting the value of Rodriguez for the case before us now, these words and phrases in the version of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) in effect at the time the Rodriguez Court construed them do not appear in any form in the OCGA § 16-15-3 definition referenced by Rule 418.3 3 We also note that the phrase “to conduct or participate in criminal street gang activity” in OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) was amended the year after Rodriguez was decided to delete the word “street” from the phrase “criminal street gang activity,” and that subsection now makes it unlawful “to conduct 10 Moreover, Rule 418 by its terms applies to all criminal prosecutions under OCGA § 16-15-4, not just those brought under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a). In addition to OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), OCGA § 16- 15-4 contains nine other subsections creating distinct crimes, each defined by unique language. Therefore, the meaning of Rule 418 cannot turn on particular language in OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) — either the version currently in effect, or the version that we construed in Rodriguez. McKinney’s only other argument is that construing Rule 418 as not requiring a nexus with gang membership or interests would lead to...
...See Rodriguez, 284 Ga. at 805 (1) (“The various provisions of a statute should be viewed in harmony and in a manner or participate in criminal gang activity[.]” See Ga. L. 2010, pp. 230, 231, § 3. The Rodriguez Court had found this former text of OCGA § 16-15-4 significant, noting that the phrase “criminal street gang activity” in OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), was “not identical to the phrase ‘criminal gang activity’ as defined in OCGA § 16-15-3 (1).” 284 Ga....
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Tedder v. State, 907 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2024 | 320 Ga. 29

...atter of Georgia statutory law. 12 participating in criminal gang activity through the commission of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as an associate of Yung Fame. See OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-...
...Though Eggleston testified that Tedder was not a member of Yung Fame, evidence that Tedder participated in the retaliatory drive-by shooting with other Yung Fame members was sufficient to prove that he was at least associated with Yung Fame, which is all the statute requires. See OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity ....
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Jackson v. State, 321 Ga. 659 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 28, 2025

...THE STATE. ELLINGTON, Justice. A DeKalb County jury found Carey Jackson guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Street Gang Act”), OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), in connection with the shooting death of Arnold Leslie and the assaults of seven other individuals.1 Jackson contends that the trial court 1 The crimes occurred on April 6, 2020....
...After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on June 26, 2024. Jackson timely filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 2024, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate 2 Because Jackson has not shown that tri...
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Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 767 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 7, 2023

