Search incident to arrest.

- Officers were authorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1 to search the vehicle incident to the defendant's arrest, and the fact that the officers might have expected to find contraband did not lessen the officers' authority to search. Polke v. State, 241 Ga. App. 891, 528 S.E.2d 537 (2000).

Reasonable basis for search.

- Without any evidence that an officer had a reasonable basis for concluding that defendant was armed, or posed a threat to the officer's safety, a pat-down search is not authorized and violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Edgell v. State, 253 Ga. App. 775, 560 S.E.2d 532 (2002).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of contraband as the defendant's nervous behavior and the fact that the police officer's experience allowed the officer to conclude that where drugs were involved, as was true in the defendant's case, weapons were usually found, made the officer's patdown search of the defendant for weapons permissible and the resulting methamphetamine that was found in defendant's pocket was properly seized since the officer knew exactly what it was when the officer touched it while patting down the defendant. Holmes v. State, 267 Ga. App. 651, 601 S.E.2d 134 (2004).

No not guilty verdict on basis of illegal arrest.

- Defendant in a criminal case cannot claim a verdict declaring the defendant to be not guilty on the ground that the defendant was illegally arrested. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

Standing to contest search.

- Defendant has no standing to complain of warrantless search of a stolen automobile. Montgomery v. State, 159 Ga. App. 446, 283 S.E.2d 663 (1981).

Rule governing vehicle searches.

- For purposes of searching a vehicle contemporaneously with the lawful arrest of an individual, the state rule is the same as the federal rule. Such a search, legal under federal law, is legal under state law. Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466 (1991).

"Plain-feel" doctrine only applies when item is immediately apparent as contraband.

- Motion to suppress was properly granted when during a Terry pat-down an officer felt a lump in the defendant's coin pocket but during the officer's testimony the officer did not articulate any distinguishing characteristics that would reasonably lead the officer to believe that the object was contraband rather than a legal substance. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 589 S.E.2d 647 (2003).

Cited in Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368 (1968); Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969); Davidson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 502, 188 S.E.2d 124 (1972); Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879 (1972); Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973); Rockholt v. State, 129 Ga. App. 99, 198 S.E.2d 885 (1973); Brewer v. State, 129 Ga. App. 118, 199 S.E.2d 109 (1973); Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 393, 199 S.E.2d 578 (1973); Rautenstrauch v. State, 129 Ga. App. 381, 199 S.E.2d 613 (1973); Brice v. State, 129 Ga. App. 535, 199 S.E.2d 895 (1973); Morrison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 558, 200 S.E.2d 286 (1973); Jones v. State, 131 Ga. App. 699, 206 S.E.2d 601 (1974); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771, 208 S.E.2d 825 (1974); Godwin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 397, 211 S.E.2d 7 (1974); Patterson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 742, 212 S.E.2d 858 (1975); Pierce v. State, 134 Ga. App. 14, 213 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35 (1975); Smith v. State, 138 Ga. App. 226, 225 S.E.2d 744 (1976); State v. Mathis, 143 Ga. App. 121, 237 S.E.2d 643 (1977); Cook v. State, 145 Ga. App. 544, 244 S.E.2d 64 (1978); Orr v. State, 145 Ga. App. 459, 244 S.E.2d 247 (1978); McCarty v. State, 146 Ga. App. 389, 246 S.E.2d 416 (1978); Kiriaze v. State, 147 Ga. App. 832, 250 S.E.2d 568 (1978); Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337 (1979); Starr v. State, 159 Ga. App. 386, 283 S.E.2d 630 (1981); Watson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 618, 284 S.E.2d 636 (1981); Denson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 713, 285 S.E.2d 69 (1981); Butler v. State, 159 Ga. App. 895, 285 S.E.2d 610 (1981); Ivory v. State, 160 Ga. App. 193, 286 S.E.2d 435 (1981); Robertson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 715, 288 S.E.2d 362 (1982); Wesley v. State, 162 Ga. App. 737, 293 S.E.2d 27 (1982); Overman v. State, 250 Ga. 494, 299 S.E.2d 542 (1983); Powell v. State, 170 Ga. App. 185, 316 S.E.2d 779 (1984); Vaughn v. State, 173 Ga. App. 716, 327 S.E.2d 747 (1985); Minor v. State, 180 Ga. App. 869, 350 S.E.2d 783 (1986); United States v. D'Angelo, 819 F.2d 1062 (11th Cir. 1987); Wade v. State, 184 Ga. App. 97, 360 S.E.2d 647 (1987); Martin v. State, 185 Ga. App. 145, 363 S.E.2d 765 (1987); Baxter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 598, 373 S.E.2d 834 (1988); Burroughs v. State, 190 Ga. App. 467, 379 S.E.2d 175 (1989); State v. Nelson, 261 Ga. 246, 404 S.E.2d 112 (1991); Loden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 683, 406 S.E.2d 103 (1991); Gebremedhin v. State, 202 Ga. App. 811, 415 S.E.2d 529 (1992); Florence v. State, 246 Ga. App. 479, 539 S.E.2d 901 (2000); Freeman v. State, 248 Ga. App. 363, 548 S.E.2d 616 (2001); Bain v. State, 258 Ga. App. 440, 574 S.E.2d 590 (2002); Banks v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. 543, 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004); Selvy v. Morrison, 292 Ga. App. 702, 665 S.E.2d 401 (2008).

