Constitutionality.

- Definition of "burglary" in former Code 1933, § 26-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1) related to main object of legislation, contained no matter variant from title, and bore a natural connection to matter contained in enacting clause. Thus, former Code 1933, § 26-1601 did not violate Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III). Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Second indictment did not need to allege special exception to statute of limitations.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion in arrest of a judgment of conviction for burglary and theft by taking because the second indictment was filed within the six-month extension authorized by O.C.G.A. § 17-3-3 and, therefore, did not need to allege an exception to the four-year statute of limitation. Johnson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 886, 782 S.E.2d 50 (2016).

Identification of defendant.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014).

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) properly upheld an immigration judge's order of removal because the alien's Georgia burglary convictions qualified as aggravated felonies under Section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act where the BIA's interpretation of the Georgia Act aligned with judicial precedent, the facts underlying the alien's conviction fell squarely within the generic burglary definition, the alien was removable as an aggravated felon based on the alien's burglary convictions, and the alien was, therefore, ineligible for discretionary relief from removal proceedings. Pruteanu v. United States AG, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017)(Unpublished).

Replacement of two jurors.

- Trial court did not err in replacing two jurors on the panel despite the fact that a transcription of the voir dire was absent from the record, in a prosecution for burglary and armed robbery, as the appellate court was able to decide, based upon a review of the arguments surrounding the state's motion, that the trial court did not err in replacing two jurors on the jury panel due to the defendant's racially motivated strikes; further, the defendant waived appellate review of the court's re-seating procedure. Pitts v. State, 278 Ga. App. 176, 628 S.E.2d 615 (2006).

Right to be present.

- Defendant was deprived of defendant's constitutional right to courts during the defendant's burglary trial when the defendant was involuntarily excluded from the courtroom while the trial court conducted a colloquy with the jury regarding early morning hang-up telephone calls some or all of the jurors received, and therefore the defendant's conviction was reversed. Vaughn v. State, 281 Ga. App. 475, 636 S.E.2d 163 (2006).

Plea in bar and plea of former jeopardy properly granted.

- Trial court properly granted the defendant's plea in bar and plea of former jeopardy in a burglary prosecution as the state improperly terminated the first trial by dismissing the indictment after jeopardy attached without the defendant's consent, and the second burglary prosecution, although alleging a different date, residence, and accomplice was based on the same material facts as the first indictment. State v. Jackson, 290 Ga. App. 250, 659 S.E.2d 679 (2008).

Definition of "dwelling house."

- Words "dwelling house" in regard to burglary, both at common law and under statute, refer to the residence or habitation of a person other than the defendant, where the person makes an abode. Mash v. State, 90 Ga. App. 322, 82 S.E.2d 881 (1954).

House that was under repair was a "dwelling" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, even though the owner was living in another house during the repairs. Earnest v. State, 216 Ga. App. 271, 453 S.E.2d 818 (1995).

Building rented, goods stored there, sufficient for conviction.

- Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because the evidence showed that the house at issue was a building under the burglary statute, and in the final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed that the burglary statute proscribed unauthorized entry into or remaining in any building or dwelling place of another; while the victim and the victim's family had moved out, the victim had continued to pay rent, continued to store most of the victim's belongings there, and checked each day that the house remained locked. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Presence of valuables inside the premises can support an inference of intent to steal, particularly when no other motive is apparent. Addis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 837 (1992).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction because the jury could infer defendant's intent to steal from the presence of valuables in the home that was burglarized, and a victim testified to the presence of such valuables. Patterson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 341, 618 S.E.2d 81 (2005).

Proof of lack of authority to enter required.

- Offense of burglary requires proof of lack of authority to enter or remain within another's dwelling house. Ealey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 110, 227 S.E.2d 902 (1976).

Burglary involves criminal's necessarily placing self within building or structure named in statute. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583, 215 S.E.2d 518 (1975).

Crime of burglary is complete when one without authority enters another's building with intent to commit theft. Green v. State, 133 Ga. App. 802, 213 S.E.2d 60 (1975).

Burglary is completed when a person enters the dwelling house of another without authority and with intent to commit a felony or a theft therein, regardless of whether or not the person accomplishes that apparent purpose. Ricks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 98, 341 S.E.2d 895 (1986).

Residence is a dwelling place under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Sapp v. State, 158 Ga. App. 443, 280 S.E.2d 867 (1981).

Burglary of store.

- Burglary may consist of breaking and entering a store with intent to commit a theft. Burks v. State, 157 Ga. App. 361, 277 S.E.2d 344 (1981).

Burglary of vehicle.

- For a person to be guilty of burglary of a vehicle such vehicle must be designed for use as a dwelling. Massey v. State, 141 Ga. App. 557, 234 S.E.2d 144 (1977).

In a prosecution for burglary of a vehicle under former Code 1933, § 26-1601, as part of the description of the particular offense the fact that the vehicle was designed as a dwelling was an essential element of the offense which had to be alleged; and since the indictment did not make this allegation and no proof to this effect was offered at trial, the indictment did not confer jurisdiction to try and convict the defendant of such offense. DeFrancis v. Manning, 246 Ga. 307, 271 S.E.2d 209 (1980).

Burglary of building.

- Defendant who is charged with burglary in that the defendant, with intent to commit a theft, entered a certain building without authority may be convicted on proof that the defendant entered a part of the building or one room of the building. Riley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 181, 202 S.E.2d 533 (1973).

Garden center: building.

- Garden center contiguous to a department store enclosed with chain link fence and partly enclosed with an unmortared block wall was a room or part of a building within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Floyd v. State, 207 Ga. App. 275, 427 S.E.2d 605 (1993).

Shelter from which defendant removed the lawnmower was a "building" within the meaning of the burglary statute because the contiguous nature of the storage shelter and the shelter's accessibility from the main building rendered the shelter "a part" of the main building for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1; further, the purpose of the shelter as a storage structure for valuable goods, the shelter's relevance to the business, and the shelter's inaccessibility to the public when the business was secured, rendered the shelter a "building" under the statute, and the unauthorized removal of an item from the shelter with the intent to commit a theft was subject to prosecution for burglary. Garrett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 870, 578 S.E.2d 460 (2002).

Barn constitutes building.

- Evidence was sufficient to establish a juvenile's guilt as to burglary as the definition of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) had been changed to use the all-inclusive term "building" rather than "dwelling"; thus, the juvenile's entry in the victim's barn for the purpose of taking two gas cans was sufficient. In re J. B. M., 294 Ga. App. 545, 669 S.E.2d 523 (2008).

Telephone booth cannot be subject of burglary, for there is always an absence of the essential element of burglary of an entry without authority. Jones v. State, 142 Ga. App. 274, 235 S.E.2d 681 (1977).

Camper.

- Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction for burglary by entering a camper designed for use as a dwelling house without authority and with the intent to commit a theft as the state did not present any evidence that the particular camper which defendant entered was designed for use as a dwelling house as required under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1; rather, the evidence indicated that the camper merely allowed for shelter and sleeping accommodations. Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga. App. 47, 576 S.E.2d 44 (2002).

Theft by taking does not constitute an affirmative defense in a burglary action. Gray v. State, 163 Ga. App. 720, 294 S.E.2d 697 (1982).

Severance.

- No abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to sever two counts of burglary. Bailey v. State, 157 Ga. App. 222, 276 S.E.2d 843 (1981).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying defendants' motions to sever their trials as defendants failed to make a clear showing of prejudice and a denial of due process protection. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).

Defendant killed the victim with a gun that the defendant stole in a burglary committed the preceding day. This shows a continuing course of criminal conduct and since the burglary and murder were connected crimes, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's severance motion and defendant's conviction for burglary was properly upheld. High v. State, 282 Ga. 244, 647 S.E.2d 270 (2007).

Witness's improper expression of legal conclusion.

- Statement by victim that the victim's house was "burglarized" should have been excluded because it constitutes an improper expression of a legal conclusion by a witness. Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416, 260 S.E.2d 374 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Copeland v. State, 160 Ga. App. 786, 287 S.E.2d 120 (1982).

Knowledge and use of home security code.

- Sufficient evidence included an accomplice's testimony (sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by accomplice's knowledge and use of the defendant's grandparent's security code) that the defendant hired an accomplice to kill the grandparent, to convict the defendant of burglary, assault, and battery. Hill v. State, 268 Ga. App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348 (2004).

Denial of motion to suppress did not warrant new trial.

- On appeal from convictions on two counts of burglary, the trial court in the court's order denying the defendant a new trial correctly ruled that the defendant's motion to suppress was moot because no tangible physical evidence was admitted at trial. Maxwell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 685, 647 S.E.2d 374 (2007).

Sufficient evidence based on testimony of codefendant and neighbor.

- Sufficient evidence supported defendant's O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 burglary conviction. The former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) "accomplice to a felony" exception did not apply and the defendant's codefendant's evidence was admissible (and subject to cross-examination) since a neighbor also testified that the neighbor saw the defendant enter the victim's home and remove items which were later recovered from the codefendant. Millirons v. State, 268 Ga. App. 644, 602 S.E.2d 346 (2004).

Codefendant's trial should have been severed.

- Trial court erred in denying a codefendant's motion to sever the trial from the defendant's trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant's antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant's9-1-1 calls or custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant's vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant's defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court erred in failing to strike a juror for cause.

- In a prosecution for burglary, the trial court abused the court's discretion by failing to strike a juror for cause after the juror stated during voir dire that if the defendant did not testify, it would cause the juror to doubt the defendant's innocence; thus, the conviction was reversed. Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. App. 330, 674 S.E.2d 389 (2009).

Evidence sufficient for delinquency adjudication.

- Testimony from the victims of three auto thefts, along with statements given by defendant juvenile, were legally sufficient to support the defendant's delinquency adjudication for acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of burglary and theft by taking-vehicle. In the Interest of E.J., 292 Ga. App. 69, 663 S.E.2d 411 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to adjudicate a child delinquent for the adult crime of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 based on a neighbor's testimony that the neighbor saw the child tampering with and opening the victim's back door and the child's admission that the child "cracked" the door. That day, it was discovered that money and video games were taken from the victim. In the Interest of R. H., 313 Ga. App. 416, 721 S.E.2d 628 (2011).

Sufficient evidence to prove identity and intent.

- Evidence in support of the burglary charge was sufficient to prove identity and intent as the victim identified the defendants as the individuals who had been in the victim's house when the officers drove to the victim's house with the defendants. In addition, the jury was authorized to find that the defendants intended to commit a theft when the defendants entered the house without permission, looked behind and inside the victim's furniture, and left once the victim called police. Gorman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 535, 734 S.E.2d 263 (2012).

Probable cause for arrest.

- Arrestee's false arrest claim failed because probable cause existed to arrest the arrestee for burglary; an eyewitness observed the arrestee and another person entering a vacant home, officers found that the home's back door appeared to have been damaged, and the arrestee and the other person admitted that they did not have permission to enter. Gray v. Ector, 541 Fed. Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

Cited in United States v. Evans, 415 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1969).

Burglary under Armed Career Criminal Act and state statute.

- After the defendant appealed the 180-month sentence for being a felon in possession, the defendant's prior Georgia burglary convictions qualified as predicate violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924; Georgia's burglary statute was divisible, and the defendant's certified indictment and guilty plea for the burglary convictions showed that the defendant was convicted of three counts of burglary of a dwelling, which had the same elements as generic burglary under the ACCA's enumerated crimes clause. United States v. Pearsey, F.3d (11th Cir. July 3, 2017)(Unpublished).

Illegal entry and evidence of intent required.

- To convict of the crime of burglary it is not sufficient merely to prove an illegal entry, but there must also be evidence from which the jury may conclude that there was an intent to commit a theft or felony. Griffin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 311, 251 S.E.2d 161 (1978).

Burglary was the unauthorized entry into the dwelling house of another with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a); so, when defendant pled not guilty to this crime, defendant required the state to prove all its elements, and the burglary defendant committed six years before the charged burglary was thus admissible to prove defendant's state of mind, knowledge, and intent. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 505, 623 S.E.2d 706 (2005).

It is not necessary that defendant actually commit theft; it is sufficient if defendant enters without authority and with the intent to commit a theft. Johnson v. Jackson, 140 Ga. App. 252, 230 S.E.2d 756 (1976).

To complete the crime of burglary, it is not necessary that a defendant actually commit a theft; it is sufficient if defendant enters without authority and with the intent to commit a theft or a felony. Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227, 314 S.E.2d 83, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1984).

Fact that defendant did not accomplish apparent purpose does not render finding of burglary improper. Coney v. State, 125 Ga. App. 52, 186 S.E.2d 478 (1971); Poole v. State, 130 Ga. App. 603, 203 S.E.2d 886 (1974); Kinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 95, 270 S.E.2d 209 (1980); Addis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 837 (1992).

Theft of any article is unnecessary to completed offense of burglary. Davis v. State, 139 Ga. App. 105, 227 S.E.2d 900 (1976); Craft v. State, 152 Ga. App. 486, 263 S.E.2d 263 (1979); Freelove v. State, 229 Ga. App. 310, 494 S.E.2d 72 (1997).

There is no requirement in law that house be continuously occupied to be "dwelling."

- It is sufficient that it is occasionally occupied for residential purposes and any such lawful occupant has a superior right as against burglars for the purpose of an indictment. Hess v. State, 132 Ga. App. 26, 207 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

House under construction.

- House under construction qualified as a "building" for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Smith v. State, 226 Ga. App. 9, 485 S.E.2d 572 (1997).

Storage shed was "building."

- Storage shed where an air compressor was kept was a "building" under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). The shed's purpose was to store, shelter, and safeguard commercial goods, and the storage shed was inaccessible to the public when the business was secured. Mezick v. State, 291 Ga. App. 257, 661 S.E.2d 635 (2008).

Construing word "building" within definition of burglary.

- Statutory definition of burglary uses the all-inclusive word of "building" which includes a "store house" as well as a "storehouse." Estep v. State, 129 Ga. App. 909, 201 S.E.2d 809 (1973).

Metal trailer serving as a lay-away storage facility and located behind a store was a building within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Franks v. State, 240 Ga. App. 685, 524 S.E.2d 545 (1999).

Broadcast tower which does not enclose anything is not a building within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Redfern v. State, 246 Ga. App. 572, 540 S.E.2d 701 (2000).

Because a building may be the situs of a burglary even if it is not being used as a dwelling house, proof that a person was an occupant of the building was not necessary to sustain defendant's burglary conviction. Smith v. State, 249 Ga. App. 427, 548 S.E.2d 21 (2001).

Defendant was properly convicted of burglarizing a parking booth under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because the booth, a storage structure for valuable goods, was a "building" for purposes of § 16-7-1(a). Holt v. State, 293 Ga. App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 645 (2008).

Conviction for burglary no longer necessarily includes proof of breaking, and it is sufficient if the accused "enters or remains" with intent to commit a felony or theft. Bridges v. State, 123 Ga. App. 157, 179 S.E.2d 685 (1970).

Forced entry is not required; it is sufficient if defendant enters a building "without authority." Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (2000).

Failure to substantially prove ownership of building allegedly entered as alleged in indictment is fatal variance. Livingston v. State, 122 Ga. App. 152, 176 S.E.2d 520 (1970).

Proof of "dwelling place of another."

- "Ownership," as that term is used in property law, is not an essential ingredient to proving that the premises entered were "the dwelling place of another" within the meaning of the burglary law. Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977); Black v. State, 143 Ga. App. 690, 239 S.E.2d 564 (1977); Phillips v. State, 152 Ga. App. 671, 263 S.E.2d 480 (1979); High v. State, 153 Ga. App. 729, 266 S.E.2d 364 (1980).

Testimony of boarder or renter as proving lack of authority to enter.

- It is well established that the testimony of a boarder or renter is sufficient to prove lack of authority or permission to enter a dwelling place. Black v. State, 143 Ga. App. 690, 239 S.E.2d 564 (1977).

Ownership of personal property in indictment for burglary may be laid in a bailee having possession of the property when the property was stolen, though the bailment was gratuitous. Hall v. State, 132 Ga. App. 612, 208 S.E.2d 621 (1974).

Thief cannot question title of apparent owner. Hall v. State, 132 Ga. App. 612, 208 S.E.2d 621 (1974).

Affirmative defenses.

- Only authorized entry into building or mistake of fact would constitute an affirmative defense to burglary charge. Gray v. State, 163 Ga. App. 720, 294 S.E.2d 697 (1982).

Because a defendant's evidence that the defendant acted under a misapprehension of fact in entering a house would have authorized the jury to acquit the defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and because the charge that was given did not properly inform the jury about the true nature of the defendant's affirmative defense, the defendant was entitled to a charge on mistake of fact under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5. Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459, 712 S.E.2d 828 (2011).

Proof of unauthorized entry of dwelling.

- Proof that the dwelling was entered without authority of the victim is sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury where the defendant does not offer to show that entry was made with the authority of the owner. Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977).

An unauthorized entry cannot be inferred from mere recent possession of the stolen goods. Knowles v. State, 124 Ga. App. 377, 183 S.E.2d 617 (1971); Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416, 260 S.E.2d 374 (1979).

Without proof of entry, a conviction for burglary cannot stand. Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416, 260 S.E.2d 374 (1979); Caldwell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 110, 357 S.E.2d 845 (1987).

Once the victim withdrew the defendant's authority to enter the victim's house, the fact that the defendant once lived there did not give the defendant subsequent authority to enter; further, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant entered the home at least once with the intent to assault the victim. Bilow v. State, 279 Ga. App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (2006).

Because the state's evidence failed to show that the robbery victim was aware that something was being taken before that taking was complete, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a robbery by sudden snatching charge; however, given that: (1) the defendant gained entry to a back office by passing through a storage area, and the jury implicitly rejected an argument that the absence of an "Employees Only" sign meant, despite the victim's testimony to the contrary, that the defendant had permission to enter either the storage area or the office; and (2) the defendant admitted to entering the office without permission, took a cash bag, and reentered the store in a manner intended to hide the defendant from view, a burglary conviction was upheld. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying a juvenile an acquittal on a burglary charge on grounds that the juvenile had permission to enter the dwelling as the appeals court specifically found that while the juvenile initially entered the burglarized house with permission, no permission had been granted to the juvenile to enter the victim's locked bedroom. In the Interest of S.K., 289 Ga. App. 672, 658 S.E.2d 220 (2008).

For purposes of the revocation of defendant's supervised release, it was established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed burglary, thus violating O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, even though no one saw the defendant in the victim's house, after the victim testified that the victim heard someone roaming around the victim's house and discovered bloody footprints on the victim's floors, and police who responded to the victim's9-1-1 call saw defendant walking away from the porch of the victim's home, with bare and bloody feet and a window screen trapped on the defendant's arm. United States v. Harris, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2009)(Unpublished).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant had, without authority, entered a girlfriend's house to threaten her and take her property because the girlfriend testified that the defendant was not on her lease, did not have a key, and did not have permission to be in her home. Wilson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 743, 698 S.E.2d 6 (2010).

Given that the victim was still paying rent to the property owner, still storing the victim's belongings there, and still receiving mail there, the victim's testimony that the defendant was not authorized to be in the house was sufficient to show that the defendant's entry was "without authority." Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Proof of unauthorized entry into toll booth.

- Defendant was properly convicted of burglarizing a parking booth under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because a burglary did not require a breaking, but only proof of entry, which was supplied by an eyewitness who saw the defendant reach into the booth and then enter the booth. Holt v. State, 293 Ga. App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 645 (2008).

Breaking window of door and reaching inside in attempt to open the door does not constitute entry for purposes of burglary and will only sustain conviction for criminal attempt to commit burglary. Hampton v. State, 145 Ga. App. 642, 244 S.E.2d 594 (1978).

Attempt to push open door sufficient for attempted burglary.

- Defendant's attempted burglary conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1, was supported by evidence that the victim heard someone "snatching" at and "pushing on" the victim's door. When the victim observed the defendant and another person outside the victim's house, the victim threatened to shoot them; they fled in a car that they had parked close enough to the house that they could have stood on the car and climbed through a window. Mock v. State, 306 Ga. App. 93, 701 S.E.2d 567 (2010).

When defendant "breaks the plane" of the structure by removing an alarm device with an instrument stuck in the door, with intent to steal, defendant has done enough to permit a reasonable trier of fact to rationally find proof of entry, with intent to commit a theft, beyond a reasonable doubt. Mullinnix v. State, 177 Ga. App. 168, 338 S.E.2d 752 (1985).

Because defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same person's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified defendant as the user of the shotgun, and defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and defendant's fingerprints were found on the car, evidence supported conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).

Entry gained by fraud, deceit, or false pretense.

- Appellate court erred by reversing the appellee's conviction for burglary because a person enters a home without authority when that person enters without the consent of the owner and when that consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, or false pretense, thus, by fraudulently posing as a potential house purchaser and providing false identification and information, the appellee violated O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. State v. Newton, 294 Ga. 767, 755 S.E.2d 786 (2014).

Entry gained by fraud, deceit, or false pretense.

- Intruder who breaches the barrier with a lie or deception, by pretending to deliver a package or to read a meter, is no less dangerous than their more stealthy cohorts, and nothing in the burglary statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, suggests an intent to exempt them from liability. State v. Newton, 294 Ga. 767, 755 S.E.2d 786 (2014).

Entry into store.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglarizing a tool supply store, because the defendant's blood was found on the smashed-in door and the defendant had two prior convictions for strikingly similar hardware store burglaries. Although the evidence was circumstantial, there was no other evidence of how the defendant's blood could have been at the scene. The trial court's definition of "entry" as entry on to real estate was not error or, if error, was not harmful because the charge as a whole required that the defendant enter the building. Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011).

Unauthorized entry alone is not enough.

- Mere illegal entry alone does not satisfy the elements of the crime of burglary; there must be some evidence of an intent to commit theft separate and distinct from the unauthorized entry. Ealey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 604, 229 S.E.2d 86 (1976).

Proof of unauthorized entry does not dispense with the need to further show such entry was with the intent to commit a felony or theft; it does make, however, the jury's conclusion, reached by consideration of all circumstances connected with the act, that the requisite intent was present, a logical one. Ealey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 604, 229 S.E.2d 86 (1976).

Entering or remaining in home without authority.

- Evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant entered or remained in the victim's home without authority and for the purpose of committing theft, after a struggle by the front of the home, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for robbery and burglary. Dupree v. State, 303 Ga. 885, 815 S.E.2d 899 (2018).

Marriage alone not a defense to burglary.

- An entry into the separate residence of an estranged spouse, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, constitutes burglary; disapproving language to the contrary in Mitchell v. State, 263 Ga. 129, 429 S.E.2d 517 (1993); reversing Kennedy v. State, 215 Ga. App., 450 S.E.2d 252 (1994). State v. Kennedy, 266 Ga. 195, 467 S.E.2d 493 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant lacked authority to enter the victims' house and that defendant intended to commit the specified felonies once inside under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and defendant's argument that defendant had authority to enter due to defendant's marriage to one of the victims was not supported by the law; the trial court did not err by refusing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the statutory aggravating circumstance based on defendant's commission of a burglary under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2). Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).

"Claim of right" defense.

- Defendant claimed that defendant had entered the home after a neighbor of the victim told the defendant that defendant could purchase some weights there; however, the state's evidence was sufficient to defeat defendant's "claim of right" defense. Williams v. State, 227 Ga. App. 147, 488 S.E.2d 708 (1997).

Authority to enter withdrawn by victim.

- Once the authority to enter a dwelling has been withdrawn by the inhabitant, the fact that defendant may have once lived in the dwelling and left personal property therein does not, in itself, give defendant subsequent authority to enter. Pittman v. State, 230 Ga. App. 799, 498 S.E.2d 309 (1998).

Defendant was without authority to enter his girlfriend's home, notwithstanding that he had lived with her there, since she asked him to leave several days before the incident at issue and, thereby, withdrew his permission to be there. Armour v. State, 247 Ga. App. 592, 544 S.E.2d 516 (2001).

Proof of one entry did not support two counts.

- When evidence which was intended to support two counts of burglary could only show that appellant had entered the building one time, the evidence could not support two guilty verdicts. Maynard v. State, 170 Ga. App. 683, 317 S.E.2d 666 (1984).

Evidence sufficient to create jury question as to whether entry into pastorium was accomplished without authority.

- See Glisson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 342, 301 S.E.2d 62 (1983).

Time of forming intent.

- Intent necessary for commission of burglary, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), need not be formed at the precise moment of entry, but can be formed thereafter while the perpetrator is remaining on the premises. Hewatt v. State, 216 Ga. App. 550, 455 S.E.2d 104 (1995); Stephens v. State, 232 Ga. App. 738, 503 S.E.2d 643 (1998).

Intent necessary for commission of burglary need not be formed at the precise moment of entry but can be formed thereafter while the perpetrator is remaining on the premises; therefore, even though defendant argued that the State of Georgia failed to prove that defendant intended to commit a felony "prior to entering the residence," the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary because defendant assaulted defendant's love interest's child with a knife in defendant's love interest's house, so the jury was authorized to determine that at some point before defendant entered the house or while defendant remained in it, defendant intended to commit the aggravated assault. The fact that defendant threatened defendant's love interest, cut the telephone line, and kicked in the love interest's back door also supported the conclusion that defendant intended to commit a felony in the house. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).

Question of intent to commit burglary is for determination of jury under the facts and circumstances proved. Griffin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 311, 251 S.E.2d 161 (1978).

Whether a defendant entertained an intent to commit a felony after entering is a matter for the jury to say, under the facts and circumstances proved. Kinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 95, 270 S.E.2d 209 (1980).

Intent is sufficient when actual felony is not committed.

- Although defendant was acquitted of the aggravated assault of his wife, there was evidence to support a finding that when defendant forced his way past his wife and into her apartment, he had the intent to commit a felony, either against her or against the victim. For such action to constitute burglary, it is not necessary that the felony be committed as long as the intent to commit the felony was present. Johnson v. State, 262 Ga. 441, 421 S.E.2d 70 (1992).

Effect of defendant's drunkenness.

- While drunkenness may be a circumstance from which the jury may infer that one who has taken and carried away another's property did not intend to steal it, still, if the intention to steal is present, drunkenness is no excuse for the crime, even though the intent to steal is caused by the drunkenness itself. Greeson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839 (1954).

Effect of defendant's intoxication.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction since the jury decided that evidence of the defendant's intoxication did not disprove intent. In addition to testimony about the television wires having been disconnected from various devices in the victim's house, one witness testified that the television was sitting upright on the floor, not face-down, despite the defendant's testimony that the defendant had knocked the television off the stand. Dillard v. State, 323 Ga. App. 333, 744 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Generally state must, of necessity, rely on circumstantial evidence in proving intent. Kinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 95, 270 S.E.2d 209 (1980).

Evidence admissible to show intent, motive, and identity of burglar.

- In a burglary trial, evidence tending to show that the accused, a few weeks after the burglary in question, again burglarized the same house, was admitted on the ground that it tended to show intent, motive, and the identity of the person who had committed the burglary for which the defendant was then on trial. Hillery v. State, 51 Ga. App. 373, 180 S.E. 499 (1935).

Defense to burglary charge where no intent.

- Where, through unconsciousness or other cause, there can be no intent, there would be a defense to a criminal charge. Greeson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839 (1954).

Presence of valuables inside premises can support inference of intent to steal, particularly when no other motive is apparent. Parrish v. State, 141 Ga. App. 631, 234 S.E.2d 174 (1977); Bradshaw v. State, 172 Ga. App. 330, 323 S.E.2d 253 (1984).

Finding of theft by taking.

- There are two essential elements which must be established by the state: (1) lack of authority to enter the dwelling or building; and (2) intent to commit a felony or theft. A finding of theft by taking constitutes proof of the second prerequisite element of burglary. Lloyd v. State, 168 Ga. App. 5, 308 S.E.2d 25 (1983).

Inference of intent to commit theft and rape.

- Defendant's testimony that he opened a drawer to look for her purse while he was holding the victim down authorizes an inference that he intended to commit a theft in addition to a rape on entering her house. Holt v. State, 147 Ga. App. 186, 248 S.E.2d 223 (1978).

Motive is not element of burglary. Pope v. State, 140 Ga. App. 643, 231 S.E.2d 549 (1976).

Sufficient evidence of intent.

- There was sufficient evidence of intent to commit theft for the defendant to be convicted of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a); although nothing appeared to be missing from the victim's apartment when the victim returned, electrical equipment that had been hooked up when the victim left was disconnected and left on a chair and some movies that were in a cabinet when the victim left were found in a plastic bag on a chair in the living room, and the jury was permitted to infer intent from the presence of valuables on the premises, the defendant's holding such valuables, and the defendant fleeing upon being discovered, as the defendant quickly left when the defendant learned that the police had been called. Westmoreland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 497, 636 S.E.2d 692 (2006).

Despite a juvenile's claim that the state failed to prove the element of intent as part of a burglary charge, the appeals court found that when the accomplice testimony and evidence of the juvenile's prior similar acts were coupled with evidence of an unlawful entry and the juvenile's flight, sufficient evidence of intent was presented. In the Interest of S.K., 289 Ga. App. 672, 658 S.E.2d 220 (2008).

Evidence that a defendant, who was under a restraining order, broke into the basement of a former spouse's home, bringing lighter fluid and several lighters, was sufficient to prove that the defendant was guilty of burglary with the intent to commit arson. Bubrick v. State, 293 Ga. App. 502, 667 S.E.2d 666 (2008).

Defendant's intent to commit a felony in the defendant's former girlfriend's home could be inferred from the defendant's conduct in committing physical violence both outside and inside the house, entering the house armed with a tire lug wrench the defendant had taken from the defendant's car, telephoning the girlfriend from her residence to tell her that her children were "going to die," and then in fact murdering one of the children and injuring the other. Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (2010).

Evidence that the defendant and another were carrying stolen items toward a police officer's car and that they dropped the items and ran when they realized it was a police car, despite the officer shouting at them to stop, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and obstruction of justice in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-10-24(a). Mitchell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 293, 718 S.E.2d 126 (2011).

Required contents of indictment.

- All that the law requires is that the indictment should identify the dwelling broken and entered with burglarious intent, and that it was not the dwelling of the party so breaking and entering, but that it was occupied by the prosecutor. Phillips v. State, 152 Ga. App. 671, 263 S.E.2d 480 (1979); High v. State, 153 Ga. App. 729, 266 S.E.2d 364 (1980).

Person's "residence and dwelling house" within a county sufficiently describes the particular and peculiar attributes of a house to properly inform the accused of the charges against the accused. Askea v. State, 153 Ga. App. 849, 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980); McCarty v. State, 157 Ga. App. 336, 277 S.E.2d 259 (1981).

There must be specification in a burglary indictment of the particular business structure burglarized when that business operates from two or more locations in the county. Askea v. State, 153 Ga. App. 849, 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980).

Burglary indictment charging the taking of currency and coins was not fatally defective when in fact only currency was taken because it sufficiently alleged the theft of money to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. Dixon v. State, 165 Ga. App. 133, 299 S.E.2d 608 (1983).

Defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance under U.S. Const., amend. 6 because counsel failed to file a timely demurrer to the burglary count of an indictment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, as it was fatally defective because it did not specify an underlying felony, and such could not be imputed when there was no specific incorporation by reference; as such failure contributed to defendant's conviction on a void count, defendant was prejudiced and harmed. Polk v. State, 275 Ga. App. 467, 620 S.E.2d 857 (2005).

Failure to file timely special demurrer.

- Defendant could admit every allegation of the indictment and still lack the requisite intent for an attempt at burglary. Consequently, the indictment would not have withstood a timely general demurrer, and trial counsel's performance was deficient in counsel's failure to timely challenge the validity of the attempted burglary count. Coleman v. State, Ga. App. , 732 S.E.2d 466 (2012).

It is not necessary that indictment for burglary state time of day of alleged burglary. Sellars v. State, 113 Ga. App. 510, 149 S.E.2d 158 (1966).

Indictment need not be in exact statutory language.

- That an indictment alleges that the defendant did "feloniously enter" the building from which the goods were stolen rather than using the words "without authority" as provided in the statute does not prevent the indictment from alleging the crime defined. Bass v. State, 123 Ga. App. 705, 182 S.E.2d 322 (1971).

Proof of burglary conviction was not fatally at variance with the indictment, and the conviction was affirmed, where evidence showed that while the victim opened the victim's door to defendant, who the victim knew, the victim did not invite defendant inside, but rather, a codefendant rushed the victim, grabbed the victim, asked where the victim's child was, and pushed the victim back in the living room. Adcock v. State, 269 Ga. App. 9, 603 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

Sufficient.

- Burglary count of the indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because although the offense was mislabeled as "aggravated battery" in the body of the count, the averment portion of the count followed the language of the burglary statute and fully apprised the defendant of the offense charged. The subject heading of the count clearly referred to the offense as burglary and the heading was followed by a citation to the burglary statute itself. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

Consolidation of indictments.

- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating two indictments charging defendant with peeping Tom and burglary with the intent to commit rape as the charges involved a common plan and a common method of operation where: (1) all the victims were young, black, female students at a particular university; (2) the offenses involved the invasion of their privacy, and all incidents occurred in the same apartment complex within a three-week period; (3) authorities were investigating the peeping Tom incident at the time defendant attacked the second victim; (4) some of the evidence found during the investigation of that attack resulted in evidence relevant to the charge of peeping Tom; and (5) as defendant was acquitted of one of two counts of the first indictment and three of nine counts of the second indictment, it was clear that the jury was able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense. Howard v. State, 266 Ga. App. 281, 596 S.E.2d 627 (2004).

Description of goods involved need not be alleged.

- When an indictment for burglary alleges, as the purpose of the breaking, the intent to commit a larceny, and when the indictment further alleges, for the purpose of illustrating the intent to steal at the time of the breaking and entering, an actual stealing after the breaking and entering, no description, value, or ownership of any goods intended to be stolen, or actually stolen after the breaking and entering, need be alleged. Green v. State, 133 Ga. App. 802, 213 S.E.2d 60 (1975).

When value is alleged in an indictment for burglary, the specific amount need not be proved. Green v. State, 133 Ga. App. 802, 213 S.E.2d 60 (1975).

It was not necessary to allege a description, value, or ownership of goods actually stolen to have a valid indictment under the burglary statute. Davis v. State, 139 Ga. App. 105, 227 S.E.2d 900 (1976).

Identity of stolen articles must be indisputably established.

- In a prosecution for the offense of burglary where the state relies upon the defendant's recent possession of goods allegedly stolen or feloniously taken for conviction, it is absolutely essential that the identity of the stolen articles be indisputably established. Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874 (1980).

No fatal variance between indictment and proof.

- Fatal variance did not occur between an indictment, which alleged that defendant committed burglary by entering the victim's house without authority, and the proof, which showed that defendant had the permission of defendant's roommate to enter the house, because the indictment did not mislead defendant to the extent that it impeded the defendant's ability to pursue a defense, did not result in any surprise to the defendant at trial, and did not raise the possibility that the defendant could be subjected to a second prosecution for burglary under the same facts; the jury was authorized to find that the defendant made unauthorized entry into one bedroom of the house with the intent of assaulting the victim. Rubaldino v. State, 271 Ga. App. 726, 611 S.E.2d 68 (2005).

In a prosecution for burglary, because the variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial did not misinform or mislead the defendant in any manner that resulted in surprise or impaired a defense, and the defendant could not be subjected to another prosecution for the same offense, the alleged variance was not fatal; as a result, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Chambers v. State, 284 Ga. App. 400, 643 S.E.2d 871 (2007).

Defendant failed to show that any variance in an indictment was fatal because the burglary count of the indictment correctly specified the location of the building unlawfully entered and also accurately identified the date of the crime; the allegations definitely informed the defendant as to the charge against the defendant so as to enable the defendant to present the defendant's defense and not to be taken by surprise, the indictment's description of the structure as a dwelling house as opposed to a building did not mislead the defendant in such a manner that impeded the defendant's ability to present a subsequent defense or surprise the defendant at trial, and the defendant could not be subjected to a subsequent prosecution for the burglary of the building in question. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Any variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial pertaining to the ownership of the building burglarized was not fatal, because ownership was not an element of burglary. Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 732 S.E.2d 110 (2012).

Defendant waived the defendant's argument that there was a fatal variance between the indictment for burglary and the proof by not presenting the indictment to the trial court; moreover, given evidence from the victim that the victim did not owe the defendant any money and that the defendant broke into the victim's apartment and then left with the victim's television and a cell phone, there was no variance. Thompson v. State, 324 Ga. App. 20, 749 S.E.2d 27 (2013).

Burglary of abandoned rental property.

- Burglary as alleged in indictment and as proved at trial was committed against landlord's property rights where rental unit had been abandoned without landlord's knowledge; it was not incumbent upon the state to prove that entry into the rental unit had not been authorized by the former tenant. Purdue v. State, 165 Ga. App. 466, 302 S.E.2d 118 (1983).

Motion to sever based on separate indictments.

- Where the defendant was charged in separate indictments with the burglary of a business and the burglary of a residence, and there was more than sufficient evidence showing that the crimes charged in the indictments were a series of acts connected together, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever. Denton v. State, 186 Ga. App. 864, 368 S.E.2d 811 (1988).

When criminal trespass is included within crime of burglary.

- When the intent to steal was proved, the crime of criminal trespass merged with or was included within the crime of burglary. Deese v. State, 137 Ga. App. 476, 224 S.E.2d 124 (1976); Varnes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 452, 283 S.E.2d 673 (1981); Poole v. State, 205 Ga. App. 652, 423 S.E.2d 52 (1992).

Defendant could properly be sentenced to serve consecutive terms on defendant's convictions of criminal damage to property in the second degree and criminal trespass since the latter crime had been charged as the lesser offense of burglary. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986).

Trial court must give a requested charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary where the testimony of the accused, if believed, would negate an element of the crime of burglary, i.e., entry with intent to commit a felony or theft. Hiley v. State, 245 Ga. App. 900, 539 S.E.2d 530 (2000).

Defendant did not meet defendant's burden to show through the record that the trial court did not consider criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b) as a lesser included offense of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 in light of the fact that both defendant and defense counsel put forth the theory of criminal trespass, and the trial court explicitly stated that it believed the victim's testimony over that of defendant. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286 (2004).

Neither burglary nor robbery is included offense of other.

- Statutory definition of burglary and robbery makes it clear that the legislature intended to prohibit two designated kinds of general conduct, and that the two crimes, which were codified in separate chapters, are not established by the same proof of all the facts, thus neither crime is a lesser, or included, offense of the other as a matter of law or fact. Moore v. State, 140 Ga. App. 824, 232 S.E.2d 264 (1976).

Common-law burglary was recognized as an offense against habitation, whereas robbery was classified as a species of aggravated larceny which violated the social interest in the safety and security of the person as well as the social interest in the protection of property rights. Moore v. State, 140 Ga. App. 824, 232 S.E.2d 264 (1976).

Neither burglary nor robbery is a lesser or included offense of the other as a matter of law or fact, for the facts must differ to convict for each offense. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984); Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 581, 344 S.E.2d 247 (1986).

No double jeopardy violation occurred when defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both burglary and robbery. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984).

Burglary did not merge with attempted armed robbery.

- Convictions for burglary, kidnapping, terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge with attempted armed robbery conviction because the attempted armed robbery was complete before the crimes were committed inside the residence; the defendant discussed with the co-worker the idea to dress up as a heating and air technician to perform a robbery, traveled to the residence armed with handguns and a hollow clipboard used to conceal the handgun, and pointed the handgun at a victim before entering the house. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).

Arson was not included in the offense of burglary because the same facts were not necessary to prove the commission of both offenses and defendant was properly convicted and sentenced on each. Carter v. State, 238 Ga. App. 632, 519 S.E.2d 717 (1999).

Crimes of burglary and attempted armed robbery.

- Elements and the culpable mental state required of burglary and attempted armed robbery are different; the trial court did not err in refusing to merge defendant's burglary and attempted armed robbery convictions where the facts which proved each crime were different and because neither of those crimes was included in the other. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 248, 596 S.E.2d 743 (2004).

Merger of armed robbery and burglary charges was not required because not only are the elements and the culpable mental state required for these crimes different, but the facts that proved each crime were different. Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 523 S.E.2d 103 (1999).

Defendant's burglary conviction was upheld on appeal, and not subject to reversal merely because of a jury's acquittal of an armed robbery charge as: (1) the verdict was inconsistent, not mutually exclusive; and (2) the inconsistent verdict rule was abolished in Georgia two decades ago; furthermore, the rule was not implicated when verdicts of guilty and not guilty were returned. Einglett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 497, 642 S.E.2d 160 (2007).

Neither burglary nor murder lesser included offense of other.

- For substantive double-jeopardy purposes, neither a burglary conviction nor a murder conviction is a lesser included offense within the other, since proof of additional elements must necessarily be shown to establish each crime. Cash v. State, 258 Ga. 460, 368 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

State may convict and punish for burglary and for unlawful possession of firearm by a previously convicted felon when the firearm was taken in the burglary. The offenses charged were separate and distinct and there was no merger; evidence used to establish the burglary was not again used to establish the later crime of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 340 S.E.2d 256 (1986).

Burglary and rape not included offenses.

- Jury's verdicts of acquittal for a burglary charge and conviction for a rape charge were not inconsistent or repugnant, since a verdict of acquittal upon a burglary charge does not necessarily include a finding against a fact essential for a rape conviction. Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 625, 327 S.E.2d 584 (1985).

Offense of burglary is separate and distinct from the sexual offenses committed subsequent to the unlawful entry upon the premises and, therefore, the offenses do not merge, even though the evidence utilized to establish the sexual offenses may also be relied upon to establish the felonious intent necessary to prove the burglary. Palmer v. State, 174 Ga. App. 720, 331 S.E.2d 77 (1985).

Kidnapping not included in burglary.

- Where the offense of burglary was completed when the defendant entered or remained in his wife's house with the intent to commit the offense of kidnapping, and it was not necessary to the burglary charge to prove that he actually committed the offense of kidnapping, the offense of kidnapping was not included in the offense of burglary as a matter of fact or of law, and he therefore was convicted properly of both offenses. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987).

Criminal damage to property-second degree is not lesser included offense of burglary.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-1502 was not a lesser included offense of the crime of burglary. Christian v. State, 130 Ga. App. 582, 203 S.E.2d 914 (1974).

Theft by taking is a lesser included offense to burglary. Lockett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 569, 266 S.E.2d 236 (1980).

Theft by taking may be lesser included offense to burglary while theft by receiving is not lesser included offense to burglary. Breland v. Smith, 247 Ga. 690, 279 S.E.2d 204 (1981).

Burglary and theft by taking did not merge.

- Defendant's burglary and theft by taking charges involving the same house were not based on the same facts; the burglary was complete when the defendant entered the dwelling house with the intent to commit theft, and the theft by taking occurred when the defendant actually took the property described in the indictment. Martin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 375, 646 S.E.2d 339 (2007).

Theft by taking may in some circumstances be a lesser included offense of burglary; but it does not follow that when a burglary was committed but nothing was actually taken the attempt to commit theft by taking will be a lesser included offense which the defendant is entitled to have charged. Cannon v. State, 167 Ga. App. 225, 305 S.E.2d 910 (1983).

Theft by receiving stolen property contains elements not present in offense of burglary.

- Only an intent to commit theft is required - not the complete act. Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 195 S.E.2d 211 (1973); Pruitt v. State, 217 Ga. App. 681, 458 S.E.2d 696 (1995).

Theft by receiving stolen property is not lesser included offense of burglary and it is not error for the trial court, in the absence of a written request, to fail to charge on the lesser crime. Jacobs v. State, 140 Ga. App. 410, 231 S.E.2d 155 (1976).

As matter of fact or of law, theft by receiving is not a lesser included offense of burglary. State v. Bolton, 144 Ga. App. 797, 242 S.E.2d 378 (1978).

Theft by receiving is not a lesser included offense of burglary. Nebbitt v. State, 187 Ga. App. 265, 370 S.E.2d 1 (1988).

Theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of burglary; thus, if the indictment avers that the defendant is the thief by way of burglary, it is not error for the court to refuse to charge theft by receiving as a lesser included offense. Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003).

Because theft by receiving is not a lesser included offense of burglary, the trial court's reduction of the charge against appellant from burglary to theft by receiving was error as the bill of indictment did not charge the appellant with theft by receiving. Holloman v. State, 168 Ga. App. 683, 310 S.E.2d 734 (1983).

One cannot be a principal thief of stolen property and at the same time be convicted of theft by receiving the same property.

- Defendants' convictions for the crimes of burglary and theft by receiving as to one residence were reversed because one cannot be a principal thief of stolen property and at the same time be convicted of theft by receiving the same property. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (2008).

Theft other than from burglarized premises.

- When a golf cart was removed from a fenced area on the grounds, not from the inside of the burglarized clubhouse, the theft of the cart was a separate offense and not included in the burglary offense. Floyd v. State, 186 Ga. App. 777, 368 S.E.2d 541 (1988).

Neither burglary nor voluntary manslaughter are included in the other within the meaning of the burglary statute. Oglesby v. State, 243 Ga. 690, 256 S.E.2d 371 (1979).

Charges of burglary and murder not legally incompatible or lesser included offenses of each other. Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 553, 300 S.E.2d 301, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S. Ct. 3097, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder and burglary, where defendant entered the victim's apartment with keys that defendant had as a maintenance worker. Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 581 S.E.2d 538 (2003).

Possession of burglary tools and burglary are separate and distinct offenses and conviction of one is not an essential part of conviction of the other. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973); McKinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 930, 273 S.E.2d 888 (1980), overruled on other grounds, 184 Ga. App. 607, 362 S.E.2d 65 (1987).

