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O.C.G.A.Title 16Chapter 4

O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5 (2019)

Abandonment of effort to commit a crime as an affirmative defense

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2019 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest cited 1984–2025 41citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 41 opinions since 1984, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(b) A renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from:

(1) A belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or

(2) A decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time.

History

Code 1933, § 26-1003, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Burden of proof. - Renunciation of criminal purpose is an affirmative defense of which defendant bears burden of proof. Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528, 221 S.E.2d 649 (1975), aff ’d, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976), over-ruled on other grounds, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, 1976,. Burden of persuasion as to renunciation of criminal purpose. - Affirmative defenses authorized by former Code 1933, § 26-901 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20 et seq.) and by former Code 1933, § 26-1003 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5) imply that if defendant presents one it is to defendant’s advantage and to defendant’s interest to affirmatively show it as best defendant can but defendant has no burden to show it nor does defendant have burden of persuasion. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev’d on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976). Charge that defendant bears burden of persuasion under former Code

1933, § 26-1003 was constitutionally impermissible. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev’d on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5). Defendant’s mere disinterest in subsequent proceedings inside the room where defendant and codefendant were engaged in a criminal enterprise did not establish abandonment. Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 92, 522 S.E.2d 684 (1999). When a crime is already completed, the court need not charge on abandonment of criminal attempt. Maddox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 384, 262 S.E.2d 636 (1979); Baker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 746, 278 S.E.2d 462 (1981); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983); Freese v. State, 196 Ga. App. 761, 396 S.E.2d 922 (1990); Perkins v. State, 224 Ga. App. 63, 479 S.E.2d 471 (1996). Showing that crime was already completed when defendant abandoned efforts is insufficient to require charge on aban-

CRIMINAL ATTEMPT, CONSPIRACY, & SOLICITATION

donment of criminal attempt. Joiner v. State, 147 Ga. App. 526, 249 S.E.2d 335 (1978). Crime already committed. - Defendant could be found guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal where, knowing that a codefendant had used the gun to shoot someone, the defendant concealed it with the intent of protecting self and defendant’s friend from punishment; defendant’s later informing the police where defendant had hidden the gun was not abandonment of a crime because the crimes had already been committed. Hubbard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 141, 435 S.E.2d 709 (1993). Victim’s testimony that after attempting rape and murder, defendant ‘‘up and left’’ does not authorize abandonment charge. Guthrie v. State, 147 Ga. App. 351, 248 S.E.2d 714 (1978). Charge on entire section where request included only portion of section. - Trial court did not err in charge on renunciation of criminal purpose where appellant requested and court had approved a charge on only a portion of O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5, and court’s charge included entire Code section. Smith v. State, 157 Ga. App. 238, 276 S.E.2d 905 (1981). Flight when discovered. - Trial court did not err by failing to give burglary defendant’s requested charge on abandonment of an attempt, where there was no evidence that the attempt was abandoned for any reason other than that defendant fled when discovered. Hayes v. State, 193 Ga. App. 33, 387 S.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 387 S.E.2d 139 (1989). Evidence supported finding of involuntary renunciation of criminal purpose. - Attempted robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence which showed, inter alia, that the defendant only abandoned a plan to rob a bank after repeatedly making eye contact with an officer who had fortuitously arrived, and that the defendant believed this increased the probability of apprehension, rendering renunciation of the criminal purposes involuntary under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b)(1); although the officer arrived in an unmarked car and did not wear a police uniform, there was evidence

