O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 (2019)

Apportionment of payments for fines and restitution; payment to victims

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) In any case in which a court sentences an offender to pay restitution and a fine, if the court permits the offender to pay such restitution and fine in other than a lump sum, the clerk of any superior court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official who receives such partial payments shall apply not less than one-half of each payment to the restitution before paying any portion of such fine or any forfeitures, costs, fees, or surcharges provided for by law to any agency, department, commission, committee, authority, board, or bureau of state or local government. (b) The clerk of any court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official who receives partial payments for restitution shall pay the restitution amount to the victim as provided in the restitution order not later than the last day of each month, provided that the amount exceeds $100.00. If the amount does not exceed $100.00, the clerk of any court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official may allow the amount of restitution to accumulate until such time as it exceeds $100.00 or until the end of the next calendar quarter, whichever occurs first.

History

Code 1933, § 27-3008, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1382, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 5/HB 172; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-36/HB 310.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 1/HB 172, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005.’ ’’ Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015. Law reviews. - For annual survey article discussing developments in criminal law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (1999). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Hearing. - Statutory purpose of the hearing and the entering of specific written findings is to allow the court to determine whether the court will order restitution and, if so, in what amount. Westmoreland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 173, 384 S.E.2d 249 (1989). No due process violation. - Former Code 1933, §§ 27-3008 - 27-3010 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-8 - 17-14-10) contemplated a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution and the amount thereof; thus, the statutory provisions on restitution do not deny defendant’s due process rights to a hearing on the damage issue. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 contemplates a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution. Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 289 S.E.2d 270 (1982); Taylor v. State, 182 Ga. App. 494, 356 S.E.2d 216 (1987); Britt v. State, 232 Ga. App. 780, 503 S.E.2d 653 (1998). Presentence hearing required. - Sentence imposing restitution on a defendant cannot stand in the absence of a presentence hearing. Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 471, 367 S.E.2d 320 (1988); Owens v. State, 187 Ga. App. 262, 369 S.E.2d 919 (1988); Radford v. State, 223 Ga. App. 312, 477 S.E.2d 428 (1996); Isaac v. State, 237 Ga. App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (1999). In a case of child molestation, the trial court erred in ordering restitution without holding a restitution hearing and that portion of the defendant’s probationary sentence which imposed reimbursement for psychological counseling of the victims required vacating and remand for a hearing on the issue of restitution in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8. Potts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 863, 429 S.E.2d 526 (1993). Necessity of complying with procedural requirements. - That portion of the defendant’s sentence which imposed restitution as a condition of probation was reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction that a hearing on the issue

of restitution be held at which O.C.G.A. § 17-14-9, regarding the amount, and the factors in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10 were to be considered, and the trial court was further directed that the written finding required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 be made. Murphy v. State, 182 Ga. App. 791, 357 S.E.2d 147 (1987). Remand proper when no written findings. - When the appeal’s court is unable to discern from the designated record any written findings as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8(a), the portion of the sentence imposing restitution will be vacated and remanded to the trial court for the preparation of written findings in compliance with that section. Howard v. State, 213 Ga. App. 542, 445 S.E.2d 532 (1994). Written findings no longer required. - Under O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq., written findings are no longer required when ordering an offender to make restitution; as a result, Garrett v. State, 175 Ga. App. 400, 333 SE2d 432 (1985), and its progeny, are disapproved to extent those cases were authority for any cases involving restitution orders issued on or after July 1, 2005, the effective date of the Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008). Restitution damages proper. - Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in concluding that the defendant caused the $5,306.28 in damages to a stolen truck since the defendant was found in possession of the truck, and therefore the defendant was responsible for all damages that the truck incurred; as a result, the trial court properly ordered the defendant to pay a judgment of restitution in the amount of $5,306.28. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008). Effect on recidivist statute. - Although O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 requires the trial court to consider fact of tender of restitution by criminal offender to a victim before imposing the sentence, the failure of the trial court to consider this fact

was not error since the sentence imposed was mandatory under the recidivist statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7). Chappell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 77, 296 S.E.2d 629 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020). Amount vacated because conviction to which restitution order was attached was reversed. - Because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant, a mortgage consultant, did not intend to

perform the services paid for by a client, only that conviction, out of eight entered by the jury, and the restitution order attached to the conviction, had to be reversed. Patterson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (2008). Cited in Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga. App. 285, 287 S.E.2d 746 (1982); Bridges v. State, 208 Ga. App. 555, 431 S.E.2d 164 (1993); Willard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 469, 535 S.E.2d 820 (2000); Miller v. State, 264 Ga. App. 801, 592 S.E.2d 450 (2003).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 36 cases, 1985–2008 · leading case: Miller v. State, 592 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
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Miller v. State, 592 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 10× “2 Several years later, Miller filed the instant “Motion to Amend Restitution Order” claiming that, at the time restitution was ordered during sentencing, the trial court failed to make specific findings about his ability to pay restitution as required by OCGA §§ 17-14-8 and…”
McCart v. State, 658 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 8× “754, 756 (3) ( 272 SE2d 709 ) (1980): We find that [former OCGA §§ 17-14-8] through [17-14-10] contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount thereof.”
Cheeks v. State, 460 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 16× “" It referred to the statute providing for such and listed the first six factors set out in OCGA § 17-14-10, stating that it considered them and, as required by OCGA § 17-14-8, found "[t]hat restitution will be ordered as a condition of the relief.”
Garrett v. State, 333 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “Are findings to be made with respect to the factors set out in OCGA § 17-14-10? If so, we do not believe that OCGA § 17-14-8 (b), which provides that “[t]he failure to make a finding as required by this Code section, however, shall not invalidate any order or other action of the…”
Fonseca v. State, 441 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 8× “"OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount thereof.”
Westmoreland v. State, 384 S.E.2d 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “Specifically, appellant asserts there were no specific written findings by the court in ordering restitution as required by OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10, and that the probation officer failed to conduct a fair investigation causing appellant to be ordered to pay more than…”
Bridges v. State, 431 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 6× “In his first enumeration, citing OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10, Bridges argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution in the absence of a presentence hearing, despite his request.”
Patterson v. State, 658 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “Patterson also contends that the court erred in failing to enter written factual findings as to those factors pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-8. Finally, he challenges the amount of restitution ordered, $42,589.”
Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “889, 890 (3) ( 449 SE2d 364 ), this court erroneously applied OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 to the requirement that defendant make reimbursement for his attorney fee.”
Slater v. State, 555 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “Second, OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 specifically contemplate a hearing on the issue of restitution.”
Brown v. State, 449 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “§ 27-3009 [now OCGA § 17-14-9] and the factors in Code Ann. § 27-3010 [now OCGA § 17-14-10] are to be considered and we further direct that the written finding required by Code Ann.”
Isaac v. State, 516 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 3× “Therefore, we must reverse that portion of appellant’s sentence which imposes restitution and remand the case to the trial court with direction that a hearing on the issue of restitution be held at which OCGA § 17-14-9 and the factors in OCGA § 17-14-10 are to be considered and…”
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— 17-14-8(a)(4) — 1 case
Cheeks v. State, 460 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). “" It referred to the statute providing for such and listed the first six factors set out in OCGA § 17-14-10, stating that it considered them and, as required by OCGA § 17-14-8, found "[t]hat restitution will be ordered as a condition of the relief.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.