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O.C.G.A.Title 16Chapter 7

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-61 (2019)

Arson in the second degree

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2018 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1987–2012 24citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 24 opinions since 1987.

(a) A person commits the offense of arson in the second degree as to any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure not included or described in Code Section 16-7-60 when, by means of fire or explosive, he or she knowingly damages or knowingly causes, aids, abets, advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to damage any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure of another without his or her consent or in which another has a security interest, including but not limited to a mortgage, a lien, or a conveyance to secure debt, without the consent of both.

(b) A person also commits the offense of arson in the second degree as to any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure not included or described in Code Section 16-7-60 when, in the commission of a felony, by means of fire or explosive, he or she knowingly damages or knowingly causes, aids, abets, advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to damage any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure of another without his or her consent or in which another has a security interest, including but not limited to a mortgage, a lien, or a conveyance to secure debt, without the consent of both.

(c) A person convicted of the offense of arson in the second degree shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years, or both.

History

(Ga. L. 1924, p. 192, § 2; Code 1933, § 26-2209; Ga. L. 1949, p. 1118, § 3; Code 1933, § 26-1402, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1497, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 935, § 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 16; Ga. L. 2004, p. 734, § 2.)

Annotations

Editor's notes. - Ga. L. 2004, p. 734, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is not applicable to any offense committed prior to July 1, 2004, and that any such offense shall be punishable as provided by the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

No variance in the indictment. - Defendant's allegations that a fatal variance existed between the allegations of the indictment and the evidence at trial were rejected, as it was unnecessary to prove who had legal title to the property, lawful possession was proven to be in the victim, a sheriff's deputy corroborated the allegations in the indictment concerning the date, place, the property damaged, and that defendant was the agent that caused the burning. Wisham v. State, 262 Ga. App. 380, 585 S.E.2d 675 (2003).

Burning separate structures as one crime. - When evidence establishes commission of only one incendiary act, only one crime was committed, even though two separate structures were burned. Altman v. State, 156 Ga. App. 185, 273 S.E.2d 923 (1980).

Apartment as protected structure. - There was no dispute that the victim's apartment was a protected structure for purposes of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-60 and 16-7-61. Alexander v. State, 263 Ga. 474, 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993).

Circumstantial evidence of both guilt and corpus delicti. - Circumstances must generally be depended upon, not only to show the guilt of the accused, but to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of arson. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956).

Corpus delicti in arson. - In a case of arson, the corpus delicti consists of two fundamental facts: first, the burning of the house described in the indictment, and second, the fact that a criminal agency was the cause of the burning. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956).

Arson and cruelty to animals as separate crimes. - Defendant was properly convicted for arson in the second degree and cruelty to animals, where the essential elements of each of the crimes differed, and the state carried its burden of proving the distinct elements of each crime. Motes v. State, 189 Ga. App. 430, 375 S.E.2d 893 (1988).

Criminal damage as lesser included offense of arson. - Trial court properly merged a conviction of criminal damage to property in the second degree, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23(a)(1), into a conviction for arson in the second degree, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-61, as the arson was not a lesser included offense of the criminal damage offense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1); arson required the higher mentally culpable state of knowingly, rather than the criminal damage scienter requirement of intentionally, and arson required that the damage to the property have been caused by fire or explosive. Youmans v. State, 270 Ga. App. 832, 608 S.E.2d 300 (2004).

Similar transaction evidence admitted in arson trial. - Similar transaction evidence was properly admitted in the defendant's trial for arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-61(a), under circumstances in which the defendant was accused of setting fire to a car belonging to the girlfriend of the defendant's former boyfriend; the state presented evidence of two prior incidents showing acts of property damage committed by the defendant following an argument with a former boyfriend or those close to a former boyfriend. The prior incidents were sufficiently similar to the crime charged to show the defendant's course of conduct or bent of mind to react violently when upset with men with whom the defendant had been intimate. Cherry v. State, 299 Ga. App. 194, 682 S.E.2d 150 (2009).

Circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict. - Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of arson even though the evidence was circumstantial as the proven facts were consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and excluded every other reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt as the defendant's burning of three trucks using gasoline at a truck-driving school where the defendant failed truck-driving courses, the defendant's presence at a nearby gas station around the time of the fire, and the defendant's admission that the defendant burned the trucks because an instructor "burned" the defendant, meant the defendant's arson convictions were supportable as a matter of law. Denson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 342, 577 S.E.2d 29 (2003).

Evidence presented at the defendant's trial for second degree arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-61(a), was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the defendant was the person who set fire to a car belonging to the new girlfriend of the defendant's former boyfriend; the evidence showed that the defendant had a history of expressing anger by damaging or destroying property, that the defendant had made numerous threats against the boyfriend and the girlfriend in the 12-hour period immediately prior to the arson, that the defendant was seen running from the scene shortly after the fire began, that a car similar to the defendant's was then seen driving away from the girlfriend's home, and that no other person was observed near the scene at or near the time the girlfriend's car began to burn. Cherry v. State, 299 Ga. App. 194, 682 S.E.2d 150 (2009).

Evidence held sufficient to prove the essential elements of arson in the second degree. Patterson v. State, 202 Ga. App. 440, 414 S.E.2d 895 (1992); Stephens v. State, 214 Ga. App. 183, 447 S.E.2d 26 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for arson because: (1) one of the defendants placed dozens of calls from the decedent's cell phone as the defendants traveled from Tampa to Atlanta in the decedent's pickup truck; (2) the truck was destroyed in a fire that was started through the use of an accelerant near an apartment complex where the defendants were staying with relatives; (3) the decedent's body was found in the bed of the truck; (4) the decedent had been dead for days before the fire; (5) personal belongings of the decedent were found in the possession of the defendants; and (6) the defendants gave statements to the police. Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 717 S.E.2d 179 (2011).

Evidence, including defendant's confession, which was corroborated by the victim's boyfriend, who testified to seeing the defendant in the backyard of the victim's home immediately before the boyfriend and the victim became aware that the victim's van was ablaze, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for second degree arson. Crawford v. State, 318 Ga. App. 270, 732 S.E.2d 794 (2012).

Cited in Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga. App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arson and Related Offenses, § 1 et seq. 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Explosions and Explosives, §§ 169 et seq., 191.

ALR. - Ownership of property as affecting criminal liability for burning thereof, 17 A.L.R. 1168.

Burning of building by mortgagor as burning property of another so as to constitute arson, 76 A.L.R.2d 524.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 16-7-61 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENShelnutt v. State, 657 S.E.2d 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 16-7-61 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“” 8 OCGA § 16-7-61 (a) defines arson in the second degree as “knowingly damaging (by fire or explosive) any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure of another without his consent, or in which another has a security interest without the consent…”
Later courts cite it for
“although defendant made no challenge to the indictment until she filed her motion for new trial, she has not waived her objection” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENYoumans v. State, 608 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 16-7-61 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“See OCGA §§ 16-7-61; 1 16-7-23 (a). 2 In its order on Youmans’s motion for new trial, the trial court determined that under the facts of this case, which showed that Youmans burned another person’s vehicle, the facts used to convict Youmans of arson in the second degree were the…”
3
GREENUnited States v. Javier Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).
cites § 16-7-61 1×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“01 (West 2005); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-7-61 (West 2005); *1231 Idaho Code Ann.”
The case’s holding
A state arson conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines if the statute involves the willful and malicious burning of property.
Later courts cite it for
“a willful and malicious burning of property.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENPatterson v. State, 414 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“This evidence, both direct and circumstantial in nature, was sufficient to prove the essential elements of arson in the second degree as defined by OCGA § 16-7-61. “In our opinion the jury was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was of incendiary…”
The case’s holding
A spouse's statement to a detective is admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule when the spouse invokes marital privilege and the statement is voluntary and corroborated.
5
GREENStephens v. State, 447 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“Similarly, a person commits the offense of arson in the second degree when, by means of fire or explosive, he knowingly damages a vehicle without the consent of both the owner of the vehicle and the holder of any security interest therein.”
6
GREENPrater v. State, 631 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 16-7-61 6×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“OCGA§ 16-7-61 (a) defines that crime as knowingly damaging (by fire or explosive) any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure of another without his consent, or in which another has a security interest without the consent of both the owner and…”
7
GREENIn the Interest of M. L., 729 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“was alleged to be delinquent for violating OCGA § 16-7-61, arson in the second degree, OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), reckless conduct, and OCGA § 15-11-2 (12) (B), unruly child.”
8
GREENUnited States v. Velez-Alderete, 569 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2009).
cites § 16-7-61 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“under any circumstances” and defining "structure” as, among other things, "any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft”); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-61 ("vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, [or] aircraft”); Idaho Code Ann.”
Later courts cite it for
“the full range of conduct prohibited by the texas arson statute falls under the generic, contemporary meaning of arson” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENWalker v. State, 386 S.E.2d 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 16-7-61 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“” Since it was unrefuted that the property alleged and proven was included in section 60, arson in the second degree was not a lesser included offense.”
10
GREENHayes v. State, 375 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of arson in the second degree, OCGA § 16-7-61, and escape, OCGA § 16-10-52, while awaiting trial on the arson charges.”
11
GREENSweet v. State, 382 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“Appellant contends that because the indictment did not allege in express words arson in the first degree (OCGA § 16-7-60), he could be adjudged, convicted and sentenced for no greater offense than arson in the second degree (OCGA § 16-7-61).”
12
GREENSenior v. State, 615 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“14 OCGA § 16-7-61. 15 OCGA §24-4-6. 16 See Harris v.”
Later courts cite it for
“a person commits second degree arson of a vehicle when, by means of a fire or explosive, he or she knowingly damages any vehicle of another without his or her consent.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENOwens v. State, 420 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“The court charged the jury on OCGA § 16-7-61, the arson code section, which itself addresses the issue of who is a party to the crime of arson.”
14
GREENState v. Bryant, 356 S.E.2d 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“” The court and counsel discussed which degree of arson the state was seeking to establish and the court ruled that there had been no showing that the fires started endangered human life, as required for arson in the first degree (OCGA § 16-7-60); no evidence that there was any…”
15
GREENCannon v. State, 496 S.E.2d 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“After beginning deliberations, the jury sent a written inquiry asking if there was another degree of arson besides first and if “they’re charged with first degree, must we follow that? What is necessary for first degree?” The court then reread the indictment, including the…”
Later courts cite it for
“might not denote 'confusion' of the entire jury” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENCrawford v. State, 732 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 16-7-61 4×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“See OCGA § 16-7-61 (a). The indictment alleged that Crawford committed arson in the second degree on or about April 15, 2010, by knowingly causing damage, by means of fire, to the vehicle owned by the victim’s mother.”
Later courts cite it for
“if a defendant is unable to establish one of the prongs of the strickland2 test, he cannot succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENCherry v. State, 682 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“1 OCGA § 16-7-61 (a). 2 Drammeh v. State, 285 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENWisham v. State, 585 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“Held: Wisham asserts that there was a fatal variance between what was alleged in the indictment and proof at trial in that the indictment alleged the car which was damaged was the property of Vickie Bird, 2 the mother of Byrd, while Byrd testified that the car belonged to her. A…”
19
GREENUnited States v. Jay Scott Ballinger, No. 01-14872, 01-15080 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2002).
cites § 16-7-61 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“In this way, the majority's insistence that the statute constitutionally prevents channels of interstate commerce from being used to accomplish injurious or harmful ends is misplaced. While Ballinger used interstate highways to travel to the States in which he burned churches,…”
The case’s holding
Congressional power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit their use for harmful purposes even if the harm is purely local.
20
GREENElrod v. State, 444 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 16-7-61 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-7-61
“OCGA § 16-7-61. The jury found him not guilty of the first two counts but guilty of the remaining three.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198719992012

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2012. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Ga. Ct. App.209th Cir.211th Cir.15th Cir.1
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Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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