O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 (2019)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such

seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure.” Law reviews. For article, “A Comprehensive Analysis of Georgia RICO,” see 9 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 537 (1993). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Limitations start for state racketeering suit. - In a state civil

RICO suit, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the cause

of action accrues, and not from the time that the racketeering activity terminates. Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 676, 426 S.E.2d 165, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1742 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0520, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 163 (Ga. Feb. 5, 1993). Civil RICO cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that plaintiff has been injured and that plaintiff’s injury is part of a pattern. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 665 (1995). Tolling of statute. - Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2(2), the statute of limitation for criminal prosecution of RICO violations was tolled up to the time the victim and the state first learned of the predicate offenses. Adams v. State, 231 Ga. App. 279, 499 S.E.2d 105, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (1998). Trial court erred by applying O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.2 to the RICO and theft charges against defendants because it was necessary for the state to show that the victim was over 65 years of age, was the principal stockholder of the corporation, was the owner of the property allegedly stolen, not the corporation, to determine the date the crime became known to the victim. Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 145 (2013). Unpublished decision: Court did not err in dismissing the tax advisor’s claims as time-barred because the advisor filed the complaint long after the limitations periods governing the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and Georgia RICO claims expired, and the advisor had not plausibly alleged that the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the causes of action and thus could not have invoked tolling because the advisor received direct information that conflicted with the bank entities’ representation that the tax shelter transactions at issue had economic substance, the advisor did not explain how the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in light of that notice, and the advisor did not explain why the advisor could not have sued earlier. Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 592 Fed. Appx. 812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22077 (11th Cir. 2014). Claim time-barred. - Claim by a partnership against the partnership’s

former managing partner was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 since the partnership should have known about the alleged racketeering by 1993 at the latest, when several partners began to question the former partner about partnership checks that the former partner had written to the former partner; the “separate accrual rule” did not apply because there was no new and independent injury. Cochran Mill Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 648 S.E.2d 764, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 764 (2007). Trial court did not err by dismissing an indictment charging the defendants with racketeering violations and conspiracy as the state failed to prove that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred less than five years from the date of the indictment. State v. Conzo, 293 Ga. App. 72, 666 S.E.2d 404, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 812 (2008). Trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s civil RICO claims based on the statute of limitation as the statute contained no language imperatively requiring retroactive application of the revised limitation period, and nothing in the act as a whole demanded a conclusion that the legislature intended such. Glock, Inc. v. Harper, 340 Ga. App. 65, 796 S.E.2d 304, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 9 (2017). In the six plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging sexual abuse by two scoutmasters, whose troop meetings were hosted on the churches’ property from the 1950s to the 1980s, the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., claims were time-barred by the five-year statute of limitation in the pre-July 1, 2015, version of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 as the plaintiffs knew they were injured by a pattern of misconduct when the sexual abuse began and continued for months and years while the churches did not intervene; and the statute of limitations ceased tolling when they reached the age of majority. McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 361 Ga. App. 877, 864 S.E.2d 189, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 517 (2021). Claim not time barred. - Defendant’s action was not time-barred as checks were written to the defendant from

a co-conspirator less than five years before the action was filed. Whaley v. State, 343 Ga. App. 701, 808 S.E.2d 88, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2017). Criminal prosecution time barred. - Defendant’s convictions for theft by conversion and a RICO violation were reversed because the state failed to carry the state’s burden to prove that the defendant was indicted on the counts

within the applicable statutes of limitation as the evidence showed that the victims, and therefore the state, had actual knowledge of the offenses more than five years prior to the June 12, 2009 indictment, and the state produced no evidence or argument to the contrary. Jannuzzo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 760, 746 S.E.2d 238, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 606 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Commencement of limitation period for criminal prosecution under Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), (18 USCS §§ 1961-1968), 89 A.L.R. Fed. 887.