O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-14 (2019)

Committal of person under 17 convicted of felony

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article and except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, in any case where a person under the age of 17 years is convicted of a felony and sentenced as an adult to life imprisonment or to a certain term of imprisonment, such person shall be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice to serve such sentence in a detention center of such department until such person is 17 years of age at which time such person shall be transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of the sentence. This Code section shall apply to any person convicted on or after July 1, 1987, and to any person convicted prior to such date who has not been committed to an institution operated by the Department of Corrections. (b) If a child is transferred to superior court pursuant to Code Section 15-11-561 and convicted of aggravated assault as defined in Chapter 5 of Title 16, the court may sentence such child to the Department of Corrections. Such child shall be housed in a designated youth confinement unit until such person is 17 years of age, at which time such person may be housed in any other unit designated by the Department of Corrections.

History

Code 1981, § 17-10-14, enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 1335, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1930, § 7; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1983, § 19; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 27; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1453, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 20, § 8; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-18/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 540, § 1-16/HB 361.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘‘School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994’’.

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, sets forth legislative findings and determinations for the ‘‘School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994’’. Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 29, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability. Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to

all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever

class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions.’’ Law reviews. - For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 81 (1994).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Custody of juvenile until 21 years. - Ordering that the juvenile remain in the Department of Juvenile Justice custody until the juvenile reaches 21 years of age is neither authorized by O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-9(e) or any other provision of Georgia law. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. Eller, 338 Ga. App. 247, 789 S.E.2d 412 (2016). While O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-9(b) provides the superior court broad discretion to modify the court’s orders for the welfare of any child subject to the court’s jurisdiction, the plain language of subsection (e) limits that discretion once that child becomes 17 years of age. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. Eller, 338 Ga. App. 247, 789 S.E.2d 412 (2016).

Judgment of the trial court directing the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to hold in its custody a criminal defendant prosecuted as an adult for a crime committed as a juvenile, until the defendant turned 21 years old, was reversed because ordering that the defendant remain in DJJ custody until reaching 21 years of age was neither authorized by O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-9(e) or any other provision of Georgia law. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. Eller, 338 Ga. App. 247, 789 S.E.2d 412 (2016). Cited in State v. Hudson, 303 Ga. 348, 812 S.E.2d 270 (2018).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2015–2023 · leading case: Georgia Dep't of Juv. Just. v. Eller, 789 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
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Georgia Dep't of Juv. Just. v. Eller, 789 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 30× “”) superior court’s directive, the plain language of OCGA § 17-10-14 (a) mandates that Eller be transferred to the Department of Corrections upon his seventeenth birthday.”
State v. Hudson, 812 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 17× “And three judges dissented, contending that OCGA § 17-10-14 (a) prohibited the resentencing.”
State v. T. M. H., 794 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 38× “” 6 Turning to the issue before us, the governing Code sections are OCGA §§ 17-10-14 and 49-4A-9. OCGA § 17-10-14 provides: (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article and except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, in any case where a…”
State v. Hudson, 303 Ga. 348 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 16× “OCGA § 49-4A-9 (e) says, with emphasis supplied: Any child under 17 years of age who is sentenced in the superior court and committed to the [Department of Juvenile Justice] may be eligible to participate in all juvenile detention facility 3 programs and services including…”
Bun v. State, 769 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 2015). · cites it 4× “As a state constitutional matter, we give up nothing by leaving open for juvenile offenders the possibility of rehabilitation and redemption for crimes they commit when they are biologically and emotionally immature.”
State v. T. M. H. (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 34× “3 See OCGA § 17-10-14 (a). 2 court’s order reflects that it heard testimony at the status conference “as to [T.”
State v. Broderick McKnight (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “at 349-350 (2) (holding that this Court unnecessarily addressed “[w]hich juvenile offenders come within the scope of OCGA § 49-4A-9 (e) and how that provision interacts with OCGA § 17-10-14 (a)” and concluding that such holdings “should be treated as dicta only”).”
Bun v. State (Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “As a state constitutional matter, we give up nothing by leaving open for juvenile offenders the possibility of rehabilitation and redemption for crimes they commit when they are biologically and emotionally immature.”
— 17-10-14(a) — 3 cases
State v. Hudson, 812 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. 2018). “And three judges dissented, contending that OCGA § 17-10-14 (a) prohibited the resentencing.”
State v. T. M. H., 794 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). “” 6 Turning to the issue before us, the governing Code sections are OCGA §§ 17-10-14 and 49-4A-9. OCGA § 17-10-14 provides: (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article and except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, in any case where a…”
State v. T. M. H. (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). “3 See OCGA § 17-10-14 (a). 2 court’s order reflects that it heard testimony at the status conference “as to [T.”
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