Crimes are not committed by accident.

- Jury instruction that crimes are not committed by accident was not erroneous, as such an instruction is an authorized reference to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Stone v. State, 257 Ga. App. 306, 570 S.E.2d 715 (2002).

Defendant's request to charge the jury on accident was properly denied as the state's evidence indicated that defendant was the aggressor in the attack and that defendant intentionally threw a cup of liquid containing bleach into the victim's face; further, defendant admitted that defendant intentionally knocked the cup of bleach out of the victim's hand. Payne v. State, 273 Ga. App. 483, 615 S.E.2d 564 (2005).

Offense of murder may be committed when there is no actual intent to kill. Keye v. State, 136 Ga. App. 707, 222 S.E.2d 172 (1975).

Strict criminal liability.

- In a prosecution for driving an unsafe motor vehicle with defective equipment, the defense of accident did not apply. The fact that there was no criminal scheme, undertaking, or criminal negligence was not a defense to a strict liability criminal statute. Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994).

After the defendant was charged with disobeying a traffic control device, rejection of an instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2 was proper because the charge was a strict liability offense. Arnold v. State, 228 Ga. App. 470, 491 S.E.2d 819 (1997).

Accidental death not attributable to conduct of defendant.

- Homicide by accident as defined in former Code 1933, § 26-602 does not include death from accidental means not attributable to any conduct, culpable or otherwise, on part of defendant. Johnson v. State, 239 Ga. 324, 236 S.E.2d 661 (1977).

Defendant's testimony suggesting that the victim died from a drug overdose and denying that defendant took any action to cause the victim's death by manual strangulation did not involve homicide by accident, but only death from accidental means not attributable to any conduct on the part of defendant; thus, this testimony did not raise the issue of accident or misfortune, but related solely to causation, and defendant was not entitled to a charge on the law of accident. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. 104, 610 S.E.2d 66 (2005).

Decision to pursue accident defense not ineffective assistance.

- Defense counsel's decision to pursue an accident defense was an informed strategic choice and was not ineffective assistance of counsel as the decision was not due to a misunderstanding of the law or the facts of the case; rather, counsel consulted with the defendant and learned that the defendant contended that the gun accidentally discharged. There was no evidence that the defendant pointed the gun at the victim before the shooting occurred and there was no dispute as to how the fatal injury was inflicted. Mayberry v. State, 281 Ga. 144, 635 S.E.2d 736 (2006).

Consideration of section in connection with involuntary manslaughter section.

- When the court attempts to apply involuntary manslaughter section, the court must consider in connection therewith former Code 1933, § 26-404 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2), the ordinary care sections, former Code 1933, §§ 105-201 and 105-401 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-2 and51-3-1), together with the section which specifies indispensable ingredients of crime. Geele v. State, 203 Ga. 369, 47 S.E.2d 283 (1948).

Failure to charge accident in child molestation trial.

- When there was evidence that defendant may have unintentionally touched the victim while sleeping in the same bed with the victim, and the record reflected that the accident was the entire thrust of defendant's defense, the trial court was required to give appropriate instructions on this principle to call the defense to the jury's attention. Metts v. State, 210 Ga. App. 197, 435 S.E.2d 525 (1993).

In a child molestation case, the defendant was not entitled to an accident defense jury instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2; the defense relied upon by the defendant at trial was not that the illegal conduct occurred by accident but that the illegal conduct never happened at all. Haynes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 81, 635 S.E.2d 370 (2006).

DUI offense.

- Trial court erred in the court's charge to the jury because the charge had the effect of eliminating the jury's consideration of the defendant's defense that the defendant was not driving or in actual physical control of the car. Defendant claimed that the car's movement was "an accident" caused by the defendant's falling headfirst onto the floorboard. Virgil v. State, 227 Ga. App. 96, 488 S.E.2d 694 (1997).

