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2018 Georgia Code 16-4-5 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 4. Criminal Attempt, Conspiracy, and Solicitation, 16-4-1 through 16-4-10.

ARTICLE 3 ALIBI

16-4-5. Abandonment of effort to commit a crime as an affirmative defense.

  1. When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.
  2. A renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from:
    1. A belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
    2. A decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time.

(Code 1933, § 26-1003, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Burden of proof.

- Renunciation of criminal purpose is an affirmative defense of which defendant bears burden of proof. Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528, 221 S.E.2d 649 (1975), aff'd, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976).

Burden of persuasion as to renunciation of criminal purpose.

- Affirmative defenses authorized by former Code 1933, § 26-901 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20 et seq.) and by former Code 1933, § 26-1003 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5) imply that if defendant presents one it is to defendant's advantage and to defendant's interest to affirmatively show it as best defendant can but defendant has no burden to show it nor does defendant have burden of persuasion. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976).

Charge that defendant bears burden of persuasion under former Code 1933, § 26-1003 was constitutionally impermissible. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5).

Defendant's mere disinterest in subsequent proceedings inside the room where defendant and codefendant were engaged in a criminal enterprise did not establish abandonment. Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 92, 522 S.E.2d 684 (1999).

When a crime is already completed, the court need not charge on abandonment of criminal attempt. Maddox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 384, 262 S.E.2d 636 (1979); Baker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 746, 278 S.E.2d 462 (1981); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983); Freese v. State, 196 Ga. App. 761, 396 S.E.2d 922 (1990); Perkins v. State, 224 Ga. App. 63, 479 S.E.2d 471 (1996).

Showing that crime was already completed when defendant abandoned efforts is insufficient to require charge on abandonment of criminal attempt. Joiner v. State, 147 Ga. App. 526, 249 S.E.2d 335 (1978).

Crime already committed.

- Defendant could be found guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal where, knowing that a codefendant had used the gun to shoot someone, the defendant concealed it with the intent of protecting self and defendant's friend from punishment; defendant's later informing the police where defendant had hidden the gun was not abandonment of a crime because the crimes had already been committed. Hubbard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 141, 435 S.E.2d 709 (1993).

Victim's testimony that after attempting rape and murder, defendant "up and left" does not authorize abandonment charge. Guthrie v. State, 147 Ga. App. 351, 248 S.E.2d 714 (1978).

Charge on entire section where request included only portion of section.

- Trial court did not err in charge on renunciation of criminal purpose where appellant requested and court had approved a charge on only a portion of O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5, and court's charge included entire Code section. Smith v. State, 157 Ga. App. 238, 276 S.E.2d 905 (1981).

Flight when discovered.

- Trial court did not err by failing to give burglary defendant's requested charge on abandonment of an attempt, where there was no evidence that the attempt was abandoned for any reason other than that defendant fled when discovered. Hayes v. State, 193 Ga. App. 33, 387 S.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 387 S.E.2d 139 (1989).

Evidence supported finding of involuntary renunciation of criminal purpose.

- Attempted robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence which showed, inter alia, that the defendant only abandoned a plan to rob a bank after repeatedly making eye contact with an officer who had fortuitously arrived, and that the defendant believed this increased the probability of apprehension, rendering renunciation of the criminal purposes involuntary under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b)(1); although the officer arrived in an unmarked car and did not wear a police uniform, there was evidence that the officer wore clothing normally worn by law enforcement individuals and that the officer's badge was possibly visible. Moreover, regardless of whether the defendant knew the individual the defendant continued to look at was an officer, the fact remained that the defendant was acutely aware of the individual's presence. Heard v. State, 299 Ga. App. 44, 681 S.E.2d 701 (2009).

No evidence presented to indicate defendant abandoned effort to sell cocaine.

- See Quinn v. State, 171 Ga. App. 590, 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984).

Forcing victim to perform fellatio after failed rape attempt was not evidence of renunciation of criminal purpose of rape.

- Since the evidence showed that, upon discovering the victim was menstruating, the defendant apparently found the accomplishment of the crime of rape to be more difficult, the defendant was not found to have abandoned the criminal enterprise, choosing instead to force the victim to perform fellatio; therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for attempted rape since the defendant did not make a complete renunciation of the criminal purpose. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (2007).

