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2018 Georgia Code 16-3-24.2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 3. Defenses to Criminal Prosecutions, 16-3-1 through 16-3-40.

ARTICLE 2 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE

16-3-24.2. Immunity from prosecution; exception.

A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title.

(Code 1981, §16-3-24.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1153, § 1.2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 16; Ga. L. 2006, p. 477, § 2/SB 396; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-3/HB 60.)

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, deleted "or 3" following "Part 2" in this Code section.

Cross references.

- Possession of dangerous weapons, § 16-11-120 et seq. Carrying concealed firearms, § 16-11-126 et seq.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on criminal law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 79 (2009). For annual survey on death penalty law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 99 (2009). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 47 (2014). For annual survey on evidence law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 101 (2017). For article, "Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 16-3-23,16-3-24,16-3-24.1, and16-3-24.2," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- Defendant failed to show that O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 treated members of a class differently from similarly situated individuals and, thus, the trial court did not err in upholding the statute as constitutional. Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557, 788 S.E.2d 484 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 646, 196 L. Ed. 2d 542 (U.S. 2017).

Applicability.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 did not apply to defendant who was acting in self-defense. Boggs v. State, 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).

Preponderance of evidence standard applies.

- To avoid trial, a defendant bears the burden of showing that the defendant is entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence. Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 667 S.E.2d 605 (2008).

Jury instructions.

- Defendant was not entitled to an immunity statute instruction at trial. Boggs v. State, 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).

Because the issue of immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 was a question of law for the trial court to decide, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give a defendant's requested jury charge on immunity in the defendant's prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. Campbell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 387, 677 S.E.2d 312 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1263, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 411 (Ga. 2009).

Impact of jury's rejection of justification defense.

- To the extent it holds that O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 does not apply once a jury rejects the defendant's justification defense, the Georgia Supreme Court overrules the Georgia Court of Appeals' decision in Eason v. State, 261 Ga. App. 221 (2003). Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 746 S.E.2d 95 (2013).

Motion must be decided pre-trial.

- In two related cases in which the state sought the death penalty against two defendants, and in a case of first impression interpreting the immunity from prosecution statute set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2, it was determined that the trial court erred by refusing to rule pre-trial on the defendants' motions for immunity from prosecution under § 16-3-24.2. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).

Upon the filing of a motion for immunity, a trial court must determine before trial whether a person is immune from prosecution; thus, the trial court did not err in ruling on the defendant's self-defense claim before trial. State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 773 S.E.2d 222 (2015).

Reconsideration of pretrial ruling on immunity.

- Appellate court erred by reversing a trial court order granting the defendant a new trial because the trial court had the inherent authority to reconsider the court's pretrial ruling on the defendant's motion for immunity from criminal prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 and to rule otherwise. Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 746 S.E.2d 95 (2013).

Immunity properly found.

- Trial court properly held that the defendant, who was charged with family violence battery and simple battery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-23.1(f) and16-5-23, was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. The testimony of the defendant's friend that the defendant restrained the friend after the friend broke the defendant's windshield and kicked a car seat, knocking the defendant into the steering wheel, provided some evidence that the defendant's actions were justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (2009).

Trial court did not err by granting the defendant's motion for immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 because the court's determination that the defendant was immune from prosecution since the defendant acted in self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) in discharging the defendant's service weapon, although based upon conflicting evidence, was supported by a preponderance of the evidence; the trial court expressly adopted the factual findings that were made by the original trial judge in the judge's previous order denying the defendant's motion, and the original trial judge's error in assessing evidentiary conflicts in light of the judge's improper legal conclusion that the defendant was required to prove "as a matter of law" that the defendant was justified in killing the victim were corrected when the supreme court held that the proper standard of review was the preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bunn, 288 Ga. 20, 701 S.E.2d 138 (2010).

As defendant showed a threat of force from the victim and reasonably believed that the defendant needed to defend oneself from a violent attack by the victim that could have caused the defendant great bodily injury, the defendant was justified in using deadly force against the victim to protect the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21; consequently, the defendant was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. State v. Green, 289 Ga. 802, 716 S.E.2d 194 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the defendants met the defendants' burden of proving that the defendants were entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 because the defendants' testimony provided some evidence that the defendants' actions were justified, and the state chose to present no contrary testimony. State v. Cooper, 324 Ga. App. 32, 749 S.E.2d 35 (2013).

