Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 16-4-5 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 4. Criminal Attempt, Conspiracy, and Solicitation, 16-4-1 through 16-4-10.

ARTICLE 3 ALIBI

16-4-5. Abandonment of effort to commit a crime as an affirmative defense.

  1. When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.
  2. A renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from:
    1. A belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
    2. A decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time.

(Code 1933, § 26-1003, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Burden of proof.

- Renunciation of criminal purpose is an affirmative defense of which defendant bears burden of proof. Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528, 221 S.E.2d 649 (1975), aff'd, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976).

Burden of persuasion as to renunciation of criminal purpose.

- Affirmative defenses authorized by former Code 1933, § 26-901 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20 et seq.) and by former Code 1933, § 26-1003 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5) imply that if defendant presents one it is to defendant's advantage and to defendant's interest to affirmatively show it as best defendant can but defendant has no burden to show it nor does defendant have burden of persuasion. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976).

Charge that defendant bears burden of persuasion under former Code 1933, § 26-1003 was constitutionally impermissible. Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5).

Defendant's mere disinterest in subsequent proceedings inside the room where defendant and codefendant were engaged in a criminal enterprise did not establish abandonment. Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 92, 522 S.E.2d 684 (1999).

When a crime is already completed, the court need not charge on abandonment of criminal attempt. Maddox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 384, 262 S.E.2d 636 (1979); Baker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 746, 278 S.E.2d 462 (1981); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983); Freese v. State, 196 Ga. App. 761, 396 S.E.2d 922 (1990); Perkins v. State, 224 Ga. App. 63, 479 S.E.2d 471 (1996).

Showing that crime was already completed when defendant abandoned efforts is insufficient to require charge on abandonment of criminal attempt. Joiner v. State, 147 Ga. App. 526, 249 S.E.2d 335 (1978).

Crime already committed.

- Defendant could be found guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal where, knowing that a codefendant had used the gun to shoot someone, the defendant concealed it with the intent of protecting self and defendant's friend from punishment; defendant's later informing the police where defendant had hidden the gun was not abandonment of a crime because the crimes had already been committed. Hubbard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 141, 435 S.E.2d 709 (1993).

Victim's testimony that after attempting rape and murder, defendant "up and left" does not authorize abandonment charge. Guthrie v. State, 147 Ga. App. 351, 248 S.E.2d 714 (1978).

Charge on entire section where request included only portion of section.

- Trial court did not err in charge on renunciation of criminal purpose where appellant requested and court had approved a charge on only a portion of O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5, and court's charge included entire Code section. Smith v. State, 157 Ga. App. 238, 276 S.E.2d 905 (1981).

Flight when discovered.

- Trial court did not err by failing to give burglary defendant's requested charge on abandonment of an attempt, where there was no evidence that the attempt was abandoned for any reason other than that defendant fled when discovered. Hayes v. State, 193 Ga. App. 33, 387 S.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 387 S.E.2d 139 (1989).

Evidence supported finding of involuntary renunciation of criminal purpose.

- Attempted robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence which showed, inter alia, that the defendant only abandoned a plan to rob a bank after repeatedly making eye contact with an officer who had fortuitously arrived, and that the defendant believed this increased the probability of apprehension, rendering renunciation of the criminal purposes involuntary under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b)(1); although the officer arrived in an unmarked car and did not wear a police uniform, there was evidence that the officer wore clothing normally worn by law enforcement individuals and that the officer's badge was possibly visible. Moreover, regardless of whether the defendant knew the individual the defendant continued to look at was an officer, the fact remained that the defendant was acutely aware of the individual's presence. Heard v. State, 299 Ga. App. 44, 681 S.E.2d 701 (2009).

No evidence presented to indicate defendant abandoned effort to sell cocaine.

- See Quinn v. State, 171 Ga. App. 590, 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984).

Forcing victim to perform fellatio after failed rape attempt was not evidence of renunciation of criminal purpose of rape.

- Since the evidence showed that, upon discovering the victim was menstruating, the defendant apparently found the accomplishment of the crime of rape to be more difficult, the defendant was not found to have abandoned the criminal enterprise, choosing instead to force the victim to perform fellatio; therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for attempted rape since the defendant did not make a complete renunciation of the criminal purpose. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (2007).

No evidence of abandonment.

- When the evidence showed that the defendant directed the getaway car to enable an accomplice to join the group and effect an escape, and the defendant disposed of weapons that had been used in the crimes, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have rejected the defendant's defense of abandonment. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 578 S.E.2d 885 (2003).

In a criminal trial on a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, a trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because a criminal attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was committed when the defendant and the defendant's two coworkers obtained equipment, including guns and ammunition, in preparation for robbing a store, drove to the store, and were thereafter spotted by the police. Level v. State, 273 Ga. App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (2005).

