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2018 Georgia Code 17-13-22 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 13. Criminal Extradition, 17-13-1 through 17-13-49.

ARTICLE 2 UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT

17-13-22. Duty of Governor to have fugitives from justice arrested and delivered to executive authorities of other states.

Subject to this article, the Constitution of the United States, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.

(Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 2.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Use of "demand" not required.

- Actual use of the word "demand" in the requisition is not required. Pahno v. Mathews, 226 Ga. 216, 173 S.E.2d 704 (1970).

Use of "request" constitutes a demand.

- Requisition of the Governor of another state using the word "request" rather than "demand," constitutes a demand by that state upon this state to return the prisoner, as is required by this section. Pahno v. Mathews, 226 Ga. 216, 173 S.E.2d 704 (1970).

Misdemeanor conviction is extraditable. Graham v. State, 231 Ga. 820, 204 S.E.2d 630 (1974).

Offenses for which fugitive may be tried.

- Fugitive from justice may be tried for any offense committed in the state to which the fugitive is returned, though the offense may have been committed before the demand and surrender, and though it be not the particular offense on account of which the fugitive was brought back for trial. Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347, 16 S.E. 945, 35 Am. St. R. 216 (1892), aff'd, 148 U.S. 537, 13 S. Ct. 687, 37 L. Ed. 549 (1893).

Not a fugitive from justice if not in demanding state at time of indictment.

- Person for whose delivery a demand has been made under U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2, and who shows conclusively, and upon conceded facts, that the person was not within the demanding state at the time stated in the indictment, nor at any time when the acts were, if ever, committed, is not a fugitive from justice. Dawson v. Smith, 150 Ga. 350, 103 S.E. 846 (1920) (superseded by later cases, see Aikens v. Turner, 241 Ga. 401, 245 S.E.2d 660 (1978); Hutson v. Stoner, 244 Ga. 52, 257 S.E.2d 539 (1979)).

Applicability to persons who voluntarily enter state.

- Neither the language of Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 2 nor former Penal Code 1910, § 1352 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-13-4 or O.C.G.A § 17-13-22) limited the arrest and rendition to one who voluntarily comes within this state. Kelly v. Mangum, 145 Ga. 57, 88 S.E. 556 (1916).

Warrant is but prima facie evidence sufficient to hold accused.

- In extradition proceedings, if the Governor of the state upon whom the demand is made issues a warrant for the apprehension and delivery of such a person, the warrant is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused, and it is open to the accused, on habeas corpus proceedings, to show some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed, the presumption being that the Governor has complied with the law. Dawson v. Smith, 150 Ga. 350, 103 S.E. 846 (1920).

Guilt not in issue on writ of habeas corpus.

- Courts of the asylum state cannot, upon a writ of habeas corpus, inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused. Barranger v. Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S.E. 524, 68 Am. St. R. 113 (1898); Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264, 57 S.E. 484 (1907).

Burden in habeas corpus case of showing why warrant should not be executed.

- When, in the trial of a habeas corpus case, it appears that the respondent holds the petitioner in custody under an executive warrant based upon an extradition proceeding, and the warrant is regular on the warrant's face, the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed. The presumption is that the Governor has complied with the Constitution and the law, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears. Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427 (1953); Baldwin v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 390, 116 S.E.2d 207 (1960).

Allegations insufficient to bar extradition.

- Allegations that the state waited a year and half to send a warrant and that the conviction was only a misdemeanor, and that the petitioner had obtained work, married, and now has a family, and has incurred obligations, even if proved, are not sufficient to act as a bar to extradition proceedings. Graham v. State, 231 Ga. 820, 204 S.E.2d 630 (1974).

Cited in Hart v. Mangum, 146 Ga. 497, 91 S.E. 543 (1917); Powell v. Brown, 281 Ga. 609, 641 S.E.2d 519 (2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

General Assembly intended that misdemeanors be covered.

- This section, by the use of the words "other crime," clearly expresses the intention of the General Assembly that the Governor shall extradite persons charged with a misdemeanor in other states. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 251.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, § 90 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35 C.J.S. (Rev), Extradition and Detainers, § 3 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.) § 2.

ALR.

- Sanity or insanity or pendency of lunacy proceedings as matters for consideration in extradition proceedings, 114 A.L.R. 693.

Necessity that demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition proceedings, 90 A.L.R.3d 1085.

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