Section permits seizure of evidence when lawful arrest effected.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1 permits the discovery and seizure of an instrumentality, or any item, substance, object or thing which is tangible evidence of the commission of the crime, when a lawful arrest has been effected and the search is made in the area of the person's immediate presence. Watkins v. State, 160 Ga. App. 9, 285 S.E.2d 758 (1981).

Since the defendant's warrantless arrest after being found at the home of a friend was justified under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) in connection with the murder of another of defendant's friends and the disappearance of defendant's spouse, a search incident to the arrest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1(4) permitted the police to search a duffel bag that was on the floor in the bedroom where the defendant was arrested because the bag was in the defendant's "immediate presence" and could be seized and searched for items used in the commission of the crime or crimes. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2004).

Because the police were authorized to seize marijuana found in plain view, seen through the window of an apartment where the police were executing an arrest warrant on another individual, once the defendant answered a knock on the apartment door, police also had the right to search incident to the defendant's arrest for possession of marijuana and based on the exigency of the circumstances; hence, the trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress the marijuana without explaining the court's interpretation of the evidence or ruling on the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Venzen, 286 Ga. App. 597, 649 S.E.2d 851 (2007).

Because an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant at the scene of an accident for driving without the defendant's driver's license in the defendant's immediate possession, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29, the officer's search of the defendant's person as the officer placed the defendant in handcuffs and in the squad car was a valid search incident to an arrest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1; gun evidence seized from the car was admissible because the car was impounded due to being undriveable from the accident. State v. McCloud, 344 Ga. App. 595, 810 S.E.2d 668 (2018).

Section permits seizure of evidence from vehicle compartment when lawful arrest.

- When a defendant was pulled over for playing the car radio too loudly in violation of city noise ordinances and the officer noted that the windshield was cracked, and after the officer confirmed by radio that the defendant's license had been suspended, there was probable cause for arrest; because of the lawful arrest and the necessity to impound the defendant's vehicle due to the vehicle's unsafe condition, the officer was authorized to search the passenger compartment. Thus, the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence of contraband on the basis that the evidence stemmed from a pretextual stop unsupported by articulable suspicion or probable cause. Freeman v. State, 195 Ga. App. 357, 393 S.E.2d 496 (1990).

Defendant had standing to raise a challenge to a search of a vehicle in which the defendant was riding as a passenger because the defendant could challenge the prolonged detention and the subsequent vehicle search. However, the taint of the illegal detention was thereafter purged by the intervening arrest of the defendant on outstanding warrants, which then justified the officer's lawful search incident to an arrest and, accordingly, marijuana found in the passenger compartment of the car was not subject to suppression under the principles established by U.S. Const., amend. IV, Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, or the Georgia Code. State v. Cooper, 260 Ga. App. 333, 579 S.E.2d 754 (2003).

As the defendant was lawfully arrested for traffic violations, the search of the vehicle's passenger compartment incident to that arrest was valid under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1, the Fourth Amendment, and the Georgia Constitution. Garcia v. State, 293 Ga. App. 422, 667 S.E.2d 205 (2008).

Property taken from defendant at sheriff's office.

- There was no error in the warrantless search of the shoes taken from the defendant at the sheriff 's office and later introduced into evidence. Property which the arrestee elected to take with the arrestee to jail was subject to search under an analysis similar to that allowing search incident to an arrest. Batton v. State, 260 Ga. 127, 391 S.E.2d 914 (1990).

Elements needed to show informer gives probable cause for search.

- To establish probable cause (whether for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate or, under exigent circumstances, for a search without a warrant) three elements are essential: that there is reason to accept an informer's reliability; that the facts are sufficient to show how the informer obtained the information or that the criminal activity is described in such detail as to negate its being a mere rumor; and, that the information is current, not stale. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

Informer's past reliability versus veracity of current information.

- One may act on the information of an informer as to whom the magic phrase "has given reliable information in the past" cannot be applied. An averment of previous reliability is not essential; the question is whether the informant's present information is truthful and reliable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Information can come from informer through other police.

- Factual information relayed by police to other law enforcement officers is not per se subject to a "double hearsay" objection, the question being whether probable cause is shown. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Probable cause does not justify invasion of house without proving emergency.

- Probable cause, however well founded, can provide no justification for a warrantless intrusion of a person's home absent a showing "that the exigencies of the situation" made that course imperative. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975).

When the circumstances are insufficient to warrant an arrest.

- Under former Code 1933, § 326-2614 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-44), Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1) did not offer a basis for the officer's warrantless intrusion of the defendant's apartment. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975).

Civil protective custody is not a criminal arrest.

