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O.C.G.A.Title 17Chapter 10

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 (2020)

Oral victim impact statement; presentation of evidence; cross-examination and rebuttal by defendant; effect of noncompliance; no creation of cause of action or right of appeal

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1994–2026 45citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 45 opinions since 1994, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (2 cases).

(a)(1) In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, subsequent to an adjudication of guilt and in conjunction with the procedures in Code Section 17-10-30, the court shall allow evidence from the family of the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, or the community. Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, such evidence shall be given in the presence of the defendant and of the jury and shall be subject to cross-examination.

(2) The admissibility of the evidence described in paragraph (1) of this subsection and the number of witnesses other than immediate family who may testify shall be in the sole discretion of the judge and in any event shall be permitted only in such a manner and to such a degree as not to inflame or unduly prejudice the jury. As used in this paragraph, the term ‘‘immediate family’’ means the victim’s spouse, child, parent, stepparent, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, stepbrother, stepsister, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law, or brother-in-law and the spouses of any such individuals.

(3) In all cases other than those in which the death penalty may be imposed, prior to fixing of the sentence as provided for in Code Section 17-10-1 or the imposing of life imprisonment as mandated by law, and before rendering the appropriate sentence, including any order of restitution, the court shall allow the victim, as such term is defined in Code Section 17-17-3, the family of the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of the crime to testify about the impact of the crime on the victim, the family of the victim, or the community. Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, such evidence shall be given in the presence of the defendant and shall be subject to cross-examination. The admissibility of the testimony and evidence in support of such testimony shall be in the sole discretion of the judge and in any event shall be permitted only in such a manner as to allow for cross-examination by the defendant and to such a degree as not to unduly prejudice the defendant. If the judge excludes the testimony or evidence in support of such testimony, the state shall be allowed to make a proffer of such testimony or evidence.

(4) Upon a finding by the court specific to the case and the witness that the witness would not be able to testify in person without showing undue emotion or that testifying in person will cause the witness severe physical or emotional distress or trauma, evidence presented pursuant to this subsection may be in the form of, but not limited to, a written statement or a prerecorded audio or video statement, provided that such witness is subject to cross-examination and the evidence itself will not be available to the jury during deliberations. Photographs of the victim may be included with any evidence presented pursuant to this subsection.

(5) If the accused has been convicted of a serious violent felony as defined in Code Section 17-10-6.1, attempted murder or attempted kidnapping, or any violation of Code Section 16-5-90, 16-5-91, 16-7-82, 16-7-84, or 16-7-86, and the victim or a representative of the victim is not present at the presentence hearing, it shall be the duty of the court to inquire of the prosecuting attorney whether or not the victim has been notified of the presentence hearing as provided in Code Section 17-17-5. If the court finds that the prosecuting attorney has not made a reasonable attempt to notify the victim, the presentence hearing shall be recessed in order to provide the victim the opportunity to attend prior to sentence being imposed; provided, however, that prior to recessing the presentence hearing, the court shall allow the state or the accused to call any witnesses who were subpoenaed and are present at such presentence hearing. Following any such testimony, the presentence hearing shall be recessed and the victim shall be notified of the date, time, and location when the presentence hearing shall resume.

(b) In presenting such evidence, the victim, the family of the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of the impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, or the community shall, if applicable:

(1) Describe the nature of the offense;

(2) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim or the family of the victim, if restitution is sought;

(3) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;

(4) Describe any change in the victim’s personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;

(5) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the victim’s family as a result of the offense; and

(6) Include any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim, the victim’s family, or the community that the court inquires of.

(c) The court shall allow the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine and rebut the evidence presented of the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, or the community, and such cross-examination and rebuttal evidence shall be subject to the same discretion set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section.

(d) No sentence shall be invalidated because of failure to comply with the provisions of this Code section. This Code section shall not be construed to create any cause of action or any right of appeal on behalf of the victim, the state, or the accused; provided, however, that if the court intentionally fails to comply with this Code section, the victim may file a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

History

Code 1981, § 17-10-1.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1985, p. 739, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1660, § 2; Ga. L. 2009, p. 192, § 1/SB 151; Ga. L. 2010, p. 214, § 4/HB 567.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of death penalty decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (2006). For annual survey of law on evidence, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 125 (2010).

