CopyCited 103 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 9, 2009 | 286 Ga. 291, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3566
...State,
264 Ga. 524(2),
448 S.E.2d 444 (1994). There being no showing that a competent and unbiased jury was not selected, the assertion of error is without merit. 6. Noting that a motor vehicle is statutorily included in the definition of "habitation" (OCGA §
16-3-24.1), both appellants contend they were denied their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of habitation, found in OCGA §
16-3-23....
...rson dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence...." OCGA §
16-3-23. "Habitation" is statutorily defined as meaning "any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business. . . ." OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 804
...2002) (“Aparty who identifies an issue, and then explicitly withdraws it, has waived the issue.”).
*486(b) Appellant also has not shown that the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on the defense of habitation theory of justification. OCGA §
16-3-24.1 defines a “habitation” to include a “motor vehicle” like the SUV that Appellant obtained from the Clarks, and OCGA §
16-3-23 says that a person is justified in using deadly force to prevent or terminate another person’s unlawful entry into a habitation only in three circumstances....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2012 | 733 S.E.2d 304, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3172
...ling to request a defense of habitation charge, Benham is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, it was undisputed that the victim struck the first blow by attacking the defendant through the window while she sat inside her automobile, see OCGA §
16-3-24.1 (providing that a motor vehicle is a habitation under OCGA §
16-3-23), and that someone tried to pull the victim away from the automobile at least twice but the victim resisted....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 6, 2012 | 722 S.E.2d 708, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 371
...ption.” [Cit.]
Smith v. State,
309 Ga. App. 241, 248-249 (3) (d) (709 SE2d 823) (2011). Furthermore, at the 1995 trial, “trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to predict either the [1998] addition of the definition of habitation [in OCGA §
16-3-24.1] (which included [‘motor vehicle’]) to the statutory scheme or the Benham holding ....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 27, 2018 | 304 Ga. 455
...Williams says that he would have been entitled to such a charge in light of his own testimony that the Floyd brothers initially attacked Gibbs while Gibbs was inside his Mustang.2 Williams is correct that a motor vehicle can be a "habitation." See OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 2, 2004 | 277 Ga. 612, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 421
...The unique aspect of this case is that Hammock does not claim the entire house as her habitation-only the master bedroom. She claims that her habit of routinely locking the victim out of the bedroom in the weeks leading up to the shooting established the bedroom as her habitation. OCGA §
16-3-24.1 defines "habitation" as "any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business." Black's Law Dictionary defines a "dwelling-house" as "a building, a part of a building, a tent, a mobile home, or another enclosed space that is used or intended for use as a human habitation." [12] In Huff v....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 19, 2005 | 279 Ga. 750, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2846
...281, 282(2),
147 S.E.2d 814 (1966). Because Benham should be cautiously and sensibly limited to its actual holding by the express terms of OCGA §
16-3-23, I concur specially in the judgment of affirmance. NOTES [1] "Habitation" is defined by OCGA §
16-3-24.1 to include "any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 24, 2020 | 309 Ga. 630
...when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or
force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or
attack upon a habitation[.]” OCGA §
16-3-23. The definition of “habitation”
includes a motor vehicle. See OCGA §
16-3-24.1.
wide range of reasonable professional conduct.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Marshall v....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 23, 2019
...rein and that
such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of
personal violence; . . . or
2 For purposes of OCGA §
16-3-23, the term “habitation” means “any
dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business.” OCGA §
16-3-24.1.
7
(3) The person using such force reasonably
believes that the entry is made or attempted for the
purpose of committing a felony therein and that such
force is necessary t...
