Motor vehicles.

- Because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to predict either the addition of the definition of habitation (which included automobiles) to the statutory scheme, or Georgia Supreme Court precedent, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective on that ground. Cochran v. Frazier, F.3d (11th Cir. May 3, 2010)(Unpublished).

Trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of habitation because the defendant testified that when the defendant returned to the vehicle with the victim to obtain the defendant's insurance card, after a vehicle collision, the victim reached through the defendant's window and began grabbing the defendant's shoulder and accusing the defendant of not having insurance; that the defendant became nervous and frightened, and that the defendant's son began to cry; and that the defendant drove away from the victim to escape the victim reaching through the window and grabbing the defendant while the victim was verbally accosting the defendant. Salazar-Balderas v. State, 343 Ga. App. 201, 806 S.E.2d 644 (2017).

Cited in Wike v. State, 262 Ga. App. 444, 585 S.E.2d 742 (2003); Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009); Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (2011); Andrade v. State, 319 Ga. App. 75, 733 S.E.2d 474 (2012).