For article, ‘‘Criminal Procedure,’’ see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 29 (2011). For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 113 (1993). For case comment, ‘‘Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials,’’ see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1191 (1987).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 contains sufficient safeguards within the statute to ensure that victim impact evidence will not be admitted which reflects on factors which the court has found constitutionally irrelevant to death penalty sentencing and which could result in the arbitrary and unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994). O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994). O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 is not unconstitutional and it is not an ex post facto law violation to apply the statute to a crime that was committed before the statute was enacted. Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (1999). O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 is not unconstitutional as written and the trial court properly reviewed the state’s victim impact testimony prior to trial and did not admit unduly inflammatory or prejudicial evidence. Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000). Trial court did not err by denying a defendant’s motion to declare as unconstitutional the statute allowing victim impact evidence during sentencing as the Georgia Supreme Court found O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 to be constitutional. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

Scope of victim impact testimony. - Evidence is limited to the impact of the specific crime on the community and does not extend to testimony concerning anger in the community about increasing lawlessness or crime in general. McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1106, 118 S. Ct. 2485, 138 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1997). Victim impact statements were proper which focused on the witnesses’ relationship with the victim and how the victim’s death had affected the witness personally, and which did not focus on the victim’s social status, nor provide a detailed narration of the emotional and economic suffering of the victim’s family. Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997). Psychiatrist testimony on impact to child. - Victim impact testimony of a psychiatrist who had treated the victim’s child both before and after the murder was not improper. Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306, 528 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 321, 148 L. Ed. 2d 258 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). Silent videotape depicting murder victim admissible. - Silent videotape depicting a murder victim that was killed during an armed robbery of an armored car that showed the victim alive in various settings and which was narrated by the victim’s oldest daughter at trial was within the statutory description of admis-

sible victim impact evidence permitted by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 and the trial court did not err by allowing the videotape to be played at the defendant’s trial. Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (2005). Testimony from non-family members. - Testimony about the emotional impact of the crime on the community may include testimony by witnesses who are not family members regarding the impact the crime had on witnesses personally. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L.Ed.2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011). Opinions about defendant and murders inadmissible. - Trial court abused the discretion granted by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 in allowing murder victims’ family members to testify by offering opinions about the defendant and the murders because such victim impact evidence unduly prejudiced the jury; the witnesses testified that the victims were ‘‘shot and left in a patch of kudzu as if they were a piece of trash on the side of the road,’’ that the victims were ‘‘left under trash and branches, left to die,’’ and that the crimes were ‘‘a senseless, selfish act of nothing but wickedness and evil.’’ While some of the witnesses’ characterizations may have been supported by the evidence presented at trial, the witnesses did not have personal knowledge of many of the facts to which the witnesses testified, and the statements, even if supported by the evidence, were particularly inflammatory and prejudicial coming from members of the victims’ families; further, the witnesses were also improperly allowed to present the witnesses’ own unduly prejudicial characterizations and opinions of the defendant. Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011). Discretion of court. - Introduction of oral victim impact testimony is controlled by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2, and the introduction of such evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court. Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899 (1999). Failure to allow defendant to cross examine the victim pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 was not a basis for

invalidating the sentence. Williams v. State, 226 Ga. App. 720, 487 S.E.2d 470 (1997). No basis for invalidating sentence. - Failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 does not provide a basis for the invalidation of a sentence. Brantley v. State, 268 Ga. 151, 486 S.E.2d 169, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 985, 118 S. Ct. 449, 139 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1997). Testimony of spouse of murder victim admissible. - Testimony of the spouse of a murder victim, who sobbed while testifying, was not improper because the questions asked had been approved by the trial court prior to trial and there was no indication that the spouse’s testimony was prolonged or that the spouse’s display of emotion disrupted the trial. Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592, 481 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S. Ct. 376, 139 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1997). Religious references in victim impact statements were permissible since the references were an essential part of a glimpse into the victim’s life and did not comprise an unduly large portion of the statements. Pickren v. State, 269 Ga. 453, 500 S.E.2d 566 (1998). Permitting the sole surviving victim of the defendant’s crimes to testify during the sentencing phase regarding the impact on the witness regarding the murder of the witness’s child was not erroneous. Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 604 S.E.2d 826 (2004). Trial court did not err by allowing emotional victim impact evidence during sentencing as O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 allowed evidence of the impact of the crime upon the victim, and the victim gave a short and limited statement. Paige v. State, 277 Ga. App. 687, 627 S.E.2d 370 (2006). Testimony from parents admissible without reading statements. - Victim impact evidence was properly admitted through the testimony of a child murder victim’s father that, since the crimes, he had suffered depression, nightmares, had trouble sleeping, and had seen a psychiatrist, and the testimony of the child’s mother that her sadness, crying, and being in a ‘‘dazed state’’ had spurred her to visit a psychologist for three months and a counselor for six months. It was not re-