Driving under the influence and failure to maintain lane convictions were affirmed because defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the law of accident as the charges related not to the accident but to defendant's condition while driving. Moreover, the defendant did not admit to driving under the influence or failure to maintain a lane, and, as a result, defendant had no right to a charge of accident with regard to these crimes. Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 412, 587 S.E.2d 868 (2003).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence and making an improper lane change, because the defendant did not request instructions on accident and justification, the trial court did not err in failing to give them; moreover, because the jury was charged on involuntary intoxication, the failure to charge on accident was not harmful as a matter of law. Walker v. State, 280 Ga. App. 393, 634 S.E.2d 177 (2006).

Relevant evidence to defendant's defense of accident.

- In connection with defendant's conviction for reckless driving, causing serious bodily injury due to reckless driving, and other crimes, the trial court abused the court's discretion in granting the state's motion in limine to exclude defendant's evidence of the design of the intersection as such evidence was relevant to defendant's defense of accident. Dunagan v. State, 283 Ga. 501, 661 S.E.2d 525 (2008).

Malfunction of light showing green lights in both directions is not accident defense.

- When the case arose from an intersection collision between a car which the defendant drove and another car, because the trial court correctly and repeatedly charged that the defendant could be convicted only if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the stop light facing the defendant was red, any defense based upon the light being green when the defendant went through it was not an accident defense; logically, one cannot be convicted of running a red light if the light was, in fact, green; accordingly, the defendant's contention that there was a malfunction of the light showing green lights in both directions did not give rise to the defense of accident. Hoffer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 378, 384 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 307 (1989).

Charge on homicide by accident does not conflict with charge on law of reasonable doubt. Jones v. State, 140 Ga. 478, 79 S.E. 114 (1913).

Charging O.C.G.A.

§ 16-2-2 does not cure omission to charge law of voluntary manslaughter. - Instruction charging this section does not cure failure to charge law of manslaughter when required. Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369, 123 S.E. 126 (1924).

Instruction which embraces law embodied in this section does not cure omission of court to charge law of involuntary manslaughter, when latter grade of homicide is involved in case. Jackson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 468, 159 S.E. 293 (1931).

Charge on accident using words "any neglect" rather than "culpable neglect" is error.

- Charge that "No one can be convicted for an accident unmixed with any neglect" was error in that court used words "any neglect" instead of words "culpable neglect," and "any neglect" is patently a broader expression than "culpable neglect." Dunahoo v. State, 46 Ga. App. 310, 167 S.E. 614 (1933).

When essential elements of crime are charged, statute need not be charged absent request.

- Charge of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2 is not required in absence of timely written request when the court charges on essential elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged, including necessity of intent, with which the crime is committed. Whigham v. State, 131 Ga. App. 261, 205 S.E.2d 467 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Harris v. State, 145 Ga. App. 675, 244 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Henderson v. State, 141 Ga. App. 430, 233 S.E.2d 505 (1977).

Charge not required where defendant did nothing by accident or mistake.

- Although there may be evidence that the defendant's sister accidentally left the diazepam in defendant's possession, where there is nothing to indicate that the defendant personally did anything by accident or mistake, a charge on accident or misfortune is not required, particularly in the absence of a request for one. Sampson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 833, 303 S.E.2d 77 (1983).

Although defendant may not have initially acted aggressively toward the victim, by defendant's own admission the victim was attempting to run from defendant at the time defendant intentionally struck the victim again with a gun and the gun discharged. Thus, notwithstanding defendant's contention that accident constituted defendant's sole defense, the trial court was not required to give a charge thereon since it was not authorized by the evidence. Gaston v. State, 209 Ga. App. 477, 433 S.E.2d 306 (1993).

Trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury as to an accident defense since the defendant tried to remain locked in defendant's prison cell and injured a corrections officer when the officer tried to get defendant out of the cell after the officer threatened to place the defendant in a padded cell if the defendant did not quit yelling. Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 678, 572 S.E.2d 38 (2002).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of accident and justification as the defendant denied shaking the baby and, given the undisputed evidence regarding the number and severity of the child's injuries, the amount of force required to inflict the injuries, and that such injuries could not have been inflicted by accident, it was unlikely the jury would have found in the defendant's favor on either defense. Noel v. State, 297 Ga. 698, 777 S.E.2d 449 (2015).

Harmless error found.

