O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-50 (2019)

Burden of proof; liability of enforcement officers in lawful performance of duties

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this article in any complaint, accusation, indictment, or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this article. The burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it. (b) In the absence of proof that a person is the duly authorized holder of an appropriate registration or order form issued under this article, he is presumed not to be the holder of the registration or form. The burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption. (c) No liability is imposed by this article upon any authorized state,

county, or municipal officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.

History

Code 1933, § 79A-829, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 221, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Former Code 1933, § 79A-829 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-50) was not unconstitutional upon the statute’s face. Strong v. State, 246 Ga. 612, 272 S.E.2d 281, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1224 (1980). Defendant need not prove prescription was written for legitimate medical purpose. - Former Code 1933, § 79A-829 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-50) would be unconstitutionally applied if the trial court were to charge that the statute required the defendant to prove that medical prescriptions were written for legitimate medical purpose within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 79A-820 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-41(f)(3)) rather than charging that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt those allegations of the indictment. Strong v. State, 246 Ga. 612, 272 S.E.2d 281, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1224 (1980). Qualification of expert to perform drug analysis. - When a pretrial hearing to determine whether an expert designated by appellant was qualified to perform analysis of alleged drugs revealed that the expert was neither licensed, registered, nor otherwise exempted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., and when the trial court gave defense counsel approximately 24 hours to determine whether counsel wished to qualify this expert for any procedures which did not require reference samples of the controlled substance, or to qualify another expert, and counsel did neither, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for independent laboratory

analysis. McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga. App. 23, 295 S.E.2d 114, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3260 (1982). Court must instruct jury on specific exemption raised as sole defense. - Question of fact was presented as to the applicability of statutory exception, and it was error to fail to instruct jury on specific exemption raised by defendant as defendant’s sole defense. Bryan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 635, 278 S.E.2d 177, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1946 (1981). State not required to allege non-existence of affirmative defenses. - Defendant’s indictment for possessing and selling XLR11 withstood a general demurrer because the indictment alleged the essential elements of the offenses under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b); under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-50(a), the state was not required to allege the affirmative defenses in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-25(12) such as that the XLR11 was intended for human consumption. Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 830 S.E.2d 195, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 448 (2019). Co-owner who asserts the innocent owner exception under the statute has a two-fold burden. First, in order to establish standing to contest the forfeiture, the co-owner has the burden of proving the nature and extent of the co-owner’s interest in the property. Second, the co-owner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the co-owner is entitled to the exception as defined by the statute. State v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 399 S.E.2d 88, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1384 (1990).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Drugs and Controlled Substances, §§ 204, 205.

C.J.S. 28 C.J.S., Drugs and Narcotics, §§ 249, 256. 28A C.J.S., Drugs and Narcotics,

§ 344 et seq. 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, § 302. U.L.A. Uniform Controlled Substances Act (U.L.A.) § 506. ALR. Instruction applying rule of reasonable doubt specifically to particular matter or defense as curing instruction placing

burden of proof upon defendant in that regard, 120 A.L.R. 591. Burden of proof and presumptions in tracing currency, bank account, or cash equivalent to illegal drug trafficking so as to permit forfeiture, or declaration as contraband, under state law, 104 A.L.R.5th 229.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1984–2019 · leading case: State of Ga. v. Banks, 452 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
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State of Ga. v. Banks, 452 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 16-13-50 (a). First, in order to establish standing to contest the forfeiture the [claimant] has the burden of proving the nature and extent of his interest in the property.”
State of Ga. v. Jackson, 399 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 16-13-50 (a). First, in order to establish standing to contest the forfeiture the co-owner has the burden of proving the nature and extent of his interest in the property.”
May v. State, 348 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “As such, it amounts to an affirmative defense (OCGA § 16-13-50), with the initial burden of producing evidence to support the affirmative defense resting upon the defendant.”
Snelling v. State, 335 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “As in other cases where affirmative defenses are involved, we conclude that an affirmative defense (i.e., a non-compliance by the officer or denial of an opportunity even where the rights have been enunciated) is a matter for the defendant to raise and not a matter for the state…”
Morgan v. State, 323 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-13-50 (a) (Code Ann. § 79A-829), relating to the burden of proof as to exemptions or exceptions to the forfeiture law, states: “It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception .”
Corbitt v. State, 315 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 16-13-50 (a) (Code Ann. § 79A-829).”
Sellers v. State, 355 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 16-13-50 (a). In Strong v. State, 246 Ga.”
Budhani v. State, 830 S.E.2d 195 (2019). · cites it 9× “(c) Moreover, Budhani's argument also fails because OCGA § 16-13-50 (a) confirms that the exceptions listed in OCGA § 16-13-25 (12) are affirmative defenses-not elements of the crime-and, as a result, the State is not required to allege them in the indictment.”
Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 15× “4 To that end, OCGA § 16-13-50 (a), which sets out the burden of proof for exceptions and exemptions contained in the Controlled Substances Act, provides in pertinent part that “[i]t is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this article in any…”
Medley v. State, 390 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “Generally speaking, it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under his or her control any controlled substances except as specifically authorized by the Controlled Substances Act.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.