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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-28 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

15-11-28. Privilege against self-incrimination.

  1. No admission, confession, or incriminating information obtained from a child in the course of any screening that is undertaken in conjunction with proceedings under this chapter, including but not limited to court ordered screenings, shall be admitted into evidence in any adjudication hearing in which a child is accused under this chapter. Such admission, confession, or incriminating information may be considered by the court at disposition.
  2. No admission, confession, or incriminating information obtained from a child in the course of any assessment or evaluation, or any treatment that is undertaken in conjunction with proceedings under this chapter, including but not limited to court ordered detention or risk assessments and evaluations, shall be admitted into evidence against such child, except as rebuttal or impeachment evidence, or used as a basis for such evidence in any future adjudication hearing or criminal proceeding in which such child is accused. Such admission, confession, or incriminating information may be considered by the court at disposition.

(Code 1981, §15-11-28, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)

Law reviews.

- For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends," see 30 Emory L. J. 1065 (1981). For comment, "School Bullies - They Aren't Just Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 731 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-31 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-7(b), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Private interview of child by father's counsel not necessary.

- Requiring a child to submit privately and alone to an interview by his father's counsel is not necessary. The father's rights provided by statute are adequate and proper to ensure him a fair hearing. In re L.L.W., 141 Ga. App. 32, 232 S.E.2d 378 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Former Code 1933, § 24A-2002 was implementation of constitutional right of due process. In re L.L.W., 141 Ga. App. 32, 232 S.E.2d 378 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was as applicable in juvenile cases as it was with respect to adults. K.E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Fair trial required.

- Adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding is the functional equivalent of the trial in the regular criminal or civil process, and a juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled by right to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial; those principles include the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of cross-examination under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7(a) and (b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-19 and15-11-28). In the Interest of J.C., 257 Ga. App. 657, 572 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7).

Rule as to confessions of juveniles should be same as that for confessions of adults because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when law enforcement officers question a juvenile what kind of case may develop, and the statutory safeguards are applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Juvenile confessions judged with more care and caution.

- Confessions of juveniles are scanned with more care and received with greater caution. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Voluntary pretrial statement admitted.

- Since the defendant was a minor when the defendant's statement was given and the defendant's statement was made outside the presence or without the assistance of counsel or other responsible adult, and there was no evidence that the defendant's statements were involuntary, the defendant's pretrial statement was admissible. Duffy v. State, 262 Ga. 249, 416 S.E.2d 734 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Minor has capacity to make voluntary confession even in a capital case, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, with such absence being just one factor or circumstance to consider in determining the voluntariness of the confession. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Minor with mental disability may confess.

- Mere showing that one who confessed to crime may have suffered from some mental disability is not a sufficient basis upon which to exclude the statement. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Presence of parents during questioning.

- There is no provision requiring that one or both parents be present during the questioning. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Duffy v. State, 262 Ga. 249, 416 S.E.2d 734 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Parents were denied due process in a termination of parental rights proceeding since the parents were excluded from an observation room during an interview of their children, even though the parents' attorneys were present in the room, from which location no one would have been seen or heard by the children. In re M.S., 178 Ga. App. 380, 343 S.E.2d 152 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Waiver of right against self-incrimination.

- Question of a voluntary and knowing waiver by a juvenile of the juvenile's right not to incriminate oneself depends on the totality of circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors: (1) the age of the accused; (2) the education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge and the nature of the accused's rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) the methods used in the interrogation; (7) the length of the interrogation; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to give statements voluntarily on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extrajudicial statement at a later date. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Age alone is not determinative of whether a person can waive one's rights. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Waiver of rights upheld on appeal absent clear error.

- Question of whether or not a defendant is capable or incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's rights is to be answered by the trial judge and will be accepted by an appellate court unless such determination is clearly erroneous. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Delinquency found when acts corroborated confession.

- Child's confession out-of-court corroborated by evidence that stolen items were found in the child's possession within a few hours of the crime with which the child was charged, theft, constituted sufficient proof to support a finding of delinquency. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Transfer hearings must meet essentials of due process and fair treatment.

- Transfer hearings are critically important proceedings affecting important rights of the juvenile. While a hearing need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

When former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2002 and 24A-2501 are read together, a juvenile faced with the possible transfer of the juvenile's case from juvenile court to "the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense" has the right to an evidentiary hearing at which the juvenile must be given "the opportunity to introduce evidence and otherwise be heard in his own behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses." R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Fair trial not found.