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 29, 2019
...ry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
Further, "as used in [ OCGA §]
16-3-23... the term 'habitation' [includes] any ... motor vehicle." OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2010 | 287 Ga. 676, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2198
...598, 606(11)(a),
458 S.E.2d 833 (1995). See also Stringer v. State,
285 Ga. 842, 846(4),
684 S.E.2d 590 (2009). 3. Kendrick contends that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the law of defense of habitation, in the context of an automobile. See OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
...Kendrick moved for a new trial on December 7, 2006, and amended the motion on November 10, 2008. The motion was denied on December 15, 2008, and Kendrick filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 2008. His appeal was docketed in the January 2010 term of this Court, and submitted for decision on the briefs. [2] OCGA §
16-3-24.1 reads: As used in Code Sections
16-3-23 and
16-3-24, the term "habitation" means any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and "personal property" means personal property other than a motor vehicle....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 29, 2019
...purpose of committing a felony therein and that such
force is necessary to prevent the commission of the
felony.
Further, “[a]s used in [OCGA §]
16-3-23 . . . the term ‘habitation’
[includes] any . . . motor vehicle.” OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2019
...e of
committing a felony therein and that such force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
Id. “Habitation,” as used in OCGA §
16-3-23, includes “any dwelling,
motor vehicle, or place of business.” See OCGA §
16-3-24.1.
At trial, Swanson’s counsel did not request, and the trial court
did not provide, a jury instruction on use of force in defense of
habitation under OCGA §
16-3-23....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2019
...r attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
Id. "Habitation," as used in OCGA §
16-3-23, includes "any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business." See OCGA §
16-3-24.1.
*316At trial, Swanson's counsel did not request, and the trial court did not provide, a jury instruction on use of force in defense of habitation under OCGA §
16-3-23....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 16, 2020 | 309 Ga. 171
...prosecutor’s introductory comments to the jury such as “[t]he
evidence is going to show,” and “what the evidence will be.” The
2 “As used in [OCGA §]
16-3-23 . . . the term ‘habitation’ [includes] any .
. . motor vehicle[.]” OCGA §
16-3-24.1.
prosecutor then highlighted for the jury the trial evidence that he
believed would support exactly what he said he expected the
evidence to show....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025
...when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such
threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s
19
unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation,” which includes a
motor vehicle.10 Id. See also OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
...hen
[the a]ppellant opened fire”). See also Brooks,
309 Ga. at 636 (2)
(concluding that there was no evidence that the victims “entered”
—————————————————————
10 OCGA §
16-3-24.1 defines “habitation” as “any dwelling, motor vehicle,
or place of business.”
20
the appellant’s vehicle during the incident in question, and thus, the
defense of habitation was not avail...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2024 | 320 Ga. 66
...murder count of the indictment was harmless. See Spence,
307 Ga.
15
at 526-527; McClain,
303 Ga. at 9-10.
3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
charge the jury on the defense of habitation. We disagree.
OCGA §
16-3-24.1 defines a “habitation” to include a “motor
vehicle,” and under OCGA §
16-3-23, “[a] person is justified in
threatening or using force against another” in defense of habitation
“when and to the extent he or she reasonabl...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 28, 2025
...es
9
person “when and to the extent that” he reasonably believes it is
necessary “to prevent or terminate” the other person’s “unlawful
entry into or attack upon” a “habitation,” which OCGA §
16-3-24.1
defines to include a “motor vehicle.” OCGA §
16-3-23 then lists the
three situations in which such a person is justified in using deadly
force, i.e., “force which is intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily harm.” See also Fair v....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025
...when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such
19
threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s
unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation,” which includes a
motor vehicle.10 Id. See also OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
...ntry
or attempted entry by [the victim] into the [appellant’s] SUV when
[the a]ppellant opened fire”). See also Brooks,
309 Ga. at 637 (2)
—————————————————————
10 OCGA §
16-3-24.1 defines “habitation” as “any dwelling, motor vehicle,
or place of business.”
20
(concluding that there was no evidence that the victims “entered”
the appellant’s vehicle during the i...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 27, 2018
...Williams says that he would have been entitled to such
a charge in light of his own testimony that the Floyd brothers initially attacked
5
Gibbs while Gibbs was inside his Mustang.2 Williams is correct that a motor
vehicle can be a “habitation.” See OCGA §
16-3-24.1....