that the officer wore clothing normally worn by law enforcement individuals and that the officer’s badge was possibly visible. Moreover, regardless of whether the defendant knew the individual the defendant continued to look at was an officer, the fact remained that the defendant was acutely aware of the individual’s presence. Heard v. State, 299 Ga. App. 44, 681 S.E.2d 701 (2009). No evidence presented to indicate defendant abandoned effort to sell cocaine. - See Quinn v. State, 171 Ga. App. 590, 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984). Forcing victim to perform fellatio after failed rape attempt was not evidence of renunciation of criminal purpose of rape. - Since the evidence showed that, upon discovering the victim was menstruating, the defendant apparently found the accomplishment of the crime of rape to be more difficult, the defendant was not found to have abandoned the criminal enterprise, choosing instead to force the victim to perform fellatio; therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted rape since the defendant did not make a complete renunciation of the criminal purpose. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (2007). No evidence of abandonment. - When the evidence showed that the defendant directed the getaway car to enable an accomplice to join the group and effect an escape, and the defendant disposed of weapons that had been used in the crimes, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have rejected the defendant’s defense of abandonment. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 578 S.E.2d 885 (2003). In a criminal trial on a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, a trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict because a criminal attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was committed when the defendant and the defendant’s two coworkers obtained equipment, including guns and ammunition, in preparation for robbing a store, drove to the store, and were thereafter spotted by the police. Level v. State, 273 Ga. App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (2005). Evidence that a defendant was partici-

pating in a home invasion robbery but backed out of the house when confronted by the victim, then shot the victim in the chest as the victim reached for the victim’s pistol, did not show the defense of abandonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b) because it was a response to circumstances presenting an increased probability of apprehension or making accomplishment of the criminal purpose more difficult. Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (2010). With regard to the defendant’s convictions for attempted child molestation, the state sufficiently defeated the defendant’s defense of abandonment because while the defendant did leave the motel parking lot, it was not until the defendant viewed the task force agents wearing identifying t-shirts, communications through open car windows about the defendant’s identification were already had, and the defendant left at a high rate of speed in an attempt to flee. Muse v. State, 323 Ga. App. 779, 748 S.E.2d 136 (2013). Trial counsel not ineffective. - In a murder case, trial counsel was not ineffective for arguing that the defendant was not guilty of attempting to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act,

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., because the defendant had abandoned the drug deal at the time of the shooting and that the shooting was in self-defense in light of limited defense options that were available and the evidence against the defendant. Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 453, 754 S.E.2d 344 (2014). Cited in Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 222 S.E.2d 55 (1975); Cowart v. State, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976); Hibbert v. State, 146 Ga. App. 887, 247 S.E.2d 554 (1978); Stewart v. State, 147 Ga. App. 547, 249 S.E.2d 351 (1978); Jackson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 623, 252 S.E.2d 26 (1979); J.E.T. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Beckum v. State, 156 Ga. App. 484, 274 S.E.2d 829 (1980); Cook v. State, 249 Ga. 709, 292 S.E.2d 844 (1982); Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 316 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Battle v. State, 178 Ga. App. 655, 344 S.E.2d 477 (1986); Merritt v. State, 183 Ga. App. 135, 358 S.E.2d 293 (1987); Willis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 251, 381 S.E.2d 416 (1989); Williams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 913, 383 S.E.2d 344 (1989); Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (2000); Barnett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (2000); Kelly v. State, 272 Ga. 800, 537 S.E.2d 338 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. - Withdrawal From or Abandonment of Criminal Enterprise, 8 POF2d 231. C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law: Substantive Principles, § 152.