- Juvenile did not receive a fair trial since the juvenile was not permitted to confront the state's witness, and was questioned without being sworn or advised of the right to remain silent, and the consequences of foregoing that right. In the Interest of J.C., 257 Ga. App. 657, 572 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7).

Cited in In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 102, 112.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 199 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 27.

ALR.

- Power of juvenile court to require children to testify, 151 A.L.R. 1229.

Applicability of rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Voluntariness and admissibility of minor's confession, 87 A.L.R.2d 624.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

Applicability of rules of evidence to juvenile transfer, waiver, or certification hearings, 37 A.L.R.5th 703.

Juvenile's guilty or no contest plea in adult court as waiver of defects in transfer or certification proceedings, 74 A.L.R.5th 453.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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State v. Outen, 714 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 52 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 27, 2011 | 289 Ga. 579, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 2077

...does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state; (6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2)(B) of Code Section 15-11-28; (7) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court granting a motion for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial; (8) From an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state to recuse or disqualify a...
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Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2011 | 288 Ga. 695, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 208

...ittal *364 based on the state's alleged failure to prove when the offenses were committed. Wilt v. State, 265 Ga.App. 158, 161(2), 592 S.E.2d 925 (2004). 3. Prior to trial, Adams filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B)....
...a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life...." OCGA § 16-6-4(d)(1). On this basis, the trial court denied the motion to transfer, finding that OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) is inapplicable and that the court was neither authorized nor obligated to conduct an investigation to determine whether there is extraordinary cause....
...sonment and instead was to "be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 years." Ga. L.1997, pp. 1578, 1579, § 1 (former OCGA § 16-6-4(d)(1)). Indeed, aggravated child molestation clearly was a transferable offense under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) prior to the 2006 amendment of OCGA § 16-6-4(d)(1)....
...Her parents' divorce was not final until May 2007. Because the indictment alleged and the evidence at trial authorized a finding that Adams committed aggravated child molestation on some date after July 1, 2006, we hold that the trial court could not be divested of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B)....
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Johnson v. State, 573 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2002 | 276 Ga. 57, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3563

...station. Therefore, I dissent to today's judgment to the extent that it authorizes the trial court to decide which conviction should be vacated. I am authorized to state that Justice HUNSTEIN and Justice THOMPSON join in this opinion. NOTES [1] OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) states that "[t]he superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed ......
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Lewis v. State, 608 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2005 | 279 Ga. 69, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 355

...Appellant then produced a rifle and shot Woods two times at point-blank range, killing him as his children watched. The murder weapon and identifying clothes were later discovered at appellant's mother's residence. Appellant (then age 14) was tried as an adult under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B), which vests the superior court with jurisdiction over children between the ages of 13 and 17 who are charged with certain crimes, including murder. 1. Having reviewed the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient for rational triers of fact to find appellant guilty of murder. [2] 2. Appellant claims that OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B), which permitted the State to try him in superior court, is (1) unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (2) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) violated due process and equal protection....
...t his claim that the trial court erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. [9] Similarly, we decline appellant's request that we adopt a rule mandating competency hearings for children under seventeen who face trial in superior court under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B)....
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Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 13, 2012 | 729 S.E.2d 393, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2302

...Because of jurisdictional concerns, we asked the parties to address whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the legal father in the legitimation proceeding that was brought as part of this divorce action. See OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) (C)....
...ed in this Constitution.” Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. Concerning courts of limited jurisdiction, the constitution declares that juvenile courts have “uniform jurisdiction as provided by law.” Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. III, Par. I. OCGA § 15-11-28 provides that juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights, except in connection with adoption proceedings....
...579, 582 (714 SE2d 581) (2011). 3. Whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to sever the legal father’s parental rights in this case depends on whether the issue is considered primarily as one involving legitimation or one involving termination. Compare OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) (C) (juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving termination except in connection with adoption) with OCGA §19-7-22 (a) (superior courts have jurisdiction over legitimation petitions filfed by father of child born out of wedlock)....
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State v. Pye, 653 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 29, 2007 | 282 Ga. 796

...does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state; (6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2)(B) of Code Section 15-11-28; (7) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court granting a motion for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial; (8) From an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state to recuse or disqualify a...
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Ertter v. Dunbar, 292 Ga. 103 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 403, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3593