Motion to dismiss the indictment was properly granted as the defendant acted in self-defense in shooting the deceased and was thus immune from prosecution because the evidence showed that the defendant received a threatening voicemail from the deceased; at the time of the shooting, the defendant knew of three prior acts of violence committed by the deceased; on the morning of the shooting, the defendant was at the apartment of the defendant's mother when the defendant saw the deceased enter the doorway of the mother's apartment; the defendant repeatedly told the deceased not to come any closer, but the deceased nevertheless continued to proceed through the doorway; and the defendant then fired a weapon once, killing the deceased. State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 773 S.E.2d 222 (2015).

Trial court did not err in granting in part the defendant's motion to bar the prosecution on immunity grounds because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to carry the defendant's burden of proving the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the necessity of deadly force with respect to the first victim because the first victim punched and choked the defendant, and threatened to kill the defendant; and the defendant's testimony, which was corroborated in part by the second victim, provided some evidence that the defendant's actions with respect to the first victim were justified. State v. Jennings, 337 Ga. App. 164, 786 S.E.2d 545 (2016).

Defendant's pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution based on the defendant's claim of self-defense was properly granted as there was evidence introduced at the motion hearing to support the ruling in favor of the defendant because, although it was error for the superior court to cite document number 17 as support for its findings, the superior court's consideration of that document was harmless as the superior court never cited that document in isolation but always in conjunction with specific citations to the transcript of testimony adduced at the motion hearing; and all of the information the court mentions as proving the defendant's credibility came most clearly from evidence at the hearing. State v. Ogunsuyi, 301 Ga. 281, 800 S.E.2d 542 (2017).

Immunity improperly found.

- In a case in which the evidence showed that defendant, a convicted felon, used a firearm to shoot the deceased, a trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the indictment under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. Since defendant possessed the firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, defendant was not entitled to the immunity offered by § 16-3-24.2 State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781, 684 S.E.2d 269 (2009).

Because the trial court failed to consider O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) when the court found that the defendant was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2, the trial court used the wrong legal standard in reaching the court's decision; accordingly, the matter was remanded for further proceedings. State v. Green, 288 Ga. 1, 701 S.E.2d 151 (2010).

After the defendant was charged with aggravated assault and family-violence battery arising from a chokehold the defendant applied to the defendant's pregnant wife, the defendant's motion for immunity was improperly granted because the defendant and the victim were married at the time of the altercation, they lived in the house where the incident occurred together, the victim routinely took care of the parties' small dog, and the victim was entitled to handle the dog, including putting the dog out of the house; and the defendant reacted to the victim's struggling against the chokehold by tightening the defendant's grip, which was not justified as the victim was not committing a forcible felony against the dog. State v. Morgan, Ga. App. , 814 S.E.2d 823 (2018).

Immunity motion properly denied.

- Trial court's apparent finding that defendant did not reasonably believe that the force defendant used was necessary to terminate a patron's entry into the restricted bakery area was supported by the patron's deposition testimony that defendant, without provocation, without warning that the bakery area was restricted, and without declaring the back door as off-limits, grabbed and struck the patron for no apparent reason other than perhaps believing that the patron was shoplifting food, despite defendant's admission that the patron had a receipt; although the trial court's ruling on defendant's immunity motion under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 was based on written deposition testimony, it could not be reviewed de novo, and as the trial court's ruling was supported by the patron's deposition testimony, the ruling had to be affirmed. Blazer v. State, 266 Ga. App. 743, 598 S.E.2d 338 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 made by a police officer who fired at and killed a fleeing suspect who was alleged to have been involved in a car theft and/or a hit and run accident. State v. Thompson, 288 Ga. 165, 702 S.E.2d 198 (2010).

Denial of a defendant's pretrial motion for immunity, based on a claim of justification, was proper because the evidence showed that the shooting was motivated by gang rivalry and a desire for revenge, rather than self-defense. Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 746 S.E.2d 127 (2013).

Trial court's denial of immunity from prosecution based on defense of habitation was supported by a victim's testimony that the victims did not enter the defendant's home in a violent and tumultuous manner for the purposes of committing a felony therein, but were invited in by the defendant, who threatened and assaulted them. Inman v. State, 294 Ga. 650, 755 S.E.2d 752 (2014).