- Any error in the failure to charge accident in a situation in which the gun going off and hitting the first officer as well as the police vehicle could be deemed an "accident" if defendant did not intend those results was harmless as the first officer was not shot and defendant was acquitted of the charges related to the shooting of the second officer and the police vehicle. Mills v. State, 273 Ga. App. 699, 615 S.E.2d 824 (2005).

Charge not required where participation in crime denied.

- Defendant's denial of participation in any manner in the crime, accidentally, mistakenly, or otherwise was inconsistent with the defendant's request to charge that one is not guilty of a crime if the act is committed by misfortune or accident. Gann v. State, 190 Ga. App. 82, 378 S.E.2d 369 (1989).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for felony murder, with the underlying felony being rape, among other crimes, the trial court did not err by refusing the defendant's request to instruct the jury that the defendant could not be found guilty if the victim's death was the result of an accident as such a defense was not available to the defendant since the defendant did not admit to the victim's killing but, instead, denied any involvement in the victim's death. Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (2009).

Trial court did not err by refusing to give the defendant's requested charge on misfortune or accident because the defendant, who was charged with driving under the influence, reckless driving, and failure to maintain lane, was not entitled to a charge that the accident was unavoidable; because the defendant did not admit to committing any act that constituted the offenses with which the defendant was charged, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on accident. Davis v. State, 301 Ga. App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0633, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 339 (Ga. 2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested charge on accident under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2 because the defendant repeatedly denied striking any vehicle in a parking lot. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court did not err by refusing to give the defendant's requested charge on the sole defense of accident because the defendant testified at trial and denied driving recklessly or with any disregard for the safety of other persons or property and the defense is only available when the defendant admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it. Lauderback v. State, 320 Ga. App. 649, 740 S.E.2d 377 (2013).

Collision during police chase not accident.

- In a prosecution for reckless conduct and battery arising from collisions occurring during a police chase, defendant was not entitled to a charge based on the defense that the collisions were accidents. Helton v. State, 216 Ga. App. 748, 455 S.E.2d 848 (1995).

Court must charge jury on accident where issue raised by defendant's testimony.

- When the defendant's testimony is sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether physical encounter is an accident or an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, it is harmful error for the court to fail to give any charge to the jury on an accident. Dotson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 113, 240 S.E.2d 238 (1977).

Failure to charge O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2 as a defense when such defense was supported by evidence and defendant's counsel had made a timely written request for the instruction was reversible error. Taylor v. State, 164 Ga. App. 660, 297 S.E.2d 755 (1982).

When accident is a main theory of defense, law relative thereto must be charged.

- When misadventure and accident was one of the main theories of the defense, and was involved by the evidence, it was error to omit to charge the law relative thereto, with or without a request. Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 184 S.E. 309 (1936).

Charge required when sole defense is accident.

- Even without request, when the defendant's sole defense is accident, the trial court must give appropriate instructions on this principle to call the defense to the jury's attention, and enable the jury to intelligently consider it. Metts v. State, 210 Ga. App. 197, 435 S.E.2d 525 (1993).

Evidence of criminal design.

- Homicide by misadventure, where the law absolves the slayer and holds the slayer guiltless of the crime, must not only exclude any evil design or intention on the slayer's part, but must also show an absence of culpable neglect, whether the evidence adduced to show an accidental killing may warrant an instruction upon manslaughter is a different question. Allen v. State, 134 Ga. 380, 67 S.E. 1038 (1910).

Evidence insufficient to establish accident.

- Sufficient evidence negated the defense of accident, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2, where the victim who was shot by defendant while hunting waved to signal defendant before the gun was fired and where defendant was hunting while on medication that could have caused mental and physical impairment; the jury also could have considered defendant's actions after the shooting in removing the victim's orange vest, hiding two guns, failing to aid the victim, and failing to alert paramedics of the victim's location. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 136, 630 S.E.2d 640 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to reject the defendant's accident defense and to convict the defendant of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim because the defendant's 21-year-old neighbor gave the 15-year-old defendant a loaded .38-caliber revolver; when the victim met the defendant the next afternoon, the defendant led the victim to where the defendant was keeping the gun and shot the victim; and, although the defendant's firearms expert testified that an accidental discharge was much more likely if the gun was cocked before being fired, the expert conceded on cross-examination that if somebody pulled the hammer back, that person was about to shoot. Kosturi v. State, 296 Ga. 512, 769 S.E.2d 294 (2015).