...m jurisdiction as provided by law.” 1983 Ga." Const., Art. VI, Sec. Ill, Par. I. A statute gives the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over a deprivation action in which there is a bona fide allegation that the child is deprived. OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (1) (C)....
...The juvenile *105court also has exclusive original jurisdiction for the termination of parental rights in most cases; the superior court has concurrent jurisdiction to terminate parental rights when the termination is in connection with an adoption proceeding. OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) (C). A statute also provides the juvenile court with concurrent jurisdiction to hear any legitimation petition or issue of custody and support that is transferred to the juvenile court by proper order of the superior court. OCGA § 15-11-28 (c) (1), (e) (1)....
...In a deprivation hearing over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, the juvenile court may award temporary custody of the child adjudicated to be deprived; however, it does not have authority to award permanent custody without a transfer order from a superior court. OCGA § 15-11-28 (c) (1)....
...termination of parental rights and adoption. OCGA § 15-11-58 (i) (1) (A).3 There is no statute that gives a juvenile court jurisdiction over a petition for permanent custody of a child in the absence of a transfer order from a superior court (OCGA § 15-11-28 (c) (1); Douglas v....
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State v. Evans, 646 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 4, 2007 | 282 Ga. 63, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1722

...does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state; (6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2)(B) of Code Section 15-11-28; (7) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court granting a motion for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial; (8) From an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state to recuse or disqualify a...
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Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 843 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2020 | 308 Ga. 714

...LaBrec, 274 Ga. [5, 7 (549 SE2d 76) (2001)]. To grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the legal father. Brine, supra, 291 Ga. at 379-380 (3). Importantly, under the version of OCGA § 15-11-28 that existed at the time that Brine was decided in 2012, “juvenile courts [had] exclusive jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights except in connection with adoption proceedings.” Id....
...at 377 (1).8 Accordingly, the superior court in Brine “[did] not have jurisdiction over the termination decision” in the legitimation action and could not decide the legitimation petition on the merits. Id. at 380 (3). However, the law has changed since our decision in Brine. OCGA § 15-11-28 was replaced by OCGA § 15-11-10 (3) (D), which became effective on May 5, 2015, before the legitimation petition was filed in this case: Except as provided in Code Section 15-11-560 [concurrent jurisdiction with superior cou...
...shall be the sole court for initiating action . . . [i]nvolving any proceedings . . . [f]or the termination of the legal parent-child relationship and the rights of the biological father who is not the legal father of the child in 8 Former OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) (C) provided: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, the [juvenile] court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and shall be the sole court for initiating action ....
...(Emphasis supplied.) Within the chapters of Title 19 where superior courts retain jurisdiction “to terminate the legal parent-child relationship” pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-10 (3) (D) is Chapter 8, which deals with “Adoption.” Thus, as was the case under former OCGA § 15-11-28, under OCGA § 15-11-10 (3) (D) superior courts continue to have jurisdiction “to terminate the legal parent-child relationship and the rights of a biological father who is not the legal father of the child” in adoption cases.9...
...Because jurisdiction here “depend[s] upon the state of things at the time that [Brumbelow’s] action [was] filed,” Plummer, supra, 305 Ga. at 27 (2) (a) (emphasis supplied), it cannot be said that the superior court would But, unlike former OCGA § 15-11-28, OCGA § 15-11-10 (3) (D) does not limit the jurisdiction of superior courts to termination of parental rights only in adoption cases....
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Taylor v. Taylor, 646 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 4, 2007 | 282 Ga. 113, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1711

...487, 228 S.E.2d 872 (1976). In Cothran, we held unequivocally that "[a] superior court judge, upon hearing a divorce and child custody case, does not have jurisdiction to terminate parental rights." It was an easy case. The governing statute, OCGA § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), provides in relevant part as follows: *246 Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section [involving criminal jurisdiction], the [juvenile] court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and shall be the sole court for initiating action ....
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Howard v. Lane, 581 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 19, 2003 | 276 Ga. 688, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1567

...s not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state; or (6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2)(B) of Code Section 15-11-28.
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State v. Gleaton, 703 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 8, 2010 | 288 Ga. 373, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3630

...does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state; (6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b)(2)(B) of Code Section 15-11-28; (7) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court granting a motion for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial; (8) From an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state to recuse or disqualify a...
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Roberts v. Tharp, 690 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 579, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 516

