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2018 Georgia Code 16-13-43 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 13. Controlled Substances, 16-13-1 through 16-13-114.

ARTICLE 2 REGULATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

16-13-43. Unauthorized distribution; penalties.

  1. It is unlawful for any person:
    1. Who is a registrant to distribute a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II, except pursuant to an order form as required by Code Section 16-13-40;
    2. To use, in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, a registration number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person;
    3. To acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, or theft;
    4. To furnish false or fraudulent material information in, or omit any material information from, any application, report, or other document or record required to be kept or filed under this article;
    5. To make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing, upon any drug or container or labeling thereof so as to render the drug a counterfeit substance; or
    6. To withhold information from a practitioner that such person has obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.
  2. Any person who violates this Code section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, may be imprisoned for not more than eight years or fined not more than $50,000.00, or both.

(Code 1933, § 79A-819, enacted by Ga. L. 1967, p. 296, § 1; Code 1933, § 79A-822, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 221, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1668, § 11; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1219, § 6; Ga. L. 1987, p. 261, § 6.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Merger inappropriate when prescriptions picked up on different dates.

- Although the accomplice's conduct in fraudulently representing to the pharmacist that the accomplice had a doctor's authority to call in the prescriptions for the defendant occurred in a single telephone call, the defendant's conduct of acquiring possession of that prescription by going to the pharmacy to pick up that prescription on that date and on a separate occasion 10 days later was not the same conduct for the purpose of deciding whether the offenses merged; thus, Count 8 of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud did not merge with Counts 1 or 2 for sentencing purposes. Hopkins v. State, 328 Ga. App. 844, 761 S.E.2d 896 (2014).

Cited in Barner v. State, 139 Ga. App. 50, 227 S.E.2d 874 (1976); Elrod v. State, 143 Ga. App. 331, 238 S.E.2d 291 (1977); Goldsmith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 786, 252 S.E.2d 657 (1979); Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981); Smith v. State, 221 Ga. App. 670, 472 S.E.2d 503 (1996); Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 799 S.E.2d 229 (2017).

Forged Prescriptions

Acquiring possession of controlled substance through forged prescription is essence of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-43(a)(3). State v. O'Neal, 156 Ga. App. 384, 274 S.E.2d 575 (1980).

O.C.G.A.

§ 16-13-43(a)(3) did not repeal O.C.G.A. § 16-9-1 by implication. - Repeal by implication is not favored, and if later Act does not embrace whole subject matter of prior Act and is not entirely repugnant to it, the court should apply a construction that will give the two statutes concurrent efficacy. State v. O'Neal, 156 Ga. App. 384, 274 S.E.2d 575 (1980).

Prosecution for violation of paragraph (a)(3) as bar to reindictment and reprosecution.

- If former Code 1933, § 79A-822 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-43) was exclusive section to be applied in a given case, former Code 1933, § 26-1701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-9-1) still generally proscribed part of same conduct, and any attempt to reindict and reprosecute would be barred by a plea of former jeopardy under former Code 1933, § 26-507 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8). State v. O'Neal, 156 Ga. App. 384, 274 S.E.2d 575 (1980).

Evidence sufficient for obtaining controlled substance by fraud conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of five counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud because, although only the defendant's alleged accomplice testified that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to obtain possession of the controlled substances by fraud and deception, the state presented evidence of corroborating circumstances that proved the defendant's intent as the defendant went to the pharmacy on one occasion to pick up a medication that was clearly labeled as having been dispensed for the defendant, purportedly on the authority of a doctor who had never provided care for the defendant. Hopkins v. State, 328 Ga. App. 844, 761 S.E.2d 896 (2014).

New trial properly denied.

- Since the jury was properly instructed as to the charged offense of criminal attempt to obtain possession of a controlled substance by forgery, the defendant did not request that the word "forgery" be defined, and the defendant did not take the position that forgery was a lesser-included offense of the crime of attempting to obtain possession of a controlled substance by forgery, a new trial was properly denied; further, the term "forgery" was not so obscure or technical that it required the court to sua sponte define the term for the jury. Sosebee v. State, 282 Ga. App. 905, 640 S.E.2d 379 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Drugs and Controlled Substances, §§ 19 et seq., 31, 40, 45, 168, 196.

C.J.S.

- 28 C.J.S., Drugs and Narcotics, §§ 188, 189, 196, 263, 269.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Controlled Substances Act (U.L.A.) § 403.

ALR.

- What constitutes "possession" of a narcotic drug proscribed by § 2 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 91 A.L.R.2d 810.

Offense of aiding and abetting illegal possession of drugs or narcotics, 47 A.L.R.3d 1239.

Validity and construction of statute creating presumption or inference of intent to sell from possession of specified quantity of illegal drugs, 60 A.L.R.3d 1128.

Common-law right of action for damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drug to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528; 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Criminal responsibility for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 99 A.L.R.3d 854.