Burglary conviction and entering an automobile with intent to commit a theft conviction did not merge as the state was required to show unlawful entry into a warehouse to convict defendant of burglary, but not to obtain a conviction for entry of automobile with intent to commit a theft; the burglary offense was completed when defendant entered the warehouse without authority and with the intent to commit the theft of the computers; the automobile offense occurred when defendant entered the victim's car with the intent to take the computers. Morris v. State, 274 Ga. App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (2005).

Court need not charge lesser included offense where not requested.

- In prosecution for burglary, although theft by taking could have been considered to be a lesser included offense given facts of case, where defendant did not request such a charge, trial court did not err in failing to give such a charge. Gray v. State, 163 Ga. App. 720, 294 S.E.2d 697 (1982).

Scope of instructions.

- Burglary, as it is defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, is a legal word of art, and whether or not all of its elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be rationally determined by an uninstructed jury. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303, 298 S.E.2d 1 (1982).

Clarifying charge not required.

- Trial court properly gave the pattern jury charge on burglary, which charge was not incomplete because the charge failed to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized entry, as defendant failed to make a written request for an additional clarifying charge; the law does not recognize authorized entry as a separate defense to burglary. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 172, 611 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

Defendant's burglary conviction was not reversed due to the trial court's charge to the jury as to the use of prior inconsistent statements as the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, and the defendant failed to submit a written request for any additional clarifying charge; hence, the giving of an otherwise correct charge was not rendered erroneous for lack of an additional explanatory charge, in the absence of an appropriate request. Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 222, 644 S.E.2d 160 (2007).

Jury charges as to intent.

- Refusal to give a charge under the burglary statute that the jury must acquit if the defendant had no intent to commit a felony or theft, "or that he formed that intent only after he was inside the building," was not error. Keith v. State, 138 Ga. App. 239, 225 S.E.2d 719 (1976).

Charge to the jury that states that a person commits burglary when and without authority the person enters the building of another constitutes reversible error as the charge omits the necessary stipulation that the person must have entered the building of another "with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein." Brooks v. State, 146 Ga. App. 519, 246 S.E.2d 506 (1978).

Charge on inference of intent to steal.

- Instructing the jury that it would be authorized but not required to infer an intent to steal from evidence which showed the unlawful entry of another's building wherein valuables were stored or kept states a legally correct principle of the law. Prothro v. State, 186 Ga. App. 836, 368 S.E.2d 793 (1988).

Charge on voluntariness of incriminating statement.

- In a prosecution for burglary, in the absence of a request, the court is not required to charge on the voluntariness of an incriminating admission. White v. State, 151 Ga. App. 559, 260 S.E.2d 554 (1979).

Charge as to definition of felony.

- There was no error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "felony" where, under the indictment, theft was the only felony that was relevant. Inman v. State, 191 Ga. App. 497, 382 S.E.2d 122 (1989).

Charge as to definition of building.

- Trial court did not err in defining a building as "an enclosed or partially enclosed structure, manmade in whole or in part, capable of ingress or egress by a person, usually on a fixed site, designed or used for the purpose of housing or providing protection for property or persons, whether permanently or temporarily." Franks v. State, 240 Ga. App. 685, 524 S.E.2d 545 (1999).

Curative instruction.

- Because the state presented sufficient identification and circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to a burglary, including similar transaction evidence of a prior burglary, and in response to trial counsel's objection to the state's comment that the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense, the defendant did not object to the curative instruction given, the defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied. Bryant v. State, 285 Ga. App. 508, 646 S.E.2d 717 (2007).

Shifting burden.

- Trial court's instruction to the jury on the inference which may arise from proof of possession of goods recently stolen in a burglary was not burden-shifting. Myles v. State, 186 Ga. App. 817, 368 S.E.2d 574 (1988).

Instruction regarding conviction on circumstantial evidence may be necessary.

- In a burglary prosecution when the only evidence tending to connect the accused with the alleged offense was the accused's unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen goods, it was error for the trial court to fail to give, with or without request, a charge on the principle contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), relating to when a conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986).

Jury instructions on "parties to crime" not misleading.

- When the court charged on "parties to a crime," and the defendant contended that the jury might have been confused and thought the charge applied to the offense of theft by receiving stolen property, which is not a lesser included offense of burglary, but the court did not charge on any lesser included offense, instructing the jury only on the offense charged, namely burglary, and also instructed the jury that there were only two findings it could make, either guilty or not guilty of burglary, there was nothing in the charge which could have misled the jury as to lesser included offenses. Accordingly, it was not error to deny defendant's motion for a new trial. Ivey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 407, 349 S.E.2d 272 (1986).

Charge on identification.

- It was not error for the trial court's charge to include instructions regarding identification, where the only eyewitness to the actual burglary could not give a positive identification, but the eyewitness did give a general description of the individuals the eyewitness saw had seen fleeing the scene of the crime, there was no contention that defendant would not match one of the descriptions, and this testimony, coupled with the other circumstantial evidence, clearly authorized a jury to find that defendant was one of the perpetrators of the burglary. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986).

Charge to jury about unaccounted-for possession of recently stolen goods.

- Even though the defendant in a burglary prosecution did not testify, a charge to the jury that the possession of recently stolen goods, unaccounted for, raises an inference that the possessor is the one who stole the goods, unless defendant makes explanation, was not an impermissible comment on the defendant's silence in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 5, 14. Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E.2d 458 (1976).

Trial court did not err in recharging a jury twice on the inference to be drawn from the defendant's possession of recently stolen tools and equipment from a victim's residence and outbuildings in the defendant's trial for three counts of burglary. Barbee v. State, 308 Ga. App. 322, 707 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

Charge on theft by taking not warranted.

- When the state's evidence established all of the elements of burglary and defendant, testifying in defendant's own behalf, admitted all of the allegations of the indictment, the lesser included offense of theft by taking was not raised by the evidence and it was not error to fail to charge the jury on this lesser crime as a possible verdict. Crawford v. State, 181 Ga. App. 454, 352 S.E.2d 635 (1987).

Because the elements of theft by taking could not be inferred from defendant's testimony, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's requested instruction on the same as a lesser included offense; moreover, any error in failing to give this requested instruction was harmless given the overwhelming evidence that defendant committed a burglary. Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006), aff'd, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007).

Charge on circumstantial evidence unwarranted.

- While the prosecution against the defendant on charges of burglary, theft by taking, and criminal trespass included both direct and circumstantial evidence, convictions on those charges were not reversed merely because the trial court failed to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) as the defendant failed to request that charge. Rodriguez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 752, 642 S.E.2d 705 (2007).

When court charged that burglary can be committed in more than one manner, i.e., with the intent "to commit a felony or theft therein"; when the indictment charged, and the evidence showed, an entry "with intent to commit a felony [i.e., kidnapping] . . . therein"; the lack of any evidence or contention that defendant entered or remained in his wife's home with the intent to commit a theft therein eliminates any reasonable probability that the jury convicted him of the commission of this type burglary (i.e., with an intent to commit theft), and any possible error resulting from the trial court's inclusion of the extraneous words, "or theft," is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987).

Effect of denial of participation on charge of criminal trespass.

- When in prosecution for burglary defendant steadfastly maintained that defendant had neither entered nor had even been near the building where the burglary took place, having denied being there, defendant was not entitled to a charge to the effect that if the jury disbelieved defendant the jury could still come back with a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. Johnson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 429, 296 S.E.2d 775 (1982).

When a defendant defended upon the theory that defendant was not a party to the crime of burglary charged and was not present, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Weems v. State, 172 Ga. App. 401, 323 S.E.2d 272 (1984).

Charge on criminal trespass as lesser included offense.

- When defendant was arrested while standing just inside an unlocked rear door of a store which had been secured for the night a few minutes earlier, the defendant explained to the arresting officer that the defendant "was looking for some food and a place to get warm," and there was no evidence that the defendant was in possession of burglary tools or property belonging to the store, and the officer testified that there was no sign of a forced entry, the trial court erred in refusing defendant's requested charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense, since the jury might reasonably have determined that although the defendant acted unlawfully in entering the store, the defendant did not enter "with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein," so as to be guilty of burglary within the contemplation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Hambrick v. State, 190 Ga. App. 119, 378 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 897, 378 S.E.2d 340 (1989).

Based on testimony that the defendant entered a business for a lawful purpose, and the state showed that the defendant entered the building with the intent to commit theft, no evidence was presented that the defendant entered the premises for any other unlawful purpose; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1) as a lesser included offense of burglary. Moore v. State, 280 Ga. App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (2006).

When the defendant was charged with burglary but denied entering the premises, it was not error to refuse to instruct on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass; trespass instructions were not appropriate when the defendant denied entering the burglarized premises. Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

There was no error in a trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense in a defendant's criminal trial on a charge of burglary, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), as the evidence supported the burglary conviction and, further, there was insufficient evidence of the amount of criminal damage to a broken window and whether such damage exceeded $500 for purposes of the criminal trespass offense. Williams v. State, 292 Ga. App. 811, 665 S.E.2d 910 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for burglary, and other offenses, based on the defendant's unlawful entry into a building that was under construction, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass based on the status of the construction as the evidence showed that the house was a building under the burglary statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, since that statute did not require that the property at issue constitute a residence, habitation, or place of abode. As a result, since all of the evidence established all of the elements of burglary, and under the defendant's defense as to the burglary charge, the defendant would have been guilty of no offense at all, a charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass was not required. Sanders v. State, 293 Ga. App. 534, 667 S.E.2d 396 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for burglary, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included charges of criminal trespass and attempt to commit burglary as, by the defendant denying any involvement, the evidence raised only two possibilities, namely that the defendant either committed the burglary or did not. Thus, the evidence did not warrant the charges on the lesser included offenses. Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 112, 673 S.E.2d 596 (2009).

Trial court's error in failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1), in the defendants' trial for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) was not harmless because there was evidence that a home had been burglarized previously, and there was very little evidence linking the damage in the house to the defendants. Waldrop v. State, 300 Ga. App. 281, 684 S.E.2d 417 (2009).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendants of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) for entering property with intent to take electrical wiring and copper piping because the trial court should have charged the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1), when the jury could have concluded that the defendants were guilty of criminal trespass since the jury could have found that the defendants entered a house with the intent to loiter there; the defendants were on the property without permission, one of the defendants stated that the defendants were not there to steal anything but rather to "look around," and the defendants thought the house was about to be bulldozed, police officers did not find any tools in the building or in the immediate possession of either of the defendants, and the defendants were not found in immediate possession of any purported stolen items. Waldrop v. State, 300 Ga. App. 281, 684 S.E.2d 417 (2009).

Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass as lesser included offense of burglary because the defendant did not request a charge on criminal trespass, either orally or in writing; because the defendant made no oral request for a charge on criminal trespass, the trial court did not err in failing to give one sua sponte. Shindorf v. State, 303 Ga. App. 553, 694 S.E.2d 177 (2010).

Because there was no written request, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. Boatright v. State, 289 Ga. 597, 713 S.E.2d 829 (2011).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary since such a charge would not have been warranted by the evidence, which showed that the defendant harbored either the unlawful purpose of committing theft or the lawful purpose of going back to sleep in a friend's house. Dillard v. State, 323 Ga. App. 333, 744 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary because, if the jury believed the state's evidence, the defendant was guilty of burglary and if the jury accepted the defendant's defense to the crime, the defendant was guilty of no offense. Stillwell v. State, 329 Ga. App. 108, 764 S.E.2d 419 (2014).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to charge the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary because the defendant did not testify at trial or present any other evidence negating any element of the crime of burglary; the state presented evidence from which the jury could infer an intent to steal; and there was no evidence that the defendant was merely seeking shelter from the cold when the defendant tried to break into the area of the victims' house containing valuables. Daniel v. State, 338 Ga. App. 389, 787 S.E.2d 281 (2016).

Court's failure to charge lesser included offense of theft by taking is not reversible error unless the accused by written application to the trial judge at or before the close of the evidence requests such charge. Lovett v. State, 165 Ga. App. 379, 301 S.E.2d 303 (1983).

Refusal of the trial court to give a requested charge that "in all cases there exists the presumption that no crime has been committed" is not error when the victim's testimony, if believed by the jury, was sufficient direct evidence to establish a corpus for the offenses of rape, burglary, and aggravated sodomy alleged, and the trial court charged the jury the general charge on the presumption of innocence. Smith v. State, 180 Ga. App. 422, 349 S.E.2d 279 (1986).

Objection to charge on recent possession waived.

- By failing to object to the charge, defendant waived right on appeal to contend that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury on the doctrine of recent possession of stolen property. Harper v. State, 180 Ga. App. 20, 348 S.E.2d 318 (1986).

Court's failure to define rape in its charge required reversal of defendant's burglary conviction, even in the absence of a request to so charge, where it could not be determined from the verdict, which read "guilty on all three counts," whether the jury convicted defendant of burglary based on entry with intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon or an assault with intent to commit rape. Kelley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 343, 411 S.E.2d 276 (1991).

Failure to charge common law marriage.

- Error by the trial court in refusing to charge the jury that a finding that defendant and his former girlfriend were living together, or that they had a common law marriage, would require a not guilty verdict to the burglary charge. Mitchell v. State, 263 Ga. 129, 429 S.E.2d 517 (1993).

Failure to give charge on burglary harmless.

- When case contained some evidence that defendant did not use a weapon to take property from the victim, defendant was therefore entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of burglary; however, in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, it was highly probable that the failure to give this charge did not contribute to the verdict, thus the conviction was affirmed. Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 442 S.E.2d 444 (1994).

Refusal to charge mistake of fact.

- Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the defense of mistake of fact under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5 as to the burglary counts of the indictment because the fact that the defendant could have thought that someone lived in the home did not constitute the type of mistake of fact that would serve as a defense to the defendant's unauthorized entry into the home since the evidence was uncontroverted that the defendant was not invited into the home. Boatright v. State, 289 Ga. 597, 713 S.E.2d 829 (2011).

Charge stating "enter or remain."

- Even though the indictment alleged that defendant did "enter and remain" in a dwelling, the court's charge that to constitute the offense of burglary, it was necessary only that the evidence show that defendant did "enter or remain" in the dwelling did not prejudice defendant's defense. Stander v. State, 226 Ga. App. 495, 486 S.E.2d 712 (1997).

Charge on "without authority" element.

- Instruction that if the jury found that a person "has entered or has remained on the premises of another with the intent to commit a theft, that person's entry or remaining would not be legally authorized" constituted reversible error. Thompson v. State, 271 Ga. 105, 519 S.E.2d 434 (1999).

Trial court fully instructed the jury on the prosecution's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crimes for which defendant was being tried, including burglary; when this charge was considered in conjunction with that which tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), the jurors were given complete and correct instructions as to defendant's authorized entry defense to burglary. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 172, 611 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

When a trial court improperly removed a question of fact from the jury's consideration, defendant's conviction for burglary was reversed, and a new trial was required. The trial court instructed the jury that the victim had withdrawn defendant's authority to enter the victim's house, but because there was evidence that defendant resided in the house, paid one-half of the down payment for the house, and contributed to the monthly bills, the issue of whether the victim initially withdrew defendant's authority was a question of fact for the jury. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).

Intent to commit a theft.

- Trial court did not err in the jury charge it gave on burglary, as the charge tracked the statutory language for burglary and the jury charge the trial court gave on intent could not have misled or confused the jurors that the intent to commit a theft had to occur in the premises entered; accordingly, the jury was properly instructed on the burglary charge. Jackson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 848, 581 S.E.2d 382 (2003).

"Level of certainty" instruction held harmless.

- Despite the defendant's correct assertion that the trial court erred in charging the jury that one of the factors to be considered in assessing the reliability of identification testimony was the level of certainty shown by the witness about her identification, because there was evidence other than the victim's identification of the defendant which connected the defendant to the offenses of burglary, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery, the error was harmless and the convictions for the same were upheld. Bharadia v. State, 282 Ga. App. 556, 639 S.E.2d 545 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0522, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2007).

Charge on inference based on recent possession of stolen property.

- In a defendant's prosecution for, inter alia, burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, the jury was properly instructed on the inferences permitted from recent possession of stolen property because although other items were stolen from the victim's home, an inference of guilt was proper from the defendant's possession of just one stolen check; even though the defendant offered some corroborating evidence for the explanation of the defendant's possession of the check, the jury was still entitled to draw an inference of the defendant's guilt from the defendant's possession of stolen property if the jury disbelieved the defendant. Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 341, 677 S.E.2d 402 (2009).

Failure to object.

- In an action in which the defendant, on appeal, argued that a disjunctive jury charge authorized a burglary conviction in a manner not set forth in the indictment, but at trial, the defendant not only failed to raise this objection, but, affirmatively stated to the court that the jury charge was adjusted to the facts, the objection was waived. Moore v. State, 280 Ga. App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (2006).

Inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict.

- Where a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery is proven, recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict. Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 234 S.E.2d 831 (1977); Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416, 260 S.E.2d 374 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Copeland v. State, 160 Ga. App. 786, 287 S.E.2d 120 (1982).

Where within a day or two following a burglary the defendant sold the stolen goods to the owner of a pawn shop, and the stolen goods were thus found to have been in the possession of the defendant charged with burglary recently after the commission of the offense, that fact authorized the jury to infer that the defendant was guilty, unless the defendant explained the possession to their satisfaction. Cosby v. State, 151 Ga. App. 676, 261 S.E.2d 424 (1979).

In a burglary trial, whether to believe that defendant's explanation of possession of the stolen goods advanced at trial was a reasonable or satisfactory one was a question for the jury. Cosby v. State, 151 Ga. App. 676, 261 S.E.2d 424 (1979).

When property alleged to be stolen is proven to be stolen property and the crime charged has been committed by someone, the recent unexplained possession of the stolen property by the defendant is a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred. From this, it may be inferred that the defendant charged committed the theft proven. This being so, no further proof, circumstantial or direct, showing that the defendant committed the burglary was necessary for conviction. Atkins v. State, 155 Ga. App. 390, 271 S.E.2d 35 (1980); Rakestraw v. State, 155 Ga. App. 563, 271 S.E.2d 696 (1980).

Evidence that defendants were in recent unexplained possession of stolen items taken from a burglarized business creates an inference or presumption of facts sufficient to convict. Nash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 533, 304 S.E.2d 727 (1983).

There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find a defendant guilty of burglary where the victim testified that the defendant was on the premises without the victim's consent and the defendant testified that because of defendant's former long-time relationship with the victim and the fact that from time to time the defendant had given the victim valuable gifts, the defendant had felt justified in entering the victim's house and removing certain contents. Powell v. State, 170 Ga. App. 360, 317 S.E.2d 338 (1984).

Recent possession of stolen property, not satisfactorily explained, is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary where defendant and three other suspects were found and identified by a public safety officer in the vicinity of a high school which was vandalized and two of the suspects testified that defendant entered the school with them and removed items in a backpack. Smith v. State, 253 Ga. App. 789, 560 S.E.2d 348 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) where two alleged accomplices testified against defendant, the victim's brother positively identified defendant as a participant, and clothes seized from defendant's home matched what the burglars were described as wearing. Stargell v. State, 254 Ga. App. 72, 561 S.E.2d 207 (2002).

Since defendant possessed some items stolen from garages within hours of the burglaries, the jury was free to reject the explanation of the possession of the goods; defendant's pawning the items within hours of the theft compounded the inference of his guilt, and, along with similar transaction evidence, was sufficient to support defendant's burglary convictions. Davis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 714, 621 S.E.2d 818 (2005).

Eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as the person who smashed a window to a building and entered it, the scratches on defendant's arms and hands, the carrying of a tool containing a screwdriver, the flight from the police, the presence of valuables in the building, as well as defendant's apprehension near the scene of the crime, constituted sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's burglary conviction. Morton v. State, 276 Ga. App. 421, 623 S.E.2d 239 (2005).

Because: (1) the evidence showed that a juvenile and the juvenile's brothers had been in and around the victim's apartment complex on the day of the burglary; (2) both the victim and the investigating officer observed the boys entering the apartment complex's parking lot through a hole in the perimeter fence while carrying two garbage bags containing some of the victim's recently stolen property; and (3) the rule in Georgia was that where a theft, whether by simply larceny, burglary, or robbery, was proven, that recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by a defendant created an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict, the aforementioned evidence was sufficient to support an adjudication against the juvenile for burglary. In the Interest of T.T., 282 Ga. App. 527, 639 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of burglary of a daycare center when an expert testified that deoxyribonucleic acid taken from blood on the interior ledge of a window that had been broken into was that of the defendant or the defendant's identical twin, from which the jury could infer that the defendant's blood was left at the time the daycare center was broken into; furthermore, even without evidence that anything was stolen, the jury could infer an intent to steal based on the evidence of an unlawful entry into a building housing an operating business. Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

Defendant's burglary convictions were affirmed based on the property owners' testimony that items were stolen during unauthorized entries into their respective residences, evidence that the stolen items were found in the defendant's bedroom shortly thereafter, and the defendant's inconsistent explanations for the defendant's possession of the stolen items. Additionally, defendant's accomplice testified that the defendant was present with the accomplice on two of the three burglaries. Mays v. State, 306 Ga. App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21 (2010).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence showed that the defendant was seen loading the victim's furniture, television and other items onto a truck, the victim did not know the defendant and did not give the defendant permission to enter the apartment or take any belongings, and the defendant's intent could be inferred from falsely telling a witness that permission was given to take the items. Pullins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 664, 747 S.E.2d 856 (2013).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported burglary of school conviction.

- State provided circumstantial evidence to support the defendant's burglary conviction including evidence to show that the building had an alarm that was set for the night, the defendant entered the building by breaking a window and setting off the alarm, the defendant was not an employee or parent of a student at the school, and the defendant fled after setting off the alarm. Harris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 122, 744 S.E.2d 111 (2013).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent.

- Sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent supported the defendant's burglary conviction as the defendant admitted entering the victim's home, and the victim testified that medications and cash were missing from the victim's home after the incident and that no one else had been in the victim's home from the time that the victim last saw the items until the victim noticed them missing; trial court's comments as to defendant's intent referred to the trial court's reason for finding defendant not guilty of burglary with intent to commit rape and did not go to defendant's burglary with intent to commit theft. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction where defendant knew that the codefendants planned a "job" and that "job" meant a burglary, defendant drove the codefendants to the victim's house and dropped them off, a codefendant discussed the codefendant's reservations in front of defendant, and defendant drove past the stated destination and returned for the codefendants but drove away at an officer's direction and never retrieved them. Botelho v. State, 268 Ga. App. 129, 601 S.E.2d 494 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support a burglary conviction, as the defendant broke into the victim's next-door residence with the intent to steal a gun from the victim's bedroom drawer. Meeks v. State, 274 Ga. App. 517, 618 S.E.2d 152 (2005).

Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, were affirmed, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to prove that the defendant was the person who committed the acts in question, based on witness testimony and the discovery of clothes and a gun used in the robbery in the defendant's room. Moore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107 (2006).

Even if a burglary victim had not testified that the checks were missing, an intent to steal could have been inferred since the evidence showed the defendant's unlawful entry into the building of another where valuable goods were kept, and the trial court did not err in charging the jury that it was allowed to "infer" an intent to steal in the context of burglary; while the defendant denied the burglary upon a defense of alibi, the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was without merit. Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga. App. 756, 629 S.E.2d 593 (2006).

Even though the evidence was circumstantial, it was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who cut a fence, broke in a door, and took checks from a desk in a body shop; an expert firearms and tool mark examiner testified with absolute certainty that the wire cutter in the defendant's multipurpose tool had been used to cut the fence at the body shop. Donnell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 135, 645 S.E.2d 614 (2007).

Defendant's burglary conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant entered the victim's house without permission and there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft therein since there was money in the house before the defendant entered, but the money was gone after the defendant left. Hall v. State, 294 Ga. App. 274, 668 S.E.2d 880 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction because the evidence that the defendant's entry in a house was unauthorized, evidence establishing the presence of valuables in the house, and evidence that contradicted the defendant's innocent explanation for the defendant's entry, authorized the jury to infer that the defendant intended to commit a theft when the defendant entered the victims' house. Long v. State, 307 Ga. App. 669, 705 S.E.2d 889 (2011).

Defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit burglary was affirmed because while the defense presented a different theory of events and claimed that the defendant did not act with the intent to commit a theft, it was the jury's province to assess witness credibility, resolve the conflicts in the evidence, and determine whether there was a reasonable hypothesis of innocence favorable to the defendant. Anthony v. State, 317 Ga. App. 807, 732 S.E.2d 845 (2012).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for attempted burglary, sufficient evidence supported the conviction because the jury evaluated the nature of the circumstances of the morning's events, as well as the daughter's eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant and, although the defendant explained that it was mistakenly the wrong house, the jury was authorized to come to a different and reasonable conclusion based on the state's case. White v. State, 323 Ga. App. 660, 744 S.E.2d 857 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to prove intent for burglary as the jury could infer an intent to steal based on the evidence of an unlawful entry into a building housing an operating business, despite no evidence that valuable items were located in the building, and that the defendant crawled out of the window during a time when the business was closed, and ran when confronted by the security guard. Taylor v. State, 325 Ga. App. 736, 754 S.E.2d 781 (2014).

Conviction without direct or circumstantial evidence that defendant committed burglary.

- When a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, recent unexplained possession of stolen goods by defendant creates inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).

When a burglary is proven, recent unexplained possession of the stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference sufficient to convict even without direct proof or circumstantial evidence that defendant committed burglary. Bankston v. State, 159 Ga. App. 342, 283 S.E.2d 319 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1154, 102 S. Ct. 1026, 71 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1982); Jackson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d 353 (1981).

To convict defendant of burglary based upon recent possession of stolen goods, it must be shown that goods were stolen in a burglary and there must be absence of or unsatisfactory explanation of that possession. Bankston v. State, 159 Ga. App. 342, 283 S.E.2d 319 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1154, 102 S. Ct. 1026, 71 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1982); Jackson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d 353 (1981).

Identity of stolen articles must be indisputably established.

- In prosecution for offense of burglary where state relies upon defendant's recent possession of allegedly stolen or feloniously taken goods for conviction, it is absolutely essential that identity of stolen articles be indisputably established. Tommie v. State, 158 Ga. App. 216, 279 S.E.2d 510 (1981); Collins v. State, 176 Ga. App. 634, 337 S.E.2d 415 (1985).

Identification of defendant.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for two counts of armed robbery with respect to two victims at the first residence, attempt to commit armed robbery with respect to one of the victims at the first residence, and two counts of burglary with respect to the two residences because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by one of the witnesses, who identified the defendant. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (2013).

When defendant may be convicted of burglary or theft by receiving stolen property.

- When the principal thieves are known, and when it appears the defendant had prior knowledge that the goods were to be stolen or, in some cases, aided in procuring the theft, but was not present at the initial caption and asportation, the defendant may be convicted of violating either the burglary or receiving stolen property statutes, but not both crimes, at the election of the state. Lamb v. State, 108 Ga. App. 722, 134 S.E.2d 505 (1963).

Jury questions.

- What constitutes recent possession is in all cases a jury question, to be determined very largely from character and nature of property stolen. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).

Whether defendant's explanation of possession is satisfactory is a question for jury. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981); Bankston v. State, 159 Ga. App. 342, 283 S.E.2d 319 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1154, 102 S. Ct. 1026, 71 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1982).

Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim's identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009).

Appellant's claim of error as to admitted hearsay evidence mooted by acquittal.

- Defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony identifying certain watches as stolen property was moot as the jury acquitted the defendant of the burglary in which the watches were taken. Price v. State, 283 Ga. App. 564, 642 S.E.2d 191 (2007).

Evidence from search admissible.

- The fact that the officers at the stop of defendant's vehicle exceeded their lawful authority by arresting defendant through handcuffing the defendant, rather than merely detaining the defendant and patting the defendant down, did not taint the search of the truck. Hunt v. State, 212 Ga. App. 217, 441 S.E.2d 514 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions where one of the victims opened the door to the victim's home when the victim recognized one of defendant's accomplices, where defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and where defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim's head, took money from the second victim's wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed defendant's accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified defendant as the gunman from a police photo array, plus made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims' testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman's arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on defendant's arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the sufficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004).

In a prosecution for burglary and trafficking methamphetamine, probable cause supported the defendant's warrantless arrest and supported the admission of the seized evidence because: (1) it was reasonable for the arresting officers to act upon an investigating deputy's observations; (2) law enforcement had reasonably trustworthy information to warrant their belief that the defendant had committed or had participated in committing a burglary; and (3) a determination of probable cause to arrest the defendant could rest on the collective knowledge of the police, given the communication between them. Murphy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 447, 649 S.E.2d 565 (2007).

Trial court properly denied suppression of the defendant's blood sample for a DNA comparison pursuant to a particularized search warrant seeking the sample as the warrant and the attached affidavit when read together particularly described the evidence to be seized and gave the executing officers adequate notice of the search warrant's scope and command. Holloway v. State, 287 Ga. App. 655, 653 S.E.2d 95 (2007).

Fingerprint evidence.

- When defendant's fingerprints were found on things taken from area of burglarized premises not generally accessible to public shortly after burglary had been committed, evidence presented was sufficient to convince rational trier of fact of guilt of defendant beyond reasonable doubt. Woodliff v. State, 158 Ga. App. 113, 279 S.E.2d 231 (1981).

Where a defendant was positively identified as being the person who was seen on the front door steps of the burglary victim's house on the day of the alleged burglary, and the defendant pawned a pistol later identified as the one stolen from the burglary victim's house on the same date, the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Wallis v. State, 170 Ga. App. 354, 317 S.E.2d 331 (1984).

There was sufficient evidence to infer that defendant's fingerprint was placed at the time of the burglary where the defendant gave no evidence to draw a contrary inference that the imprinting occurred on another occasion even though the defendant denied committing the burglary. Brown v. State, 180 Ga. App. 188, 348 S.E.2d 575 (1986).

Rule that a conviction may not be based solely on fingerprint evidence unless it is established that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed did not apply when the conviction was based on evidence in addition to fingerprint evidence. Kier v. State, 220 Ga. App. 649, 469 S.E.2d 851 (1996).

After a fingerprint examiner identified fingerprints from one victim's door and another victim's jewelry box as belonging to the defendant, when coupled with the defendant's admissions to committing the crimes, such evidence was sufficient to uphold the defendant's burglary convictions. Shelton v. State, 260 Ga. App. 855, 581 S.E.2d 378 (2003).

Because defendant juvenile could not explain how defendant's fingerprints got on the inside of a burglary victim's window, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). In the Interest of J.D., 275 Ga. App. 147, 619 S.E.2d 818 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction of two counts of residential burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 because defendant's fingerprints were found in both residences; because the homeowners did not know defendant and did not give defendant permission to enter, there was no evidence as to how defendant's fingerprints could have been left at the crime scenes at a time other than when the crimes were committed, and defendant had previously committed strikingly similar crimes. Marion v. State, 276 Ga. App. 553, 623 S.E.2d 739 (2005).

Defendant's convictions of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of an armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary were supported by sufficient evidence that, the day before the three murder victims were found shot in the head, the defendant borrowed the defendant's sibling's car to visit one of the victims, who owed the defendant money, the defendant admitted going to the victims' home twice on the day of the murders, but stated that the victims were not home during either visit, neighbors heard gunshots around the home at approximately 7:30 P.M., near the last time that the two younger victims were heard from, and again at 10:00 P.M. that evening, when the older victim returned home for the day, a number of items stolen from the victims' home at the time of the murders were subsequently found in a dumpster next to a storage locker the defendant shared with the defendant's love interest, the items were contained in plastic bags which had the defendant's fingerprints on them, and the plastic bags came from a roll of trash bags found in the trunk of the car which the defendant borrowed on the day of the murders. Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (2006).

Testimony by a victim that the defendant and an accomplice, armed with handguns, forcibly entered the victim's apartment, raped and sodomized the victim, struck the victim with a gun, stole jewelry, bound the victim, and escaped in a car owned by the victim's prospective spouse, and evidence that 24 fingerprints lifted from the apartment and car matched the defendant's fingerprints, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

Juvenile's fingerprint, which was found on a bottle of tonic water at the crime scene, was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication of the juvenile as delinquent for committing burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, and the juvenile's alternative hypothesis that the juvenile earlier touched the bottle while the bottle was in the stream of commerce before the victim purchased the bottle was not plausible. In the Interest of H. A., 311 Ga. App. 660, 716 S.E.2d 768 (2011).

Conviction for burglary based solely on fingerprint evidence is authorized when fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused are discovered at the crime scene and under circumstances disclosing the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time of the offense. Brown v. State, 180 Ga. App. 188, 348 S.E.2d 575 (1986).

Evidence of flight may be submitted to jury, and the jury may infer guilt therefrom. Cohran v. State, 157 Ga. App. 551, 278 S.E.2d 133 (1981).

Syringes found in defendant's vehicle shortly after burglary of veterinary office were admissible because they were in possession of defendant at time of defendant's arrest and due to relevance in explaining defendant's motive for burglary. Wortham v. State, 158 Ga. App. 19, 279 S.E.2d 287 (1981).

Chain of custody of weapon used in burglary.

- Where defendants were convicted of burglary, the trial court did not err by admitting a shotgun used in the crime spree into evidence without establishing an appropriate chain of custody as the state was not required to prove a chain of custody of the exhibit, since the gun was a distinct and recognizable physical object which could be identified upon mere observation. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).

Denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was appropriate where the jury was authorized to believe defendant's witnesses, who provided defendant with an alibi and an exculpatory explanation for defendant's subsequent possession of some 984 coins in the trunk of defendant's car, but the jury was not required to believe defendant's witnesses, and it was equally authorized to believe the state's witnesses, who placed defendant at the convenience store shortly before the burglary and who identified an oddly discolored token found in defendant's subsequent possession as having been among those stolen in the burglary. Dean v. State, 181 Ga. App. 452, 352 S.E.2d 633 (1987).

In a trial for burglary, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence was properly denied. Based on the defendant's possession and pawning of the stolen goods within hours of the theft and the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime shortly after the burglary occurred, there was ample evidence to support a finding of guilt. Chambers v. State, 288 Ga. App. 550, 654 S.E.2d 451 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, which was based on the argument that the state's case relied too heavily on allegedly tainted evidence concerning the victims' pretrial identification of burglars, because at the time trial counsel moved for the directed verdict, the allegedly tainted identification evidence had been admitted without objection, and accordingly, the trial court properly considered that evidence in deciding the motion; even in the absence of testimony concerning the victims' pretrial identification of the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction because the defendant and the codefendant matched the general description of the burglars that the victims gave to police, they were seen walking a short distance from the scene, not long after the burglary occurred, at the time police first saw them, the codefendant was carrying a backpack stolen during the break-in, when the codefendant saw police, the codefendant immediately discarded the backpack, and a number of items stolen during the burglary were recovered from the front porch of the defendant's residence. Bell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (2010).

Court's determination that essential elements were not established constituted directed verdict of acquittal on the merits, and the state could not appeal and subject defendants to a new trial on the merits. State v. Bryant, 182 Ga. App. 698, 356 S.E.2d 656 (1987).

Admitting evidence of other crimes.

- In a trial for burglary certified copies of indictments and guilty pleas from 1982 on four counts of burglary and four counts of theft by taking were admissible, as there was evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator and there was sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 227, 348 S.E.2d 747 (1986).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in defendant's trial for peeping Tom and burglary with intent to commit rape in admitting similar transaction evidence of defendant's involvement in a peeping Tom incident where defendant was arrested for entering a restroom at another college and peering into an occupied stall with a hand mirror as: (1) the state offered the testimony of the alleged victim in that peeping Tom incident as well as the testimony of the arresting police officer, for the appropriate purpose of showing defendant's bent of mind, course of conduct, and identity; (2) the alleged victim's testimony provided sufficient evidence that defendant peered into the bathroom stall while the victim was in it; and (3) the acts were sufficiently similar. Howard v. State, 266 Ga. App. 281, 596 S.E.2d 627 (2004).

In trial for burglary, trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior burglary as evidence of intent and state of mind, even though the trial court failed to expressly balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact; the evidence was not overly prejudicial as detailed limiting instructions were given when the evidence was admitted and at the close of the case. Clark v. State, 272 Ga. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 741 (2005).

In a burglary prosecution, because the state presented sufficient similarities between the earlier offenses and the charged offense, specifically that all three offenses were committed in rural or isolated locations on property located at or near the county line and in each instance the defendant drove to the residence and parked a vehicle nearby, and all three offenses were committed in the middle of the day while the homeowners were either at home or returned to their residence while the crimes were in progress, and given the defendant's failure to object to that evidence at trial, no abuse of discretion resulted by the admission of the prior offenses. Kimble v. State, 285 Ga. App. 420, 646 S.E.2d 511 (2007).

While state presented sufficient evidence of the victim's age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, defendant's aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for burglary, the trial court did not err by allowing the admission of similar transaction evidence of the defendant's prior burglary as the evidence was admitted for the appropriate purpose of showing the defendant's bent of mind, course of conduct, and intent; the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction, and although the defendant's guilty plea was sufficient to establish that the defendant actually committed the prior crime, the state also presented testimony from the officer who arrested the defendant after the defendant fled from the scene of the burglary as well as from the victim in that case. Butler v. State, 294 Ga. App. 540, 669 S.E.2d 525 (2008).

Admission of evidence of a later burglary as a similar transaction was proper in the defendants' burglary trial because the state showed a sufficient connection between the two offenses such that proof of the former tended to prove the latter; in the similar transaction, at about 4:45 in the morning, a large chunk of concrete was thrown through the front glass door of a gas station at an interstate exit, cigarettes were stolen, two large black plastic garbage bags containing cigarettes and shards or slivers of glass were found in the defendants' vehicle, and a large chunk of concrete and an empty black plastic bag were on the ground next to the vehicle. In the case charged, a large rock was thrown through the front glass door of a gas station at an interstate exit at approximately 4:45 in the morning, cigarettes and cash were stolen, and some black plastic garbage bags that the owner did not sell in the store were left behind. Kennedy v. State, 298 Ga. App. 372, 680 S.E.2d 478 (2009).

Trial court did not err in admitting evidence of two prior burglaries as similar transactions under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404) during the defendant's trial for burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, because the trial court's finding that the offenses satisfied the similarity requirement was not clearly erroneous; there was evidence that the defendant was in a house on the day before the burglary was discovered and was found wearing stolen sunglasses two days later, in each instance the defendant became acquainted with male college students by asking for money or odd jobs and later, when the victims' house appeared to be vacant, entered without authority to appropriate the victims' goods, and the burgled houses were within one mile of each other. Long v. State, 307 Ga. App. 669, 705 S.E.2d 889 (2011).

Evidence of prior burglary convictions admissible.

- See Harper v. State, 180 Ga. App. 20, 348 S.E.2d 318 (1986).

There is no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting in evidence a prior burglary as tending to prove intent and bent of mind. Masters v. State, 186 Ga. App. 795, 368 S.E.2d 557 (1988).

Evidence sufficient to establish unlawful entry.

- See West v. State, 178 Ga. App. 275, 342 S.E.2d 756 (1986); Pruitt v. State, 217 Ga. App. 681, 458 S.E.2d 696 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41 because: (1) defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the defendant's love interest saw defendant and defendant showed defendant's love interest a stack of cash, and defendant told the defendant's love interest it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with defendant and defendant told the informant that defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that the defendant got the layout of the house from the defendant's love interest. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Burglary of home where previously lived.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, because the defendant's former love interest testified that the former love interest and defendant were separated, that the former love interest had told defendant that defendant could not return to the house, which was titled in the former love interest's name, and that defendant had removed most of defendant's belongings from the home and did not have a house key on the day defendant entered the former love interest's residence by kicking down the back door. From such testimony, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant was not authorized to enter the house, and in light of defendant's forcible entry the jury could have inferred that defendant knew that defendant was without authority to be in the former love interest's house. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).

In a prosecution for burglary, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant entered the victim's house without authority because the victim's testimony showed that when defendant entered the house, the victim told defendant that the victim's sibling "was going to kill him or make him leave and never come back." Winkfield v. State, 275 Ga. App. 456, 620 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction on three counts of burglary; a video of one of the burglaries showed a masked person wearing a distinctive work shirt and certain other clothing, which shirt and clothing defendant was wearing when defendant was filmed redeeming stolen lottery tickets two days later. Burdette v. State, 276 Ga. App. 695, 624 S.E.2d 253 (2005).

With regard to a burglary conviction, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant lacked authority to enter the mobile home where the victim was found dead; the fact that the victim was found partially dressed in the victim's bathroom allowed the inference that the victim's privacy had been intruded upon, and a witness testified that the victim had recently refused to give the defendant a new key to the mobile home. Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 651 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

Regarding defendants' convictions for burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, sufficient evidence authorized the jury's decision to reject one defendant's version of events - that defendants believed that the property involved belonged to an accomplice - because, with regard to one of the burglarized residences, the fact that defendants were unsuccessful in taking anything from the home was irrelevant to the burglary convictions since the crime was completed upon entry into the dwelling. As to the second residence, the fact that property from that residence was found in the vehicle in which defendants were in was sufficient to establish that the property had been stolen. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (2008).

With regard to a burglary charge, the evidence authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have authority to enter a residence where the defendant used to live with the victim: the locks on the home had been changed since the defendant had stayed there; the defendant had to break a window in the rear door of the home in order to gain entry; the security alarm was active and armed when the defendant arrived; and the victim was afraid of the defendant and had turned to authorities to prevent the defendant from coming near the victim or the victim's family. Furthermore, the evidence of the defendant's rampage once in the residence also permitted the jury to find that the defendant entered the home with the intent to commit aggravated assault and murder. Allen v. State, 284 Ga. 310, 667 S.E.2d 54 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant entered uninvited into his ex-wife's home, kicked open the bedroom door where his ex-wife was asleep with her boyfriend, laid across the victims, grabbed their throats, and threatened them, in violation of the terms of a condition of bond issued in a previous case, was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated stalking, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Bray v. State, 294 Ga. App. 562, 669 S.E.2d 509 (2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant entered the victim's apartment without permission when, although the victim, who owned the apartment, did not testify at trial, the evidence was that the victim had changed the locks after the defendant moved out and that the defendant could no longer use the defendant's keys; on the day of the burglary, the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to use the defendant's keys and then went around to the patio, climbed over the railing around the patio, and went, uninvited, into the apartment through the patio door. Ursulita v. State, 307 Ga. App. 735, 706 S.E.2d 123 (2011).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for burglary based on the evidence that showed that the defendant and the co-defendant approached the victim's house armed and with the intent to rob, that the co-defendant knocked and gave a false name to entice the occupants to open the door, that the defendants entered the house without being invited in, that the victim immediately attempted to make the strangers leave the house, and that the intruders drew their guns as the intruders entered, all of which established that the defendant entered the house without authority. Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (2013).

Neither invited or authorized on premises.

- Because defendant was neither invited nor authorized to be in the victim's home, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Waters v. State, 294 Ga. App. 442, 669 S.E.2d 450 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with the intent to rape, aggravated sexual battery, and burglary based on the testimony of the victim that at approximately 4:00 A.M.. the victim was in bed asleep when a man got into the victim's bed and began choking the victim, that it was not consensual, and that the perpetrator indicated watching the victim for some time and inserted two fingers into the victim's vagina. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 778, 757 S.E.2d 443 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for burglary based on witnesses observing five or six radiators in the back seat of the defendant's car immediately after exiting the premises, a dummy lock was found on the back gate, tire tracks led up to the rear of the buildings where a roll-up door showed signs of forced entry, two witnesses watched the defendant drive away, and incriminating evidenced existed, including admissions. Harris v. State, 328 Ga. App. 852, 763 S.E.2d 133 (2014).

Based on evidence that the victim changed the locks during the defendant's incarceration, that the defendant moved in with the defendant's mother upon release from jail, and that the defendant forcibly entered the victim's home, the jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant no longer lived at the residence and was no longer authorized to enter the residence and, thus, to convict the defendant of burglary. Polanco v. State, 340 Ga. App. 292, 797 S.E.2d 204 (2017).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of attempted burglary.

- See Richardson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 661, 356 S.E.2d 725 (1987).

Presence of valuables inside premises, evidence of defendant's flight, presence of a cement block under a broken window, and a positive identification of defendant were sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit burglary. Methvin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 906, 377 S.E.2d 735 (1989).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted burglary because defendant admitted to trying to break into a gas station to steal beer and cigarettes. Smith v. State, 273 Ga. App. 107, 614 S.E.2d 219 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted burglary, as it showed that defendant took the substantial step of prying open the carport door of the house of another person, the exterior of which was 100 percent complete, so that defendant could steal the valuable construction tools inside, and that defendant was caught in the act while doing so. Weeks v. State, 274 Ga. App. 122, 616 S.E.2d 852 (2005).

Sufficient evidence, including that the defendant took a substantial step of knocking off the victim's shed door handle, without authority, with the intent to steal valuable goods therein, supported an attempted burglary conviction; moreover, although the defendant denied any intention to commit a theft, the credibility of the witnesses and the questions as to the reasonableness of the defendant's actions were issues for the factfinder to decide. Minor v. State, 278 Ga. App. 327, 629 S.E.2d 44 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; in addition to testimony by a codefendant and eyewitness testimony by the victim's spouse, the victim's blood was on the defendant's clothes, the defendant had the victim's keys, and the knife used to kill the victim and a pistol were discovered near the site of the defendant's arrest in some woods near the scene of the crime. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011).