quired that the victims read their statements. Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (2010). Counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor’s victim impact argument during opening statement because negative characterizations of the victim were proper since the characterizations were relevant to evidence later offered to explain the context in which the drug-related crimes occurred, and the prosecutor’s allusion to the fact that the victim was no longer alive was relevant to the murder charge; a witness’s testimony and photographs of the witness’s injuries were directly relevant and admissible to prove the charge against the defendant of committing aggravated assault on the witness. Lacey v. State, 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (2010). Counsel not ineffective for failing to object to impact statement from sibling. - Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the victim’s sibling giving impact testimony during sentencing on the ground that the defense had no prior notice of the sibling’s testimony because the defendant failed to explain how the sibling’s testimony prejudiced the defendant, given that the trial court had already heard the victim’s testimony that the victim had been hospitalized for over a month as a result of the knife attack, that the attack had paralyzed the victim, that the victim could not live with the victim’s spouse because of the victim’s disability, and the victim’s only income was social security disability payments. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012). Testimony held not victim impact evidence. - Testimony that was given by the child of a person who was killed in a multi-car collision caused by a juvenile, which provided the child’s personal observations of teen driving habits in the area where the collision occurred and was offered by the state to show that it was in the interests of the community for the juvenile to be treated as an adult, was not victim impact evidence, but the juvenile court did not err by admitting the testimony. In the Interest of W.N.J., 268 Ga. App. 637, 602 S.E.2d 173 (2004). Leading questions authorized. - Trial court acted within the court’s discre-

tion in allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions of the victim’s spouse in order to ensure that the spouse’s testimony remained within the parameters outlined in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2. Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592, 481 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S. Ct. 376, 139 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1997). Procedural irregularity does not constitute reversible error absent a constitutional violation. McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1106, 118 S. Ct. 2485, 138 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1997). Although the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objections to victim impact references in the state’s opening statement and in the testimony of two witnesses, the appellate court did not need to reverse the defendant’s convictions and sentences because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as the comments and testimony would have been admissible in the sentencing phase and as the defendant had confessed both to a friend, who testified at trial, and to law enforcement officers in a videotaped confession that was played for the jury. Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 840, 123 S. Ct. 163, 154 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2002). Proper procedures. - Procedure best comported with requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 whereby witnesses prepared written statements, a pretrial hearing provided defendant the opportunity to challenge the content of the statements, and, at trial, the state asked the witnesses to read their statements and the witnesses were then available for cross-examination. Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997). Jury instructions. - When victim impact evidence is given in the sentencing phase of a death penalty or life without parole case, the trial court should instruct the jury regarding the purpose of the evidence. Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997). Harmless error. - Although some of the victim impact testimony admitted over the defendant’s objection was improper, the testimony did not require reversal of the defendant’s death sentence because the admission was harmless be-

yond a reasonable doubt. Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011, 131 S. Ct. 522, 178 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2010).

Cited in Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997); Taylor v. State, 264 Ga. App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Victim impact evidence in capital sentencing hearings - post-Payne v. Tennessee, 79 A.L.R.5th 33.