- Drug evidence found in a defendant's pocket by a police officer who was executing a civil order to apprehend the defendant for a mental health evaluation under O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-41(a) and37-7-41(b) should have been suppressed because such an order authorized civil protective custody, not a criminal arrest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1; because no criminal arrest had taken place based on probable cause, the defendant had not been arrested such that a search incident to an arrest was authorized. Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 644, 639 S.E.2d 584 (2006).

Reasonable nature of seizure varies with case.

- Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2 (1980) (opinion of Smith, J., concurring specially).

Reasonable nature of seizure is not determined by ease in getting search warrant.

- Practicability of procuring a search warrant is not a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search. Some flexibility will be accorded law officers. Thomas v. State, 118 Ga. App. 359, 163 S.E.2d 850 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943, 89 S. Ct. 1273, 22 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1969).

Search can be made with consent as well as lawful arrest.

- Legal search may be made incident to a lawful arrest or by consent of the owner of the premises or property. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967).

Prevention of destruction of contraband.

- Trial court's finding that an officer's right to search defendant upon arresting the defendant encompassed the right to ask the defendant to empty the defendant's mouth of its contents; furthermore, because the arrest was lawful, the officer was authorized to discover or seize any item that was unlawful to possess, and, even though the officer did not know exactly what was in the defendant's mouth, the officer's suspicion that it may have been an unlawful item was reasonable under the circumstances. Sanders v. State, 247 Ga. App. 170, 543 S.E.2d 452 (2000).

Bloody clothing freely given is admissible evidence.

- Bloody sweater and shoes of a defendant who is charged with robbery by intimidation, when voluntarily given to the officer, are admissible and the defendant cannot complain of being compelled to testify against oneself. Moton v. State, 225 Ga. 401, 169 S.E.2d 320 (1969).

Consent after momentary stop with reasonable suspicion not consent after illegal arrest.

- When the momentary detention of the defendant's car was "an intrusion short of arrest" and when the officer had "specific and articulable facts" to provoke a "reasonable and founded suspicion," assertions that the consent to search was not valid because consent was given after an illegal arrest were without merit. Huffman v. State, 149 Ga. App. 464, 254 S.E.2d 489, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918, 100 S. Ct. 236, 62 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1979).

Head of household gives effective consent.

- Voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Montgomery v. State, 155 Ga. App. 423, 270 S.E.2d 825 (1980).

Third party car owner who turns over defendant's suitcases.

- If an individual, in whose car defendant's luggage is placed prior to the defendant's arrest, is torn between two unattractive alternatives - keeping the unwanted luggage or turning the luggage over - and finally decides to take a police receipt and give the luggage to the police, the individual's consent is voluntary and effective. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

When the defendant, in making no provision for the luggage, in effect abandons the luggage in an individual's automobile with no undertaking from the individual to keep the luggage, the individual is at best a reluctant bailee, and thus the defendant's argument that the individual has no authority to dispose of the luggage, by turning the luggage over to the police, is clearly erroneous. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Test determining whether consent to search is voluntary is the "totality of the circumstances" under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) and United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1978); Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Burden on state to show consent.

- Whether or not consent to search was freely given is an issue on which the state must carry the burden of proof. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Search for weapons or contraband incident to arrest.

- Once defendant has been placed under custodial arrest, police may search the defendant's person, incident to that arrest, for weapons or contraband. Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 285 S.E.2d 741 (1981).

Transcript showed that deputies were conducting a legitimate Terry search of the defendant's jacket for weapons when the cocaine was discovered; therefore, seizure of the cocaine was incident to a lawful arrest. Montoya v. State, 232 Ga. App. 24, 499 S.E.2d 699 (1998).

Because the defendant was handcuffed to ensure the officers' safety after a pistol-like device was found and the handcuffs were removed before the agent spoke with the defendant, the defendant's statement to the agent that the defendant used drugs that evening gave the agent probable cause for the defendant's arrest; the defendant was then searched incident to a lawful arrest. Bond v. State, 271 Ga. App. 849, 610 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Immediate search of area for weapons.

- Officer is entitled to make a reasonable search of the immediate area for weapons. Mobley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 80, 202 S.E.2d 465 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 232 S.E.2d 233 (1977).

Search including area where defendant might reach.

- It is reasonable for an officer to search an area surrounding the arrest area into which a suspect might reach to obtain a weapon. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980).

In exigent circumstances, police officers are authorized, pursuant to a lawful arrest, to enter upon the premises and conduct a reasonable search of the suspects' persons and immediate presence, including a search under a piece of furniture where one of the suspects was observed reaching for or disposing of an unknown object, which might reasonably be thought to be either a weapon or evidence. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443 (1983).

Weapons within lunging area properly seized.

- Trial court properly denies a motion to suppress evidence of weapons found in a box within the arrestee's "lunging area" when the law enforcement officer knew that the arrestee was armed. Smallwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. 247, 304 S.E.2d 95 (1983).

Officer may remove weapons.

- It is reasonable that when a lawful arrest is made the arresting officer may remove any weapons that the suspect might seek to use to try to resist arrest or to escape. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980).

If limited "pat down" sufficient, only limited "stop and frisk" allowed.

