Evidence sufficient to convict.

- Where an employee had the knowledge of the computer system and the access code for the payroll system that gave the employee the opportunity for committing the crime, and the checks were not received by the payees and reflected on their faces that they were cashed, the jury's conclusion that defendant had accessed the system was supportable as a matter of law. Gordon v. State, 206 Ga. App. 450, 425 S.E.2d 906 (1992).

Testimony showing that defendant used a computer owned by the company with the intention of deleting or removing data from that computer was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that a computer trespass had occurred. Fugarino v. State, 243 Ga. App. 268, 531 S.E.2d 187 (2000).

Defendant was properly convicted of computer theft under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93 because the defendant copied homeowner association data from the computer of the defendant's employer without authority under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-92(18), and the defendant had the intent of appropriating that information for the defendant's own use in the defendant's new business. DuCom v. State, 288 Ga. App. 555, 654 S.E.2d 670 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0598, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 383 (Ga. 2008).

Claim did not state a violation.

- Customer was granted a summary judgment as to a copyright owner's claims of violations of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-90 et seq., because the Act was not broad enough to cover the actions alleged in that there was no allegation that an appropriation of the owner's intellectual property was achieved by unauthorized use of a computer under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(a) and the owner did not allege that the customer used the owner's name on the Internet for the purpose of falsely identifying itself to make O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1 applicable. SCQuARE Int'l, Ltd. v. BBDO Atlanta, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Because the former employer did not allege that the former employees changed the location of the files or otherwise disposed of the files, and the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(b) contemplated a temporary or permanent elimination of files or a temporary or permanent change of the file locations, the employer did not assert a claim for computer trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(b). Vurv Tech. LLC v. Kenexa Corp., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2009).

Trial court did not err in denying a former employee's claims under the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93, because the actions of a former employer's president in perusing the employee's email on the computer that the employee used in conducting business for the employer were not taken without authority; the president had authority to inspect the employee's computer pursuant to the computer usage policy contained in the employee manual, which the employee had agreed to abide by when the employee started work with the employer, and the president acted in order to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation of improper employee behavior. Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 365, 718 S.E.2d 532 (2011).

Former employee was not guilty of computer theft when the employee accessed clients' tax returns through a client portal, not though the network, using passwords obtained from the clients. Drawdy CPA Servs., P.C. v. N. GA CPA Servs., P.C., 320 Ga. App. 759, 740 S.E.2d 712 (2013).

Opinion testimony related to computer trespass claims was speculative, irrelevant, and unhelpful because the expert's statements indicated only that damage was possible, rather than probable; moreover, claims of computer trespass and computer invasion of privacy failed because the alleged conduct occurred outside Georgia. Krise v. Sei/Aaron's, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2017).

Damages for computer trespass.

- Because the collection agency received the applications to run the agency's business from the independent contractor and the independent contractor provided technical support and maintenance services to the collection agency, the collection agency received value in exchange for the money the agency paid to the independent contractor, and the agency's cost of compensating the independent contractor during that time period was not an element of damages that resulted from the independent contractor's computer trespass for which the agency could receive reimbursement. Ware v. Am. Recovery Solution Servs., 324 Ga. App. 187, 749 S.E.2d 775 (2013).

Punitive damages not authorized.

- Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-90 et seq., did not authorize an award of punitive damages as the statement in O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(g)(1) indicating that a plaintiff may recover "any damages sustained," without more, would not appear to indicate a legislative intent to allow for punitive damages to be recoverable under the statute given that punitive damages are not sustained by a plaintiff but intended to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant. Lyman v. Cellchem International, Inc., 300 Ga. 475, 796 S.E.2d 255 (2017).

Computer trespass.

- Independent contractor committed computer trespass because the independent contractor did not have authorization to use the login and password of the chief financial officer of the collection agency to access the server and to disable an administrative login or alter a program, and the independent contractor's actions first completely shut down the collection agency and then hampered the agency's ability to operate for a significant length of time. Ware v. Am. Recovery Solution Servs., 324 Ga. App. 187, 749 S.E.2d 775 (2013).

Computer invasion of privacy.

- Defendant's motion for new trial was improperly denied as to the computer invasion of privacy charge because counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the first victim's hearsay testimony as the victim's statement about what the victim learned from an online backup system was introduced to prove that the defendant used the victim's computer to access the victim's financial information and constituted hearsay; counsel provided no reason for not objecting to that testimony; the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency as that testimony was the only evidence offered to prove the charge; and, but for counsel's deficient performance, a more than reasonable probability existed that the trial's outcome would have been different. Entwisle v. State, 340 Ga. App. 122, 796 S.E.2d 743 (2017).

Insufficient evidence in defamation case from social media.

- Judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdicts in a defamation case were affirmed because the plaintiff was properly found to be a public figure in the spheres of running and Christian evangelism and there was no evidence of actual malice as to the social media postings, which alleged that the plaintiff was having multiple affairs with married women and had not completed all of the long distance runs, were true; there was no evidence of violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93 or O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1. Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank, 299 Ga. 459, 788 S.E.2d 787 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 571, 196 L. Ed. 2d 447 (U.S. 2016).

Cited in Stargate Software Int'l, Inc. v. Rumph, 224 Ga. App. 873, 482 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 1.

C.J.S.

- 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §§ 1, 2.

ALR.

- Computer fraud, 70 A.L.R.5th 647.

Invasion of privacy by using or obtaining e-mail or computer files, 68 A.L.R.6th 331.

Validity, construction, and application of state computer crime and fraud laws, 87 A.L.R.6th 1.