When the defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal stabbing of the victim, the defendant's motion for immunity from prosecution was properly denied because, although the trial judge did not reference the judicial standard or explicitly state that the trial judge had weighed the evidence at the hearing on the immunity motion, the trial judge later clarified that the trial judge had weighed the evidence during the immunity hearing and determined not only that the defendant failed to show that the defendant was entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence but that it appeared more likely than not that the defendant was not acting in self-defense when the defendant killed the victim. Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's pre-trial motion for immunity based on self-defense as the court weighed the defendant's account of the shooting against the medical examiner's testimony that the victim had been shot in the back from a distance of at least 18 inches away, the testimony of the victim's friend that the defendant pointed a gun at the friend and refused to call 911, and the defendant's own admission that the defendant did not render aid or summon medical assistance. Lowe v. State, 298 Ga. 810, 783 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

Given the undisputed evidence that the defendant did not possess a weapons carry license and was thus in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 insofar as the defendant was carrying a weapon without such license in a place other than the defendant's own property, vehicle, or business, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's claim to immunity. Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 783 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

Defendant failed to show that the defendant was entitled to immunity as the defendant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of being subjected to unlawful force when the defendant shot the victim because, although the defendant testified that the defendant shot the victim only after the victim grabbed a gun from the victim's car, two guests at the gathering in the defendant's front yard testified that the guests never saw the victim with a gun; and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim that the victim was the aggressor and to conclude that the defendant did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to shoot the victim in self-defense. Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 805 S.E.2d 94 (2017).

Denial of immunity improper.

- Evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the defendant met the burden of proving that the defendant was entitled to immunity from prosecution as there was some evidence to support the trial court's finding that the suspect was physically resisting being handcuffed and detained by the defendant, and that the defendant's application of the arm bar technique as a defensive measure to bring the suspect to the ground and handcuff the suspect was reasonable and proportionate. State v. Hall, 339 Ga. App. 237, 793 S.E.2d 522 (2016).

Trial court was authorized to find that the appellant failed before, during, and after trial to meet the burden of showing that the appellant was entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 because the statements-in-place by the appellant's lawyer were not a proper substitute for evidence at the hearing on the motion for immunity because the state did not accept those proffers but rather insisted that the appellant prove the appellant's immunity with traditional evidence. Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 785 S.E.2d 277 (2016).

Immunity from prosecution did not apply when executing no-knock warrant.

- In a capital murder case involving the shooting death of a deputy while executing a no-knock warrant with other officers involved in a drug task force, the immunity from prosecution prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 did not apply to the defendants because the officers' entry was lawful. Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (2010).

Counsel not ineffective for failing to file motion for immunity from prosecution.

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution based on the defendant's claim of self-defense because trial counsel testified that it was a strategic decision not to file such a motion inasmuch as counsel did not want to expose the defendant to pre-trial cross-examination from the state, thereby previewing the defendant's anticipated trial testimony, and that counsel chose to attempt to demonstrate self-defense to the jury, as opposed to the judge. Dent v. State, 303 Ga. 110, 810 S.E.2d 527 (2018).

Appeal from finding of immunity from prosecution.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(1) provides that the state may appeal an order dismissing "any count" of the indictment, the trial court's order that in effect dismissed two of the three counts by finding that the defendant was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 was appealable. State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (2009).

Appeal from order denying motion to dismiss indictment was dismissed.

- Because the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on immunity grounds under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 was not a final appealable order, the criminal matter was still pending below, and no other reason under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 was presented allowing an appeal from the same, the defendant's appeal was dismissed. Crane v. State, 281 Ga. 635, 641 S.E.2d 795 (2007).

