Hearing.

- Statutory purpose of the hearing and the entering of specific written findings is to allow the court to determine whether the court will order restitution and, if so, in what amount. Westmoreland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 173, 384 S.E.2d 249 (1989).

No due process violation.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 27-3008 - 27-3010 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-8 -17-14-10) contemplated a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution and the amount thereof; thus, the statutory provisions on restitution do not deny defendant's due process rights to a hearing on the damage issue. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980).

O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 contemplates a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution. Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 289 S.E.2d 270 (1982); Taylor v. State, 182 Ga. App. 494, 356 S.E.2d 216 (1987); Britt v. State, 232 Ga. App. 780, 503 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

Presentence hearing required.

- Sentence imposing restitution on a defendant cannot stand in the absence of a presentence hearing. Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 471, 367 S.E.2d 320 (1988); Owens v. State, 187 Ga. App. 262, 369 S.E.2d 919 (1988); Radford v. State, 223 Ga. App. 312, 477 S.E.2d 428 (1996); Isaac v. State, 237 Ga. App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (1999).

In a case of child molestation, the trial court erred in ordering restitution without holding a restitution hearing and that portion of the defendant's probationary sentence which imposed reimbursement for psychological counseling of the victims required vacating and remand for a hearing on the issue of restitution in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8. Potts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 863, 429 S.E.2d 526 (1993).

Necessity of complying with procedural requirements.

- That portion of the defendant's sentence which imposed restitution as a condition of probation was reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction that a hearing on the issue of restitution be held at which O.C.G.A. § 17-14-9, regarding the amount, and the factors in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10 were to be considered, and the trial court was further directed that the written finding required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 be made. Murphy v. State, 182 Ga. App. 791, 357 S.E.2d 147 (1987).

Remand proper when no written findings.

- When the appeal's court is unable to discern from the designated record any written findings as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8(a), the portion of the sentence imposing restitution will be vacated and remanded to the trial court for the preparation of written findings in compliance with that section. Howard v. State, 213 Ga. App. 542, 445 S.E.2d 532 (1994).

Written findings no longer required.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq., written findings are no longer required when ordering an offender to make restitution; as a result, Garrett v. State, 175 Ga. App. 400, 333 S.E.2d 432 (1985), and its progeny, are disapproved to extent those cases were authority for any cases involving restitution orders issued on or after July 1, 2005, the effective date of the Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008).

Restitution damages proper.

- Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that the defendant caused the $5,306.28 in damages to a stolen truck since the defendant was found in possession of the truck, and therefore the defendant was responsible for all damages that the truck incurred; as a result, the trial court properly ordered the defendant to pay a judgment of restitution in the amount of $5,306.28. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008).

Effect on recidivist statute.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 requires the trial court to consider fact of tender of restitution by criminal offender to a victim before imposing the sentence, the failure of the trial court to consider this fact was not error since the sentence imposed was mandatory under the recidivist statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7). Chappell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 77, 296 S.E.2d 629 (1982).

Amount vacated because conviction to which restitution order was attached was reversed.

- Because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant, a mortgage consultant, did not intend to perform the services paid for by a client, only that conviction, out of eight entered by the jury, and the restitution order attached to the conviction, had to be reversed. Patterson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (2008).

Cited in Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga. App. 285, 287 S.E.2d 746 (1982); Bridges v. State, 208 Ga. App. 555, 431 S.E.2d 164 (1993); Willard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 469, 535 S.E.2d 820 (2000); Miller v. State, 264 Ga. App. 801, 592 S.E.2d 450 (2003).