...The parties soon filed contempt motions again and also sought modification of custody and *405 visitation. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-30.1(b), the superior court transferred the action to the juvenile court for investigation and determination. Father requested child support in accordance with OCGA § 19-6-15. See OCGA §§ 15-11-28(c)(1), 15-11-30.1(b)....
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Seabolt v. State, 616 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2005 | 279 Ga. 518, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2013

...the time they were committed, jurisdiction over these incidents lay in the juvenile court, and the superior court did not have jurisdiction over these offenses. He concedes that the superior court had jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated in OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A), namely murder and armed robbery, *450 and any other crimes committed during the incidents of murder and armed robbery, but argues that the counts that did not relate to murder or armed robbery could only be brought in juvenile court as delinquent acts....
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State v. Johnson, 292 Ga. 409 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2013 | 738 S.E.2d 86, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 180

...In November 2011, Johnson filed a motion asking the superior court to transfer his case to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-50.1, which says in relevant part: (a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section 15-11-28 or 15-11-30.2, who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to the grand jury....
...In 1994, the General Assembly gave the superior courts original jurisdiction, exclusive of the juvenile courts, over seven serious felonies committed by juveniles ages 13 to 17. See Ga. Laws 1994, pp. 1012, 1034; then OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A); now OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (A)....
...However, if such an offense was not punishable by the death penalty or life imprisonment, the superior court was given discretion to transfer the case to the juvenile c'ourt after indictment and “after investigation and for extraordinary cause.” Ga. Laws 1994atp. 1034;thenOCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (B); now OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B).2 In the same 1994 act, and in distinct contrast to the 2006 act creating OCGA § 17-7-50.1, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-7-1 to authorize the State to appeal this type of transfer order....
...Laws 1994 at p. 1049; then OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5);nowOCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) (authorizing an appeal by the State “[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to subparagraph (b) (2) (B) of Code Section 15-11-28”). To emphasize the point, the General Assembly also included a reference to OCGA § 5-7-1 in the transfer statute. See Ga. Laws 1994 at p. 1034; then OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (B); now OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) (stating that a transfer order under § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) “shall be appealable by the State of Georgia pursuant to Code Section 5-7-1”). Moreover, when former OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (B) was renumbered as OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) in 2000; the General Assembly amended *412what was then OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) to make sure that the State appeals provision referenced the correct transfer order provision....
...ference to it.’ ” Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 256 (702 SE2d 420) (2010) (citation omitted). Thus, we presume that the General Assembly amended (and re-amended) OCGA § 5-7-1 to authorize the State to appeal transfer orders under what is now OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) with the understanding that OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) already authorized the State to appeal any order dismissing or setting aside an indictment— something the State has been able to do since the original version of OCGA § 5-7-1 was enacted in 1973....
...of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 380, 383 (703 SE2d 648) (2010). Accordingly, it is clear that the General Assembly, by adding the provision to OCGA § 5-7-1 specifically authorizing the State to appeal from a superior court order transferring a case to juvenile court under OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B), did not mean such a transfer order to be equivalent to an order dismissing or setting aside an indictment under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) but instead meant to extend the State’s appeal rights to such transfer orders. Whether entered under OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) or OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b), a transfer order has the same effect: it transfers the juvenile’s entire case from the superior court to the juvenile court. There is no reason to believe that a transfer order entered under OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) is not an order dismissing an indictment but a transfer order entered under OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b) is....
...include orders transferring cases to the juvenile court, OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) would be surplusage, and “we normally avoid construing statutes to leave parts of them meaningless.” Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 698 (723 SE2d 894) (2012). OCGA §§ 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) and 5-7-1 (a) (6) demonstrate the General Assembly knows how to make transfer orders appealable by the State, yet despite referencing OCGA § 15-11-28 in OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), the legislature did not similarly authorize the State to appeal transfer orders entered under OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b)....
...ircumstances. See, e.g., In the Interest of C. B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 779 & n. 2 (723 SE2d 21) (2012). Because Johnson was charged with murder, which carries a life sentence, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (d), his case was not eligible for transfer under OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B).
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Douglas v. Douglas, 678 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2009 | 285 Ga. 548, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 2001