No evidence of abandonment.

- When the evidence showed that the defendant directed the getaway car to enable an accomplice to join the group and effect an escape, and the defendant disposed of weapons that had been used in the crimes, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have rejected the defendant's defense of abandonment. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 578 S.E.2d 885 (2003).

In a criminal trial on a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, a trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because a criminal attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was committed when the defendant and the defendant's two coworkers obtained equipment, including guns and ammunition, in preparation for robbing a store, drove to the store, and were thereafter spotted by the police. Level v. State, 273 Ga. App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (2005).

Evidence that a defendant was participating in a home invasion robbery but backed out of the house when confronted by the victim, then shot the victim in the chest as the victim reached for the victim's pistol, did not show the defense of abandonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b) because it was a response to circumstances presenting an increased probability of apprehension or making accomplishment of the criminal purpose more difficult. Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (2010).

With regard to the defendant's convictions for attempted child molestation, the state sufficiently defeated the defendant's defense of abandonment because while the defendant did leave the motel parking lot, it was not until the defendant viewed the task force agents wearing identifying t-shirts, communications through open car windows about the defendant's identification were already had, and the defendant left at a high rate of speed in an attempt to flee. Muse v. State, 323 Ga. App. 779, 748 S.E.2d 136 (2013).

Trial counsel not ineffective.

- In a murder case, trial counsel was not ineffective for arguing that the defendant was not guilty of attempting to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., because the defendant had abandoned the drug deal at the time of the shooting and that the shooting was in self-defense in light of limited defense options that were available and the evidence against the defendant. Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 453, 754 S.E.2d 344 (2014).

Cited in Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 222 S.E.2d 55 (1975); Cowart v. State, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976); Hibbert v. State, 146 Ga. App. 887, 247 S.E.2d 554 (1978); Stewart v. State, 147 Ga. App. 547, 249 S.E.2d 351 (1978); Jackson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 623, 252 S.E.2d 26 (1979); J.E.T. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Beckum v. State, 156 Ga. App. 484, 274 S.E.2d 829 (1980); Cook v. State, 249 Ga. 709, 292 S.E.2d 844 (1982); Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 316 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Battle v. State, 178 Ga. App. 655, 344 S.E.2d 477 (1986); Merritt v. State, 183 Ga. App. 135, 358 S.E.2d 293 (1987); Willis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 251, 381 S.E.2d 416 (1989); Williams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 913, 383 S.E.2d 344 (1989); Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (2000); Barnett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (2000); Kelly v. State, 272 Ga. 800, 537 S.E.2d 338 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Withdrawal From or Abandonment of Criminal Enterprise, 8 POF2d 231.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 150.

ALR.

- Attempt to conceal or dispose of body as evidence connecting accused with homicide, 2 A.L.R. 1227.

What constitutes attempted murder, 54 A.L.R.3d 612.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5

Total Results: 11  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Lobdell v. State, 353 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 12, 1987 | 256 Ga. 769

...[5] Appellant asserts that his constitutional rights were violated, but he does not specify which of those rights were infringed. [6] We also pretermit deciding whether abandonment is an affirmative defense to the charge that the defendant was a party to a crime within the meaning of OCGA § 16-2-20. Compare with OCGA § 16-4-5, which provides that abandonment of an effort to commit a crime is an affirmative defense to the substantive crime of criminal attempt, OCGA § 16-4-1....
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Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 70 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2013 | 739 S.E.2d 332, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 406

...t in Harris County that was probably on the list [of burglaries that he planned on doing].” The trial court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of abandonment in relation to the charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. OCGA § 16-4-5 states that to be considered abandonment, the defendant’s conduct must be “under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.” Further, “[a] renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from [a] belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose.” OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1)....
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Thompson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 1999 | 271 Ga. 105, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1924

...er than trial testimony given by a party who constitutionally waived his right against self-incrimination. 4. Based on the facts adduced at trial, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to give Thompson's requested charge on abandonment. OCGA § 16-4-5....
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Johnson v. State, 578 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2003 | 276 Ga. 368, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1117