Cited in Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (2011).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Allen v. State, 890 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2023 | 317 Ga. 1

...Allen argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for immunity. We disagree. With some exceptions, a person who uses threats or force in 9 accordance with OCGA § 16-3-21 is immune from criminal prosecution. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...reat bodily injury; in other words, a defendant must show that his fear was objectively reasonable. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. 396, 398 (1) (782 SE2d 255) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). “To prevail on a motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, a defendant must establish his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ellison v....
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Buckner-webb v. State, 878 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 2022 | 314 Ga. 823

...not apply to an order denying a pretrial motion for a constitutional speedy trial); Crane v. State, 281 Ga. 635, 635 (641 SE2d 795) (2007) (holding that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to an order denying a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2); Thomas v....
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State v. COPELAND (Three Cases), 850 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2020 | 310 Ga. 345

...HOWELL. BETHEL, Justice. A Washington County grand jury indicted former sheriff’s deputies Henry Lee Copeland, Rhett Scott, and Michael Howell for felony murder and other offenses in connection with the death of Eurie Lee Martin. Each defendant sought immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, claiming that his actions resulting in Martin’s death were in defense of himself or others. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting immunity to Deputies Copeland, Scott, and Howell, and the State appealed....
...the trial court’s weighing of credibility or resolving of conflicts in the evidence.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 825 (1) (A) (2) n.1 (725 SE2d 260) (2012). This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s legal application of OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...Deputies Copeland, Howell, and Scott were indicted on two counts each of felony murder and involuntary manslaughter and one count each of false imprisonment, aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless conduct. They filed motions for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which the trial court granted following the hearing and briefing. charge duration of 25 seconds, though it is unclear how long Martin actually received an electrical discharge. 9 Deputy Howell testified that, during this time,...
...3-24.2 beyond the plain meaning of the statute. More specifically, the State argues that the trial court failed to make a finding that the deputies acted in self-defense and that, instead, the trial court conflated the law of self-defense pertinent to OCGA § 16-3-24.2 with the law pertaining to justification set forth in OCGA § 16-3-20 (2) and (4), which is not relevant to the trial court’s analysis of the motions under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. We hold that the trial court made factual findings that were inconsistent with its legal conclusions in support of its grants of immunity in favor of Deputies Copeland, Scott, and Howell under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, conflated legal concepts that are relevant to the immunity motion with concepts that are not relevant, made unclear findings of material fact with respect to whether any or all of the deputies used force intended or likely to cause d...
...ch. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order granting immunity in all three cases and remand these cases so that the trial court can reconsider the motions for immunity consistent with this opinion. (a) The immunity statute. OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides that a person is immune from prosecution where he can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he threatened or used force based on a reasonable belief that such threat or force was necessary to defend himself or a third person against another’s imminent use of unlawful force. See OCGA §§ 16-3-24.2;10 16-3-21....
...See also Mullins v. State, 287 Ga. 302, 302 (1) (695 SE2d 621) (2010); Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) (667 SE2d 605) (2008). When the person claiming immunity uses force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, that 10 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 also provides that a person who uses threats or force in defense of habitation under OCGA § 16-3-23, in defense of property other than habitation under OCGA § 16-3-24, or under OCGA § 16-3-23.1 (no duty to retreat) is immune from prosecution....
...(3) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the 12 under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 when they are indicted based on their threats or use of force....
... above, that is not the end of the inquiry before the trial court. The court must further consider whether the deputies acted in full accord with OCGA § 16-3-21 such that they should be granted immunity from prosecution. To qualify for immunity, the deputies were required by OCGA § 16-3-24.2 to show that they “use[d] threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24[.]” However, our review of the trial court’s immunity order leads us to conclude that, in making its determination, the trial court conflated principles found in OCGA § 16-3-20 (2)15 and (4),16 which are not referenced in OCGA § 16-3-24.2, with self-defense under OCGA § 16-3-21, which is referenced in OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Specifically, the trial court relied on State v....
...In Hall, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether an officer’s use of force was “reasonably necessary” to effectuate a detention and proportionate to the suspect’s level of resistance in deciding whether the officer was entitled to immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...But whether officers used reasonable force in effectuating a lawful detention or arrest is a separate inquiry from whether their use of force was in defense of themselves or each other under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) such that they were entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...25 OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). Thus, regardless of whether the deputies’ encounter with Martin was a first-, second-, or third-tier encounter, if Martin’s conduct constituted an “imminent use of unlawful force,” OCGA § 16-3-24.2 requires an analysis of the threat or force needed by the deputies to reasonably defend against such threat or force rather than a consideration of proportionality or reasonability of the deputies’ conduct in the fulfillment of police duties....
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Hughes v. State, 861 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 7, 2021 | 312 Ga. 149