- If a search of a person is conducted pursuant to this section and a limited "pat down" of the person's outer clothing would be sufficient to satisfy the police officer's suspicion that a weapon was being concealed, only a limited "stop and frisk" search is permitted. Merritt v. State, 133 Ga. App. 956, 213 S.E.2d 84 (1975).

Limitations on search incident to arrest.

- Except under exigent and unusual circumstances, a search incident to arrest can be held reasonable only for the purposes of preventing the defendant from accessing a weapon or evidence which the defendant may destroy, and this usually limits the search to the defendant's person and clothing, and that very narrow area surrounding the defendant where the defendant might reach even though under restraint. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481 (1970).

Seizure of instrumentalities used to commit crime.

- Instrumentalities used to commit a crime may also be seized during arrest without search warrants. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967).

Searching entire house to discover occupants and preserve evidence permitted.

- Subsequent to warrantless entrance under exigent circumstances, officers were authorized to make a search of the entire house for the limited purpose of securing the house, i.e., discovering the presence of all occupants and eliminating the possibility of harm to the officers and the destruction of evidence. Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).

Officer was entitled to search the defendant's person and immediate presence pursuant to the defendant's valid arrest for marijuana possession, and was further entitled to a limited search of the entire house, and to seizure of cocaine that was spotted in plain view. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 477 S.E.2d 910 (1996).

Searching trailer justified when defendant took guns and lied about location.

- When a murder had just been committed by the defendant and the defendant retreated to the defendant's trailer with the gun in the defendant's hand and misstated the gun's location upon arrest, the limited immediate search conducted by an officer to find the murder weapon was reasonable and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979).

Searching house justified if police likely noticed by defendants.

- When several persons were in the house before the defendant's arrest, two persons were seen fleeing the house after the defendant's arrest, and the defendant had brought out only a third of the agreed-on sale of marijuana - giving the officers reason to believe that the officers' presence and identity had been detected, and that there was a substantial possibility that the remaining occupant or occupants would attempt to escape or destroy evidence, set up resistance to an eventual entry or plan a desperate flight, a warrantless search was justified. Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).

Evidence of consent sufficient to authorize search of vehicle.

- When the state presents evidence of defendant's free and voluntary consent to search the trunk of the defendant's vehicle and of the subsequent creation of probable cause as to the suitcase by defendant's statement to the officers that the suitcase contained marijuana, along with the exigent circumstances arising from the mobility of the automobile, these were circumstances which authorized a warrantless search of the vehicle. Smith v. State, 160 Ga. App. 690, 287 S.E.2d 44 (1981).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug offense, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the items seized from the defendant's vehicle and the defendant's person after a traffic stop as the defendant's failure to wear a seatbelt and to have insurance on the vehicle justified the traffic stop. Thereafter, after being released from the traffic stop and being asked to come back, the defendant consented to the search of the vehicle and of the defendant's person, which led to the seizure of the contraband. Hughes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 404, 667 S.E.2d 163 (2008).

Consensual search following lawful warrantless arrest valid.

- When the warrantless arrest was legal, the search of the accused's car 30 minutes later with the accused's consent, as an incident to a lawful arrest, was proper. Knighton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 390, 304 S.E.2d 512 (1983).

Search of automobile incident to arrest.

- Once passenger was placed under arrest, officer could lawfully search the entire passenger compartment of the defendant's vehicle as a search incident to arrest. Tutu v. State, 252 Ga. App. 12, 555 S.E.2d 241 (2001).

Police officers lawfully arrested the defendant after the officers saw the defendant's companion drive at a high rate of speed and hit a stop sign; furthermore, the officers were allowed to search the car that the defendant's companion was driving after the defendant was arrested, and the trial court erred by suppressing items associated with the use and manufacture of methamphetamine which police found when police searched the car. State v. Lowe, 263 Ga. App. 1, 587 S.E.2d 169 (2003).

Search of the defendant's vehicle incident to the defendant's arrest for driving with a suspended license was not illegal under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1; there was no claim that the defendant was unlawfully arrested, and no violation of a deputy's authority to search incident to the defendant's arrest. Hurley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 482, 651 S.E.2d 748 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 175 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress as the officers could lawfully search the interior of the defendant's car. A sergeant who had received a report of a speeding car had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity having occurred, and after the defendant fled and disobeyed an order to stop, a second officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction following which the car interior could be lawfully searched under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. Spence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 583, 672 S.E.2d 538 (2009).

Seizure of automobile as instrumentality of crime.

- When police officers had probable cause to seize an automobile as an instrumentality of crime, a search was made of the automobile contemporaneously with the automobile's seizure, the police had no way of determining who might have access to the vehicle and could remove and destroy the evidence, and the evidence contained in the automobile was in plain view, there was no error in allowing the results of the warrantless search into evidence since the search was reasonable. Collins v. State, 171 Ga. App. 906, 321 S.E.2d 757 (1984).

Officer may search automobile to find and protect evidence.