...The evidence is sufficient for such a finding here. Johnson urges that even if there is evidence that he participated in conduct that developed into a crime, he abandoned the conduct once Mitchell fired the first shot, and that abandonment is an affirmative defense to an attempted crime. See OCGA § 16-4-5(a). First, even if Johnson's running from the taxi is seen as evidence of abandonment, the crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob Huerta was completed when Mitchell pointed the pistol at Huerta. See OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1). Further, under OCGA § 16-4-5(a), an abandonment must be "a voluntary and complete renunciation of [the] criminal purpose." See Barnett v....
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Younger v. State, 702 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 8, 2010 | 288 Ga. 195, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3635

...ablished that he abandoned the attempt to commit robbery before Monty was shot. He argues in this Court that his conduct of leaving the house when confronted by Monty fits the parameters of the affirmative defense of abandonment as set forth in OCGA § 16-4-5....
...; he exited the woods with the men, briefly walked with them, went in the other direction, and rejoined them after Monty was shot. [4] Nor is there evidence showing abandonment under the State's version of events, upon which Younger now relies. OCGA § 16-4-5 specifically states that to be considered abandonment, the defendant's conduct must be "under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose." OCGA § 16-4-5(a)....
...And, a "renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from... [a] belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose." OCGA § 16-4-5(b)(1)....
...ed on January 8, 2010. On October 16, 2009, Younger filed a notice of appeal. See McCulley v. State, 273 Ga. 40, 43(4), n. 3, 537 S.E.2d 340 (2000). His appeal was docketed in this Court on April 15, 2010, and orally argued on July 6, 2010. [2] OCGA § 16-4-5 reads: (a) When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commiss...
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Mikell v. State, 689 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 434, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 253

...In light of McClouden's testimony that she saw appellant in the doorway after the shots had been fired, we find no merit in appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his affirmative defense of abandonment. See OCGA § 16-4-5(a) (circumstances must manifest complete renunciation of the criminal purpose to constitute affirmative defense of abandonment); Johnson v....
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Bailey v. State, 291 Ga. 144 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 29, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 214, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1777

...ent to commit a crime. OCGA§ 16-4-1 provides: A person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to *147commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. OCGA § 16-4-5 states in full: (a) When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented...
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Satterfield v. State, 849 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2020 | 309 Ga. 843

...If Satterfield fails to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, we need not address the other part. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 (2) (807 SE2d 369) (2017). (a) Satterfield contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (“When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime, ....
...drawn the conclusion that he never went inside the victim’s house and that he did not know what happened in the house until being informed by Young. We disagree with Satterfield that the evidence supported a charge on abandonment. OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) provides that an abandonment must be “a voluntary and complete renunciation of [the] criminal purpose.” Such a renunciation does not include “[a] belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or a...
...that he did not know who went in the house as he was “two houses . . . down,” and wanted nothing to do with the planned robbery. Neither Jones’s nor Tinch’s testimony showed that Satterfield voluntarily abandoned his criminal purpose within the meaning of OCGA § 16-4-5....
...— a claim that he never committed a crime, as opposed to having abandoned an attempt to commit a crime. See Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 788 (2) (534 SE2d 498) (2000) (where conduct does not constitute an attempt to commit a crime, OCGA § 16-4-5 is not applicable)....
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Simmons v. State, 716 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 3, 2011 | 289 Ga. 773, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3056

...(e) Finally, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment. He claims that there was evidence that he did not participate in the beating outside the apartment but instead executed a "voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose," OCGA § 16-4-5(a), by going to his car and encouraging Watson to leave....
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Kelly v. State, 272 Ga. 800 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 2000 | 537 S.E.2d 338, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3702

...Although Kelly asserts that he abandoned his active participation before the actual murder was committed, the evidence is not consistent with this claim, showing instead that he never renounced the criminal enterprise, but only postponed it. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1); Hyman v....
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Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 453 (Ga. 2014).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 27, 2014 | 754 S.E.2d 344, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 134

...Therefore, in an attempt to make the self-defense theory more viable, trial counsel argued that, although Moore was initially going to be involved in a drug deal, he had “abandoned” that criminal enterprise by deciding not to purchase any marijuana before the shooting began. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (“When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime ....