CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1984 | 252 Ga. 312
...re a "device" is physically placed. OCGA §
16-11-64 (b) (Code Ann. § 26-3004) provides: "When in the course of his official duties, a law enforcement officer desiring to make use of any device, but only as such term is specifically defined by Code Section
16-11-60 (Code Ann....
...on, under oath, of the district attorney of the circuit wherein the device is to be physically placed . . . any judge of the superior court of the circuit aforesaid may issue an investigation warrant permitting the use of devices, as defined by Code Section
16-11-60 (Code Ann. § 26-3009), for the surveillance of such person or place. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The word "device" is defined in OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...." The dispute between the parties now centers on the question of which of the pieces of equipment used by the district attorney the inductor coil on the one hand, or the control unit, computerized pen register and particularly the tape recorder, on the other hand, were "devices" within the purview of §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...nn. § 26-3004). Defendants urge that because the inductor coil, a piece of equipment essential to the success of the wiretap, both "intercepted" sounds and "transmitted" them to the listening post in Hapeville, the coil was a wiretap "device" under §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...The purpose of the General Assembly in enacting the law in question, insofar as telephone and other private communications are concerned, was to prevent such private conversations from being overheard by unauthorized persons. We therefore interpret the word "intercepting" in OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-3009), like its federal counterpart, as "aural acquisition." Similarly, we find that the word "transmitting" in OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...Compare paragraph (1) of OCGA §
16-11-62 (Code Ann. § 26-3001) with paragraph (4) thereof. We therefore conclude that the inductor coil involved here was not a device used to overhear, record or intercept defendant's conversations within the meaning of OCGA §§
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...We find no error. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Clarke, Smith and Bell, JJ., who dissent. GREGORY, Justice, concurring. I agree with all that is said in the majority and add these thoughts with regard to Division One of the opinion. OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...Because today's majority opinion produces a result squarely contradictory to the fundamental intent of our electronic surveillance statute, I dissent. This case turns upon whether the inductor coils utilized by the Fulton district attorney's surveillance team are "devices" within the meaning of OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-3009). If they are, then the warrants issued in this case were defective, as they were not applied for or issued in the circuit where these "devices" were physically placed. OCGA §
16-11-64 (b) (Code Ann. § 26-3004); §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-3009). The majority, showing undue concern with administrative inconvenience (majority opinion at 318), concludes that inductor coils are not devices within the meaning of OCGA §
16-11-60 (1) (Code Ann....
...torney. [1] In view of this description of the function of an inductor coil, there can be no doubt that inductor coils clearly qualify as instruments or apparatuses which electronically intercept and transmit sounds within the facial meaning of OCGA §
16-11-60 (Code Ann....
...CGA Title 16, Ch. 11, Art. 3, Pt. 1 (Code Ann. § 26-3001 et seq.). But, this conclusion ignores the plain language of OCGA §
16-11-64 (Code Ann. § 26-3004), which speaks in terms of "a device, but only as such term is specifically defined by Code Section
16-11-60 (Code Ann. § 26-3009)," (emphasis supplied), and of "investigation warrants permitting the use of devices, as defined by Code Section
16-11-60 (Code Ann. § 26-3009)," (emphasis supplied). Because the General Assembly clearly intended that OCGA §
16-11-60 (Code Ann. § 26-3009) supply the sole definition of the term "device" governing state surveillance warrants, and because OCGA §
16-11-60's (Code Ann....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 17, 1987 | 256 Ga. 751
...rom Ellis' telephone. The appellants contend the warrant obtained in March was tainted by use of information recorded by the pen register which was installed without a warrant in violation of OCGA §
16-11-64 because it is a device covered by OCGA §§
16-11-60;
16-11-62....
...OCGA §
16-11-64 covers interception of wire or oral transmissions by law enforcement and provides in part "[W]hen in the course of his official duties, a law enforcement officer desiring to make use of any device, but only as such term is specifically defined by Code Section
16-11-60 and such use would otherwise constitute a violation of Code Section
16-11-62, the law enforcement officer shall act only in compliance with the procedure provided for in this subsection." OCGA §
16-11-64 (b)....
...As used in this statutory scheme a "device" is "an instrument or apparatus used for overhearing, recording, intercepting, or transmitting sounds or for observing, photographing, recording, or transmitting visual images and which involves in its operation electricity, electronics, infrared, laser or similar beams ..." OCGA §
16-11-60 (1)....