- Officer at the time of a lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the accused, a limited area within the control of the person arrested, and of the automobile in the person's possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence. Stoker v. State, 153 Ga. App. 871, 267 S.E.2d 295 (1980).

If probable cause justifies a search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and the vehicle's contents that may conceal the object of the search; contraband lawfully discovered and seized from the passenger area of a vehicle furnishes probable cause for believing that more contraband is contained in the vehicle. Medlin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 551, 309 S.E.2d 639 (1983); Watson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 696, 379 S.E.2d 817 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 547 S.E.2d 664 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 563 S.E.2d 527 (2002).

Warrantless search of an automobile glove compartment was justified for the purpose of attempting to find a robbery weapon which was not found on the defendant's person at the time of arrest since the defendant was in the vehicle when the defendant was arrested for armed robbery. Cain v. State, 178 Ga. App. 247, 342 S.E.2d 742 (1986).

When a driver was lawfully arrested for operating a car without a license and for not having proof of insurance, a police officer did not exceed the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest when the officer searched the car. Vega v. State, 236 Ga. App. 319, 512 S.E.2d 65 (1999).

Evidence insufficient for arrest and evidence seized required suppression.

- Because the circumstances of the defendant's low-speed flight from an uniformed detective, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, were insufficient to present law enforcement with evidence of a particular crime, the defendant could not be charged with the crime of attempting to elude an officer, and the police lacked probable cause sufficient to warrant an arrest for the offense; thus, the search incident to the arrest was invalid, warranting suppression of the evidence seized. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga. App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (2006).

Search of automobile for proof of intoxication.

- Search of a vehicle is proper for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the basis of a suspect's intoxication. Stoker v. State, 153 Ga. App. 871, 267 S.E.2d 295 (1980); State v. Holden, 162 Ga. App. 33, 290 S.E.2d 130 (1982); State v. Elliott, 205 Ga. App. 345, 422 S.E.2d 58 (1992).

If a person is lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of any substance, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle for the purpose of obtaining evidence of intoxication as an incident to that lawful arrest. Knox v. State, 216 Ga. App. 90, 453 S.E.2d 120 (1995).

Abandoned vehicle was searchable.

- Although after committing a traffic violation the defendant attempted to evade arrest so that the defendant's vehicle was no longer in the defendant's immediate presence when the defendant was arrested, that fact did not deprive the officer of authority to search the vehicle. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507 (1997).

Police have probable cause to believe that car contains contraband.

- Automobile in which contraband goods are concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant provided the police have probable cause for believing that the automobile contains the contraband. Still v. State, 149 Ga. App. 792, 256 S.E.2d 133 (1979).

Rationale for search of automobile without warrant.

- Automobile in which contraband goods are concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant provided the police have probable cause for believing that the automobile which the police search contains the contraband. The reason for this rule is obvious. An automobile, unlike a home or place of business, is mobile and can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction; therefore, a search without a warrant is allowed when it is impractical to obtain a warrant. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Search of automobile and closed container therein.

- Broad scope of authority granted to police officers in conducting searches of automobiles pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception extends to the entire passenger compartment of the automobile and any closed containers therein. Bagwell v. State, 214 Ga. App. 15, 446 S.E.2d 739 (1994).

Probable cause needed to search and seize moving vehicle.

- One of the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search is a situation where there is a seizure and search of a moving vehicle, and when the vehicle is indeed moving there is only the requirement that the search and seizure be based upon sufficient probable cause. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

Police may search car later at station house.

- Police officers with probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it was stopped may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. Shaw v. State, 149 Ga. App. 853, 256 S.E.2d 150 (1979).

Impoundment of car when occupants arrested.

- When occupants of a car are arrested, and no one remains to take custody of the car, which has been stopped in a traffic lane, the police are authorized to impound the car, and a resultant inventory is proper. Hansen v. State, 168 Ga. App. 304, 308 S.E.2d 643 (1983).

Limited stop when there is articulable suspicion.

- Limited stop by police officers when there is an articulable suspicion is permissible even though no probable cause exists. Smith v. State, 160 Ga. App. 690, 287 S.E.2d 44 (1981).

Permissible extent of momentary stop.

- Investigatory stop is a brief stop, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion, and limited in scope to identification, licensing of a driver and a vehicle if appropriate, a protective "pat down" of the outer surface of clothing for weapons if the officer has reasonable apprehension that the person is armed or dangerous, and questioning reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initiation of the momentary stop. Clinkscale v. State, 158 Ga. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 341 (1981).

Articulable suspicion less than probable cause.

- Articulable suspicion is less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search, but must be more than mere caprice or arbitrary harassment. Clinkscale v. State, 158 Ga. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 341 (1981).

Specific and articulable suspicion found.

- When, based on the information received from an informant, as well as the officer's own observations, the officer had specific and articulable facts which reasonably warranted a stop of the defendant's vehicle, because the defendant had been identified as a possible suspect in the distribution of illegal drugs, there was sufficient articulable suspicion for the officer to temporarily detain and question the defendant and, after the defendant's arrest, to search the defendant for weapons and contraband. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 197, 540 S.E.2d 212 (2000).