...punctuation omitted)). 4. Finally, Appellant argues that the case must be remanded for reconsideration of his motion for immunity because the trial court wrongly considered his duty and failure to retreat as a ground for denying him immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...In defending himself, he “has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his . . . ground and use force as provided in [OCGA § 16-3-21], including deadly force.” OCGA § 16-3-23.1. If his use of force falls within these parameters, he “shall be immune from criminal prosecution.” OCGA § 16-3-24.2. To avoid trial, a defendant bears the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bunn v....
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Wood v. State, 890 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2023 | 316 Ga. 811

...On November 6, 2020, a Baldwin County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). On April 16, 2021, Appellant moved for immunity from prosecution based on self-defense under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
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Gude v. State, 874 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2022 | 313 Ga. 859

...hearsay testimony from McClain’s sister, and overruling his objection to an officer’s testimony and giving an insufficient curative instruction. Gude also argues that the trial court erred when it ruled he had not timely moved for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 or established his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence....
...Thus, we cannot say that the curative instruction constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this contention also fails. 6. Gude next contends that the trial court erred when it determined that he had not timely moved for immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2, as he first made his request via an oral motion near the end of his trial. Gude also contends that the trial court erred in its determination that he had not met his burden of showing that he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary such that he should be immune from prosecution as provided in OCGA § 16-3-24.2. OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21 ....
.... . ground and use force as provided in said Code section[ ], including deadly force. OCGA § 16-3-23.1. With regard to the timing of Gude’s motion, as we have previously discussed, [a]lthough nothing in the language of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 requires an immunity motion to be filed pretrial, such motions are generally made before trial because a grant of immunity terminates a criminal prosecution....
...determine today whether such motion was timely because even assuming the motion was timely, Gude has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred by denying it on the merits. “[A] defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bunn v....
...441, 444 (2) (746 SE2d 127) (2013). In order to justify the use of “force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm” against McClain (which Gude clearly used in this case) and thus to show that he was entitled to 27 immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, Gude had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the shooting, he “reasonably believe[d] that such force [was] necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself ....
...testimony but also to conclude that he had not met his burden to prove justification so as to entitle him to immunity.” Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 111 (868 SE2d 189) (2022). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying Gude’s motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Judgment affirmed....
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Priester v. State, 317 Ga. 477 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 2023

...State’s investigation). Thus, Priester has failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. (e) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.19 At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, counsel testified that he did not file a pre-trial motion for immunity because the defense team did not feel “comfort” in Priester testifying. Priester has not shown that this was unreasonable trial strategy, 19 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 says: “A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the c...
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Ellison v. State, 868 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 19, 2022 | 313 Ga. 107

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Reddick v. State, 911 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 28, 2025 | 321 Ga. 73

...at 319 (III) (B); Corley, 308 Ga. at 322 (1) (a); Clark, 307 Ga. at 541 (1); Collier, 288 Ga. at 757 (2). 2. Reddick contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial motion seeking immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2.4 He contends that the trial court failed to consider and rule on his claim that he was acting in defense of habitation. The record does not support this claim of error. 4 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides: A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or 17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title. 15 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 bars criminal proceedings against a defendant if the defendant presents sufficient evidence at a pretrial hearing to persuade the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was justified in using deadly force. See Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 110 (868 SE2d 189) (2022) (“To prevail on a motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, a defendant must establish his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”)....
...n claim when it concluded: “The presented evidence at the two immunity motion hearings [is] insufficient for this Court to determine that [Reddick] met [his] burden of proving that [he] is entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2,” a statute that expressly includes defense of habitation pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-23 as a rationale for immunity from prosecution.5 Consequently, Reddick has not shown that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. 3....
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Dugar v. State, 877 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 9, 2022 | 314 Ga. 376

...the community, you can note both.” 5 Later the same month, new counsel filed an entry of appearance on behalf of Dugar, and six months later filed a motion for dismissal under the immunity statute, OCGA § 16-3-24.2, on the basis of justification by self-defense....
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Russell v. State, 905 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 13, 2024 | 319 Ga. 556

...appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. insufficient to support the verdict and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek pretrial immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...in self-defense if he was the aggressor). 3. Russell also argues that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial 9 motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.3 That statute generally provides that a person is immune from prosecution for the use of force for any of several permissible reasons, including self-defense....
...ial motion for immunity, Russell must show that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the case would have been different. See 3 At the time of the crime, OCGA § 16-3-24.2 stated: A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force,...
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Madera v. State, 899 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2024 | 318 Ga. 593

