Presumption of sanity returns upon discharge.

- Presumption of sanity prevails after release of accused previously committed to mental institution. Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 253, 253 S.E.2d 874 (1979).

Although person may have been previously committed, presumption of sanity returns when person is discharged from institutional confinement. Fulghum v. State, 246 Ga. 184, 269 S.E.2d 455 (1980).

Even when an accused has initially been found incompetent to stand trial, upon the accused being administratively released for trial, the rebuttable presumption of sanity applies. Johncox v. State, 189 Ga. App. 188, 375 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

Defendant has burden once criminal intent has been shown, of illustrating defendant's insanity before state is required to rebut that showing beyond a reasonable doubt. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to conclude that the defendant failed to prove that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial because the state's expert witness found that, based on the defendant's exchanges during a police interview, the felony murder concept was explained to the defendant numerous times and the defendant's responses indicated that the defendant understood; the fact that the defendant did not think that the defendant should be held responsible for the victim's death, did not mean that the defendant should not be held responsible or that it rendered the defendant incapable of understanding the situation; and there was no medical support for the conclusion that the defendant was not competent to stand trial in 2008. Tye v. State, 298 Ga. 474, 782 S.E.2d 10 (2016).

No evidence of incompetency.

- Children's challenges to changes in life insurance beneficiaries made by their parent just before the parent's death on mental competency grounds failed, as the children did not present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to the decedent's mental competency at the time the parent executed the change of beneficiary forms; the children pointed the court to no evidence that they were present at the time the changes were made nor that they specifically observed the decedent's in an altered or confused state at or near the time the forms were executed. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Carlyle, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2006).

Burden is on defendant to prove insanity by preponderance of evidence.

- To overcome presumption of sanity, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of commission of act. Longshore v. State, 242 Ga. 689, 251 S.E.2d 280 (1978).

When defendant in criminal case files general plea of insanity, i.e., argues that one is not guilty of crime by reason of being insane at time of the crime's commission, burden is on defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was insane. Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980).

Insanity is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Strozier v. State, 254 Ga. 712, 334 S.E.2d 181 (1985); Harris v. State, 256 Ga. 350, 349 S.E.2d 374 (1986).

Pretrial notice requirement has no effect on burden of proof.

- Procedural requirement of pretrial notice to the state of a defense which would generally require expert opinion to rebut has no effect on the burden of proof. The state must still prove criminal intent, but the notice does not add a new burden, that the state must prove sanity without the aid of the "presumption" of sanity in the state's case-in-chief. The state is merely entitled to prior notice that the state will have to present evidence in rebuttal to overcome the defendant's evidence of insanity. Johncox v. State, 189 Ga. App. 188, 375 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

Presentation of evidence of insanity does not automatically dissipate presumption of sanity which exists by law. Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 253, 253 S.E.2d 874 (1979); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993); Fulghum v. State, 246 Ga. 184, 269 S.E.2d 455 (1980); Dennis v. State, 170 Ga. App. 630, 317 S.E.2d 874 (1984); Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).

Jurors are not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses regarding a defendant's sanity; instead, they may rely on the presumption of sanity in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-3 unless the proof of insanity is overwhelming. Vanderpool v. State, 244 Ga. App. 804, 536 S.E.2d 821 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 996, 121 S. Ct. 1658, 149 L. Ed. 2d 640 (2001).

Overwhelming proof of insanity.

- When the proof of insanity is overwhelming, juries may no longer rely solely on the presumption of sanity. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986).

When proof of insanity is overwhelming, juries may not rely solely on the rebuttable presumption of sanity. It is a jury's function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of testimony, to weigh the evidence and not arbitrarily ignore it. Proof of insanity may be so clear and so overwhelming that a finding of sanity cannot be upheld. Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 444, 359 S.E.2d 891 (1987).

Evidence of insanity not overwhelming.

- Court was authorized to rely on the presumption of sanity in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-3 because the evidence of insanity was not overwhelming. Stanley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 597, 530 S.E.2d 506 (2000).

Jury can view surrounding facts and circumstances in making determination regarding appellant's sanity and in determining whether defendant could in fact distinguish right from wrong. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993).

Rebutting presumption imposed by statute in civil matters.

- Plaintiffs' stated cognizable claims against a bishop arising out of a breach of fiduciary duty as evidence was presented that the bishop abused the bishop's position of spiritual authority to coerce or seduce the married plaintiff female into consenting to a prolonged sexual relationship with the bishop. Plaintiffs also put forward evidence of the bishop's charismatic nature and the bishop's ability to control and coerce using the bishop's spiritual authority, all of which is evidence in rebuttal of the presumptions of "sound mind and discretion" relied upon by the trial court. Brewer v. Paulk, 296 Ga. App. 26, 673 S.E.2d 545 (2009).

Sanity of defendant is presumed.

- Defendant's proffered testimony that defendant had a blackout during defendant's act of DUI was properly rejected. Crossley v. State, 261 Ga. App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (2003).