...The court relied on statutory language defining intercept as the "aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication." The state takes the position that the Georgia statute is similar in defining a device as something "used for overhearing, recording, intercepting, or transmitting sounds. " OCGA §
16-11-60, and argues that Evans holds that the only device requiring a warrant is the tape recorder. Evans presented the issue of whether an inductor coil placed in a telephone junction box was a "device" under OCGA §
16-11-60 in order to determine if the court which had in fact issued a warrant for electronic surveillance had jurisdiction over the phone lines in question....
...Evans does not hold, as the state argues, that only the tape recorder is a device, but only holds that the coil is not a device. Now that we are presented with the direct question on the pen register itself we hold that it is a "device" under OCGA §
16-11-60 et seq....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2017 | 807 S.E.2d 861
...We disagree.
At the time Brindle secretly video recorded Rogers and another person in Rogers’ home in June 2012, a “private place” for purposes of OCGA §
16-11-62 (2) was defined as “a place where one is entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance.” See former OCGA §
16-11-60 (3).11 Based on the indictment as written, and based on the plain language of the former *629version of OCGA §
16-11-60 (3), both Rogers and the other person who was secretly video recorded in the residence in this case would have had a reasonable expectation to be safe from “hostile intrusion or surveillance” in the places where they were video recorded....
...hin the residence that were outside of the public view. Accordingly, for these reasons alone, the places involved in this case would meet the statutory definition of “private place [s]” that were “out of public view.” OCGA §§
16-11-62 (2);
16-11-60 (3).
Although there is nothing in the plain language of former OCGA §
16-11-62 (2) to indicate that Rogers and the other person in the residence would no longer have a reasonable expectation to be safe from the “hostile intrusion” of h...
...ideo surveillance that would not be subject to the one-party-consent exception created by OCGA §
16-11-66 (a).
The statute was amended in 2015 to define “private place” as “a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” OCGA §
16-11-60 (3).
This is not to say, however, that our analysis of one’s reasonable expectation to be safe from “hostile or intrusive surveillance” under the former version of OCGA §
16-11-62 (2) is lim ited to the parameters set forth in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence....
...trusion of being secretly video recorded after Brindle entered the residence. Nor do we need to determine whether, by amending the statute in 2015 to define “private place” as “aplace where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” (OCGA §
16-11-60 (3)), the legislature intended for the definition of “private place” under OCGA §
16-11-62 (2) to only reference the “reasonable expectation of privacy” that one would have under the Fourth Amendment, as the language under the 20...
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 5, 2021 | 311 Ga. 259
...which shall originate in any
private place[.]” Since 2015, before the overhearing at issue in this case,
“private place” has been defined for purposes of this provision as “a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” OCGA §
16-11-60 (3).
7
such a violation in the scenario presented here, or whether a party
may forfeit a challenge to standing of this sort by not raising it in a
timely way before the trial court.3
It is fundamental that harm as well as error must be
shown for reversal....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 15, 2021 | 310 Ga. 762
...his motion in limine to exclude the audio recording that Pridgen
secretly made of a conversation that he had with Appellant.
Appellant relies on OCGA §
16-11-67, which says: “No evidence
obtained in a manner which violates any of the provisions of this
part [i.e., OCGA §§
16-11-60 to
16-11-70] shall be admissible in any
court of this state except to prove violations of this part.” However,
the provision that governs audio recordings is OCGA §
16-11-62 (1),
which says: “It shall be unlawful for ....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 25, 1989 | 259 Ga. 278
...A search of their cars yielded the contraband for which appellants now face charges. 2. We are guided to a decision in this case by the prior case of Ellis v. State,
256 Ga. 751 (353 SE2d 19) (1987). In Ellis, we held that a pen register is a "device" as defined in OCGA §
16-11-60, the use of which requires a properly issued warrant under state law....
...ct attorney of the circuit wherein the device is to be physically placed, or the Attorney General, ... any judge of the superior court of the circuit aforesaid may issue an investigation warrant permitting *282 the use of devices, as defined by Code Section
16-11-60, for the surveillance of such person or place....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 21, 2020 | 310 Ga. 624
...Only Nuckles
filed a petition for certiorari in this Court.
8 At the time that the video recording was made, the statutory term
“private place” was defined in this context as “a place where one is entitled
reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance.”
OCGA §
16-11-60 (3) (2002)....
...h this Court
granted to consider the issue of whether the video recording fell
within the Security Exception.9
That amendment changed the definition of “private place” to “a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” OCGA §
16-11-60 (3)....
...is erected or growing upon or affixed to land”).
We turn next to the meaning of “occupier” in the term “occupier
of real property” under the Security Exception. Unlike the term
“private place,” “occupier” is not defined in this context under OCGA
§
16-11-60....
