Corpus delicti in arson.

- In a case of arson, the corpus delicti consists of two fundamental facts: first, the burning of the house described in the indictment, and second, the fact that a criminal agency was the cause of the burning. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956).

Burning with intent to defraud is not essential element of third-degree arson. Powell v. State, 121 Ga. App. 57, 172 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

Burning to defraud insurer is not lesser included offense.

- Burning to defraud an insurer under former Code 1933, § 26-2213 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-9-53) is not a lesser offense included in the greater one of third-degree arson under former Code 1933, § 26-2210 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-62) because each is a separate and distinct offense. Powell v. State, 121 Ga. App. 57, 172 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

Testimony by state's expert witness.

- State's expert witness may be allowed to testify as to the expert's belief that the fire had been incendiary in origin. Blackburn v. State, 180 Ga. App. 436, 349 S.E.2d 286 (1986).

Proof of loss form admitted without objection.

- When the defendant and the defendant's father filed with the insurer of the personal property a proof of loss form which stated that personal property damage amounting to several thousand dollars had resulted from the fire, this form, which was admitted into evidence without objection, was sufficient to authorize a finding that the personal property damaged by the fire was valued at $25 or more. Blackburn v. State, 180 Ga. App. 436, 349 S.E.2d 286 (1986).

Circumstances generally depended on to show guilt and establish corpus delicti.

- Circumstances must generally be depended upon, not only to show the guilt of the accused, but to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of arson. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, third-degree arson, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the evidence showed that the defendant made the defendant's accomplice shoot a convenience store clerk after the defendant forced the clerk at gunpoint into a wooded area, took money from a cash register in the store, and started a fire in the store. The accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the defendant's admission that the defendant owned the shotgun that was used in the shooting, the defendant's admission that the defendant gave the shotgun to the accomplice, the testimony of a third person that the accomplice gave the third person the shotgun after the robbery, and the fact that shotgun shells found in the defendant's home matched shells taken from the clerk's body. Judkins v. State, 282 Ga. 580, 652 S.E.2d 537 (2007).

Cited in Boggus v. State, 136 Ga. App. 917, 222 S.E.2d 686 (1975).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arson and Related Offenses, § 1 et seq. 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Explosions and Explosives, §§ 169 et seq., 191.

C.J.S.

- 6A C.J.S., Arson, § 17.