Admissibility of victim impact evidence in noncapital state proceedings, 8 A.L.R.7th 6.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENLivingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. 1994).
cites § 17-10-1.2 108×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“Additionally, Livingston appeals the trial court's denial of his constitutional attack and other related attacks on OCGA § 17-10-1.2, which governs the admissibility of victim impact evidence, as amended in the 1993 legislative session to apply to death penalty cases.”
The case’s holding
Victim impact evidence is admissible to assist a jury in determining a defendant's culpability.
Later courts cite it for
“while there may be advantages to a criminal defendant in having a trial apart from the guilt-innocence phase on the issue of mental retardation, such a change must come from the general assembly.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENBryant v. State, 708 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 2011).
cites § 17-10-1.2 20×subsections: (b)(1) 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“2d 742 (1988) (applying harmless error analysis where testimony violated a defendant's attorney-client privilege). Sentencing Phase Issues 15.”
The case’s holding
The trial court errs by admitting unconstitutional victim impact testimony during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
Later courts cite it for
“because bryant did not raise this argument in his motion to suppress, he has waived it here” · 1 citing court
3
GREENWillis v. State, 820 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 2018).
cites § 17-10-1.2 6×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“The trial court did not err by denying Willis's motion claiming that Georgia's statute authorizing victim impact testimony in death penalty trials, OCGA § 17-10-1.2, was unconstitutional on its face.”
The case’s holding
A defendant is not harmed by a trial court's erroneous refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause if that juror is subsequently removed by a peremptory strike.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant is not presumptively harmed by a trial court's erroneous failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause simply because the defendant subsequently elected to remove that juror through the use of a peremptory strike.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENMcClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1996).
cites § 17-10-1.2 11×cited by 177 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“(a) McClain’s contention that OCGA § 17-10-1.2, which governs the introduction of victim impact testimony during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, violates the State and Federal Constitutions has been decided adversely to McClain.”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor may appeal to the jury to convict for the safety of the community or to send a message that criminal activities will be punished.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor may appeal to the jury to convict for the safety of the community or to send a message to others that criminal activities will be punished.” · 9 citing courts
5
GREENTurner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1997).
cites § 17-10-1.2 12×subsections: (b)(6) 2×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“State, [3] we considered the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2, Georgia's victim impact statute.”
The case’s holding
Victim impact evidence is admissible when witnesses read brief, pre-approved statements regarding personal relationships without providing a detailed narration of the emotional and economic sufferings of the victim's family.
Later courts cite it for
“detailed narration of . . . emotional and economic sufferings of the victim's family.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENTollette v. State, 621 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. 2005).
cites § 17-10-1.2 10×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“See OCGA§ 17-10-1.2. OCGA§ 17-10-1.2 (a) (1) permits “evidence from the family of the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of the victim’s personal characteristics.”
The case’s holding
An objection to victim impact evidence is waived if not raised in the trial court (noting that a motion in limine may also seek to limit specific arguments at trial).
Later courts cite it for
“an improper subject matter for argument by counsel” · 3 citing courts
7
YELLOWCarruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 2000).
cites § 17-10-1.2 8×cited by 73 cases
Overruled by Vergara v. State on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“The presentation of victim impact testimony in a death penalty trial is governed by OCGA § 17-10-1.2, and, therefore, Carruthers' reliance upon OCGA § 17-10-1.”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor violates due process by using religious language of command or obligation to mandate a death sentence during the sentencing phase of a capital case.
Later courts cite it for
“the granting of a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed when the trial court has taken remedial measures sufficient to ensure a fair trial.' cits.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENLance v. State, 560 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2002).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“OCGA § 17-10-1.2, wil'ch authorizes the presentation of certain victim impact testimony, is not unconstitutional.”
The case’s holding
A search is lawful if the subject provides consent through a signed form and fails to withdraw that consent during the search (consent).
Later courts cite it for
“the erroneous qualifying of a single juror for the panel from which the jury was struck” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENJones v. State, 481 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1997).
cites § 17-10-1.2 6×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“(a) Under OCGA § 17-10-1.2, and Livingston v. State, 264 Ga.”
The case’s holding
Trial courts possess unusually broad discretion in admitting victim impact evidence and are presumed to follow statutory limits regarding inflammatory or unduly prejudicial testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“we presume that trial courts will follow the dictates of the statute in not admitting inflammatory or unduly prejudicial evidence. . . .” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENMartin v. State, 779 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. 2015).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“] OCGA § 17-10-1.2 (b) (1). Nevertheless, we caution the trial courts that the statute, even aside from constitutional concerns, also provides that such testimony “shall be in the sole discretion of the judge and in any event shall be permitted only in such a manner and to such…”
The case’s holding
A jury may infer penetration from circumstantial evidence and testimony regarding a defendant's physical performance during a sexual encounter.
Later courts cite it for
“test for harm under plain error review is equivalent to the test in ineffective assistance of counsel cases for whether an attorney's deficient performance has resulted in prejudice of constitutional proportions.” · 13 citing courts
11