Despite a sufficiency challenge to an adjudication on a charge of criminal attempt to commit burglary, the court of appeals upheld the finding because the juvenile's conduct including: (1) repeatedly ringing the victim's doorbell; (2) hiding in the backyard; (3) furtive observation of the victim's house; (4) telephone contact with the other juvenile who was at the victim's front door; and (5) climbing over a basketball goal to reach a window at the back of the house was suspicious and undoubtedly consistent with preparation for a daylight burglary. Moreover, the juvenile's actions, as well as evidence of a bent window screen, constituted evidence of a substantial step towards entering the victim's house without authority and inconsistent with a lawful purpose. In the Interest of R.C., 289 Ga. App. 293, 656 S.E.2d 914 (2008).

Evidence supported a conviction of criminal attempt to commit burglary. The victim heard knocking at the victim's sliding glass door and saw the defendant, a neighbor, crouched down holding a crowbar and beating the bottom track of the door; when the victim asked what the defendant was doing, the defendant said, "Oh, you're home," and asked to borrow the victim's shovel, then said that the defendant had just wanted to make sure the victim was okay and left without the shovel; when police asked the defendant what had gone on, the defendant said, "I didn't have a crowbar in my hand. I had a screwdriver in my hand"; and during an interview with police, the defendant gave differing explanations for the defendant's actions. Rudnitskas v. State, 291 Ga. App. 685, 662 S.E.2d 729 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant, who was convicted of attempted burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1, had the intent to rob the sawmill in question. The defendant and others set out early on a Saturday and entered the property in an unusual way; and the defendant drove the getaway truck, lied to police, and failed to produce a flashlight when asked to empty the defendant's pockets. Armour v. State, 292 Ga. App. 111, 663 S.E.2d 367 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of attempted burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1(a) because the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant took a substantial step toward entering an owner's apartment to commit a felony; the defendant's inculpatory statement that the defendant intended to enter the owner's apartment to get money was direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, and this statement, combined with a witness's testimony that the witness heard the defendant and the defendant's brother discuss entering the owner's apartment through the window, saw them on the owner's porch, and then heard the window breaking, provided ample evidence to support the defendant's conviction of attempted burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Durham v. State, 295 Ga. App. 734, 673 S.E.2d 80 (2009).

Juvenile conviction for attempted burglary.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a juvenile's adjudication as delinquent after a finding was made that the juvenile had committed acts which, had the juvenile been an adult, would have supported a conviction for attempt to commit burglary, based on the testimony of one victim, who stated that a couple of young people, including a person matching the juvenile's description, were banging loudly on the victim's door and then threw a rock through the back window in an attempt to break into the home. Additionally, the juvenile's cohort pled guilty to the crime and testified to the juvenile's involvement. In the Interest of J. S., 296 Ga. App. 144, 673 S.E.2d 645 (2009).

Window screen removal sufficient for attempted burglary conviction.

- Witness's testimony that the witness awoke during the night and found that someone had removed a screen from the window of the witness's apartment, that the witness saw someone when the witness looked outside, that the witness was able to see defendant's face and noticed that the defendant was naked when the defendant moved near a neighbor's porch light, and that police apprehended defendant near the witness's residence a short time later and found that the defendant possessed property belonging to another person who had the screen outside that person's window removed was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions on charges of burglary with the intent to commit theft and public indecency. Heard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 718, 603 S.E.2d 69 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's attempted burglary conviction since the victim testified that, after the victim woke and saw the defendant outside, the victim found the screen to an open window on the hood of the victim's car and found a piece of carpet the victim had left in the window sill for the victim's cat to sit on in the yard. The jury thus could have found that the defendant removed the screen in an attempt to gain entrance into the house. Dillard v. State, 323 Ga. App. 333, 744 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Same evidence used to prove attempt and burglary.

- Defendant was properly convicted of criminal attempt to commit burglary, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1, because prosecution for that crime was not time-barred; the crime for criminal attempt to commit burglary was substituted in lieu of a count of burglary charged in the original indictment, and the same evidence could be used to prove both the crime and criminal attempt to commit that crime. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010).

Identification by victim and codefendant.

- Defendant's convictions for robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a),16-7-1(a), and16-5-41(a), respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence because the victim and a codefendant both positively identified defendant as a participant in a criminal event, wherein three individuals burst into the victim's apartment, robbed the victim at gunpoint, and tied the victim up; the lack of physical evidence did not alter the sufficiency, as the identification testimony from a photographic line-up and at trial was within the trier of fact's credibility determination, and denial of defendant's new trial motion under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 was proper. Tucker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 611, 621 S.E.2d 562 (2005).

Identification of defendant.

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for burglary, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree based on the evidence adduced at trial that the defendant broke into the adult victim's apartment through a rear window and attacked the victim, stabbed the adult victim in the neck, dragged the victim down the hall, and stabbed the victim's hand and, although the defendant put a cloth over the victim's face at some point, the adult victim saw that the person stabbing the victim in the neck was the defendant, the victim's ex-boyfriend, and the victim positively and consistently identified the defendant as the perpetrator. White v. State, 319 Ga. App. 530, 737 S.E.2d 324 (2013).

Circumstantial evidence identifying defendant.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for burglary, despite a witness being impeached, because while there was conflicting testimony about what the witness told police and whether the defendant had sold the stolen phone to someone else, the circumstantial evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator was sufficient. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013).

Defendant's convictions for burglary and smash and grab burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(c) and16-7-2(b) were supported by circumstantial evidence, including cell phone evidence that the defendant was near the scenes of the two burglaries and DNA evidence from a cigarette butt found in a very similar burglary days after the charged crimes. Nations v. State, 345 Ga. App. 92, 812 S.E.2d 346 (2018).

Burglary of former employer's home.

- There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of burglary; the defendant: (1) was fired by the victim; (2) knew the home's layout; (3) was seen driving in the area of the home at the time of the crime; and (4) sold the victim's jewelry to a jeweler, who said the jewelry did not appear as though it was found in a junk car as the defendant claimed. Leonard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 745, 603 S.E.2d 82 (2004).

Sufficient evidence for conviction.

- See Weems v. State, 172 Ga. App. 401, 323 S.E.2d 272 (1984); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Reed v. State, 174 Ga. App. 573, 330 S.E.2d 790 (1985); McCutchen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 719, 341 S.E.2d 260 (1986); Maxwell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 20, 342 S.E.2d 8 (1986); Howard v. State, 178 Ga. App. 376, 343 S.E.2d 151 (1986); Laidler v. State, 180 Ga. App. 213, 348 S.E.2d 739 (1986); Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 366, 349 S.E.2d 255 (1986); Ivey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 407, 349 S.E.2d 272 (1986); Miller v. State, 180 Ga. App. 525, 349 S.E.2d 495 (1986); Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 687, 350 S.E.2d 49 (1986); White v. State, 182 Ga. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 693 (1987); Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119 (1987); Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987); Burson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 647, 359 S.E.2d 731 (1987); Litmon v. State, 186 Ga. App. 762, 368 S.E.2d 530 (1988); Masters v. State, 186 Ga. App. 795, 368 S.E.2d 557 (1988); Cash v. State, 258 Ga. 460, 368 S.E.2d 756 (1988); Clark v. State, 186 Ga. App. 882, 369 S.E.2d 282 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. App. 562, 376 S.E.2d 725 (1988); Hurston v. State, 189 Ga. App. 748, 377 S.E.2d 519 (1989); Benford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 761, 377 S.E.2d 530 (1989); McCounly v. State, 191 Ga. App. 266, 381 S.E.2d 552 (1989); Schley v. State, 191 Ga. App. 412, 382 S.E.2d 120 (1989); Garmon v. State, 192 Ga. App. 250, 384 S.E.2d 278 (1989); Mitchel v. State, 193 Ga. App. 146, 387 S.E.2d 390 (1989); Livingston v. State, 193 Ga. App. 502, 388 S.E.2d 406 (1989); Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990); Bagley v. State, 202 Ga. App. 416, 414 S.E.2d 547 (1992); Hawkins v. State, 219 Ga. App. 484, 465 S.E.2d 527 (1995); Quinn v. State, 222 Ga. App. 423, 474 S.E.2d 297 (1996); Igle v. State, 223 Ga. App. 498, 478 S.E.2d 622 (1996); Brown v. State, 224 Ga. App. 241, 480 S.E.2d 276 (1997); Alford v. State, 224 Ga. App. 451, 480 S.E.2d 893 (1997); Williams v. State, 224 Ga. App. 665, 482 S.E.2d 415 (1997); Toney v. State, 225 Ga. App. 228, 483 S.E.2d 627 (1997); Patterson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 515, 484 S.E.2d 317 (1997); Jackson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 604, 487 S.E.2d 142 (1997); Howard v. State, 227 Ga. App. 5, 488 S.E.2d 489 (1997); Howard v. State, 228 Ga. App. 784, 492 S.E.2d 759 (1997); Etheridge v. State, 228 Ga. App. 788, 492 S.E.2d 755 (1997); Wilson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 271, 495 S.E.2d 894 (1998); Romines v. State, 233 Ga. App. 790, 505 S.E.2d 530 (1998); Ford v. State, 234 Ga. App. 301, 506 S.E.2d 668 (1998); Hart v. State, 238 Ga. App. 325, 517 S.E.2d 790 (1999); King v. State, 238 Ga. App. 575, 519 S.E.2d 500 (1999); Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 131, 522 S.E.2d 722 (1999); Abney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 280, 523 S.E.2d 362 (1999); Overand v. State, 240 Ga. App. 682, 523 S.E.2d 610 (1999); Ashley v. State, 240 Ga. App. 502, 523 S.E.2d 901 (1999); In re M.M., 240 Ga. App. 571, 524 S.E.2d 274 (1999); Kidd v. State, 241 Ga. App. 446, 526 S.E.2d 916 (1999); Phagan v. State, 243 Ga. App. 568, 533 S.E.2d 757 (2000); Welch v. State, 243 Ga. App. 798, 534 S.E.2d 471 (2000); Massey v. State, 247 Ga. App. 827, 545 S.E.2d 66 (2001); Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000); Whitehill v. State, 247 Ga. App. 267, 543 S.E.2d 470 (2000); Dunn v. State, 245 Ga. App. 847, 539 S.E.2d 198 (2000); King v. State, 246 Ga. App. 100, 539 S.E.2d 614 (2000); Hawkins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 26, 546 S.E.2d 280 (2001); Hawkins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 26, 546 S.E.2d 280 (2001); Watkins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 302, 548 S.E.2d 56 (2001); Jackson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 848, 581 S.E.2d 382 (2003); Posley v. State, 264 Ga. App. 869, 592 S.E.2d 504 (2003); Griggs v. State, 264 Ga. App. 636, 592 S.E.2d 168 (2003); Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 703, 653 S.E.2d 468 (2007); Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 297, 656 S.E.2d 582 (2008); Carr v. State, 289 Ga. App. 875, 658 S.E.2d 419 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant confessed to entering the apartment to burglarize it, the apartment was occupied, and the defendant and the accomplices took items from the apartment was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

Circumstantial evidence, including that a house was burglarized, the defendant sold jewelry stolen from the house at two local pawn shops, and the defendant had a car the same as the one seen leaving the house on the day of the burglary, was sufficient to uphold the jury's conclusion that the defendant had committed burglary and theft. Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 761, 811 S.E.2d 479 (2018).

Selling of stolen goods.

- In a burglary trial, when evidence of defendant's selling the stolen goods to a pawn shop within one or two days of the burglary was presented to show possession and was uncontested, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict. Cosby v. State, 151 Ga. App. 676, 261 S.E.2d 424 (1979).

Possession of recently stolen goods.

- Evidence that accused has been found in possession of property stolen in recently committed burglary is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for burglary in absence of reasonable or credible explanation for defendant's possession of the property. Porter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 883, 273 S.E.2d 644 (1980).

At trial the victim of the burglary testified as to the circumstances surrounding the theft and identified with specificity the items stolen. Within approximately 27 to 30 hours after the established time of the burglary, appellant was apprehended driving the van in which was discovered property proven to be fruits of the burglary. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, this evidence was sufficient to authorize the conviction of burglary. Warfle v. State, 157 Ga. App. 196, 276 S.E.2d 689 (1981).

Considering the proof of the commission of a burglary, defendant's recent possession of the goods stolen in that burglary, and the conflicts between defendant's testimony and his statements, along with all the other circumstances of the case, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Myles v. State, 186 Ga. App. 817, 368 S.E.2d 574 (1988).

When a television that had been reported stolen from a duplex was found with defendant in a nearby house, a witness had seen someone carry a television down the street and enter the house, and defendant had previously done painting for the duplex's occupant, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for burglary. Buckles v. State, 260 Ga. App. 638, 580 S.E.2d 638 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary where an accomplice's testimony that defendant was an active participant in the burglary was corroborated by: (1) a police officer's testimony that defendant was in a vehicle with two accomplices shortly after the burglary; (2) another officer's testimony that handguns were found in a pillowcase retrieved from the vehicle; and (3) the pawn shop owner's testimony that the guns found in the vehicle were the guns stolen from the owner's shop. Reynolds v. State, 267 Ga. App. 148, 598 S.E.2d 868 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction when an employee of the burglarized store testified that the employee encountered the defendant between 3:30 and 4:30 A.M.. in the store while the defendant was trying to pry open the lock on a jewelry counter with a knife, and the employee identified the defendant from a photographic lineup and at trial; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the testimony of one witness was sufficient to establish a fact. Standfill v. State, 267 Ga. App. 612, 600 S.E.2d 695 (2004).

Defendant's possession of goods stolen in a burglary, found in a car in which defendant was a passenger, viewed with defendant's presence near the scene of the burglary, was sufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction. Cothran v. State, 269 Ga. App. 256, 603 S.E.2d 762 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2), because evidence was seen in one of the defendant's vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant's homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support both an armed robbery and a burglary conviction as: (1) defendant admitted to possessing a gun stolen in the robbery and other items used in commission of the crimes; (2) defendant fled when confronted by police; and (3) defendant asked another person in the courthouse why that person snitched on defendant; the state's failure to produce or ever locate the weapon used by defendant was immaterial, as was the fact that defendant was acquitted of the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Roberts v. State, 277 Ga. App. 730, 627 S.E.2d 446 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's burglary convictions when: a taxi driver had picked up the defendant from outside one of the burglarized residences; evidence indicated that someone had called for a taxi from inside the house; items taken from both burglarized residences were found by police when the police searched the defendant; and the defendant's girlfriend was wearing jewelry that had come from one of the residences and which the girlfriend told police had been a gift from the defendant. Perez v. State, 284 Ga. App. 212, 643 S.E.2d 792 (2007).

Evidence that a defendant was found in possession of stolen property in close proximity to the apartment from which the property had been taken a day earlier, and that when police saw the defendant with the property, the defendant tried to evade the police and then gave the police a false name was sufficient to allow a rational juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Rivera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 215, 666 S.E.2d 739 (2008).

Theft from a school.

- When a defendant was found inside a school building near keys from the school office, the defendant admitted at trial that defendant entered the school through the windows and took the keys from an office desk, and there was also evidence that there was valuable property located in the school, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary. Roberson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 179, 300 S.E.2d 196 (1983).

Evidence, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to sustain convictions of five counts of burglary; and the fact that evidence did not exclude all reasonable explanations pointing to defendant's innocence did not require a different result where there was direct evidence pointing to the defendant's participation and guilt. McConnell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 530, 304 S.E.2d 733 (1983).

Entering without authority but not taking anything.

- When the evidence of record shows that the defendant entered the victim's house without authority, the door had been kicked in, but nothing had been taken, and the defendant's explanation of the circumstances surrounding defendant's presence at the scene was not supported by subsequent police investigation, any rational trier of fact can find from such evidence proof of the defendant's guilt of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Grice v. State, 166 Ga. App. 706, 305 S.E.2d 438 (1983).

Evidence that a neighbor observed a person enter the house next door through a broken back window, that police officers found almost every room in the house ransacked and found a man subsequently identified as the defendant hiding in a closet and that the homeowner had given no one permission to enter the home in the owner's absence was sufficient for conviction. Anderson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 762, 310 S.E.2d 299 (1983).

Evidence that about an hour before armed robbery and burglary occurred defendant was seen sitting in vehicle near scene of crime, assailant broke into victim's home and took cash and a Cadillac, victim identified defendant as assailant, and Cadillac was found on property where defendant lived was sufficient to convince rational trier of fact of guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 176 Ga. App. 378, 336 S.E.2d 257 (1985).

Breaking and entering with intent to abduct.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary when the jury was authorized to conclude from the evidence that the defendant broke into the home with the intent to "abduct" defendant's spouse. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987).

Circumstantial evidence of entry sufficient.

- Evidence which was produced at trial as to defendants' entry of the building, while circumstantial, was sufficient to establish that they had done so. Prothro v. State, 186 Ga. App. 836, 368 S.E.2d 793 (1988).

Testimony of the accomplice and the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony were sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary and theft of a motor vehicle. Thurston v. State, 186 Ga. App. 881, 368 S.E.2d 822 (1988).

Taking and using electricity.

- When defendant, without lawful permission, was taking and using electricity in the apartment to heat the stove burners to dry defendant's clothing, the state did prove the element of intent to commit a felony or theft with respect to the burglary charge. Phillips v. State, 204 Ga. App. 698, 420 S.E.2d 316 (1992).

Nature of the wounds, the position of the body, and the presence of a spent bullet lodged in an interior wall allowed the jury to conclude that the murder was committed inside the house and the jury was authorized to find defendant was the person who murdered the victim; thus, the defendant can also be found guilty of burglary. Robbins v. State, 269 Ga. 500, 499 S.E.2d 323 (1998).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of burglary when the victim identified the defendant as the man she had seen at her house earlier on the day of the burglary, she identified his van as the one seen leaving her house after the driver had entered her house while she was home, and police officers testified that the defendant's shoes and the tires of his van matched shoe and tire tracks at the burglary scene. Grabowski v. State, 234 Ga. App. 222, 507 S.E.2d 472 (1998).

Looking for a place to sleep.

- Evidence of the presence of valuable effects inside the premises, the movement of dishes from the cabinet to the recliner, and two similar transactions where defendant pled guilty to attempting burglary with intent to commit theft discounted defendant's alternative theory that defendant was simply looking for a place to sleep. Carr v. State, 251 Ga. App. 117, 553 S.E.2d 674 (2001).

Trial court's admission of recall evidence that defendant threatened a witness, a neighbor of the victims, when defendant was leaving the stand was not error; even if the admission of the recall testimony was error, it was harmless as the evidence was overwhelming to support a conviction for child molestation, burglary, and criminal trespass since: (1) two victims and one mother of a victim, all with a sufficient opportunity to observe defendant, identified defendant in a pre-trial photographic lineup and at trial; (2) the neighbor also identified defendant; (3) a victim and the neighbor knew defendant by first name preceding the incident; (4) a victim and the neighbor noticed defendant wearing the clothes discovered in a victim's home the night of the incident; and (5) the state presented evidence that defendant had committed similar acts previously. Rubi v. State, 258 Ga. App. 815, 575 S.E.2d 719 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) since defendants were seen on the burglarized property at the time of the burglary, they fled the scene, and one defendant gave inconsistent statements as to their reason for being at the scene. Bollinger v. State, 259 Ga. App. 102, 576 S.E.2d 80 (2003).

Hiding in ceiling preceding armed robbery.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary as the evidence showed that defendant, without permission, hid in a space above the store's bathroom ceiling and remained there until the store closed, at which time defendant committed an armed robbery of the store by ordering the bookkeeper to put the store's cash in a trash can and let an accomplice come inside the store who ordered the manager and the bookkeeper into the cooler and threatened them with death if they came out in order to allow defendant and the accomplice to escape. Lighten v. State, 259 Ga. App. 280, 576 S.E.2d 658 (2003).

Taking from unconscious victim.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of burglary where defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a skillet, and robbed the victim's cash while the victim was unconscious. Lord v. State, 259 Ga. App. 449, 577 S.E.2d 103 (2003).

Taking from the elderly.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary as it showed defendant broke into the elderly person's house and took money from the person by force even though the person identified defendant by another name at trial and stated an amount was taken that was different than the amount the elderly person originally reported as the jury was entitled to discredit the person's trial testimony and give more weight to statements the person made at the time the crimes occurred, as well as the testimony of other witnesses at the trial. Currington v. State, 259 Ga. App. 654, 578 S.E.2d 270 (2003).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of burglary, kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by taking when a treating physician stated that the 86-year-old victim's injuries, including blood inside her vagina and bruises and contusions on her vagina, were consistent with forcible penetration; when the defendant admitted entering the victim's home, removing her clothing, restraining her with electrical cords, hitting her, putting a plastic bag over her head, forcing her from one room to another, and taking her money and her car; and when DNA from the defendant matched the DNA of two hair roots found on the victim's living room floor. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

Victim's testimony sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence consisting mostly of testimony from the victim, that the victim was awakened by defendant when the defendant broke into the victim's home, placed the defendant's hand around the victim's neck, and forced the victim to shut up or die, as the defendant threw the victim onto a couch and engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim without the victim's consent, was sufficient to uphold defendant's rape conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1, aggravated assault conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Lowe v. State, 259 Ga. App. 674, 578 S.E.2d 284 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where defendant: (1) planned the crimes, and was armed with a gun and handcuffs; (2) broke into the defendant's in-laws' house after severing their phone line; (3) shot and killed the defendant's father-in-law and wounded the defendant's mother-in-law while they lay in bed; (4) handcuffed the defendant's bleeding mother-in-law to the mother-in-law's nine-year-old child and left them tethered to a bed rail in a room with the mother-in-law's dead husband and defendant's two-year-old child; and (5) abducted the defendant's estranged spouse and the spouse's 17-year-old sibling to a mobile home where the defendant made them take showers while the defendant watched, and then raped them both. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).

Circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, armed robbery, cruelty to children, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm as: (1) defendant was driving a stolen car that defendant knew was not defendant's own; (2) defendant returned to the victims' house, which defendant had left only a short time before, slowly circling the victims' residence, pointing at the house; (3) defendant appeared to let codefendants out of the car for a specific purpose, since defendant saw them enter the victims' home and waited for them, demonstrating that defendant knew they would return shortly; (4) when codefendants ran back to the car and jumped in, defendant drove off in response to their rapid return; and (5) shortly thereafter, defendant abandoned the stolen car. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).

Recent and unexplained possession of stolen goods.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for burglary, as defendant was shown to be in the recent and unexplained possession of property stolen from different residences, the burglarized homes were adjacent to and accessible on foot from the wooded area where defendant was seen around the time the crimes occurred, and similar transaction evidence showed defendant had previously received stolen items from homes in the area, including one home that had been burglarized. Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 581 S.E.2d 279 (2003).

Circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary, as the fact that it showed "old money," printed in the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, was taken from the site of the burglary, that defendant's codefendant drove defendant, who was carrying a screwdriver, to the house that was burglarized, that similar "old money" was left inside the house, that defendant soon purchased two vehicles in cash, and that defendant gave the codefendant a large amount of money in cash which the codefendant deposited in a bank account and which triggered a police investigation, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that defendant burglarized the house. Edward v. State, 261 Ga. App. 57, 581 S.E.2d 691 (2003).

Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction because: (1) defendant drove a truck that exactly matched the truck in the surveillance tape; (2) defendant had a board in defendant's truck with glass particles embedded in the board that were of the same thickness and physical chemical properties as the glass of the window that was broken during the crime; (3) a sweater cap and white gloves found in the truck appeared to match those worn by the perpetrator in the surveillance tape; and (4) the stolen television and videocassette recorder were found approximately 500 yards from the defendant's mother's home. Brooks v. State, 273 Ga. App. 691, 615 S.E.2d 829 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant's brother; and (4) according to the defendant's brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901 (2007).

Circumstantial evidence supported a defendant's conviction of burglarizing a garden center. On the morning the garden center burglary was discovered, the defendant was caught burglarizing a car dealership two doors down; gloves that fell from the defendant's pocket at the dealership came from the garden center; a shoe print on another glove from the center matched the defendant's boots; an investigator who drove by the area the previous evening testified that neither building showed signs of forced entry at that time; and the defendant stated that the defendant could have committed the garden center burglary but did not remember doing so. Johnson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 253, 661 S.E.2d 642 (2008).

Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). The victim's stolen computer was discovered in the attic area between the victim's side of a duplex and the defendant's side, and an officer noticed a path in the insulation from the defendant's side to the victim's attic access door. Norful v. State, 296 Ga. App. 387, 674 S.E.2d 633 (2009).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) for the defendant's conviction of burglary because: (1) an investigating officer, who responded to a burglary alarm at a townhouse, found the defendant coming from the back of the townhouse; (2) the defendant said that the defendant had just put defendant's dog away through the back door of the defendant's neighboring townhouse; (3) the defendant's shoe print was found outside the broken window of the townhouse with the alarm, and the defendant had a remote control in the defendant's pocket that operated a television set that had been unplugged and was put on the floor by the front door of the townhouse; and (4) the defendant's fingerprints were found on the television. Reggler v. State, 307 Ga. App. 721, 706 S.E.2d 111 (2011).

Fleeing without goods.

- Evidence which showed that a victim heard a crash in the victim's bedroom, and that defendant was holding a computer game system before defendant saw the victim and fled, was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for burglary. Wilson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 576, 583 S.E.2d 243 (2003).

Testimony from an eyewitness at the scene that the eyewitness heard suspicious noises in the adjacent government offices, which were closed for business for the day, then saw defendant flee from police while removing items from defendant's pocket, when coupled with the discovery of 169 quarters which were found in the immediate vicinity of the tree where defendant was apprehended, the presence of tools at the crime scene, visible pry marks on the door which defendant attempted to open, and the destroyed gum ball machines, authorized the jury to infer that although defendant did not have the tools in defendant's possession, defendant used them to break into the offices, steal the money from the destroyed machines, and attempt to flee the police and avoid apprehension; thus, defendant's convictions for burglary, possession of tools for the commission of a crime, interference with government property, and obstruction of an officer were all affirmed. Harris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 866, 589 S.E.2d 631 (2003).

When a victim heard defendant breaking into the victim's home, went to a neighbor for help, and, upon returning to the victim's home with the neighbor, confronted defendant exiting the victim's house with the victim's television, the victim's identification of defendant as the person the victim saw exiting the victim's house with the victim's television, corroborated by the victim's neighbor, together with the victim's testimony that defendant did not have permission to be in the victim's house, was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary. Hill v. State, 264 Ga. App. 622, 591 S.E.2d 484 (2003).

Use of crowbar in attempted burglary.

- Insertion of a crowbar into the locked door of a business with the intent of prying open the door and exerting pressure on the crowbar in such a manner that the striker plate on the door was bent and damaged constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of burglary to support a conviction for attempted burglary. Flanagan v. State, 265 Ga. App. 122, 592 S.E.2d 894 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for burglary since defendant's friend testified that defendant asked the friend to drive a truck to a dealership, that defendant and another disappeared for a short time, and that the truck and another vehicle then left the dealership; there was testimony that the police stopped their vehicles and found a stolen four-wheeler in the back of the truck, together with burglary tools; and there was testimony from a witness to the crime. Norwood v. State, 265 Ga. App. 862, 595 S.E.2d 537 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support all but one of defendant's convictions for burglary, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the three shooting victims was entirely consistent in all material respects, and any conflicts in the witnesses' testimony raised a credibility issue for jury resolution. Squires v. State, 265 Ga. App. 673, 595 S.E.2d 547 (2004).

Evidence that defendants entered the victim's apartment, took the victim by the hands and demanded money, shoved a gun into the victim's side and removed the victim's ring, watch, and money, and then forced the victim into a closet blocked with a heavy table with instructions not to come out until they had left was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pinson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Armed robbery of victim in hotel room.

- Evidence that defendant, wielding a gun, barged into the victim's hotel room, demanded money, pistol whipped the victim, and took the victim's wallet sufficed to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary. Bay v. State, 266 Ga. App. 91, 596 S.E.2d 229 (2004).

Screwdriver used in burglary.

- Evidence that defendant was seen exiting a burglarized building, that defendant had items taken from the building, that defendant also had a screwdriver, and that marks on the building's door corresponded to those made by a screwdriver supported defendant's burglary conviction. Taylor v. State, 266 Ga. App. 818, 598 S.E.2d 122 (2004).

Evidence presented at defendant's trial for multiple burglary counts was sufficient to support defendant's convictions where the testimony of defendant's nephew, who acted as an accomplice, was corroborated by the testimony of the victims describing the methods used to break into their homes and the items that were taken. Gibson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 473, 600 S.E.2d 417 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), where evidence showed that three persons forcibly entered the victims' apartment and demanded money, that all three persons were in the car together on the way to the apartment and on the way to the hospital to drop off a bleeding codefendant, that all three persons carried guns, that one of the victims was shot, and that defendant's statement that defendant only was involved to drop off the bleeding codefendant at the hospital was in contrast to the fact that defendant had blood on defendant's pants, shirt, boxer shorts, and that defendant ejected the bloody codefendant from the car in a hurried manner at the hospital. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 642, 600 S.E.2d 731 (2004).

Defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied because evidence from independent sources sufficiently corroborated the son's accomplice's statements implicating defendant in the burglary. The son's statements were corroborated by the victim's testimony that defendant had seen the victim bring the shotguns inside the apartment, by the victim's spouse's testimony that defendant had seen them leave their apartment, and by the apartment manager's testimony that defendant had been standing outside the victim's apartment, along with the son, during the time period when the crimes were committed. Stocks v. State, 268 Ga. App. 351, 601 S.E.2d 729 (2004).

When defendant, according to defendant's love interest, drove a stolen vehicle onto the victim's property through a locked gate, parked near a building where objects were stolen, and got into the vehicle and drove away, and the owner testified that the owner had not given defendant permission to take the objects that were stolen, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of criminal trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Sexton v. State, 268 Ga. App. 736, 603 S.E.2d 66 (2004).

Burglary of storage shed.

- When an eye-witness identified defendant as the individual the witness saw leave the witness's storage shed with the witness's goods, the evidence sufficed to sustain a guilty verdict on the charge of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Gibson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 696, 603 S.E.2d 319 (2004).

Because a burglary victim recognized defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2),16-7-1(a),16-8-41(a),16-11-37(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).

Defendant's multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury, were supported by sufficient evidence because defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, the defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that the defendant beat; only one store owner's testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and three counts of kidnapping arising from an incident in which the defendant and a companion robbed the victim at gunpoint, then forced the victim and the victim's children into their house and tied the victim up with duct tape; the victim identified the defendant from a photo line-up, the defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene, a store video showed the defendant buying the duct tape which was used, and the store manager identified the defendant as the buyer of the duct tape. Brownlee v. State, 271 Ga. App. 475, 610 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Robbery of fast-food restaurant.

- When the defendant's victim identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim's limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for burglary, under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the per- petrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee's car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told the relatives what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer's gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer's blood was found on the defendant's chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Breaking of window.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and burglary, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20,16-5-21, and16-7-1, because the defendant threatened and broke a window in the victim's home, reached in and tried to grab the victim, and the victim positively identified the defendant in a show-up identification that was found to be fair under the totality of the circumstances. Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. App. 701, 610 S.E.2d 668 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a); testimony indicated that the defendant broke a window in order to enter the victim's apartment and that the behavior of the defendant and the defendant's companions, involving beating the victim and telling the victim not to appear at court to testify against the defendant in a pending criminal case, indicated the defendant's intent to enter the apartment to intimidate the victim from testifying at a criminal trial. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) after an apartment occupant observed the defendant, without authority, break a window and enter the apartment with the assumed intent to commit a theft or felony; the defendant's claim that defendant tripped over a rock and fell into the window was not deemed credible as the rock was not that close to the window and the window was broken at head level. Williams v. State, 292 Ga. App. 811, 665 S.E.2d 910 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for a new trial or the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find the defendant guilty of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) beyond a reasonable doubt when the back window of a home was broken and police found the defendant hiding in a closet under a pile of clothing. Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 723, 678 S.E.2d 95 (2009).

Fleeing as evidence of guilt.

- Evidence supported the defendant's burglary conviction as the defendant admitted that the defendant was in a van with the codefendant, who was arrested at the scene, and that the defendant drove off when the defendant heard noises; the victim testified that the victim saw two persons in the home and the jury was free to consider that defendant fled as evidence of guilt. Mitchell v. State, 271 Ga. App. 711, 610 S.E.2d 672 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for child molestation, attempted statutory rape, and burglary were supported by the evidence because: (1) defendant entered the 14-year-old victim's room through a window, uninvited; (2) the defendant told the victim to push the victim's bed against the door; (3) the defendant removed the victim's underwear and the defendant's own pants and laid on top of the victim, but the victim prevented the defendant from penetrating the victim; (4) defendant fondled the victim's breasts and touched the victim's nipples; and (5) on a prior occasion, defendant made the victim touch the defendant's genitals with the victim's hand. Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga. App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (2005).

Theft from open garage.

- Jury was authorized to infer defendant's intent to commit a theft from the fact that defendant backed the car up a long driveway to an open garage attached to the victim's house, left the car running, valuables were present and turned up missing, defendant did not knock or otherwise announce the defendant's presence, defendant was not authorized to enter onto the property or into the garage, defendant opened the door to the interior of the house, and defendant fled in haste when confronted by the victim. Railey v. State, 273 Ga. App. 520, 615 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, burglary, and one firearms offense because: (1) defendant confessed to the crimes; (2) a companion wore distinctive shoes that matched those of an armed robber; (3) two dust-free ski masks, similar to those worn by the armed robbers, were found in defendant's very dusty utility closet; and (4) a small red car was parked near a restaurant that was robbed, officers stopped defendant two hours later, and defendant drove the same car to the police station when defendant came for voluntary questioning. Ray v. State, 273 Ga. App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for burglary and entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft because there was evidence corroborating defendant's confession regarding how defendant gained entry into both a warehouse and a car. Morris v. State, 274 Ga. App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (2005).

Open door to house.

- Evidence was sufficient to support burglary conviction because an officer found defendant at the scene of the crime, the doorway of the house was broken, defendant lacked authority to enter the premises, defendant admitted that defendant had entered the house with the intent to steal, and goods stolen from the house were found in the immediate vicinity of defendant's bicycle and bag; further, defendant admitted to the parole officer that, although defendant had found the door to the house open, defendant had gone into the house to find something to steal. Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 21, 619 S.E.2d 731 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a burglary conviction whereas the fact that the victim opened a door without seeing anyone when the victim looked through a pane did not mean that the victim authorized the defendant's entry into the victim's home; furthermore, the fact that there was no evidence that the defendant committed a theft in the victim's home did not mandate reversal as the victim had been kidnapped, and the offense of burglary was completed when one entered the home of another with the intent to commit the felony offense of kidnapping. Smith v. State, 287 Ga. App. 222, 651 S.E.2d 133 (2007).

Trial court did not err in entering judgments of conviction on defendant's three burglary convictions in two cases following jury verdicts finding the defendant guilty of those offenses; the state introduced sufficient evidence apart from the testimony of defendant's accomplice to warrant convictions, primarily based on the three homeowners' identification of the property taken and their testimony about the circumstances under which the relevant property went missing. Daniel v. State, 275 Ga. App. 70, 619 S.E.2d 770 (2005).

Defendant's convictions of aggravated stalking, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91,16-7-1,16-5-21, and16-5-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, despite the victim's recantation at trial, the victim stated to police earlier that defendant broke into the victim's apartment, scratched and damaged furniture and other property, tied the victim up, locked the victim in the bedroom for several hours, harmed the victim, threatened that defendant and defendant's friends were going to lock the victim in a basement for a few months, and defendant had been waiting for the victim to arrive home. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).

In defendant's prosecution for rape, kidnapping with bodily injury, and burglary, the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses because the evidence showed the assailant to be a young, African-American male driving a white automobile with certain plates, and defendant admitted to driving a stolen white automobile prior to the date that the crimes occurred; this evidence coupled with DNA evidence showing DNA of both defendant and the victim in stains left on the bedding in the victim's apartment where the rape occurred was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes. Winkfield v. State, 275 Ga. App. 456, 620 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was at least a party to the crime of burglary and guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, as defendant's own statements established that the codefendant intended to commit an underlying offense of armed robbery when telling defendant that they should go rob someone in order to get drinking money, and that the codefendant had a handgun; the evidence supported a finding that defendant was present and assisted in the commission of the crime, such that defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under a party to the crime theory pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Because witnesses saw defendant come and go from an empty mobile home and heard defendant brag about a burglary, and the mobile home's back door had pry marks on it that were consistent with defendant's knife, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of burglary and possession of criminal tools under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-7-20(a). Barrow v. State, 275 Ga. App. 522, 621 S.E.2d 537 (2005).

Alleged permission to take.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), because defendant was caught in an apartment, taking shoes that belonged to the apartment dweller, and there were other items that belonged to the dweller in defendant's own apartment; defendant's claim that the dweller had informed a neighbor that anyone could take the neighbor's belongings after a fire had destroyed items in the apartment did not negate any elements of the crime, as the trier of fact was within its province in making a credibility determination that defendant was not as believable as the victim, who claimed to have never said that. Cobb v. State, 275 Ga. App. 554, 621 S.E.2d 548 (2005).

Burglary conviction was supported by sufficient evidence because, while defendant claimed to be merely fixing a broken window in the victim's home, the victim claimed that jewelry and compact discs had been taken from the home, defendant's fingerprints were found on the compact disc case, and a bookshelf inside the home which was blocking the broken window had been turned over; although circumstantial, the evidence, which included defendant's statements to the police and in court, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude that all reasonable hypotheses were excluded, save defendant's guilt. Rolling v. State, 275 Ga. App. 902, 622 S.E.2d 102 (2005).

Evidence regarding defendant's forced entry into the defendant's love interest's house followed by an attempt to murder the defendant's love interest sustained defendant's burglary conviction. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 41, 622 S.E.2d 413 (2005).

Sufficient evidence was introduced to support defendant's convictions for felony murder and burglary despite defendant's claims that defendant was not sufficiently involved in the crimes to be convicted on those charges. Joyner v. State, 280 Ga. 37, 622 S.E.2d 319 (2005).

Forced entry not required for burglary conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of burglary, armed robbery, and malice murder, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a),16-8-41, and16-5-1, respectively, because defendant and a friend decided to rob the victim and they entered the apartment unlawfully with that intent, they stabbed and bludgeoned the victim, and they took a lock-box and left; although the evidence as to whether defendant was let into the apartment by the victim willingly was conflicting, forced entry was not an element of burglary and accordingly, resolution of that fact did not change the sufficiency of the evidence for the burglary conviction. Redwine v. State, 280 Ga. 58, 623 S.E.2d 485 (2005).

Use of DNA in proving offense.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated assault since: (1) the victim testified that the victim discovered a strange person in the victim's den who grabbed the victim as the victim tried to run away, that the person held a knife to the victim's face and told the victim that the person would kill the victim if the victim screamed, that the person then forced the victim to go from room to room in the victim's home to turn out the lights, and that the person then raped the victim; (2) the victim identified defendant as the victim's attacker after hearing the person's voice; and (3) a DNA analyst testified that, with a probability of error of one in a trillion, DNA from defendant's blood matched the DNA found in vaginal swabs that were taken from the victim. McKinney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of malice murder, burglary, and possession of a gun during commission of a crime because a witness testified that the witness, defendant, and defendant's sibling drove around looking for a home to burglarize and that while in a house, the two victims came home unexpectedly and were killed; also, DNA found at the crime scene matched defendant. Denny v. State, 280 Ga. 81, 623 S.E.2d 483 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for malice murder, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another were supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) defendant broke into the office where the victim was living; (2) defendant hit the victim several times on the head and body with a pair of pliers; (3) defendant choked the victim with defendant's hands and arms, and with the pliers, until the victim was dead; (4) defendant took the victim's credit card and driver's license; and (5) defendant disposed of the victim's body. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for rape, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping, burglary, and misdemeanor sexual battery based on the similar transaction evidence produced by the state, defendant's unlawful entry into the victims' homes, the fact that the defendant's DNA was found in the victims' beds, and that the defendant's identity was established, all of which sufficiently linked the defendant to the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 682 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant was found in the laundry room of the home that was the subject of the home burglary; police found masks, gloves, money, a gun, and some of the victim's jewelry in or near the laundry room; and the defendant's DNA was found on one of the masks recovered supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Rudison v. State, 322 Ga. App. 248, 744 S.E.2d 444 (2013).

While the victim initially identified someone else as the assailant, evidence that the defendant's DNA matched the seminal fluid found on the victim's clothing, the defendant was seen near the house shortly after the rape, and the defendant's shirt was found in the residence supported the defendant's convictions for rape, child molestation, false imprisonment, and burglary. Couch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 207, 756 S.E.2d 291 (2014).

Circumstantial evidence that a cigarette butt with the defendant's DNA on the butt was found in a burglary victim's home, that the defendant was seen standing in a neighbor's yard, that the defendant was wet and muddy, and that some of the stolen items were also wet and near a creek near the victim's home was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Stokes v. State, 327 Ga. App. 511, 759 S.E.2d 585 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant's DNA was found on a soda can left inside the victim's house after the burglary, the victim's stolen property was found in a house where the defendant was residing, and the defendant fled when officers tried to arrest the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for burglary and theft by taking. Barstad v. State, 329 Ga. App. 214, 764 S.E.2d 453 (2014).

Theft of lottery tickets.

- Evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction on three counts of burglary because, regarding one of the burglaries, defendant was videotaped redeeming eight lottery tickets from a stolen roll of tickets within two hours of that burglary, and testimony showed that a person would most likely have to have at least 30 of those tickets to redeem eight winning tickets. Burdette v. State, 276 Ga. App. 695, 624 S.E.2d 253 (2005).

Evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction on three counts of burglary; regarding one of the burglaries, defendant had a police business card, which an officer left with a plumbing business for the owner to use to contact the police, on defendant's person. Burdette v. State, 276 Ga. App. 695, 624 S.E.2d 253 (2005).

Reversing course during burglary.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary with intent to commit theft; a rational jury could have inferred that defendant entered the victim's home to commit a theft and began to carry out the plan by seizing a gold chain, but reversed course and then fabricated another explanation to tell the victim as to why defendant was in the home. Nelson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 92, 625 S.E.2d 465 (2005).

Robbery of drug dealer.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the first defendant and the second defendant's convictions for murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary, as the evidence showed that they were involved in a scheme to rob a man who they believed to be selling large amounts of marijuana from his apartment, that they burst into his apartment brandishing guns, that one of the defendants fatally shot the man, and that the other defendant forced two people present to lie on the ground and divulge the location of a safe in the apartment that held money and marijuana. Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 611 S.E.2d 3 (2005).

Robbery of parents.

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder, burglary, and hindering a police officer where defendant was at the back door of his mother's home without authorization, and fled when an officer tried to handcuff him, defendant's mother was found dead from massive head injuries, and the mother's rings, a lawnmower blade, and a hatchet were found on defendant's person or stashed in bags outside the home. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 172, 611 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

Robbery of relative.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary since the evidence showed that defendant broke into the relative's house by crawling through a window without permission and with the intent of falsely imprisoning the relative; defendant not only admitted to doing so, but other family members also positively identified the defendant as the intruder. Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 620 S.E.2d 792 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1,16-8-41,16-5-21,16-7-1, and16-11-106, respectively, after the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim's home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim's apartment, took some of the victim's belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), and the defendant's convictions for kidnapping, burglary, aggravated sodomy, rape, and false imprisonment were supported by sufficient evidence when the victim testified that the defendant forced the victim into a train boxcar, threatened to kill the victim, and had vaginal and oral sex with the victim against the victim's will and without the victim's consent; there was also circumstantial evidence showing the victim's lack of consent, including the victim's fleeing from the boxcar while naked, the victim's outcry to a train engineer that the victim had been raped, and the victim's injuries. Davis v. State, 278 Ga. App. 628, 629 S.E.2d 537 (2006).

Conviction of burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, was supported by sufficient evidence, including a neighbor's eyewitness testimony that the neighbor saw the defendant taking property out of the victim's house during the time when the burglary happened, the discovery of a business card from the defendant's probation officer at the victim's home, with the time and date of defendant's next appointment written on it, and the discovery of an item of stolen property at the place where the defendant was residing. Walker v. State, 279 Ga. App. 390, 631 S.E.2d 413 (2006).

While the defendant, a passenger in a pick-up truck seen at a burglary scene, and the truck driver both claimed that the defendant was passed out while the driver committed the burglary without the defendant's knowledge, another witness saw the truck outside the dock and two people cutting the chain, an officer heard two car doors shut and an engine start at the scene right before the officers arrived, and the defendant was not passed out when officers intercepted the truck; the jury was authorized to disbelieve the account offered by the defendant and the driver, and the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Spradlin v. State, 279 Ga. App. 638, 631 S.E.2d 828 (2006).

Defendant's burglary conviction, as well as the sentence imposed, were upheld on appeal, as: (1) defendant failed to make out a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in jury selection; (2) the evidence did not warrant a jury charge on theft by taking as a lesser-included offense; and (3) based on defendant's prior felony criminal record, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, and not O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b), applied. Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006), aff'd, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the defendant was arrested in the white van seen at the scene of the crime, a person resembling the defendant was seen at the scene, the defendant's brother was tied by DNA evidence to the offense, and the defendant and the defendant's brother were known to commit burglaries together. Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Sufficient evidence existed to support five defendants' convictions for felony murder and burglary by any rational trier of fact based on the state's introduction of both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove that the defendants rode together in a truck and participated in the invasion of the victim's house; although much of the state's case depended on accomplice testimony, the state presented additional corroborating evidence in the nature of the black clothing, weapons, and cellular telephone records, which tended to connect defendants to the crime. Guyton v. State, 281 Ga. 789, 642 S.E.2d 67 (2007).

