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Call Now: 904-383-7448The arrest of a person may be lawfully made by any peace officer or private person, without a warrant, upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but when so arrested, the accused must be taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and complaint must be made against him under oath, setting forth the ground for the arrest, as provided in Code Section 17-13-33; and thereafter the answer of the accused shall be heard as if he had been arrested on a warrant.
(Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 14; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 17.)
- O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34 is justified under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it is based upon a standard which comports with the constitutional standard of probable cause as set forth in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).
§ 17-4-20 for warrantless arrest. - While under former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20), a lawful arrest without a warrant can be made by an officer only if the offense is committed in the officer's presence; if the offender is endeavoring to escape; or if for other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant, the General Assembly by the enactment of Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 14 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34) made provision for another instance in which an arrest without a warrant might be lawfully made. Fields v. State, 211 Ga. 335, 85 S.E.2d 753 (1955); Wheeler v. Stynchcombe, 234 Ga. 240, 215 S.E.2d 244 (1975).
- Taking a defendant before a judge for a commitment hearing on Monday after defendant's Friday arrest satisfies the "all practicable speed" requirement. Wheeler v. Stynchcombe, 234 Ga. 240, 215 S.E.2d 244 (1975).
- When an officer believes that an out-of-state warrant has been issued, and this belief is based on reliable information from out-of-state officials that the issuance of a warrant is imminent, this amounts to probable cause to arrest, which is the applicable standard for a warrantless arrest in Georgia, even if this belief is mistaken and does not meet the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34 that the officer have "reasonable information." Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).
- Trial court properly dismissed an inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted based on a finding that such was prematurely filed in that no governor's warrant had been issued or served from the seeking state at the time the petition was filed and the inmate had only been arrested for Georgia offenses; moreover, to the extent that the inmate might have been seeking to challenge an arrest without a warrant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34, insufficient facts were pled which supported such a claim. Powell v. Brown, 281 Ga. 609, 641 S.E.2d 519 (2007).
Cited in Bearden v. State, 223 Ga. 381, 155 S.E.2d 5 (1967); Cota v. Benson, 239 Ga. 695, 238 S.E.2d 332 (1977); Batton v. Griffin, 240 Ga. 450, 241 S.E.2d 201 (1978).
- Prior to the issuance of a requisition for extradition, an officer of this state is not authorized to make an arrest under a warrant issued by an inferior court of another state. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 362.
- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, § 58.
- 35 C.J.S. (Rev), Extradition and Detainers, §§ 21, 22, 95.
- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.) § 14.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-01-22
Citation: 641 S.E.2d 519, 281 Ga. 609, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 188, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 31
Snippet: shows conclusively, an arrest pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-34 (see infra), Powell filed a petition for a writ
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1983-09-07
Citation: 306 S.E.2d 629, 251 Ga. 487, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 797
Snippet: trial court's overruling her challenge to OCGA § 17-13-34 (Code Ann. § 44-414) as violating the Fourth,