Search without warrant or seizure before seeing magistrate both justified with probable cause.

- For constitutional purposes, there is no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant; given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

Warrantless arrest for fleeing.

- Flight accompanied by other suspicious circumstances will sometimes authorize a warrantless arrest even though the officers do not at the time know that the particular crime for which the arrestee is brought to trial has been committed. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

Search based on outstanding arrest warrant.

- Marijuana found in a search of the defendant incident to the defendant's arrest was admissible under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 because a police dispatcher's statement to an officer that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant provided the probable cause necessary to arrest the defendant and, as a consequence, the search incident to the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. State v. Edwards, 307 Ga. App. 267, 704 S.E.2d 816 (2010).

Searching car stopped for traffic violation without further suspicion.

- If a defendant, while operating an automobile, runs a stop light upon entering a state highway, in the presence of a state police officer, who immediately arrests the defendant for that offense and searches the automobile without the consent of the defendant, and the police officer gives as the officer's only reason for searching the automobile that it was the officer's usual practice to search stopped cars, and no other reason appears from the evidence on a hearing upon a motion to suppress, such a search is unreasonable and illegal. Rowland v. State, 117 Ga. App. 577, 161 S.E.2d 422 (1968).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence that a police officer gathered incident to a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle as the officer was justified in stopping the defendant's vehicle because the officer observed the defendant weave substantially outside the defendant's lane of travel, which was a traffic violation that permitted the officer to stop the defendant's vehicle. Spence v. State, 263 Ga. App. 377, 587 S.E.2d 766 (2003).

Warrantless automobile search must be reasonable.

- If search of an automobile is made by a police officer without a warrant, the test of the search's legality is whether the search was reasonable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-33 did not justify the defendant's continued detention by the police and the officer's decision to detain the defendant while the officer waited for another officer to bring a written warning book was unreasonable; thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not have specific, articulable facts that could constitute a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity thereby making the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and requiring suppression of the evidence seized from the vehicle. Bennett v. State, 285 Ga. App. 796, 648 S.E.2d 126 (2007).

Reasonableness is question for trial judge, not appellate court.

- Reasonableness is not determined by the hindsight of appellate court judges after weeks of academic deliberation; it is determined by the foresight of the officer on the scene who must act in the public interest in a very short space of time. The reasonableness of the officer's action must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Motive for search under section immaterial.

- Whenever a search is made pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, §§ 1 and 2 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-5-1 and17-5-2), the motive for the search is irrelevant. Carson v. State, 241 Ga. 622, 247 S.E.2d 68 (1978).

Right to search based on officer's reasonable belief, not right to arrest.

- Right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for the belief that the contents of the automobile offend the law. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Officer needs only probable cause to believe articles stolen.

- Law does not require knowledge by the officer seizing articles subsequent to an arrest that the articles have been stolen. Probable cause to believe the articles have been stolen is sufficient. Boyd v. State, 133 Ga. App. 136, 210 S.E.2d 251 (1974).

Items in plain view giving probable cause to believe crime occurring.

- When articles are in plain view without a search and are in sufficient connection with the totality of the circumstances to constitute probable cause for the belief that a crime is being committed in the police officers' presence, the arrest is valid and the search incident thereto is reasonable. Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57, 179 S.E.2d 286 (1970).

Plain view.

- Officers are not required to ignore articles that are in plain view and readily observable and seizure of the articles under these circumstances does not make the articles the fruit of an unlawful search since, being in plain view, no search is involved. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481 (1970).

"Plain view" doctrine will support a warrantless search and seizure if the agents are lawfully in a position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Trial court did not err by limiting the admissibility of admissible items in a defendant's felony murder trial to those items seized incident to the defendant's arrest in the early morning hours and in plain view during the processing of the crime scene as an approximately 15-minute video recording of the premises, which was viewed by the trial court, supported the officers' testimony that guns, shell casings, significant amounts of cash, and items appearing to be crack cocaine were all in plain view and, under the circumstances, presented probable cause as being contraband or evidence of the crime of the felony murder of an officer. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the tennis shoes and jeans found in the defendant's motel room with blood on them and the results of the DNA tests showing that the victims' blood was found on them because a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent lawfully seized the shoes and clothes under the plain view doctrine, and the agent seized the shoes and clothes during the execution of the search warrant as the agent knew at the time of the seizure, based on the agent's training and experience, that shoes and clothes worn by the suspect could be evidence of the crimes being investigated. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016).

Entry based on exception to warrant requirement.

- If the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Warrantless search and seizure when sheriff given entry by defendant's spouse.

- If evidence establishes that a warrantless arrest and seizure were unrelated as when a sheriff who seized the items in question was permitted inside defendant's home by a person identified as defendant's spouse, and the items seized were either in plain view or voluntarily given to the sheriff, the evidence does not show a seizure pursuant to an illegal warrantless arrest that should be suppressed. Dickerson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 429, 260 S.E.2d 535 (1979).

If officer's presence is lawful, plain view doctrine applies.