Failure to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of accident. was reversible error, where defendant's testimony was sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether any obstruction by defendant of a sheriff and sheriff's men was deliberate or accidental, i.e., caused by defendant's misfortune in being stricken ill while being confronted by the sheriff. Sapp v. State, 179 Ga. App. 614, 347 S.E.2d 354 (1986).

Trial court did not commit error by not charging the jury on accident and misfortune, as defendant did not submit a written request to charge on accident and misfortune and absent a written request it is not error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction. Colbert v. State, 263 Ga. App. 193, 587 S.E.2d 300 (2003).

Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were reversed because the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defense of accident as requested when that defense was raised by the evidence, and the Court of Appeals could not find that it was highly probable that the failure to give the requested charge did not contribute to the verdict; at least slight evidence supported the theory that the defendant armed oneself with a knife in order to fend off the victim's attack with a pipe wrench and that although the defendant was prepared to intentionally stab the victim in self-defense, the defendant did not do so, but the victim lunged at the defendant and was impaled on the knife. Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210, 684 S.E.2d 356 (2009).

Trial court did not err in rejecting the defendant's request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of accident, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2, since although the defendant said that the defendant did not fire a gun intentionally, the defendant also testified that the defendant climbed into bed with the victim holding a loaded handgun with the defendant's finger on the trigger because the defendant wanted the victim to understand the seriousness of the defendant's concerns about infidelity; while the defendant initially denied pointing the gun at the victim and said the defendant kept the gun by the defendant's side, the defendant later admitted that the defendant did point the gun at the victim's head and that the gun went off when the victim smacked the gun away, and misuse of a firearm in the manner described by the defendant showed a degree of culpability that constituted criminal negligence. Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 700 S.E.2d 544 (2010).

In a vehicular homicide case, any error in the trial court's failure to charge the jury on the law of accident under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2 was waived because the proposed charge was not in the record, and there was no evidence that it was the pattern charge, and the defendant failed to object after the charge was given as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(a). Rouen v. State, 312 Ga. App. 8, 717 S.E.2d 519 (2011).

Even if the evidence supported an instruction on accident, the trial court's refusal to give the instruction did not affect the outcome of the trial since the jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with malice necessarily meant that the jury would have rejected any accident defense. Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750, 778 S.E.2d 168 (2015).

Trial court's failure to give the defendant's requested charge on the principle of accident and misfortune to the jury constituted harmless error as there was no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different because, to accept the defendant's theory of accident, the jury would have had to believe the defendant's account of the shooting - that the defendant's wife accidentally pulled the trigger and was shot while the defendant was trying to wrestle the gun away from the wife; and, when the jury found the defendant guilty of malice murder, the jury necessarily had to have discredited the defendant's account of the shooting. McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 810 S.E.2d 77 (2018).

After the defendant was convicted of murder and related offenses arising out of the beating death of an 18-month-old child, the trial court did not err when the court failed to give the defendant's requested instructions on accident because evidence that the child might have fallen from the bed while sleeping and been injured did not involve homicide by accident but only death from accidental means not attributable to any conduct, culpable or otherwise, on the part of the defendant; and the defendant's admission that, in the days leading up to the child's death, the defendant had tripped over a board and fallen on top of the child did not account for the extent of the child's injuries and was not a basis for an accident instruction. Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5, 815 S.E.2d 875 (2018).

Charge on accident held proper.

- There was no reason to reverse the defendant's convictions because the trial court properly instructed the jury on the defense of accident, and as such: (1) followed the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2; (2) tracked the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions; and (3) did not diminish the state's burden of proving all elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Watkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 41, 658 S.E.2d 812 (2008).

In a defendant's homicide prosecution, the trial court did not err in failing to give the complete charge on accident requested by the defendant as the court instructed the jury on accident as defined under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Hamilton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 47, 676 S.E.2d 773 (2009).

Instruction on accident.

- Appellate court erred in reversing defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide based on her failure to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk because those charges were strict liability offenses to which the accident defense did not apply since it was undisputed she voluntarily drove into the crosswalk and struck the child. State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012).