GREENGissendaner v. State, 532 S.E.2d 677 (Ga. 2000).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×cited by 131 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“OCGA § 17-10-1.2 is not unconstitutional as written, and the trial court properly reviewed the State's victim impact testimony prior to trial and did not admit unduly inflammatory or prejudicial evidence.”
The case’s holding
Proportionality review determines whether a death sentence is excessive per se or substantially out of line with similar cases.
Later courts cite it for
“this court's review of death sentences is neither unconstitutional nor inadequate under georgia statutory law.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENPaige v. State, 627 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 17-10-1.2 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“(2) In all cases other than those in which the death penalty may be imposed, prior to fixing of the sentence as provided for in Code Section 17-10-1 or the imposing of life imprisonment as mandated by law, and before rendering the appropriate sentence, including any order of…”
13
GREENTaylor v. State, 592 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 17-10-1.2 8×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“Although OCGA § 17-10-1.2 allows evidence of the impact of the crime upon the victim, this evidence is admissible only during the sentencing phase of trial.”
14
GREENHenry v. State, 604 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 2004).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×subsections: (a)(1) 2×cited by 20 cases
Later courts cite it for
“it is improper for the state to argue that a defendant will kill in prison simply because he killed while free.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENSpeed v. State, 512 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1999).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“OCGA § 17-10-1.2 on victim-impact evidence is not unconstitutional, and it is not an ex post facto law violation to apply this statute to a crime that was committed before the statute was enacted.”
The case’s holding
A defendant waives the right to be present during in-camera voir dire by agreeing to the procedure and failing to object to the subsequent excusal of a juror.
16
GREENThomason v. State, 637 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. 2006).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“402 (1) ( 444 SE2d 748 ) (1994). 10. Thomason argues that the trial court erred by improperly seating six jurors who he alleges were either biased against him or predisp'osed in favor of the death penalty.”
Later courts cite it for
“given the trial court's 'prompt, thorough, and curative action,' the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying lord's motion for a mistrial.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENMcCray v. State, 799 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 2017).
cites § 17-10-1.2 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“Speaking as the victim, the prosecutor also stated that when the victim got out a shotgun, he was simply doing what he felt he had to do to protect the women, himself, and Holloway’s child.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's decision to admit or refuse to admit evidence is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“this court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or refuse to admit evidence for abuse of discretion” · 4 citing courts
18
GREENLucas v. State, 555 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 2001).
cites § 17-10-1.2 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“6 OCGA § 17-10-1.2 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied).”
The case’s holding
The improper admission of victim impact evidence during the guilt phase of a trial constitutes harmless error when guilt is established by confession and corroborating evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“considering the trial record, ... the ensuing exchange between the witness and the district attorney rendered harmless any error in the trial court's not addressing the district attorney's use of hyperbole, particularly because the district attorney himself later clarified that he was using the phrase as an idiom and not literally.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENPickren v. State, 500 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. 1998).
cites § 17-10-1.2 4×subsections: (a)(1) 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“” OCGA § 17-10-1.2 (a) (1). “ ‘[W]e presume that trial courts will follow the dictates of the statute in not admitting inflammatory or unduly prejudicial evidence[.”
The case’s holding
Illustrative materials used to support testimony are inadmissible if they contain erroneous or prejudicial matter that is unauthenticated by the testimony they purport to illustrate.
Later courts cite it for
“certain materials may be used as tools to illustrate testimony without being admitted as demonstrative evidence, but not where the illustrative material contains erroneous or prejudicial matter unauthenticated by the testimony which it purports to illustrate.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENStinski v. State, 691 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 17-10-1.2 2×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 17-10-1.2
“See OCGA § 17-10-1.2 *854 (authorizing victim impact testimony); Turner v.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not err by asking statutory questions regarding death penalty views, allowing follow-up questions, and excusing jurors in accordance with constitutional standards.
Later courts cite it for
“allowing follow-up questions by both parties, and then excusing jurors in accordance with constitutional standards” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga.30Ga. Ct. App.15
By subsection
(a)(1)2 cases
Henry v. State, 604 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 2004).
Pickren v. State, 500 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. 1998).“” OCGA § 17-10-1.2 (a) (1). “ ‘[W]e presume that trial courts will follow the dictates of the statute in not admitting inflammatory or unduly prejudicial evidence[.”
(a)(2)1 case
Taylor v. State, 592 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).“Although OCGA § 17-10-1.2 allows evidence of the impact of the crime upon the victim, this evidence is admissible only during the sentencing phase of trial.”
(a)(3)1 case
Jason Elridge v. State, No. A25A1601 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2026).
(a)(4)1 case
Jason Elridge v. State, No. A25A1601 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2026).
(b)(1)1 case
Bryant v. State, 708 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 2011).“2d 742 (1988) (applying harmless error analysis where testimony violated a defendant's attorney-client privilege). Sentencing Phase Issues 15.”
(b)(6)1 case
Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1997).“State, [3] we considered the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2, Georgia's victim impact statute.”
(c)1 case
Jason Elridge v. State, No. A25A1601 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2026).
(d)1 case
Jason Elridge v. State, No. A25A1601 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2026).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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