...ndictment, the trial court properly sentenced Monroe on the rest of his Gang Act charges. Here, Monroe challenges the sentences he received for crimes committed pursuant to two subsections of the Gang Act: OCGA § 16- 15-4 (a) and (b). OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) 40 of Code Section 16-15-3.”13 Id. OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) makes it illegal “for any person to commit any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3 with the intent to obtain or earn membership or maintain or increase his or her status or position in a criminal street gang.” Id. Monroe contends that all of the crimes charged as violations of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) should have merged as a matter of fact into the crimes charged as violations of OCGA § 16- 15-4 (b) pursuant to the required evidence test of Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (636 SE2d 530) (2006). The State, however, contends that the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (m), which provides that “[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense,” 13 OCGA § 16-15-3 defines “criminal gang activity” as “the commission, attempted commission, c...
...question of whether the statute provides for the merger of a predicate offense into the separate Gang Act count. We concluded that it does not. See Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 404 (2) (b) n.7 (811 SE2d 399) (2018) (“We have also held that OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) allows separate punishment for both participation in criminal gang activity and for the predicate offense through which the participation in gang activity is established.”); Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 239 (1) (b) n.4 (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (noting that the language of subsection (m) “indicat[es] the General Assembly’s intent to impose separate punishment for conduct that violates both OCGA § 16-15-4 and another felony statute”).15 14 Monroe only asserts that the Gang Act crimes should merge under Drinkard and does not argue that the crimes should merge under any other theory. 15 For these same reasons, we reject Monroe’s claim that the trial court erred by not merging the predicate felonies listed in Counts 10, 12, 13, 16, 18 and 20 into one of the OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) violations. 42 However, the question of whether the language of subsection (m) provides for separate sentences for violations of different subsections of the Gang Act has not been addressed by this Court....
...170, 172-173 (1) (751 SE2d 337) (2013), while also giving meaning to all words in the statute, see Arby’s Restaurant Group v. McRae, 292 Ga. 243, 245 (1) (734 SE2d 55) (2012). When we construe a statute on appeal, our review is de novo. See Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693 (749 SE2d 726) (2013). OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) states that “[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense.” The plain language of this provision evidences the legislature’s clear 44 intent to designate certain crimes as “separate offense[s]” subject to separate punishments. OCGA § 16-15-4 (m). Those crimes that constitute separate offenses under subsection (m) are specifically “crime[s] committed in violation of this Code section.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Subsection (m) appears within “Code section” 16-15-4. Thus, subsection (m) indicates that the crimes which should be treated as “separate offense[s]” are those violations of law defined in OCGA § 16-15-4, including, as relevant here, violations of subsections (a) and (b), each of which specifies that “[i]t shall be unlawful” for a person to engage in certain conduct. OCGA § 16-15- 4 (a), (b). Because the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4 (m) indicates the legislature’s intent to punish as “separate offense[s]” violations of subsections (a) and (b), charged violations of those subsections cannot merge....
...does not merge with another separate offense under the Code section 45 or with any predicate offense listed in the Code section”). In this case, where Monroe was found guilty of numerous violations of both OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) and (b), the convictions for violating those two subsections do not merge for sentencing purposes.16 Consequently, Monroe’s 15 violations of OCGA § 16-15- 4 (a) found in Counts 6, 7, 22 through 33, and 46, do not merge into his six counts of violating OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) found in Counts 34, 35, 38, 39, 47, and 48. That said, we agree with Monroe that the trial court erred in 16 Monroe also alleges that the trial court should have merged the OCGA § 16-15-4 violations listed in Counts 22, 24, 26, and 30 through 42 into Count 8 for sentencing purposes....
...ubsection (a) violation, that claim also fails. The trial court merged the predicate offense of the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 4) into the malice murder of Cross (Count 1). Thereafter, the trial court purported to merge the violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) Gang Act charge for the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 8) into the violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) for the murder of Cross (Count 6)....
...at 403 (2) (a), Count 8 should have been vacated because, once the predicate offense for that Gang Act charge merged, there was “only one predicate crime to form the basis for unlawful participation in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a).” Anthony, 303 Ga....
...State, 287 Ga. 713, 714-715 (1) (a) (699 SE2d 291) (2010). 46 sentencing him on two counts. Count 47 charged that Monroe possessed the firearm “with the intent to maintain his status,” in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b), while Count 48 charged that Monroe possessed the firearm “with the intent to increase his status,” also in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b)....
...(Emphasis supplied.) We agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision in Nolley that there is “no statutory basis to conclude that the Legislature intended that proof of intent to ‘maintain’ status or position in the gang would constitute a separate ‘unit of prosecution’ [in OCGA § 16-15-4 (b)] from proof of intent to ‘increase’ status or position in the gang.” Nolley, 335 Ga. App....
...48, and remand for resentencing on only one of those counts. See State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 223 (6) (862 SE2d 125) (2021).17 17 We note that Count 38 charged that Monroe unlawfully participated in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) by committing aggravated assaults against Cross, Kenneth, Darius, Calhoun, Clark, Ellis, and Harris with the intent to maintain his status or position in said gang....
...However, when the trial court reached the weapons charges in Counts 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21, it determined that these charges were separate convictions triggering the enhancement provisions of OCGA § 16-11- Count 39 charged that Monroe unlawfully participated in criminal gang activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) by possessing a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assaults of Cross, Kenneth, Darius, Calhoun, Clark, Ellis, and Harris....
...the aggravated assault of Cross (Count 5) into other counts. Despite a portion of the predicate felonies listed in Counts 38 and 39 being merged, Monroe does not allege that the entirety of Counts 38 and 39 could or should have merged with the OCGA § 16-15-4 (b) counts charging Monroe with the murder of Cross and for possessing a firearm during the murder of Cross (Counts 34 and 35, respectively)....

Bradford v. State (Ga. 2026).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 17, 2026

...gang’s interests. We disagree. The Street Gang Act makes it “unlawful for any person ... associated with a criminal street gang to ... participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of” certain enumerated offenses. OCGA § 16-15-4(a)....

Upshaw v. The State (three Cases) (Ga. 2026).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 5, 2026

Copney v. State (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2025

...is a nexus between the crime committed and the gang and that the crime was committed to further the interest of the gang, meaning proof that the crime committed was the sort of crime that the gang does.” (emphasis added). 10 Under OCGA § 16-15-4(a), “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.” “[T]he necessary and required element ... is that there must be some nexus between the act and an intent to further street gang activity. That nexus is provided by the use of the preposition ‘through’ in OCGA § 16-15-4(a).” Rodriguez v....
...pattern jury instruction. See Dixon v. State, 309 Ga. 28, 35–37 (2020) (stating that Criminal Pattern § 2.02.25 was a “correct and complete statement of the law applicable to the charges of participation in criminal gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4(a)”). We note that this Court recently granted certiorari to determine whether, for purposes of proving a violation of OCGA § 16-15-4, the State can “prove that a defendant committed a crime with the intent to further the gang’s interests by proving merely that the crime was of the ‘sort’ or ‘type’ that the gang commits.” See Lee v....

Evans v. The State (two Cases) (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 30, 2025