Instruction concerning presumption not unconstitutional.

- Trial court's charge to the jury that every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion, but that this presumption may be rebutted, was not unconstitutionally burden-shifting. Thompson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 723, 344 S.E.2d 696 (1986).

Absent request, failure to charge burden of proof regarding sanity is not error.

- When charge of court includes instruction as to insanity but places burden of proof as to each essential element of crime, including intent, upon state beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not error for court not to instruct jury specifically, absent request, as to any burden of proof regarding sanity. Howard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 356, 258 S.E.2d 39 (1979).

Charge on intent in murder trial did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof. Parker v. State, 256 Ga. 363, 349 S.E.2d 379 (1986).

Instruction reciting pattern charge upheld on appeal.

- Because the trial court's charge on presumption that "every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion, but the presumption may be rebutted" recited the pattern charge on presumption word for word, it was upheld on appeal. May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

"Guilty but mentally ill" and "not guilty by reason of insanity" distinguished.

- In a trial for murder of defendant's parents it was held that, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the guilty verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was insane at the time of the crime. This led to the conclusion that, also construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty but mentally ill beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, 256 Ga. 350, 349 S.E.2d 374 (1986).

Guilty, but mentally ill and not insane.

- Evidence of defendant's calm behavior after the crime, of the fact that defendant displayed no psychotic behavior, was not under medication during hospitalization after the crime, and that defendant denied hearing voices or having any special connection to God, supported the jury's decision that defendant was guilty but mentally ill, rather than insane at the time of the offense. Barge v. State, 256 Ga. App. 560, 568 S.E.2d 841 (2002).

Evidence sufficient to support jury's finding defendant sane at time of crime.

- See Murray v. State, 253 Ga. 90, 317 S.E.2d 193 (1984).

Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was insane at the time of the crimes as the evidence showed that defendant wore a hat and gloves to the scene; defendant had change ready for the victim's use at pay telephones; defendant was aware of the time the victim arrived at work; and defendant even devised a plan to make the victim forget about the events that transpired; therefore, a rational trier of fact was authorized to rely on the presumption of defendant's sanity. Guillen v. State, 258 Ga. App. 465, 574 S.E.2d 598 (2002).

Evidence insufficient for involuntary intoxication.

- Although the police officers who arrested a defendant provided some evidence that corroborated the defendant's affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, testimony from the victim of a false imprisonment and aggravated assault that the victim had not injected the defendant with any drugs on the night of the assault was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was of sound mind and discretion when the defendant held the victim captive. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (2008).

Directed verdict in competency trial.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in the defendant's competency trial because the evidence on competency was in conflict; even though the defendant's expert witness opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, the state's expert testified that the defendant was competent to do so. Smith v. State, 312 Ga. App. 174, 718 S.E.2d 43 (2011).

Competency established.

- While the defendant presented expert testimony, based on the defendant's performance on various cognitive tests, that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, the finding of competency to stand trial was supported by the testimony of the state's expert, who opined that the defendant understood the nature and object of the proceedings, had a basic comprehension of the defendant's own condition in reference to the proceedings, and had the ability to assist counsel in a defense. Tiegreen v. State, 314 Ga. App. 860, 726 S.E.2d 468 (2012).

Cited in Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501, 220 S.E.2d 262 (1975); Thomas v. State, 136 Ga. App. 165, 220 S.E.2d 736 (1975); Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697, 238 S.E.2d 334 (1977); Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978); C.H. v. State, 148 Ga. App. 609, 252 S.E.2d 22 (1979); Bowers v. State, 153 Ga. App. 894, 267 S.E.2d 309 (1980); Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980); Slaughter v. State, 162 Ga. App. 136, 290 S.E.2d 338 (1982); Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga. App. 331, 291 S.E.2d 58 (1982); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982); Peek v. State, 250 Ga. 50, 295 S.E.2d 834 (1982); Dollar v. State, 168 Ga. App. 726, 310 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Davenport v. State, 170 Ga. App. 667, 317 S.E.2d 895 (1984); Adams v. State, 254 Ga. 481, 330 S.E.2d 869 (1985); Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 357, 343 S.E.2d 140 (1986); Nelson v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 670, 344 S.E.2d 492 (1986); Jackson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 774, 350 S.E.2d 484 (1986); Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 66, 101, 114.

Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial, 40 POF2d 171.

C.J.S.

- 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 961, 962.

ALR.

- Presumption of continuing insanity as applied to accused in criminal case, 27 A.L.R.2d 121.

Counsel's right, in consulting with accused as client, to be accompanied by psychiatrist, psychologist, hypnotist, or similar practitioner, 72 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Modern status of rules as to burden and sufficiency of proof of mental irresponsibility in criminal case, 17 A.L.R.3d 146.

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as defense to murder, assault, or other violent crime, 4 A.L.R.7th 5.