- If a police officer has a right to be in the position from which an object is seen lying in plain view, the object is admissible as evidence. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443 (1983).

There was evidence that when police officers entered the hotel room, the officers saw a pistol butt protruding from under the pillow on which the defendant was lying, clearly within arm's reach, therefore, the introduction of the pistol at trial was not suppressed, although the officers had an arrest warrant for the defendant and not a search warrant for the room. Majors v. State, 203 Ga. App. 139, 416 S.E.2d 156 (1992).

Seizure of fruits of crime within plain view.

- In a trial for murder and armed robbery, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress items seized in the room where the defendant was arrested, which were believed to be clothing belonging to the victim, as the items were possible fruits of the crime and were within plain view of the officers at the time of the arrest. Batton v. State, 260 Ga. 127, 391 S.E.2d 914 (1990).

Police may seize evidence not specifically in warrant.

- When peace officers entered a defendant's residence with an arrest warrant and a search warrant, arrested the defendant and searched the premises, certain articles in plain view having strong evidentiary value as to the crimes charged are not subject to a motion to suppress although not specifically named in the search warrant. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481 (1970).

Offense influences what objects incidentally seizable.

- Nature of the offense for which the accused is arrested has an important bearing upon what objects may be seized as incidental to the arrest. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967); Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481 (1970).

Seizure of marijuana is valid when the defendant is arrested for driving under the influence and police officers are searching the defendant's automobile for the source of the defendant's intoxication. Howe v. State, 132 Ga. App. 840, 209 S.E.2d 258 (1974).

Because the underlying crime that was the basis for issuance of an arrest warrant involved threatening a person in an attempt to obtain firearms, officers were justified in searching the bedroom where the defendant was arrested for weapons and any confederates or other persons who might pose a danger to the officers. Powell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 796, 538 S.E.2d 857 (2000).

"Papers" not immune from searches.

- There is nothing inherent in "papers" which immunizes the papers from searches otherwise proper under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Obviously sexually oriented materials not immune if no warrant.

- Since the sexually oriented materials offered for sale and seized were obviously for the primary purpose of stimulation of human genital organs in violation of former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80) and the materials were in plain view to the officers in a lawful position to view and see the materials, no warrant was necessary to make a lawful seizure. Ball v. State, 149 Ga. App. 270, 253 S.E.2d 886 (1979).

Shotgun in plain view following armed robbery not immune if no warrant.

- When officers were advised following a robbery of the description of the robber and details of the robbery, upon finding the suspect and the suspect's car, no search warrant was necessary as the shotgun was in plain view and the alleged shotgun had been used in the robbery. Duffey v. State, 151 Ga. App. 673, 261 S.E.2d 421 (1979).

Weapon discovered in vehicle.

- Search of defendant's vehicle, after the defendant had been arrested for a traffic violation, resulting in the discovery of a .38 caliber revolver "stuffed down" between the front seat and the console, was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466 (1991).

Police may not open closed containers without warrant.

- Once officers are entitled to go throughout the house for the limited purpose of securing the house, the officers are free to seize the marijuana in plain sight on the bed and in open suitcases. The officers are not authorized to open up closed containers or otherwise discover contraband which is not in plain view, and this is true whether the officers are conducting the warrantless search incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants or under the exigencies of the situation. Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).

Search of the area within arrested person's "immediate presence" did not mean that a search of the defendant's bedroom closets and dresser drawers was justified as a "search incident to arrest" when the defendant was arrested in the kitchen. Brannon v. State, 231 Ga. App. 847, 500 S.E.2d 597 (1998).

Warrant required for search of house when all occupants detained.

- After it is determined that all of the occupants of the house plus the defendant are in custody, no exigency exists which would justify a general search of the entire house. At that point, the officers could and should procure a search warrant to discover whatever contraband or other evidence may be on the premises, not in plain view. Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).

Items in plain view during routine inventory search of vehicle.

- When a driver is arrested and removed from the driver's vehicle, and the vehicle is on a highway or other public property, and there is no third person present to whom it is or might properly be turned over, or for some other sufficient reason a decision to impound it is properly made, and when in connection with such impoundment an "inventory search" is a recognized and routine procedure, contraband which appears in plain view in the course of such inventory is properly seized, and may be introduced in evidence. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2 (1980).

Police may itemize the vehicle's property.

- When the police take custody of any sort of container such as an automobile, it is reasonable to search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Inventory search requires no warrant or probable cause.

- In circumstances involving noncriminal inventory searches, when probable cause to search is irrelevant, search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable-cause concept. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Inventory searches have two purposes: to protect the vehicle and the property in the vehicle, and to safeguard the police or other officers from claims of lost possessions. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980); Thompson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 101, 270 S.E.2d 313 (1980).

Inventory not just to protect property.

- Police seizure and inventory is not dependent for its validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve the property. The police are permitted to take charge of property under broader circumstances than that. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Inventory also permissible to protect police from danger.

- An inventory search serves three distinct purposes: the protection of personal property; the protection of the police against claims arising from property allegedly lost or stolen; and the protection of the police from possible danger. Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877 (1980).