...In connection with the shooting death of Tunchez on October 7, 2018, Evans, Miller, Torres, and Adams were jointly charged with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), armed robbery (Count 4), aggravated assault (Count 5), and a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(a) predicated on armed robbery (Count 6); and Miller and Adams were separately charged with a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(d) predicated on armed robbery (Count 7). In connection with the robbery of Wei and Yeon on October 5, 2018, Evans and Torres were jointly charged with armed robbery (Counts 8 and 9), aggravated assault (Counts 10 and 11), and a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(a) predicated on armed robbery (Count 12). In connection with the robbery of Russell on October 6, 2018, Evans, Miller, Torres, Adams, and Davila were jointly charged with armed robbery (Count 13), aggravated assault (Count 14), and a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(a) predicated on armed robbery (Count 15)....
...Torres, Adams, Grant, and Davila were charged with armed robbery (Count 16), aggravated assault (Count 17), and a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16- 15-4(a) predicated on armed robbery (Count 18); and Miller and Adams were separately charged with a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(d) predicated on armed robbery (Count 19). Finally, in connection with a gang- initiation fight on October 6, 2018, Evans, Miller, Adams, and Davila were jointly charged with affray (Count 21) and a Gang Act violation under OCGA § 16-15-4(a) predicated on affray (Count 20). Before trial, Adams and Grant agreed to testify for the State without the benefit of a plea agreement....
...61 Count 16 (which charged Miller with the armed robbery of Arrington). The trial court imposed separate sentences for the Gang Act charges in Counts 6 and 7, which charged Miller with violating subsections (a) and (d) of OCGA § 16-15-4, respectively, by committing the armed robbery of Tunchez....
...(a) On appeal, Miller raises two arguments regarding merger 16 Count 6 alleged that Miller, “being associated with a criminal street gang, … did unlawfully participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of the offense of Armed Robbery.” See OCGA § 16-15-4(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15- 3.”)....
...robbing him). See Chambers, 305 Ga. at 365. Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s sentence on Count 17. (b) Miller also argues that the trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for Counts 6 and 7, which charged Gang Act violations under OCGA § 16-15-4(a) and OCGA § 16-15-4(d), respectively. According to Miller, because both counts were predicated on the same offense (the armed robbery of Arrington), they should have merged for sentencing purposes. As explained below, we disagree. OCGA § 16-15-4(m) provides that “[a]ny crime committed in violation of this Code section shall be considered a separate offense.” In Monroe, we held that, “[b]ecause the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4(m) indicates the legislature’s intent to punish as ‘separate offense[s]’ violations of subsections (a) and (b), charged violations of those subsections cannot merge.” Monroe, 315 Ga. at 787. As we 65 explained, The plain language of [OCGA § 16-15-4(m)] evidences the legislature’s clear intent to designate certain crimes as “separate offense[s]” subject to separate punishments. Those crimes that constitute separate offenses under subsection (m) are specifically “crime[s] committed in violation of this Code section.” Subsection (m) appears within “Code section” 16-15-4. Thus, subsection (m) indicates that the crimes which should be treated as “separate offense[s]” are those violations of law defined in OCGA § 16-15-4, including, as relevant here, violations of subsections (a) and (b), each of which specifies that “[i]t shall be unlawful” for a person to engage in certain conduct. Id. at 786–87 (citations omitted). Although Monroe did not expressly consider whether charged violations of subsections (a) and (d) of OCGA § 16-15-4 merge, our rationale for concluding that violations of subsections (a) and (b) cannot merge applies equally to subsections (a) and (d). Under subsection (m), “the crimes which should be treated as ‘separate offense[s]’ are those violations of law defined in OCGA § 16-15-4”— including, as relevant here, violations of subsections (a) and (d)— “each of which specifies that ‘[i]t shall be unlawful’ for a person to engage in certain conduct.” Monroe, 315 Ga. at 787. See OCGA § 16- 66 15-4(a) & (d). And because the plain language of OCGA § 16-15-4(m) indicates that the legislature intended to punish violations of subsection (a) and (d) as “separate offense[s],” charged violations of those subsections cannot merge. OCGA § 16-15-4(m)....

Rhodes v. State (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 12, 2025

...Rule 403 permits exclusion.” Butler v. State, 310 Ga. 892, 898 (2) (855 SE2d 551) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). Here, Rhodes was charged with violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. See OCGA § 16-15-4....
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Rosenau v. State, 914 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2025 | 321 Ga. 299

...568, 574 (2) (889 SE2d 824) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted). The Gang Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . associated with a criminal street gang to . . . participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of” certain enumerated offenses. OCGA § 16-15-4 (a). To establish a violation of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State is required to prove four elements: (1) the existence of a “criminal street gang,” defined in 7 OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) as “any organization, association, or group of th...

Rooks v. The State (two Cases) (Ga. 2023).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 24, 2023 | 321 Ga. 299

...The evidence also was constitutionally sufficient for a jury to find Rooks and Clark guilty of the criminal street gang crimes of which they were convicted. To establish that Rooks and Clark participated in criminal street gang activity under OCGA § 16-15-4 (a), the State was required to prove four elements: (1) the existence of a “criminal street gang,” defined in OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) as “any organization, association, or group of three or more persons associated in fac...
...as a criminal street gang; photos showing the defendant making Slime hand signs; and evidence that the defendant killed the victim to retaliate against him for disrespecting Slime, sufficiently established the elements of OCGA § 16-15-4 (a) and thus authorized the jury to find him guilty of participating in criminal street gang activity).11 Contentions Raised Only by Clark 3....
...intrinsic evidence and because it satisfied OCGA § 24-4-418 (“Rule 418”), which says that evidence of a defendant’s commission of criminal gang activity shall be admissible in a criminal proceeding in which he is accused of violating OCGA § 16-15-4, but that the State generally must provide notice of its intent to offer such evidence at least 10 days before trial....