Burglary when drugs involved.

- Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim's head, a victim's wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant's house was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

As the evidence provided by the state at defendants' criminal trial demonstrated that based on information from defendant-B regarding a large quantity of marijuana possessed by a victim, defendant-A and another person forcibly entered the victim's residence while defendant-A was armed, pushed the victim to the ground, demanded to know where the marijuana was, and a physical struggle resulted, the evidence supported defendants' convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault; defendant-B was convicted as a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(4). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for malice murder, aggravated battery, burglary, and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., by unlawfully possessing cocaine and marijuana were supported by sufficient evidence; the defendant walked into a neighbor's house with a butcher knife in each hand and stabbed two people, knives found in the woods behind the defendant's apartment matched the descriptions of those used in the stabbings and had deoxyribonucleic acid matching the defendant's, two knives were missing from a knife block in the defendant's apartment, marijuana and cocaine were found in the apartment, the defendant told a friend that the defendant had "hurt some people really bad," and three eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the assailant. Swanson v. State, 282 Ga. 39, 644 S.E.2d 845 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for burglary because defendant was seen exiting a meat store with a white box in defendant's hand, threw the box at the officers who had responded to an alarm at the store and attempted to flee, the store manager indicated that defendant did not have permission to be in the store, and there were boxes of meat and a hand truck outside of the store which the manager indicated had been inside when the manager left the night before. Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 636 S.E.2d 671 (2006).

Burglary conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant entered the victim's home without permission with the intent to commit a theft therein; and (2) the state properly presented res gestae evidence, even if such improperly placed the defendant's character in evidence. Meyers v. State, 281 Ga. App. 670, 637 S.E.2d 78 (2006).

Juvenile's delinquency on charge of burglary

- Beyond the witnesses' identification of a juvenile's hairstyle and clothing as those worn by one of the burglars, and beyond the burglars' going to the juvenile's home to escape, the juvenile's possession of the stolen items soon after the burglary was sufficient to uphold the court's adjudication of delinquency on that charge; hence, the admissible evidence sufficed to sustain the finding of delinquency on a charge of burglary. In the Interest of A.D., 282 Ga. App. 586, 639 S.E.2d 556 (2006).

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the state to support a charge of burglary was rejected given evidence that the defendant's acts of entering the victim's residence without permission and removing items from therein satisfied the elements of that crime. Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 222, 644 S.E.2d 160 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and criminal trespass; the evidence included a custodial statement in which the defendant admitted participating in the crimes and testimony by a witness as to the preparations for the robbery, the clothing worn by the defendant and by the accomplice, and the defendant's disposal of a gun. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

Because sufficient evidence was presented consisting of the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a burglary, who threatened the victim with a sharp, knife-like letter opener, forcing the victim into a closet, and stealing the victim's camera upon fleeing, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's burglary, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping convictions. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

Victim's testimony that the defendant forcibly entered the victim's house and accused the victim of sexually assaulting a sibling of the defendant, then beat the victim with a bat and kicked the victim, established the essential elements of aggravated assault and burglary; a single witness's testimony was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1765, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant juvenile delinquent due to the defendant's involvement in the burglary of a pharmacy because an accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the burglary was corroborated; the extraneous evidence, even if slight and entirely circumstantial, connected the defendant to the burglary. In the Interest of R.W., 315 Ga. App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (2012).

Defendant found in backyard.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a burglary conviction when the defendant was found on a neighbor's back porch after a witness saw the defendant in the witness's backyard; although the neighbor found nothing missing, the neighbor testified that valuables were in the house, that drawers were opened, that the neighbor did not know the defendant, and that the defendant did not have permission to enter, which authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant had the intent to commit a felony in the neighbor's house. Griffith v. State, 286 Ga. App. 859, 650 S.E.2d 413 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, third-degree arson, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the evidence showed that the defendant made the defendant's accomplice shoot a convenience store clerk after the defendant forced the clerk at gunpoint into a wooded area, took money from a cash register in the store, and started a fire in the store. The accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the defendant's admission that the defendant owned the shotgun that was used in the shooting, the defendant's admission that the defendant gave the shotgun to the accomplice, the testimony of a third person that the accomplice gave the third person the shotgun after the robbery, and the fact that shotgun shells found in the defendant's home matched shells taken from the clerk's body. Judkins v. State, 282 Ga. 580, 652 S.E.2d 537 (2007).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The victim had been struck twice in the head with a pistol, strangled, and shot twice in the head; the victim's wallet and keys were missing; and the defendant, who told police where the wallet could be found, admitted shooting the victim and claimed that the defendant had done so after the victim tried to hug and kiss the defendant and things got "ugly." Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 658 S.E.2d 740 (2008).

Party to a burglary.

- Evidence was sufficient for a jury to infer that the defendant was a party to a burglary. When police responded to an alarm, the defendant was hiding behind a codefendant's truck, which had been backed into a storage shed; a police scanner and a pair of bolt cutters were found in the truck; the codefendant testified that the codefendant and the defendant went to the codefendant's house to pick up bolt cutters, that the defendant helped the codefendant cut a lock, and that the two "manhandled" an air compressor to try to get the compressor into the truck; the defendant admitted putting the scanner into the truck, riding with the codefendant through a gate, going inside the storage shed, and standing on the rack where the compressor was located; and an investigator found that the 600-pound compressor had been moved about three feet. Mezick v. State, 291 Ga. App. 257, 661 S.E.2d 635 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a burglary conviction, which was based on the intent to commit second-degree criminal damage to property under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23, when the defendant entered the victim's home, broke glass, attempted to kick down the victim's bedroom door, and caused $13,540 in damage to the victim's home. Jones v. State, 291 Ga. App. 296, 661 S.E.2d 651 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary when the victim unhesitatingly identified the defendant as one of the people who attacked the victim with a bat or a pipe; the victim's roommate was about "70 percent sure" that the defendant was one of the attackers; the defendant came to the victim's door earlier in the evening and told someone in the street, "Oh no, not now"; one of the attackers threatened the victim because the victim befriended the attacker's paramour; the paramour, who was a friend of the defendant and who had called the victim to the victim's door before the attack, knew that the victim had come into some cash; and the parent of the defendant's child testified that the defendant and others left the house saying that they were going to get into a fight. Furthermore, the victim sustained a stab wound in the liver, a shattered jaw, a broken foot, a stab to the elbow, damage to the facial nerves, and a double hernia and was in constant pain and could not work. Drew v. State, 291 Ga. App. 306, 661 S.E.2d 675 (2008).

Testimony that an 11-year-old child saw the defendant and another person take speakers out of a neighbor's apartment and put the speakers into a truck; evidence that the child identified the defendant from a photo lineup and saw the defendant before at the victim's apartment; and the victim's testimony that the defendant did not have permission to enter the apartment or remove any belongings was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Smith v. State, 293 Ga. App. 569, 667 S.E.2d 421 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant entered a victim's home brandishing a gun and demanding money was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).

Victim's testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence, entered without permission, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give the defendant money was sufficient in itself to support the defendant's conviction for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for burglary based on the overwhelming evidence presented at trial that established that various property was stolen from the victim's home and that the defendant was the person who sold those items to at least three shops that specialized in reselling used goods. Further, at trial, the victims positively identified items recovered from the trunk of the vehicle and all three stores as having been taken from the home, which detail eliminated the chance that the items taken were simply generically similar to the items possessed by the defendant. Butler v. State, 294 Ga. App. 540, 669 S.E.2d 525 (2008).

Writing a check from checkbook of victim.

- Convictions against the defendant for malice murder, burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault were supported by evidence that the defendant entered the victim's home, hit the victim multiple times about the head and face with a tree limb with a metal piece on the limb, and wrote a check in defendant's name from the victim's checkbook; evidence included witness testimony from the bank where defendant cashed the check, defendant's confession to police, and physical evidence. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

Evidence, both direct and circumstantial, was more than sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because sheriff's deputies found a single check bearing the victim's signature in the defendant's pocket; the victim's spouse testified that around the time of the break-in, the spouse discovered that some of the spouse's checks had been stolen from the house because they began appearing at various banks with the spouse's forged signature. Shindorf v. State, 303 Ga. App. 553, 694 S.E.2d 177 (2010).

Removing door from hinges.

- Victim's uncorroborated testimony that the defendant entered the victim's home by removing the back door from the door's hinges, ordered the victim at gunpoint to get in the defendant's truck, and did not bring the victim back home for hours was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and kidnapping. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's burglary conviction as it was within the province of the jury to believe the testimony of the owner of the burglarized home, who was a police officer, and the testimony of a detective, regardless if the owner's trial testimony contradicted a prior written statement. Further, because the evidence showed that the defendant committed the burglary in which certain guns were stolen, it followed that the defendant took possession of the guns during the burglary, thus, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the verdict of guilty on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge with regard to the guns found in the bedroom of defendant's parent. Smallwood v. State, 296 Ga. App. 16, 673 S.E.2d 537 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0986, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 341 (Ga. 2009).

Juvenile's delinquency on charge of burglary.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant juvenile's adjudication of delinquency by the juvenile's commission of an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted burglary, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a); an accomplice's testimony regarding the criminal incident was sufficiently corroborated by the juvenile's threats to the victim beforehand and the juvenile's actions after the incident. In re M. W., 296 Ga. App. 248, 674 S.E.2d 107 (2009).

Evidence of fabric softener supports burglary conviction.

- Sufficient evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction, under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), because: (1) the daughter of the owner of the burglarized dwelling identified defendant as the person the daughter observed in the dwelling; and (2) fabric softener matching the brand present in the dwelling's laundry room was present in defendant's vehicle. Taylor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 145, 679 S.E.2d 371 (2009).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for burglary and possession of tools for the commission of a crime, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the trial testimony of two accomplices, who testified that the defendant directly participated in the burglaries with them as such evidence was sufficient and established corroboration. Dyer v. State, 298 Ga. App. 327, 680 S.E.2d 177 (2009).

Possession and concealment of stolen cigarettes.

- Evidence of the defendants' unexplained possession and concealment of cigarettes stolen during a burglary, which occurred shortly before the defendants' arrest, was sufficient to establish guilt. Kennedy v. State, 298 Ga. App. 372, 680 S.E.2d 478 (2009).

Theft of wiring.

- Testimony placed defendant near the crime scene, an owner of the facility testified that wire was missing and the owner testified that the amount and type of wire found at defendant's home was the same as that used at the owner's plant; additionally, a person who was arrested for and pled guilty to burglary of and criminal damage to the same facility, testified that, while the person was at the facility, the person worked with defendant, borrowing and loaning the defendant tools to assist in cutting and preparing the wire to be taken from the facility. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Adams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 294, 684 S.E.2d 404 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for burglary, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, based on the evidence showing that the defendant was hiding in the bushes in a field near the victim's chicken houses; that the defendant resided with the accomplice; that the defendant made a sale of copper wire to a recycling business the day after the burglary; and that buckets of coil wiring were present at the defendant's home after the burglary, which additional evidence more than satisfied the slight evidence requirement necessary to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. Garrett v. State, 317 Ga. App. 520, 732 S.E.2d 93 (2012), cert. denied, No. S13C0065, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 81 (Ga. 2013).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for burglary based on the evidence adduced at trial that showed that the defendant intended to commit a theft based on the hot water heater and pipes being damaged less than an hour before the landlord saw the defendant exit the rental home through a back door while carrying an object with a red handle, there were no personal possessions of the former tenants located inside the home, the defendant and the defendant's friend fled when the landlord called9-1-1, a red-handled bolt cutter was found underneath bushes near the door where the defendant exited, and the friend told the police that the friend and the defendant had gone to the home looking for copper wire and that the defendant had cut wire in the home. Floyd v. State, 319 Ga. App. 564, 737 S.E.2d 341 (2013).

Sufficient evidence of aiding and abetting burglary.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aiding and abetting a burglary because, knowing that the defendant's spouse and another person were removing portable items from the home of an unknown person, the defendant asked the spouse to take specific items from the victim's home. Green v. State, 301 Ga. App. 866, 689 S.E.2d 132 (2010).

There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, enticing a child for an indecent purpose, kidnapping, false imprisonment, cruelty to children, burglary, theft by taking, and striking an unattended vehicle were authorized because at trial the defendant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crimes; a nurse and doctor testified that the victim had an injury that was consistent with the molestation allegation, and a videotape depicted the defendant driving a maintenance truck that the defendant did not have authority to take. Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 699 S.E.2d 363 (2010).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant juvenile committed burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2) because the defendant was in the vicinity of the victim's apartment shortly after the burglary, wearing a jacket that matched the victim's description of the jacket worn by the perpetrator, carrying a loaded pistol, and wearing shoes that matched the tread pattern and size of the muddy footprints found in the victim's apartment. In the Interest of J.D., 305 Ga. App. 519, 699 S.E.2d 827 (2010).

Testimony of two codefendants that a defendant was the third man in a burglary was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) because the codefendants corroborated each other, and one codefendant's sibling testified that the sibling lent the three defendants the sibling's car and later noticed the defendant carrying a flat-screen television, which was taken in the burglary. Sims v. State, 306 Ga. App. 68, 701 S.E.2d 534 (2010).

Evidence that a defendant was seen riding a bicycle after midnight while carrying a tire iron and a black saw case and wearing a new leather tool belt around the defendant's waist, along with the defendant's own statement that the defendant had been working at the address later determined to have been broken into and a tool belt and saw taken, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, although the defendant fled from police and the stolen items were not recovered. Wilcox v. State, 310 Ga. App. 382, 713 S.E.2d 468 (2011).

Because the defendant admitted entry into a home, the defendant's statement to a witness, and the victim's in-court identification of the defendant supported the defendant's conviction of armed robbery and burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-8-41(a), the jury could find that a conspiracy existed without regard to a coconspirator's statements under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801). Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. App. 54, 714 S.E.2d 732 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because the defendant was caught within four minutes of the burglary in a truck matching the victims' description of the truck outside their home, and the defendant was carrying a crowbar, had the victims' television, and fled from police. Veasley v. State, 312 Ga. App. 728, 719 S.E.2d 585 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because although the defendant argued that there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence to show that the defendant was the victim's attacker, determinations of witness credibility and the weight to give the evidence presented was solely within the province of the jury; defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim, the responding officers, and the investigator regarding the victim's demeanor after the attack, the victim's description of the attack and the attacker, and the inconsistencies between what the victim told each of them. Pennington v. State, 313 Ga. App. 764, 723 S.E.2d 13 (2012).

Burglary by romantic partner.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary as the victims testified that on the night of an attack by the defendant, the defendant's former girlfriend exclaimed, "What are you doing here?" when the former girlfriend saw the defendant coming upstairs. The former girlfriend testified that the former girlfriend did not invite or allow the defendant into the former girlfriend's home that night. Gray v. State, 291 Ga. App. 573, 662 S.E.2d 339 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant broke into his ex-girlfriend's home; (2) the defendant stabbed the ex-girlfriend's current boyfriend in the spine with a knife, paralyzing him; (3) the defendant cut his ex-girlfriend with a knife on the back of her head, on the side of her face, on her shoulder and back, and stabbed her in the stomach; and (4) the ex-girlfriend continued to bear scars from the knife attack. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary, when the state presented independent corroboration in support of an accomplice's testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes; the defendant's statements to police, the defendant's actions before and after the crimes, and the defendant's girlfriend's testimony stating that the defendant asked the girlfriend to lie about the defendant's whereabouts corroborated the defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the second defendant's conviction for burglary as it was reasonable for the jury to have concluded that the second defendant acted as the getaway driver, waited for the first defendant while the first defendant was in the alley, covered for the first defendant when being questioned by the witness, and drove the first defendant from the scene when the first defendant ran away from the witness after being seen near the broken window. Nangreave v. State, 318 Ga. App. 437, 734 S.E.2d 203 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the first defendant's conviction for burglary as the first defendant was found in close proximity to the window, appeared to be coming out of the window, ran from the scene, and was apprehended with a bag of merchandise confirmed to be from the store. Nangreave v. State, 318 Ga. App. 437, 734 S.E.2d 203 (2012).

Theft of plastic containers containing quarters.

- Defendant's conviction for burglary was affirmed because the evidence, taken together, authorized the jury to find that the defendant was in possession of the victims' stolen plastic container filled primarily with quarters. Defendant knew of the location of the residence and during the burglary a large, heavy container filled with coins, primarily quarters, was stolen. Badie v. State, 317 Ga. App. 712, 732 S.E.2d 553 (2012).

Use of baby stroller in burglary.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for two counts of burglary based on eyewitness testimony and a videotape showing the defendant with a baby stroller filled with contents taken from a store. Fitzpatrick v. State, 317 Ga. App. 873, 733 S.E.2d 46 (2012).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for aiding and abetting armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment based on the evidence that the defendant was a party to the crimes, including evidence that the defendant drove the co-defendants to the house just before the crimes were committed; that the defendant was in the vehicle when plans to commit the crimes were discussed; that the defendant waited in the victim's driveway when the co-defendants entered the front door of the house, wearing masks and carrying guns; and that the defendant drove the perpetrators away from the scene after the crimes were committed - speeding, driving erratically, and not stopping when the police, with sirens and lights activated, began following the vehicle. Simon v. State, 320 Ga. App. 15, 739 S.E.2d 34 (2013).

Evidence, taken together, authorized the jury to find that the defendant was guilty of burglary and contributed to the delinquency of a minor as the victim's neighbor identified the defendant as the person the neighbor saw standing on an air conditioner unit while beating on the victim's kitchen window, the point of entry for the burglary was that window and, just minutes after the neighbor saw the defendant at the window, the victim observed the defendant and a child walking away from the victim's residence carrying an item that was taken during the burglary. Williams v. State, 320 Ga. App. 831, 740 S.E.2d 766 (2013).

Theft of a beer.

- Evidence that an officer responding to the burglary observed the defendant on the store's loading dock with an unopen beer, the defendant ran upon seeing the officer, and testimony from two accomplices that the defendant was inside the store and had taken the beer was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Russell v. State, 322 Ga. App. 553, 745 S.E.2d 774 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and burglary because three black males robbed the store, one of whom pointed a gun at the store manager; after the defendant was apprehended, the defendant made incriminating statements that the defendant took the stuff to pay bills and that the defendant did not know where the other two individuals were; and the bags found in the defendant's vicinity consisted of six cooler totes containing approximately $700 in merchandise from the store and a plastic bag containing money and the deposit slip from the store's safe. Brooks v. State, 324 Ga. App. 352, 750 S.E.2d 423 (2013).

Possession of recently stolen goods.

- Evidence that two days after the burglary, the defendant was found in a motel room the defendant shared with a woman who was attempting to sell goods stolen from the burglarized residence; that the woman obtained the goods from the defendant; that stolen goods were found in the motel room; and that after the burglary was reported, the defendant went to the road of the burglarized residence to retrieve some items the defendant claimed the defendant dropped was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Riles v. State, 321 Ga. App. 894, 743 S.E.2d 552 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant was found with a chainsaw and towel stolen from the subject residence the same day they were discovered missing, within a mile of the residence, and that the defendant had tried to pawn the chainsaw that same morning was sufficient to allow the jury to convict the defendant of burglary. Gaither v. State, 321 Ga. App. 643, 742 S.E.2d 158 (2013).

Parent's participation in burglary.

- Evidence that the defendant had driven the defendant's son to a home that was burglarized, was waiting by the side of the road for the defendant's son to return, and received numerous calls from the defendant's son while an officer stopped to talk to the defendant, was sufficient to convict the defendant for being a party to the crime of burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(b) and16-2-20. Wise v. State, 325 Ga. App. 377, 752 S.E.2d 628 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014).

Temporary protective order as foundation for burglary charge.

- Because the temporary protective order specifically deprived the defendant of authority to enter the victim's home, and because the evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant entered that home without authority and with the intent to commit the crime of aggravated stalking, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the burglary conviction. Slaughter v. State, 327 Ga. App. 593, 760 S.E.2d 609 (2014).

Evidence the defendant and the codefendant were found in a motel room with gloves, a bandana, broken glass pieces, and keys to the codefendant's vehicle, which contained 61 purses belonging to a store that had just been robbed, and that rocks like those used to break the glass were missing from landscaping next to the motel supported the defendant's conviction for burglary. Mackey v. State, 326 Ga. App. 298, 756 S.E.2d 552 (2014).

Pawning of recently stolen items.

- Evidence showing that shortly after the burglary the defendant pawned some of the items stolen, which the defendant claimed, but failed to prove, were obtained from a Mexican male, was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Ricks v. State, 327 Ga. App. 291, 758 S.E.2d 624 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant confessed to police that the defendant had broken into the first victim's apartment to steal, broke the sliding glass door to gain entry, did not know the victim, and fled from police when the police arrived on the scene was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Reeves v. State, 329 Ga. App. 470, 765 S.E.2d 407 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary as a party because, pursuant to a plan the defendant designed, the defendant gained entry into the residence, then assisted the accomplice's unauthorized entry by returning to the door, peering outside where the accomplice was staged with a gun and mask, then leaving that door ajar for the accomplice's unauthorized entry; and, seconds later, the accomplice abruptly entered through that door, taking money and property from the other individuals present by use of a gun. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for burglary based on the victim's eyewitness encounter with the defendant inside the apartment, the defendant's admission that the defendant made an unauthorized entry into the apartment, the discovery of money exactly like that stolen from the victim's wallet inside the defendant's pocket, and the evidence of the defendant's two prior burglary convictions. Paul v. State, 331 Ga. App. 560, 769 S.E.2d 396 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary because the defendant opened a fence gate and entered the victims' property; upon no one answering a knock on the back door, the defendant broke in the door and entered an enclosed porch; the defendant then attempted to remove the hinges of a door leading into the home's interior, where the victims had many valuable items; a patrol officer saw the defendant while the defendant was still trying to gain entry through the door; the defendant came out from the porch with the defendant's hands up and said that the patrol officer had gotten the defendant; and there was no evidence in the record that would support an inference that the defendant was merely seeking shelter from the cold. Daniel v. State, 338 Ga. App. 389, 787 S.E.2d 281 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree burglary as the defendant broke the plane of the structure with the intent to steal or with the intent to commit a felony therein because the defendant, without authority, entered the workshop at the back of the second victim's property and took multiple items; and the defendant broke the glass on the door leading from the patio to the garage of the second victim's occupied home, but the door was locked with a deadbolt and could not be opened without a key. Entwisle v. State, 340 Ga. App. 122, 796 S.E.2d 743 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree burglary and entering an auto because the state presented evidence that the defendant entered a dwelling house without authority with the intent to commit a theft as a victim's wallet was stolen from within the home lived in by two of the defendant's victims, and the defendant entered four cars with the intent to commit a theft. Daniel v. State, 342 Ga. App. 448, 803 S.E.2d 603 (2017).