Evidence that a defendant was participating in a home invasion robbery but backed out of the house when confronted by the victim, then shot the victim in the chest as the victim reached for the victim's pistol, did not show the defense of abandonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-5(b) because it was a response to circumstances presenting an increased probability of apprehension or making accomplishment of the criminal purpose more difficult. Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (2010).

With regard to the defendant's convictions for attempted child molestation, the state sufficiently defeated the defendant's defense of abandonment because while the defendant did leave the motel parking lot, it was not until the defendant viewed the task force agents wearing identifying t-shirts, communications through open car windows about the defendant's identification were already had, and the defendant left at a high rate of speed in an attempt to flee. Muse v. State, 323 Ga. App. 779, 748 S.E.2d 136 (2013).

Trial counsel not ineffective.

- In a murder case, trial counsel was not ineffective for arguing that the defendant was not guilty of attempting to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., because the defendant had abandoned the drug deal at the time of the shooting and that the shooting was in self-defense in light of limited defense options that were available and the evidence against the defendant. Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 453, 754 S.E.2d 344 (2014).

Cited in Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 222 S.E.2d 55 (1975); Cowart v. State, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976); Hibbert v. State, 146 Ga. App. 887, 247 S.E.2d 554 (1978); Stewart v. State, 147 Ga. App. 547, 249 S.E.2d 351 (1978); Jackson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 623, 252 S.E.2d 26 (1979); J.E.T. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Beckum v. State, 156 Ga. App. 484, 274 S.E.2d 829 (1980); Cook v. State, 249 Ga. 709, 292 S.E.2d 844 (1982); Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 316 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Battle v. State, 178 Ga. App. 655, 344 S.E.2d 477 (1986); Merritt v. State, 183 Ga. App. 135, 358 S.E.2d 293 (1987); Willis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 251, 381 S.E.2d 416 (1989); Williams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 913, 383 S.E.2d 344 (1989); Spivey v. State, 243 Ga. App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (2000); Barnett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (2000); Kelly v. State, 272 Ga. 800, 537 S.E.2d 338 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Withdrawal From or Abandonment of Criminal Enterprise, 8 POF2d 231.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 150.

ALR.

- Attempt to conceal or dispose of body as evidence connecting accused with homicide, 2 A.L.R. 1227.

What constitutes attempted murder, 54 A.L.R.3d 612.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 16-4-5 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 10

Moore v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-01-27

Citation: 294 Ga. 453, 754 S.E.2d 344, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 134, 2014 WL 273891, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 98

Snippet: the *455 shooting began. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (“When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute

Brockman v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-03-04

Citation: 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 406, 2013 WL 776589, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 201

Snippet: criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. OCGA § 16-4-5 states that to be considered abandonment, the defendant’s

Bailey v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-05-29

Citation: 291 Ga. 144, 728 S.E.2d 214, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1777, 2012 WL 1909480, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 494

Snippet: toward the commission of that crime. OCGA § 16-4-5 states in full: (a) When a person’s conduct would

Simmons v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-10-03

Citation: 716 S.E.2d 165, 289 Ga. 773, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3056, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 709

Snippet: complete renunciation of his criminal purpose," OCGA § 16-4-5(a), by going to his car and encouraging Watson

Younger v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-11-08

Citation: 702 S.E.2d 183, 288 Ga. 195, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3635, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 847

Snippet: affirmative defense of abandonment as set forth in OCGA § 16-4-5.[2] But, Younger's requests for jury instructions

Mikell v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-02-01

Citation: 689 S.E.2d 286, 286 Ga. 434, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 253, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 111

Snippet: affirmative defense of abandonment. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (circumstances must manifest complete renunciation

Johnson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-03-27

Citation: 578 S.E.2d 885, 276 Ga. 368, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1117, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 320

Snippet: affirmative defense to an attempted crime. See OCGA § 16-4-5(a). First, even if Johnson's running from the taxi

Kelly v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2000-10-02

Citation: 272 Ga. 800, 537 S.E.2d 338, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3702, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 678

Snippet: criminal enterprise, but only postponed it. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (b) (1); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 421

Thompson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-05-17

Citation: 519 S.E.2d 434, 271 Ga. 105, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1924, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 432

Snippet: Thompson’s requested charge on abandonment. OCGA § 16-4-5. 5. Thompson’s remaining enumeration, regarding

Lobdell v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-03-12

Citation: 353 S.E.2d 799, 256 Ga. 769, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 659

Snippet: meaning of OCGA § 16-2-20. Compare with OCGA § 16-4-5, which provides that abandonment of an effort to