...and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, his argument that trial counsel was ineffective on this ground fails. (b) Madera also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a pretrial motion for immunity based on justification. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2 (“A person who uses threats or force in accordance with [certain statutes governing justification as a defense, including self-defense,] shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such pers...
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State v. Brown, 878 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 2022 | 314 Ga. 588

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Depriest v. State, 907 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2024 | 319 Ga. 874

...Accordingly, Depriest’s 10 statutory sufficiency claim fails. 3. Depriest next argues that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution based on self-defense. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2 (granting immunity to person who uses deadly force in self-defense)....
...have been different. This burden, though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one. Blackmon v. State, 302 Ga. 173, 175 (2) (805 SE2d 899) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). To succeed on a pretrial immunity motion pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2, trial counsel would 11 have had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Depriest acted in self-defense....
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Pope v. State, 858 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2021 | 311 Ga. 557

...r prong.” Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (690 SE2d 801) (2010). In his amended motion for new trial, Pope contended that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file an immunity motion before trial. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2 (“A person who uses threats or force in accordance with [certain statutes governing justification as a defense, including self-defense,] shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such per...
...Trial counsel also added that she did not think that the trial “judge would find it sufficiently compelling to grant . . . an immunity motion, and we just saved it for trial.” Pope contends that it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to move for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 in a self- defense case where, as here, the defendant intends to testify at trial. In his brief on appeal, Pope argues that because he “had to testify at trial if he had any hope of acquittal on self-defense grounds,” 3 “Prior to 2014, a felon in possession of a firearm generally could not assert a claim for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 for crimes involving the use of deadly force.” State v....
...296, 296 (840 SE2d 385) (2020). However, at the time of Pope’s crimes in December 2014, a felon like Pope, who was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131, was “no longer categorically precluded by the final clause of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 from seeking immunity from criminal prosecution under that statute,” Remy, 308 Ga....
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State v. Gates, 912 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 18, 2025 | 321 Ga. 45

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Harris v. State, 886 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 18, 2023 | 316 Ga. 141

...pre-trial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16- 3-24.27 on the basis that he was reasonably defending himself 6 Harris led officers to several different areas where he claimed that he threw the gun, but they were unable to locate it. 7 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides: A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such p...

Graham v. State (Ga. 2026).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 3, 2026 | 316 Ga. 141

Whisnant v. State (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 12, 2025 | 316 Ga. 141

...Finally, Whisnant contends that the trial court “failed to fully consider” Whisnant’s claim of self-defense or the expert testi- mony on battered person syndrome. We understand this contention to refer to the trial court’s denial of Whisnant’s motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...ruling, and we accept the trial court’s findings of fact and judgments of credibility if there is any evidence to support them. See State v. 16 Copeland, 310 Ga. 345, 346 (2020). But we review de novo the trial court’s application of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 to the facts....
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State v. Hylton, 914 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2025 | 321 Ga. 292

...HYLTON. BOGGS, Chief Justice. Appellee Shawn Hylton was indicted for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Lathan Davenport.1 Prior to trial, Hylton filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court’s order granting the motion lacked sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit meaningful appellate review....
...On December 19, 2023, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Hylton for felony murder (Count 1), aggravated assault (Count 2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3). On March 12, 2024, Hylton filed a motion for a hearing on immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...the motion on July 10, 2024. The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. necessary to prevent an attack, and immunity was not warranted under OCGA § 16-3-24.2....
...dings of fact or conclusions of law that support its order and erroneously cites and incorporates by reference its oral findings, notwithstanding that no such findings were stated at the hearing. We disagree. As the State acknowledges, OCGA § 16-3-24.2 does not require a trial court’s order granting or denying immunity to include explicit factual findings or conclusions of law. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2 (providing that “[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or 17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly fo...
...evidence that Davenport made any threats, warnings, or menaces or brandished any weapons that would warrant Hylton using deadly 12 force. Again, we disagree. As discussed above, to prevail on his motion for pretrial immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, Hylton was required to establish a justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hamilton, 308 Ga. at 128; OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). On appeal of an order granting or denying immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, “we accept the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” State v....