ALR. - Attempt to conceal or dispose of body as evidence connecting accused with homicide, 2 A.L.R. 1227. What constitutes attempted murder, 54 A.L.R.3d 612.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENYounger v. State, 702 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 16-4-5 10×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“He argues in this Court that his conduct of leaving the house when confronted by Monty fits the parameters of the affirmative defense of *197 abandonment as set forth in OCGA § 16-4-5.”
Later courts cite it for
“voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose,” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENBrockman v. State, 739 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. 2013).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“OCGA § 16-4-5 states that to be considered abandonment, the defendant’s conduct must be “under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.”
The case’s holding
A murder may be found to have been committed during the commission of an armed robbery even if the attempted robbery fails or is abandoned.
Later courts cite it for
“because the state constitutional issue was not raised or ruled on below, it is waived on appeal.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENMuse v. State, 748 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 27 cases
The case’s holding
A defendant’s flight from a meeting location upon observing law enforcement presence does not constitute voluntary abandonment of a criminal attempt.
4
GREENJohnson v. State, 578 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 2003).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a). First, even if Johnson’s running from the taxi is seen as evidence of abandonment, the crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob Huerta was completed when Mitchell pointed the pistol at Huerta.”
Later courts cite it for
“if it is shown that he is the accomplice of the person who was in physical possession of the pistol.” · 2 citing courts
5
REDGivens v. State, 439 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 16-4-5 8×cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Givens v. State (1994): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“" OCGA § 16-4-5. The remedial purpose behind OCGA § 16-4-5 (formerly OCGA § 26-1003) is explained in the Committee Notes to the 1968 Criminal Code as follows: "This section is a new provision that specifically allows a person to withdraw without criminal liability if he has a…”
6
GREENSatterfield v. State, 849 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 2020).
cites § 16-4-5 8×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (“When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime, .”
7
GREENHayes v. State, 387 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1) provides that "[a] renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from.”
8
GREENHeard v. State, 681 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“4 OCGA § 16-4-5 (a). 5 OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1).”
Later courts cite it for
“as long as there is some evidence, even though contradicted, to support each necessary element of the state's case, this court will uphold the jury's verdict.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENMikell v. State, 689 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 16-4-5 4×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“In light of McClouden’s testimony that she saw appellant in the doorway after the shots had been fired, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his…”
Later courts cite it for
“prosecutor's comments in closing argument did not exceed the scope of the invited response” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENThompson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. 1999).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“OCGA § 16-4-5. 5. Thompson's remaining enumeration, regarding the trial court's alleged incomplete charge on parties to a crime, is unlikely to recur upon retrial.”
Later courts cite it for
“categorically rejected the position that the element of an unlawful entry may be established solely by proof that an accused had the intent to commit a theft or other felony within another's premises . . . as contrary to the plain language of the statute . . . .” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENLobdell v. State, 353 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 16-4-5 2×cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“Compare with OCGA § 16-4-5, which provides that abandonment of an effort to commit a crime is an affirmative defense to the substantive crime of criminal attempt, OCGA § 16-4-1.”
The case’s holding
Participants in a robbery plan are criminally responsible for acts committed during the execution of the plan that are probable consequences of the unlawful design.
Later courts cite it for
“all of the participants in a plan to rob are criminally responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the plan, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the unlawful design, even though the particular act may not have actually been a part of the plan.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENLevel v. State, 615 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“Pursuant to OCGA § 16-4-5 (a), it is an affirmative defense when one abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents its commission under circumstances “manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.”
13
GREENBattle v. State, 344 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 16-4-5 8×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“In order for the affirmative defense of abandonment to come into play, it must be shown that the perpetrator “prevented [the crime’s] commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.”
14
GREENFreese v. State, 396 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“” Defendant cites OCGA § 16-4-5 in support of his seventeenth request to charge.”
15
GREENHubbard v. State, 435 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“Appellant contends that he could not be found guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal because he “abandoned” his crime within the meaning of OCGA § 16-4-5 when he told the police he had hidden the gun and led them to the place it was concealed.”
16
GREENQuinn v. State, 320 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“OCGA § 16-4-5. Appellant did not raise this defense at trial, and did not testify.”
17
GREENJones v. State, 540 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“3 OCGA § 16-4-5 (a); see also Lobdell, supra at 771-772 (1); Cunningham v.”
18
GREENHyman v. State, 474 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“See OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1). Moreover, Hyman’s assistance in the participants’ flight by driving was consistent with his participation in the criminal enterprise.”
19
GREENSpivey v. State, 534 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 16-4-5 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“In her second enumeration of error, Spivey contends the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on abandonment as set forth in OCGA § 16-4-5: When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is *788 an…”
20
GREENCunningham v. State, 522 S.E.2d 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 16-4-5 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 16-4-5
“OCGA § 16-4-5 provides that when conduct would otherwise be a crime, it is a defense that a defendant “abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2013. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.30Ga.11
By subsection
(a)1 case
Mikell v. State, 689 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. 2010).“In light of McClouden’s testimony that she saw appellant in the doorway after the shots had been fired, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his…”

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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