...1. Father claims that the habeas court erred in finding that Mother has legal custody of the child pursuant to the juvenile court order. Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases in which a child is alleged to be deprived. OCGA § 15-11-28(a)(1)(C)....
...394, 395-396, 636 S.E.2d 117 (2006). In such a deprivation proceeding, the juvenile court may award temporary custody to another parent, but it does not have authority to grant permanent custody absent a transfer order from the superior court. OCGA § 15-11-28(c)(1); In the Interest of C.F., 199 Ga.App....
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Amerson v. Vandiver, 673 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 26, 2009 | 285 Ga. 49, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 264

...805, 807(2), 426 S.E.2d 901 (1992); In the Interest of S.L., 189 Ga.App. 361, 363, 375 S.E.2d 484 (1988) (on motion for rehearing); In the Interest of C.M., 172 Ga.App. 757, 324 S.E.2d 581 (1984); Dan E. McConaughey, Ga. Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody, § 22:14, p. 851 (2007-2008 ed.). However, under OCGA § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), except in connection with an adoption proceeding, which has not occurred here, the juvenile court is the sole court for initiating action involving any proceeding for the termination of parental rights....
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Gutierrez v. State, 290 Ga. 643 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 6, 2012 | 723 S.E.2d 658, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 356

CARLEY, Presiding Justice. Francisco Gutierrez was indicted in superior court for armed robbery and other offenses even though he was 16 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. See OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (A) (vii) (giving superior court exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of any child 13 to 17 years old accused of armed robbery committed with a firearm). Gutierrez moved to transfer the case to juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B). At a hearing on that motion, the State presented evidence that Guiterrez and four other males, armed with a handgun and other weapons, entered the back door of a restaurant and began demanding money and using an aluminum baseball bat to strike Susan Jiang, who was the owner of the restaurant....
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Stanfield v. Alizota, 294 Ga. 813 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 17, 2014 | 756 S.E.2d 526, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 524

...Court of Appeals correctly observed that in cases where the termination of parental rights is sought in connection with a petition for adoption, superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile courts over termination proceedings. OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) ( C)....
...ive jurisdiction for the termination of parental rights in most cases, superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to terminate parental rights when the termination is in connection with an adoption proceeding. See Ertter, 292 Ga. at 104- 105; OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) ( C). We note, however, that under recent comprehensive revisions to the Juvenile Code effective January 1, 2014, see Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1/HB 242, OCGA § 15-11-28 has been repealed, and the new statute addressing the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, OCGA § 15-11-10 (2) (D), no longer refers to the superior court as having concurrent jurisdiction in termination proceedings related to adoption, but...
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State v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 623 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2007 | 641 S.E.2d 515

...The State moved to stay the transfer, arguing that, prior to indictment, the superior court, on its own accord, had no authority to transfer the cases to juvenile court once the State had elected to pursue them in superior court. The superior court denied the State’s motion, finding that, although OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (1) granted it concurrent jurisdiction over the cases before it, the statute is unconstitutional in that it violates separation of powers, equal protection, and due process....
...ted a delinquent act which would be considered a crime if tried in a superior court and for which the child may be punished by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal institution.” OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (1)....
...ansfer the cases to juvenile court prior to indictment. The legislature has made clear that the district attorney, and not the court, makes the election regarding whether to pursue a case against ajuvenile in superior court or juvenile court. SeeOCGA§ 15-11-28 (b) (2) (C) (“Before indictment, the district attorney may, after investigation and for extraordinary cause, decline prosecution in the superior court of a child 13 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed [one of the seven serious offenses specified in OCGA§ 15-11-28 (b) (2) (A)]”) (emphasis supplied); OCGA § 15-18-6 (4) (It is the district attorney’s duty “[t]o draw up all indictments or presentments ......
...te, to transfer it prior to indictment. Accordingly, the superior court exceeded its authority in transferring Henderson and McClendon’s armed robbery cases to juvenile court after the State had elected to pursue the cases in superior court. OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (B), (C). 2. The superior court concluded that OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (1) violates due process, equal protection, and separation of powers by failing to provide for judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision to charge minors in superior court rather than juvenile court. However, this Court has previously rejected similar arguments in Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592 (385 SE2d 661) (1989) and Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821 (462 SE2d 716) (1995). OCGA§ 15-11-28 (b) (1) is constitutional....
...See OCGA § 16-7-80 (8); see also New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341 (1), n. 3 (606 SE2d 865) (2004). We need not address whether the superior court was correct in concluding that it did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Henderson and McLendon (see OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (A)), as it is clear that the court had jurisdiction over the cases, regardless of whether such jurisdiction was concurrent or exclusive.