O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-95 (2019)

Offense of violating family violence order; penalty

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) ‘‘Civil family violence order’’ means any temporary protective order or permanent protective order issued pursuant to Article 1 of Chapter 13 of Title 19. (2) ‘‘Criminal family violence order’’ means: (A) Any order of pretrial release issued as a result of an arrest for an act of family violence; or (B) Any order for probation issued as a result of a conviction or plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or first offender to an act of family violence. (3) ‘‘Family violence’’ shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 19-13-1.

(b) A person commits the offense of violating a civil family violence order or criminal family violence order when such person knowingly and in a nonviolent manner violates the terms of such order issued against that person, which: (1) Excludes, evicts, or excludes and evicts the person from a residence or household; (2) Directs the person to stay away from a residence, workplace, or school; (3) Restrains the person from approaching within a specified distance of another person; or (4) Restricts the person from having any contact, direct or indirect, by telephone, pager, facsimile, e-mail, or any other means of communication with another person, except as specified in such order. (c) Any person convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (d) Nothing contained in this Code section shall prohibit a prosecution for the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking that arose out of the same course of conduct; provided, however, that, for purposes of sentencing, a violation of this Code section shall be merged with a violation of any provision of Code Section 16-5-90 or 16-5-91 that arose out of the same course of conduct.

History

Code 1981, § 16-5-95, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 652, § 1; Ga. L. 2013, p. 667, § 1/SB 86.

Annotations

Cross references. - Termination of

residential lease after issuance of civil family violence order or criminal family violence order, § 44-7-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Charging instrument defective. - Trial court’s denial of a defendant’s general demurrer to a charge against the defendant of violation of a family violence order, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-95(a) (now subsection (b)), was error as the accusation failed to state any specific acts that violated any specific terms of a family violence order, such that the accusation failed to set out the essential elements of the crime or to apprise the defendant properly of the charge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-71(c). Newsome v. State, 296 Ga. App. 490, 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009). Jury instruction erroneous. - Defendant’s conviction for violating a family

violence protective order as a lesser included offense of aggravated stalking was reversed on appeal because the defendant was not indicted for the family violence protective order violation; thus, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser offense. Edgecomb v. State, 319 Ga. App. 804, 738 S.E.2d 645 (2013). Instruction properly denied. - Because there was no evidence that could have shown that the defendant violated the protective order, but nonviolently, the evidence either showed the defendant committed aggravated stalking or no offense, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on violation of a temporary protective order as a lesser included

offense of aggravated stalking. Slaughter v. State, 327 Ga. App. 593, 760 S.E.2d 609 (2014).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 10 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2009–2024 · leading case: Newsome v. State, 675 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).

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Newsome v. State, 675 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “That is, *492 the accusation failed to specify the terms of the order and the manner in which he violated those terms, as set forth in OCGA § 16-5-95 (a) (1) through (4). We agree.”

Strickland v. State, 824 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “2d 229 (2009) (trial court erred in denying defendant's general demurrer to count in accusation, charging defendant with "unlawfully violat[ing] the provisions of a family violence order, in violation of OCGA § 16-5-95," because the accusation failed to set out the essential…”

Slaughter v. State, 760 S.E.2d 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “Slaughter also contends that the trial court erred when it refused his request for a charge on violation of a temporary protective order, OCGA § 16-5-95, as a lesser included offense of aggravated stalking.”

Edgecomb v. State, 738 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 6× “We note that the State points to language in OCGA § 16-5-95 (c) (pertaining to the violation of a family violence order), which provides as follows: Nothing contained in this Code section shall prohibit a prosecution for the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking that arose…”

Raphael Fraga v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 12× “Fraga contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction of violating a family violence order in violation of OCGA § 16-5-95 for his conduct on January 14, 2021 (Count 11), because the State failed to prove that the order alleged to be violated was…”

Benjamin Edgecomb v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 6× “After some difficulties with Edgecomb, his ex-wife petitioned for and obtained a “Stalking Twelve Month 1 OCGA § 16-5-95 (a). 2 See Short v. State, 234 Ga.”

Kenneth Slaughter v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “Slaughter also contends that the trial court erred when it refused his request for a charge on violation of a temporary protective order, OCGA § 16-5-95, as a lesser included offense of aggravated stalking.”

Deiage Hendrix v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 16-5-95 (b) (4). 5 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A21A0920.”

Antonio Strickland v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “490, 492-493 (1) ( 675 SE2d 229 ) (2009) (trial court erred in denying defendant’s general demurrer to count in accusation, charging defendant with “unlawfully violat[ing] the provisions of a family violence order, in violation of OCGA § 16-5-95,” because the accusation 3 failed…”

John C. Huber v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “20 The term “place or places” is defined as “any public or private property occupied by the victim other than the residence of the defendant.”

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