Defendant's concession that the defendant broke into the shed to take a ladder and the damaged window screen under the trailer's window were sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant entered the shed with the intent to steal the ladder for the purpose of breaking into the classroom building such that the defendant was guilty of burglary of the shed under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Solomon v. State, 342 Ga. App. 836, 805 S.E.2d 293 (2017).

Evidence sufficient to support convictions of murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Baty v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 655 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant's conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).

Victim's testimony that the defendant was one of the two men who came into the victim's house, beat the victim with fists and a flashlight, and demanded the victim's keys and money authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary, aggravated battery, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Garmon v. State, 317 Ga. App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the third defendant of first degree burglary because the evidence showed that the third defendant was working in the vicinity of the burglarized residence, was seen walking near the back of the house just prior to the work-detail guard's arrival to investigate, and was in possession of a gold wristwatch later identified as belonging to the homeowner; and because the jury was entitled to reject, and did reject, the third defendant's explanation of having found the watch outside of the home when there was also testimony that the third defendant claimed that the watch was a gift from the third defendant's family. Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 142, 796 S.E.2d 765 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of first degree burglary because the second defendant was seen suspiciously walking across a field near the residence, notwithstanding an assignment to work in another area; and, in light of the inconsistent statements the second defendant provided to law enforcement, the jury was entitled to reject as unreasonable the second defendant's explanation of having touched a bottle outside of the residence before another inmate took the empty bottle back inside, and the second defendant's denial of having consumed any alcohol when the second defendant's DNA was found on a bottle. Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 142, 796 S.E.2d 765 (2017).

Evidence of intent to steal sufficient.

- See Duke v. State, 176 Ga. App. 125, 335 S.E.2d 400 (1985).

Evidence sufficient to convince rational trier of fact of existence of essential elements of crime. Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233, 303 S.E.2d 773 (1983).

Because someone pried open the glass sliding doors of defendant's love interest's house and stole only personal files, and defendant called the love interest and asked about the files, stating that they were gone, there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence of the couple's troubled relationship, that only files were stolen, and that defendant knew that the files were missing. Maskivish v. State, 276 Ga. App. 701, 624 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of rape and burglary with intent to rape.

- See Clark v. State, 249 Ga. App. 97, 547 S.E.2d 734 (2001).

Evidence sufficient for criminal attempt at burglary.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit burglary since the defendant, who had a history of sexual assaults, went to a hotel alone, late at night, wearing a mask, since, after visiting the hotel parking lot once before in the evening, and following a hotel employee until the employee ran, the defendant approached the office door where that same lone hotel employee had returned to work, and attempted to open the locked door, since, when the locked door would not open, the defendant continued to shake the door violently, still wearing the mask, and since, when the defendant saw the hotel employee pick up the phone and dial9-1-1, the defendant fled; in light of this evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant took a substantial step toward entering the hotel office without authority to commit a sexual felony therein. Swint v. State, 279 Ga. App. 777, 632 S.E.2d 712 (2006).

Probation revocation; insufficient evidence for conviction of burglary.

- Evidence was insufficient, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to find that defendant committed the offense of burglary as the evidence showed only that defendant was present on the outside of the home on the date the crime allegedly occurred; no one saw defendant enter the residence, defendant was not seen or found inside, no one saw defendant remove any items from the house, no extrinsic evidence connecting defendant to the crime was discovered at the scene, none of the stolen items were recovered from defendant or from the residence, and others with equal opportunity to enter the dwelling were present on the date in question. Parker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 35, 619 S.E.2d 750 (2005).

Circumstantial evidence insufficient.

- Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim's barn, the defendant's conviction for burglary was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) as the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was only at the victim's barn to drop off a saw the defendant wanted to sell to the victim based on a telephone message left by the defendant for the victim and eyewitness testimony. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345 (2009).

Finding property at defendant's home insufficient.

- Several counts of the defendant's robbery and burglary convictions were reversed as was one count of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the finding of the proceeds of some of the robberies at an apartment did not show that the defendant was in possession of the property taken and no witness testified connecting the defendant with some of the home invasions; thus, the evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that the defendant did not participate in some of the crimes. Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga. App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (2015), aff'd, 792 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 2016).

Allowed in years and fractions thereof.

- There is no inhibition against meting out a sentence measured in years and fractions thereof, so long as it falls within the statutory limits. Tift v. State, 132 Ga. App. 10, 207 S.E.2d 261 (1974).

Construction with other law.

- Construing O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(b) and17-10-7(a) together, the Georgia General Assembly intends that a habitual burglar be given the benefit of the trial court's sentencing discretion, but it further intends that a habitual burglar who is also a habitual felon be subject to the imposition of the longest sentence prescribed for the subsequent offense for which he or she was convicted; because Mikell v. State, 270 Ga. 467 (510 S.E.2d 523) (1999) failed to consider O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(e) and its effect on other recidivist sentencing provisions, it reached the erroneous result and is therefore overruled. Goldberg v. State, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2932, 171 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in sentencing a defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 because the trial court imposed a modified sentence of 20 years to serve 10 upon the defendant; the sentence, as modified, was proper under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b), the specific sentencing scheme applicable to a defendant convicted of burglary having two prior burglary convictions. Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 723, 678 S.E.2d 95 (2009).

In a case in which defendant appealed a 41-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) and (g), a district court did not err in calculating the defendant's U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sentence. Defendant's 2011 burglary conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b)) was for burglary of a dwelling within the meaning of U.S. Sentencing § 4B1.2(a), and the district court did not err in concluding that the defendant had a prior conviction for a crime of violence. United States v. Harris, F.3d (11th Cir. June 24, 2014)(Unpublished).

Multiple convictions.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b) provides a specific sentencing scheme for defendants convicted more than once of burglary, the general recidivist scheme of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 does not apply. Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 548 S.E.2d 478 (2001).

Where defendant pled guilty to burglary and had a prior felony conviction for forgery in addition to a prior burglary conviction, defendant was, for sentencing purposes, a three-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) rather than a mere two-time burglary offender under the specific recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b); accordingly, the trial court properly found that it was required to sentence defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 to the maximum period of confinement allowed for burglary, which was 20 years. Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 578 S.E.2d 179 (2003).

Since defendant had prior felonies in addition to two prior burglary convictions, defendant was not subject to the exclusive sentencing provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b) after being convicted of a third felony burglary; the additional felonies subjected defendant to the general recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), which gave the sentencing court discretion to suspend a portion of the sentence, and the state's appeal of defendant's 20 year sentence, which included suspension of 12 years of the sentence after defendant served 8 years, was rejected. State v. Chambers, 275 Ga. App. 666, 621 S.E.2d 588 (2005).

Because defendant had multiple prior convictions in addition to burglary convictions, the existence of said prior convictions in addition to those for burglary removed the case from the purview of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b); thus, defendant was properly sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006), aff'd, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007).

When O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(b) and17-10-7(a) are harmonized, the former specific recidivist statute applies when the defendant is a habitual burglar having only prior convictions for burglary, whereas the latter general recidivist statute applies when the defendant is a habitual felon with prior convictions for other crimes; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(e) provides that the general recidivist sentencing statute for habitual felons is supplemental to other recidivist sentencing statutes, such as § 16-7-1(b), and when the Georgia General Assembly enacted § 16-7-1(b), it did not provide that § 17-10-7 would not be applicable to subsequent convictions for burglary. Goldberg v. State, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2932, 171 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2008).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, the defendant completed a burglary when the defendant entered the victim's apartment without authority intending to commit a felony, before the defendant committed other offenses - false imprisonment, rape, armed robbery, aggravated sexual battery, hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by not merging those other crimes with the defendant's burglary conviction. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for burglary, the trial court properly sentenced the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 to 20 years, with 10 years to serve in prison without parole and the remainder of the sentence suspended on the condition that the defendant not violate any laws, as a result of three prior felony convictions because the defendant waived any claimed error by failing to challenge the sentence. However, even if the error had not been waived, the recidivist sentence was proper since the state proved all four of the convictions that were listed in the indictment and notices and, although the trial court stated that the court was not relying on the defendant's robbery convictions in imposing a sentence, there was no reason those convictions could not be used to support the sentence. Battise v. State, 295 Ga. App. 833, 673 S.E.2d 262 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0917, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 369 (Ga. 2009).

Under the facts, the trial court should have merged the defendant's criminal trespass conviction into the burglary conviction prior to sentencing because the offenses were based upon the same act; the evidence showed that the defendant only entered an apartment one time. Hawkins v. State, 302 Ga. App. 84, 690 S.E.2d 440 (2010).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist because the records of an Alabama conviction showed that the defendant pled guilty to the offense of burglary in the third degree and received a sentence of four years imprisonment; the elements of the crime as charged in the Alabama indictment were similar to the elements required to commit the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 722 S.E.2d 133 (2012).

Trial court did not err by correcting the court's written sentence to conform with the court's oral pronouncement because the trial court was authorized to correct the clerical error appearing in the court's written sentence as compared to the court's original oral pronouncement; the trial court, after reviewing the original transcript, determined that the court's original pronouncement and intent was for the aggravated battery and burglary counts to be served consecutive to each other as well as to the other aggravated battery count. Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158, 723 S.E.2d 480 (2012).

Although both counts of burglary occurred in the same building, the trial court properly sentenced the defendant on both counts because the defendant entered two distinct businesses, operated and controlled by different individuals and separated by a wall, with the intent to commit theft inside each shop. Cordle v. State, 345 Ga. App. 584, 814 S.E.2d 569 (2018).

Rule of lenity inapplicable.

- With regard to defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit burglary in the first degree, the trial court did not err in not applying the rule of lenity because the crimes of criminal trespass and criminal attempt to commit a burglary do not address the same criminal conduct and there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime, thus, the rule of lenity did not apply. Snow v. State, 318 Ga. App. 131, 733 S.E.2d 428 (2012).

Merger claim waived.

- Due to the entry of a guilty plea over 20 years before the filing of a motion to correct alleged illegal sentences, the defendant's merger claim was waived, and since the sentences imposed were not void, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over said motion for correction. Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006).

Aggravated stalking did not merge with burglary.

- Trial court did not err by not merging a defendant's aggravated stalking count into a burglary count based upon the defendant's contention that under the actual evidence test, the same factual evidence was used to prove both crimes; as to prove the burglary count, the state had to prove that the defendant entered the victim's residence without authority and with the intent to commit aggravated stalking, and to prove the aggravated stalking count, the state had to prove that the defendant surveilled and contacted the victim in violation of a condition of probation for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim. As such, the burglary statute required that the state show entry into the residence, which was not required by the aggravated stalking statute, and, on the other hand, the aggravated stalking statute required that the state prove that the defendant actually contacted the victim, which was not required by the burglary statute that only required that the defendant contact the victim when the defendant entered the residence. Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 193, 666 S.E.2d 703 (2008).

Restitution.

- In a burglary case where a sawmill was stripped of copper wiring, there was a preponderance of evidence to support a restitution order when the defendant parked in the same location where burglars had parked the previous day, went to a main power room where tools needed for pulling wire and not owned by the sawmill had been left, and had similar tools in the defendant's pickup truck; the amount of a restitution order was not supported by the evidence, however, because the correct determination of the amount of restitution was the fair market value of the property and the witnesses for the state only testified as to replacement value. Hawthorne v. State, 285 Ga. App. 196, 648 S.E.2d 387 (2007).

Juveniles.

- Defendant could not be found to be a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) where one of defendant's prior felony convictions was invalid as it was for burglaries committed when defendant was 16 years of age; the superior court did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to find defendant guilty of a felony, under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(1), because the punishment for burglary was neither death nor life imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. App. 111, 596 S.E.2d 230 (2004).

Sentencing not excessive as matter of law.

- Sentence of ten years upon conviction of the offense of burglary, being within the limits fixed for the offense by former Code 1933, § 26-2402 (one to 20 years), is as a matter of law not excessive. Whitfield v. State, 115 Ga. App. 231, 154 S.E.2d 294 (1967).

Rule of lenity did not apply.

- Trial court did not err in not applying the rule of lenity with regard to defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit burglary because the crimes of criminal trespass and criminal attempt to commit a burglary did not address the same criminal conduct and there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime, thus, the rule of lenity did not apply. Snow v. State, 318 Ga. App. 131, 733 S.E.2d 428 (2012).

Consecutive sentences not void.

- Denial of defendant's motion attacking the defendant's consecutive sentences for burglary as void was affirmed as under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10 sentences were to be served "concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein." Jones v. State, 271 Ga. App. 830, 610 S.E.2d 570 (2005).

Same building, same date, meant one sentence.

- One of two burglary convictions was vacated because both burglary counts charged the defendant with entering the same building, a restaurant, on the same date with the intent to commit the same crime of theft and the evidence showed that the acts were committed at the same location, were inspired by the same criminal intent, and were part of a continuous act spanning a matter of minutes. Lucas v. State, 328 Ga. App. 741, 760 S.E.2d 257 (2014).

Merger of sentences.

- For separate offenses charged in one indictment to carry separate punishments, they must rest on distinct criminal acts. Two burglaries committed at the same time and place were part of a single continuous criminal act and therefore carry one punishment. McConnell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 686, 589 S.E.2d 271 (2003).

After the trial court merged defendant's burglary with intent to commit robbery conviction into the burglary with intent to commit rape for the purpose of sentencing, the burglary with the intent to commit robbery conviction was vacated by operation of law and defendant's contention that there was no evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft was moot. Howard v. State, 266 Ga. App. 281, 596 S.E.2d 627 (2004).

Defendant's burglary convictions should have been merged because both counts charged the defendant with entering the same building without authority on the same date to commit a felony. Andrews v. State, 328 Ga. App. 344, 764 S.E.2d 553 (2014).

No merger with assault or kidnapping.

- Burglary conviction did not merge with the armed robbery or aggravated assault convictions as a matter of law because each offense had distinct elements, nor did the convictions merge as a matter of fact; the crime of burglary was complete as soon as the defendant remained in the victims' home without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein. Maddox v. State, 277 Ga. App. 580, 627 S.E.2d 166 (2006).

Defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 as O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b) was inapplicable since defendant was convicted of attempted burglary, which was subject to sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-6; further, defendant had been convicted of two other burglaries and two other felonies, so defendant was a four-time felony offender subject to the general recidivist sentencing scheme in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. Smith v. State, 273 Ga. App. 107, 614 S.E.2d 219 (2005).

Trial court properly dismissed a defendant's petition to correct a void sentence, which challenged the imposition of a 60-year recidivist sentence imposed against the defendant for burglary and arson, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(a) and16-7-60(c), respectively, as the state gave notice of the state's intent to have the defendant sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) and (c) and no abuse of the trial court's discretion was shown. Marshall v. State, 294 Ga. App. 282, 668 S.E.2d 892 (2008).

Trial court did not commit cruel and unusual punishment in sentencing a defendant to two consecutive terms of 20 years to serve in confinement for two burglary convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) based on the defendant's recidivism under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because the sentence was within statutory limits. Hight v. State, 302 Ga. App. 826, 692 S.E.2d 69 (2010).

Recidivist sentencing appropriate.

- Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant under the general recidivist statute, which applied when the defendant was a habitual felon with prior convictions for crimes other than just burglary, rather than the specific recidivist statute, which applied only to prior convictions for burglary, because the defendant's federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods did not constitute a burglary conviction; thus, the defendant's conviction in the current case represented not only the defendant's third burglary conviction but also the defendant's fourth felony conviction, and the defendant fell squarely within the ambit of the general recidivist statute. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist due to the defendant's four prior felony convictions. Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 761, 811 S.E.2d 479 (2018).

Defendant properly sentenced as an armed career criminal.

- Defendant was properly sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) based upon a Georgia attempted burglary of a dwelling conviction under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-7-1 because the defendant failed to object to the factfindings at sentencing, which conclusively established that the defendant was in fact convicted of attempting to commit a generic burglary within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); thus, because that offense was an enumerated violent felony, the crime of attempting to commit that offense was also a violent felony, permitting the court to use the conviction as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act after the defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006).

Upon defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), prior burglary convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) met the requirements of violent felonies under the Armed Criminal Career Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4, because the presentence report and the indictment for the prior conviction showed that defendant was charged and subsequently pled guilty to breaking into a residence to commit theft. United States v. Chaney, F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010)(Unpublished).

It was not plain error to count the defendant's Georgia burglary conviction as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) predicate offense because: (1) the statute was divisible; (2) the crime qualified as an ACCA predicate offense under the modified categorical approach; and (3) the court could rely on undisputed facts in the presentence investigation report in applying that approach. United States v. Brundidge, F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017), cert. denied, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1410, 200 L. Ed. 2d 321 (U.S. 2018)(Unpublished).

Defendant properly sentenced as career criminal.

- In a case in which the defendant appealed a 180-month sentence for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the district court did not err in deeming the defendant a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. The presentence investigation report (PSI) stated that the burglaries involved dwellings and, although the defendant objected before the district court to the PSI's characterization of the burglary convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 as crimes of violence, the defendant did not argue specifically that the crimes did not involve a dwelling; the defendant qualified for the § 4B1.1 enhancement. United States v. Kicklighter, F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 28, 2009).

Correction of sentence required.

- Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by failing to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) as the trial court was required to impose a 20 year sentence for each burglary count, the longest sentence prescribed in the burglary statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b), which the court did not do since the court sentenced the defendant merely to 10 years on Count 1. Barney v. State, 333 Ga. App. 807, 777 S.E.2d 490 (2015).

Forfeiture order.

- Forfeiture of a pickup truck and a trailer used to commit a burglary was upheld as: (1) the state's burden of proof was "by a preponderance of the evidence" and not "beyond a reasonable doubt" as alleged by the property owner; (2) the state was not required to prove a burglary conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, or that charges were even filed; and (3) whether a burglary took place without the owner's knowledge or consent was a fact question to be resolved by the court which as the trier of fact was not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony was uncontradicted. Walker v. State of Ga., 281 Ga. App. 526, 636 S.E.2d 705 (2006).

Court's comments at sentencing did not invalidate the sentence imposed.

- As a result of a burglary conviction, the trial court did not err in mechanically sentencing the defendant to 20 years to serve as the court's comments did not show an inflexible policy or formula that required imposition of a particular kind of punishment for a particular offense or the rejection of an available sentencing option. Moreover, the court's statement that "a life was lost" as a result of the defendant's commission of a burglary did not somehow invalidate a sentence that was within the statutory limits. Valentine v. State, 289 Ga. App. 60, 656 S.E.2d 208 (2007).

Sentencing court could consider defendant's illegal alien status.

- Trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering defendant's illegal alien status as a relevant factor in formulating an appropriate sentence within the statutory range for burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a); the trial court properly considered that the court could not order the defendant to work as a condition of probation. Trujillo v. State, 304 Ga. App. 849, 698 S.E.2d 350 (2010).

Immigration consequences to guilty plea.

- Attorney's assistance was deficient when the attorney incorrectly advised the defendant that the defendant "may" face deportation as a result of the defendant's plea of guilty to burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 because a burglary conviction was an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), and would almost certainly lead to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Encarnacion v. State, 295 Ga. 660, 763 S.E.2d 463 (2014).

History of section.

- See 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 80.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Burglary, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 12A C.J.S., Burglary, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Conviction or acquittal of larceny as bar to prosecution for burglary, 19 A.L.R. 626.

Pendency in one county of charge of larceny as bar to subsequent charge in another county of offense which involves both felonious breaking and felonious taking of same property, 19 A.L.R. 636.

Necessity of naming owner of building in indictment or information for burglary, 20 A.L.R. 510; 169 A.L.R. 887.

Opening closed but unlocked door as breaking which will sustain charge of burglary or breaking and entering, 23 A.L.R. 112.

Burglary without breaking, 23 A.L.R. 288.

Necessity of alleging and proving in prosecution for larceny, embezzlement, or receiving stolen property that "owner" of property, if not a natural person, was incorporated or otherwise a legal entity capable of owning property, 88 A.L.R. 485.

Necessity and sufficiency of allegations in indictment or information for burglary as to value of property intended to be stolen which would make its theft a felony, 113 A.L.R. 1269.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 123 A.L.R. 119; 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Admissibility, in prosecution for burglary, of evidence that defendant, after alleged burglary, was in possession of burglarious tools and implements, 143 A.L.R. 1199.

Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent offense under habitual criminal statutes, 24 A.L.R.2d 1247.

Pardon as affecting consideration of earlier conviction in applying habitual criminal statute, 31 A.L.R.2d 1186.

Burglary: outbuildings or the like as part of "dwelling house,", 43 A.L.R.2d 831.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery, 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Burglary or breaking and entering of motor vehicle, 79 A.L.R.2d 286.

Propriety, under statute enhancing punishment for second or subsequent offense, of restricting new trial to issue of status as habitual criminal, 79 A.L.R.2d 826.

Sufficiency of showing that burglary was committed at night, 82 A.L.R.2d 643.

Stolen money or property as subject of larceny or robbery, 89 A.L.R.2d 1435.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Breaking and entering of inner door of building as burglary, 43 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Criminal prosecution based upon breaking into or taking money or goods from vending machine or other coin-operated machine, 45 A.L.R.3d 1286.

What felonies are inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life for purposes of felony-murder doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3d 397.

Conviction under Dyer Act (18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2312, 2313) as ground for enhancement of penalty under state habitual criminal statutes, 65 A.L.R.3d 586.

What constitutes "money" within coverage or exclusion of theft or other crime policy, 68 A.L.R.3d 1179.

Entry through partly opened door or window as burglary, 70 A.L.R.3d 881.

Receiver of stolen goods as accomplice of thief for purposes of corroboration, 74 A.L.R.3d 560.

Antagonistic defenses as ground for separate trials of codefendants in criminal case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

What constitutes such discriminatory prosecution or enforcement of laws as to provide valid defense in state criminal proceedings, 95 A.L.R.3d 280.

Admissibility, weight, and sufficiency of blood-grouping tests in criminal cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 500.

Occupant's absence from residential structure as affecting nature of offense as burglary or breaking and entering, 20 A.L.R.4th 438.

Liability of person furnishing, installing, or servicing burglary or fire alarm system for burglary or fire loss, 37 A.L.R.4th 47.

Maintainability of burglary charge, where entry into building is made with consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335.

What is "building" or "house" within burglary or breaking and entering statute, 68 A.L.R.4th 425.

Burglary, breaking, or entering of motor vehicle, 72 A.L.R.4th 710.

Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty under habitual offender statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th 263.

Minor's entry into home of parent as sufficient to sustain burglary charge, 17 A.L.R.5th 111.

Use of fraud or trick as "constructive breaking" for purpose of burglary or breaking and entering offense, 17 A.L.R.5th 125.

Construction and application of enhanced sentencing provision of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) - United States Supreme Court cases, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Comment note: Construction and application of "crime of violence" provision of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 pertaining to unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States after commission of felony offense, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 55.