Social host's liability for injuries incurred by third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-13-43

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 17, 2017 | 799 S.E.2d 229

...controlled substance) by “withholding information from various [medical] practitioners . . . that [the defendants] had obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.” See OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6).9 Count 1 says that the pattern of racketeering activity is “more particularly described” in subsequent counts of the indictment, and indeed, 19 other counts charge various defendants with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by wit...
...at 383-384 (2) (a), as well as the denial of their special demurrers seeking more detail about the alleged acts of racketeering. See id. at 386-387 (2) (b) (ii). We do not address those aspects of the decision below. Doerr and Downard are not parties to this appeal. See OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Paragraph 16-13-43 (a) (6) makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o withhold information from a practitioner that such person has obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.” The patte...
...actitioner); and Counts 47, 49, and 50 (charging Downard with obtaining Oxycodone by withholding information from a practitioner). Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 14 charge Mayfield with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by subterfuge in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3). Counts 12 and 13 charge Mayfield with unlawfully obtaining Hydrocodone (a Schedule III controlled substance) by subterfuge and withholding information from a practitioner in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3) and (6). Count 16 charges Kimbrough with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by subterfuge in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3). Count 23 charges Doerr with unlawful possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. Counts 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, and 36 charge Doerr with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by subterfuge in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3). Counts 37 through 46 charge Downard with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by subterfuge in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3), as does Count 48. Count 1 specifies that the pattern of racketeering activity consists of the defendants “unlawfully obtain[ing] possession of Oxycodone ... by withholding information from various practitioners . . . that [the defendants] had obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner,” conduct that is prohibited by OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6). We note that obtaining a controlled substance by “subterfuge” is separately prohibited by OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3), and because Count 1 says nothing about “subterfuge” in its specification of the racketeering activity that forms the basis of the RICO charge, the counts charging the defendants with obtaining Oxycodone by subterfuge are not predicates of the RICO charge....
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Whatley v. State, 297 Ga. 399 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2015 | 774 S.E.2d 687

...Decided: June 29, 2015 S15A0032. WHATLEY v. THE STATE. MELTON, Justice. On March 28, 2013, Bernadette Bowie Whatley was indicted for withholding information from a practitioner pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6)....
...of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner." On April 24, 2013, Whatley filed a general demurrer, contending among other things that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court ruled that OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and we granted Whatley’s application for an interlocutory appeal to consider the propriety of this ruling....
...“[W]hen a statute or ordinance does not implicate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, a facial vagueness challenge will be upheld only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 374. Whatley does not argue that OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) violates her First Amendment freedoms, so Whatley would necessarily have to challenge the 2 constitutionality of the statute as applied to the specific facts of her case. A review of the record, however, indicates that Whatley challenged OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) on its face, not as applied....
...escribed, and a general period of time during which the statute was allegedly violated. There is no indication anywhere in the record that Whatley raised an argument with regard to the facts of her specific case, much less the application of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) to her specific facts....
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In re Chambers, 264 Ga. 317 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 27, 1994 | 444 S.E.2d 313, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2131

...Chambers filed a petition for voluntary discipline, requesting this Court to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months for violating Standard 66 of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) (conviction of a felony). Chambers had been convicted of three counts of Obtaining Controlled Substances by Fraud, in violation of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3)....

Whatley v. State (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2015 | 444 S.E.2d 313, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2131

297 Ga. 399 FINAL COPY S15A0032. WHATLEY v. THE STATE. MELTON, Justice. On March 28, 2013, Bernadette Bowie Whatley was indicted for withholding information from a practitioner pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6)....
...of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner." On April 24, 2013, Whatley filed a general demurrer, contending among other things that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court ruled that OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and we granted Whatley’s application for an interlocutory appeal to consider the propriety of this ruling....
...“[W]hen a statute or ordinance does not implicate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, a facial vagueness challenge will be upheld only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 374. Whatley does not argue that OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) violates her First Amendment freedoms, so Whatley would necessarily have to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the specific facts of her case. A review of the record, however, indicates that Whatley challenged OCGA § 2 16-13-43 (a) (6) on its face, not as applied....
...escribed, and a general period of time during which the statute was allegedly violated. There is no indication anywhere in the record that Whatley raised an argument with regard to the facts of her specific case, much less the application of OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6) to her specific facts....
...36 (273 SE2d 616) (1981). Nonetheless, since Whatley’s general demurrer was properly denied, we affirm the judgment of the trial court under the right-for-any-reason rule. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. Decided June 29, 2015. OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6); constitutional question....
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In re Brooks, 266 Ga. 159 (Ga. 1996).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 8, 1996 | 464 S.E.2d 821, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 165

Per curiam. The Respondent, Christopher P. Brooks, has petitioned this Court for the voluntary surrender of his license to practice law in this state.1 In his petition, Brooks admitted that he had pled guilty to violating OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (3), a felony, and that his conviction violated Standard 66 of Bar Rule 4-102 (d)....