O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
As used in Code Sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24, the term ‘‘habitation’’ means any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and ‘‘personal property’’ means personal property other than a motor vehicle.
History
Code 1981, § 16-3-24.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1153, § 1.1.
Annotations
Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and
Defense of Property Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 16-3-23, 16-3-24, 16-3-24.1, and 16-3-24.2,’’ see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (2008).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Motor vehicles. - Because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to predict either the addition of the definition of habitation (which included automobiles) to the statutory scheme, or Georgia Supreme Court precedent, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective on that ground. Cochran v. Frazier, No. 09-14520, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9108 (11th Cir. May 3, 2010) (Unpublished). Trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of habitation because the defendant testified that when the defendant returned to the vehicle with the victim to obtain the defendant’s insurance card, after a vehicle collision, the victim reached through the defendant’s window and began grabbing the defendant’s shoulder and accusing the defendant of not having insurance; that the defendant became nervous and fright-
ened, and that the defendant’s son began to cry; and that the defendant drove away from the victim to escape the victim reaching through the window and grabbing the defendant while the victim was verbally accosting the defendant. Salazar-Balderas v. State, 343 Ga. App. 201, 806 S.E.2d 644 (2017). Jury charge on defense of habitation. - Although the jury was not specifically instructed on the defense of habitation, the jury was, in fact, instructed on self-defense as well as accident, and the jury rejected all of the appellant’s conflicting stories and those defenses and in light of compelling evidence of the appellant’s guilt, the alleged error did not likely affect the outcome of the trial court proceedings. State v. Newman, No. S19A0374, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 286 (Apr. 29, 2019). Cited in Wike v. State, 262 Ga. App. 444, 585 S.E.2d 742 (2003); Coleman v.
State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009); Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709
S.E.2d 823 (2011); Andrade v. State, 319 Ga. App. 75, 733 S.E.2d 474 (2012).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
41
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 2003–2026 · leading case:
Coleman v. State, 687 S.E.2d 427 (Ga. 2009).
Coleman v. State, 687 S.E.2d 427 (Ga. 2009).
· cites it 4× “Noting that a motor vehicle is statutorily included in the definition of “habitation” (OCGA § 16-3-24.1), both appellants contend they were denied their constitutional right to effective assis *297 tance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on…”
Benham v. State, 591 S.E.2d 824 (Ga. 2004).
· cites it 4× “That statute authorizes the use of force which is intended to cause death or great bodily injury to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon a "habitation" (including a motor vehicle under OCGA § 16-3-24.1) if the "entry is made or attempted in a violent and…”
Chambers v. State, 739 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 6× “” 2 That sentence was not a part of OCGA§ 16-3-23, although OCGA § 16-3-24.1 provided: “As used in Code Sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24, the term ‘habitation’ means any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and ‘personal property’ means personal property other than a motor…”
Walker v. State, 801 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 2× “1 defines a “habitation” to include a “motor vehicle” like the SUV that Appellant obtained from the Clarks, and OCGA § 16-3-23 says that a person is justified in using deadly force to prevent or terminate another person’s unlawful entry into a habitation only in three…”
Patel v. State, 620 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. 2005).
· cites it 4× “) [2] OCGA § 16-3-24(b) provides that a person is justified in threatening or using deadly force "to prevent trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with real property other than a habitation or personal property .”
Williams v. State, 818 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 2× “" See OCGA § 16-3-24.1. For the most part, however, the evidence presented at trial showed that the shots were fired after any attack upon Gibbs's Mustang had ended.”
Kendrick v. State, 699 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 2010).
· cites it 4× “Rather, his only written submission stated that he wished the court to give the “following pattern requests to charge numbered 1 through 23,” and then “22.”
Brooks v. State, 847 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. 2020).
· cites it 2× “8 “A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation[.”
State v. Newman, 827 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 2019).
· cites it 2× “e; (2) That force is used against another person who is not a member of the family or household and who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible…”
Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537 (Ga. 2019).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 16-3-24.1. 7 (3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.”
State v. Newman, 305 Ga. 792 (Ga. 2019).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 16-3-24.1. Moreover, “[t]o authorize a jury instruction .”
Barrett v. State, 733 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 2012).
· cites it 2× “In that case, it was undisputed that the victim struck the first blow by attacking the defendant through the window while she sat inside her automobile, see OCGA § 16-3-24.1 (providing that a motor vehicle is a habitation under OCGA § 16-3-23), and that someone tried to pull the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.