When the defendant was convicted of malice murder and cruelty to children arising out of the death of the 17-month-old victim, the evidence presented did not authorize a charge on accident because the only evidence presented was that the victim's death was caused by tremendous blunt force trauma that could not have been the result of the victim falling off the bed or a self-inflicted injury; according to the medical examiner, the extensive internal injuries found in the victim's abdomen could not have been inflicted accidentally; and the defendant did not admit to others that the defendant struck the victim with tremendous force or even that the victim had fallen off the bed or onto any other object with such force. Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 783 S.E.2d 117 (2016).

Cited in Coggins v. State, 227 Ga. 426, 181 S.E.2d 47 (1971); Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971); Towns v. State, 127 Ga. App. 751, 195 S.E.2d 235 (1972); Spencer v. State, 231 Ga. 705, 203 S.E.2d 856 (1974); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 207 S.E.2d 494 (1974); Beckman v. State, 134 Ga. App. 118, 213 S.E.2d 527 (1975); D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975); Davis v. State, 138 Ga. App. 317, 226 S.E.2d 101 (1976); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 146, 231 S.E.2d 757 (1977); Harris v. State, 145 Ga. App. 675, 244 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Kimbrell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 302, 250 S.E.2d 883 (1978); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 634, 252 S.E.2d 62 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Johnson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 887, 262 S.E.2d 201 (1979); Davis v. State, 153 Ga. App. 847, 267 S.E.2d 263 (1980); Phillips v. State, 247 Ga. 13, 273 S.E.2d 606 (1981); Taylor v. State, 157 Ga. App. 212, 276 S.E.2d 691 (1981); Holt v. State, 247 Ga. 648, 278 S.E.2d 390 (1981); Pennamon v. State, 248 Ga. 611, 284 S.E.2d 403 (1981); Jones v. State, 161 Ga. App. 610, 288 S.E.2d 788 (1982); Mansfield v. State, 161 Ga. App. 875, 289 S.E.2d 814 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Stovall v. State, 169 Ga. App. 691, 314 S.E.2d 707 (1984); Kennedy v. State, 172 Ga. App. 336, 323 S.E.2d 169 (1984); Stewart v. State, 254 Ga. 233, 326 S.E.2d 763 (1985); Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 703, 331 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Laymac v. State, 181 Ga. App. 737, 353 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Flanders v. State, 188 Ga. App. 98, 371 S.E.2d 918 (1988); Fowler v. State, 188 Ga. App. 873, 374 S.E.2d 805 (1988); Stewart v. State, 261 Ga. 654, 409 S.E.2d 663 (1991); Polley v. State, 203 Ga. App. 825, 418 S.E.2d 107 (1992); Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 424 S.E.2d 638 (1992); Moore v. State, 220 Ga. App. 434, 469 S.E.2d 211 (1996); Johnson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 294, 477 S.E.2d 439 (1996); Smith v. State, 237 Ga. App. 852, 521 S.E.2d 7 (1999); Bolick v. State, 244 Ga. App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (2000); Sledge v. State, 245 Ga. App. 488, 537 S.E.2d 753 (2000); Atkins v. State, 274 Ga. 103, 549 S.E.2d 356 (2001); Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (2007); Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (2011); Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (2013).

Self-defense not shown.

- When person, acting in self-defense, intentionally shoots at another, defense of accidental killing is not involved. Dobbs v. State, 132 Ga. App. 368, 208 S.E.2d 178 (1974).

When one claims to be acting in self-defense, defense of accidental killing is not involved. Todd v. State, 149 Ga. App. 574, 254 S.E.2d 894 (1979).

Defendant's testimony that defendant fired a weapon to defend self from codefendant and to scare the codefendant off did not invoke the legal defense of accident. Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 480 S.E.2d 32 (1997).

Lack of intent to kill.

- Voluntary manslaughter conviction upheld after evidence failed to show accident, despite claims that defendant lacked the intent to kill; defendant's act of choking the victim and not letting go, even though defendant had the chance to do so, placed the victim in a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Blackford v. State, 251 Ga. App. 324, 554 S.E.2d 290 (2001).

No error in failing to instruct on self-defense.

- Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of accident because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that defendant's act of striking the victim was an accident; rather, defendant testified that defendant struck the victim in self-defense. As the jury believed defendant to be guilty of malice murder, it could not have believed the victim's death to be the result of an act committed in the absence of criminal intent. Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 599 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

Defenses of self-defense and accident inconsistent.

- Defenses of self-defense and justification do not deny the intent to inflict injury, but claim authority for the act under the legal excuse of reasonable fear of immediate serious harm to oneself or another. Since an accident defense involves the lack of intent to do the act at all, the two defenses are inconsistent. Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 816, 307 S.E.2d 712 (1983).

Defenses of self-defense and accident are inconsistent. Wilkerson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 26, 357 S.E.2d 814 (1987).

Trial court correctly ruled that defendant's requested charge setting forth the affirmative defense of accident was inconsistent with defendant's claim that defendant stabbed the victim in self-defense. Ray v. State, 191 Ga. App. 881, 383 S.E.2d 364 (1989).

Instructions on accident and justification authorized.

- When there is evidence of both justification and accident, and timely requests for instructions on both topics have been made, the trial court should instruct the jury as to both. Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994).

Instruction on self-defense and accident authorized.

- In a murder case, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on both self-defense and accident because the evidence supported both charges. The defendant testified that the victim was threatening the defendant and that the defendant used a knife to force the victim to get back; the defendant also testified that the defendant did not mean to stab the victim and that the defendant did not understand how the knife became lodged in the victim's chest. Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595, 669 S.E.2d 94 (2008).

Criminal negligence defined.

- Criminal negligence means not merely such negligence as might be foundation of damage suit, but reckless and wanton negligence and of such character as to show utter disregard for safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby. Keye v. State, 136 Ga. App. 707, 222 S.E.2d 172 (1975).

When homicide results from culpable neglect or unlawful act, defense of accident is not involved. Keye v. State, 136 Ga. App. 707, 222 S.E.2d 172 (1975).

Charge on accident not authorized when act was criminally negligent.

- When the defendant's act of shooting close to the victim in order to scare the victim was criminally negligent, a charge on accident was not authorized. Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979).

Cocking and aiming a gun, which tends to fire at the slightest touch, at someone's face is an act in utter disregard for the safety of that person and constitutes criminal negligence. Therefore, the defense of accident is inapplicable. New v. State, 260 Ga. 441, 396 S.E.2d 486 (1990); Campbell v. State, 263 Ga. 824, 440 S.E.2d 5 (1994).

When the defendant hit patrol cars while making a U-turn and appeared to be in full control of the vehicle just prior to impact and when there was no evidence authorizing a finding that the collisions occurred absent criminal negligence, the court's refusal to give an instruction on accident was proper. Black v. State, 222 Ga. App. 80, 473 S.E.2d 186 (1996).

Defendant approached the victim's car with a pistol, demanded money, and reached inside and shot the victim when the victim attempted to drive away. Even if the defendant did not intentionally fire the pistol, defendant's acts constituted criminal negligence rendering the defense of accident inapplicable. Griffeth v. State, 224 Ga. App. 462, 480 S.E.2d 889 (1997).

An instruction on the law of accident is not warranted when a knife is used to place someone in reasonable apprehension of bodily injury and the victim is unintentionally injured with the knife, since the intentional use of the knife constituted, at the least, criminal negligence. Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276, 496 S.E.2d 699 (1998).

After the defendant admitted in open court that the defendant armed with a revolver which was loaded because the defendant thought the defendant's significant other would see the gun and leave, and did not testify to believing to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, defendant showed utter disregard for the victim's safety as well as criminal negligence which precluded a charge to the jury on accident. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 61, 510 S.E.2d 918 (1999), overruled on other grounds by Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to a charge on accident because even if the defendant did not intentionally fire a shotgun, which injured the victim, the defendant's admitted acts in threatening the victim and another person and pointing a shotgun at the victim constituted criminal negligence. Arnold v. State, 303 Ga. App. 825, 695 S.E.2d 299 (2010).

Defendant admitted that the defendant pulled back the hammer of the gun and pointed the gun at the victim to scare the victim, but did not intend for the gun to go off; this testimony established criminal negligence, and the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on accident and misfortune under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Browner v. State, 296 Ga. 138, 765 S.E.2d 348 (2014).

Homicide occurring during aggravated assault not accident.

- Evidence that defendant had cocked a gun and pointed it at her husband's head in order to scare him, and that the gun discharged when the victim struck it with his arm, was sufficient to authorize a conviction for felony-murder and the defense of "accident" was inapplicable. Stiles v. State, 264 Ga. App. 446, 448 S.E.2d 172 (1994).

Theory of accident not supported.

- Evidence presented at trial did not support a theory of accident since the defendant pulled the hammer back on the pistol and pointed the pistol at the rape victim in order to get the victim to stop screaming, and in so doing the pistol discharged and the victim died. Brooks v. State, 262 Ga. 187, 415 S.E.2d 903 (1992).

In a prosecution for cruelty to children, where defendant's defense as to some of the injuries was that the child fell off a bunk bed, and where defendant had no knowledge of the origin of other injuries, the trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on the law of accident. Mansfield v. State, 214 Ga. App. 520, 448 S.E.2d 490 (1994).

No reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the defendant's murder trial would have been different even had trial counsel presented an expert's testimony as to the defendant's borderline intellectual functioning and organic brain damage in the guilt/innocence phase of the original trial because the defendant's own testimony acknowledged that the defendant shot the vehicle occupant purposefully, as opposed to accidentally, in attempting to obtain a vehicle to escape, and even if the defendant had been convicted of only malice murder, instead of felony murder, the defendant would have still remained eligible for the death penalty. Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706 (2013).

Failure to charge misfortune or accident is not error when crime resulted from unlawful act. Herrington v. State, 31 Ga. App. 167, 120 S.E. 554 (1923).

Homicide occurring by discharge of gun held by accused during attempted robbery.

- When it is shown by the evidence, and admitted in the defendant's statement, that the homicide occurred by the discharge of a gun held by the accused and used in an attempt to rob the deceased, even if the discharge of the gun was unintentional, the offense is murder; and in no view of such facts does it involve homicide by accident, or involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the court properly declined to give the requested charges on accidental homicide and involuntary manslaughter. Ford v. State, 202 Ga. 599, 44 S.E.2d 263 (1947).

Charge of aggravated assault for deliberately firing gun in direction of person.

- Deliberately firing gun in direction of human being in order to distract that person raises no issue of accident or misfortune when charge is aggravated assault. DeBerry v. State, 241 Ga. 204, 243 S.E.2d 864 (1978).

Swinging knife blade among group of persons as criminal negligence.

- Fact that criminal scheme or undertaking, or intention may not have been directed toward decedent, would not absolve defendant of consequences of act, inasmuch as act of swinging knife blade among a group of persons in close proximity can be found to be criminal negligence or culpable neglect, especially where defendant had opportunity to leave scene and avoid further confrontation, but chose not to do so. Keye v. State, 136 Ga. App. 707, 222 S.E.2d 172 (1975).

In prosecution for manslaughter resulting from battery, evidence of deceased's fall related to causation, not accident.

- When evidence adduced at trial of defendant charged with manslaughter resulting from battery to deceased showed that victim, prior to demise, fell down several steps, and further, that such fall could possibly result in a ruptured spleen and eventually, death, this evidence did not raise issue of accident or misfortune within meaning of statute; rather, it related solely to issue of causation. Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979).

Evidence did not raise issue of accident or misfortune.

- See Mills v. State, 187 Ga. App. 79, 369 S.E.2d 283 (1988).

Evidence that defendant drove tractor-trailer truck at a high rate of speed through an area that had signs and indications that slow-moving traffic was nearby was sufficient to show that the victim's death, which resulted from defendant's truck slamming into the back of the vehicle that the victim was in, was caused by culpable neglect or an unlawful act and was not the result of mere misfortune. Wilkes v. State, 254 Ga. App. 447, 562 S.E.2d 519 (2002).

Trial court did not err in refusing an instruction on the affirmative defense of accident because the defendant admitted going to the service station with the intent to rob the victim, admitted pointing a loaded gun at the victim, and acted with criminal negligence, rendering the defense of accident inadmissible. Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013).

Failure to charge section not reversible error.

- Charge of accident or misfortune in the case of a defendant who voluntarily consumed alcohol after defendant may have accidentally inhaled alcohol fumes from paint was perhaps authorized since defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, but failure to give the charge was not reversible error. Taylor v. State, 190 Ga. App. 79, 378 S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 899, 378 S.E.2d 335 (1989).

Instruction properly refused.

- Trial court properly refused to give a requested jury instruction on the defense of accident or misfortune, where defendant's own testimony showed that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit an aggravated assault upon the victim when the pistol discharged and the victim was struck by a bullet. Grude v. State, 189 Ga. App. 901, 377 S.E.2d 731 (1989).

During a fight, the victim was burned when the defendant applied a hot iron to her neck and shoulder area, and the defendant denied knowing that the iron was hot, the trial court did not err in refusing to give as a jury instruction the defendant's incomplete statement of the law set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Collier v. State, 195 Ga. App. 380, 393 S.E.2d 509 (1990).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on accident where defendant obtained a gun with intent to use it for intimidation, bravado or protection; if defendant used the gun for intimidation or bravado, the shooting was not an accident since defendant had the opportunity to leave the scene; if defendant shot the victim in self-defense, defendant was not entitled to the instruction because the defenses of self-defense and accident are inconsistent. Sumner v. State, 210 Ga. App. 856, 437 S.E.2d 855 (1993).

Because the defendant was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), the claim that defendant thought that the defendant was delivering marijuana to an informant's girlfriend rather than methamphetamine, based on prior marijuana deliveries made by the defendant for a drug dealer, did not warrant a jury instruction on accident pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2; the accident defense was unavailable to the defendant, who still thought that the defendant was committing a criminal act. Dimas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 245, 622 S.E.2d 914 (2005).

In a defendant's trial for reckless driving and driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive, arising out of an incident in which the defendant's car spun out of control and struck another car, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of accident under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2; the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on that affirmative defense because the defendant did not admit to driving recklessly or under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive. Rutland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 728, 639 S.E.2d 628 (2006).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on accident since the accident occurred as the defendant was driving recklessly. Dryden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 70, 728 S.E.2d 245 (2012).

Charge not authorized when defendant deliberately fired through window.

- When in a murder trial the defendant testified to deliberately firing through a glass window pane at a large figure, a charge on accident was not authorized. Duke v. State, 256 Ga. 671, 352 S.E.2d 561 (1987).

Charges on accident and criminal negligence proper.

- Trial court did not err in charging the jury on the definition of criminal negligence in addition to including the bracketed "criminal negligence" language in the pattern instruction on accident as the jury was not confused by the charge and was not led to believe that it could substitute criminal negligence for malice; the trial court gave a complete charge on criminal intent and properly charged the jury on murder and malice. Yeager v. State, 281 Ga. 1, 635 S.E.2d 704 (2006).

Jury authorized to convict defendant.

- Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as there was ample evidence that the state disproved the defendant's accident defense since: (1) the defendant was hurt by the fact that the defendant's significant other had begun a relationship with the victim; (2) the defendant threatened to blow the victim's and the significant other's heads off a few weeks before the shooting; (3) defendant testified that the victim was standing in the defendant's way, that the defendant was searching for a cell phone, and that the defendant pulled out several items, including a gun; (4) a door hit the defendant in the back, causing the gun to discharge into the victim's chest; (5) the defendant testified that the defendant was careless with the gun; and (6) a detective testified that after the detective Mirandized the defendant, the defendant stated that "(the defendant) put a shell in every chamber" and that "(the defendant) fired every shell, every round." Noble v. State, 282 Ga. App. 311, 638 S.E.2d 444 (2006).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 4.

ALR.

- Criminal responsibility of druggist for death or injury in consequence of mistake, 55 A.L.R.2d 714.

Homicide predicated on improper treatment of disease or injury, 45 A.L.R.3d 114.

Homicide: burden of proof on defense that killing was accidental, 63 A.L.R.3d 936.