Routine searches when cars impounded permitted by U.S. Const., amend. 4. - When vehicles are impounded, police routinely follow caretaking procedures by securing and inventorying the cars' contents. These procedures have been widely sustained as reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2 (1980).

Impound search of the automobile in an armed robbery trial was not illegal as it followed defendant's arrest by an undercover officer. Smith v. State, 151 Ga. App. 697, 261 S.E.2d 439 (1979).

Inventory search rationale must inhere in decision to seize and inventory.

- Unless the rationale for an inventory search inheres in the decision to seize and inventory, the impoundment itself may be unreasonable and the resulting inventory search invalid. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Seizure of marijuana legal during arrest for forgery.

- When arresting officer acted with reasonable caution in believing that the appellant was involved in the forgery scheme being perpetrated on a bank, marijuana which fell from the appellant's hand was lawfully seized incident to the appellant's arrest. Denson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 713, 285 S.E.2d 69 (1981).

Inventory search proper when defendant allows car to be driven to police station.

- After the lawful initial stop and arrest of the defendant, the subsequent inventory search of the defendant's automobile, which revealed additional contraband, was proper when the defendant made no request that someone be called to retrieve the vehicle but, instead, voluntarily acquiesced to an officer's driving the automobile to the police station where the vehicle would be impounded. Kilgore v. State, 158 Ga. App. 55, 279 S.E.2d 239 (1981).

Evidence of traffic violation justifies search.

- If there was probative evidence that the defendant was driving in excess of the lawful speed limit, there was evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that the police officer did not overstep the officer's bounds in stopping the defendant, arresting the defendant for a traffic violation, and conducting a protective search of the immediate vicinity of the defendant's automobile. Kilgore v. State, 158 Ga. App. 55, 279 S.E.2d 239 (1981).

If a police officer stopped the defendant's car for having an improper tag, determined that the defendant appeared intoxicated and arrested the defendant, the search of the defendant's car was proper, and cocaine found during the search was seized lawfully. It was not error to deny the defendant's motion to suppress. Lewis v. State, 195 Ga. App. 59, 392 S.E.2d 563 (1990).

Evidence of other crimes found in container during search for marijuana.

- When officers were lawfully conducting a search for marijuana in the house when the officers found a closed container with unknown contents apparently stored or hidden in the attic, the officers had the right to open any receptacle that could reasonably hold the substance or thing being sought and to discover or seize any item, substance, object, thing, or matter, the possession of which is unlawful or which is tangible evidence of the commission of a crime in the State of Georgia. Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983).

Admission into evidence of substances contained within boxes and envelopes found on the defendant's person during a search incident to the defendant's arrest for a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., is not error. Dasher v. State, 166 Ga. App. 237, 304 S.E.2d 87 (1983).

Search of bag not incident to arrest.

- Trial court properly suppressed evidence gathered in connection with a warrantless search of a bag owned by the defendant after the defendant's arrest at a friend's house. The search was not incident to the defendant's arrest under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1 as the defendant was already secured in a patrol car and there was no contention that the bag was related to the outstanding warrant on which the defendant had been arrested; the consent given by the defendant's friend to the search of the friend's home did not override the privacy interest that the defendant, a visitor, had in the bag; and there was no testimony that the bag was searched as part of an inventory of the defendant's personal effects. State v. McCarthy, 288 Ga. App. 426, 654 S.E.2d 239 (2007).

Searches by campus police and security personnel.

- Individuals who have been granted arrest powers on premises under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents are authorized to conduct searches. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-172.

ALR.

- Entry and search of premises for purpose of arresting one without search warrant, 5 A.L.R. 263.

Right of search and seizure incident to lawful arrest, without a search warrant, 32 A.L.R. 680; 51 A.L.R. 424; 74 A.L.R. 1387; 82 A.L.R. 782.

Arrest, or search and seizure, without warrant on suspicion or information as to unlawful possession of weapons, 92 A.L.R. 490.

Illustrations of distinction, as regards search and seizure, between papers or other articles which merely furnish evidence of crime, and the actual instrumentalities of crime, 129 A.L.R. 1296.

Search incident to one offense as justifying seizure of instruments of or articles connected with another offense, 169 A.L.R. 1419.

Lawfulness of nonconsensual search and seizure without warrant, prior to arrest, 89 A.L.R.2d 715.

Lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 10 A.L.R.3d 314.

Modern status of rule as to validity of nonconsensual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727.

Search and seizure: "furtive" movement or gesture as justifying police search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581.

Lawfulness of "inventory search" of motor vehicle impounded by police, 48 A.L.R.3d 537.

State or municipal liability for invasion of privacy, 87 A.L.R.3d 145.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse (resident or nonresident) - state cases, 1 A.L.R.4th 673.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in warrantless search of rental property authorized by lessor of such property - state cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 1173.

Lawfulness of warrantless search of purse or wallet of person arrested or suspected of crime, 29 A.L.R.4th 771.

Search and seizure of bank records pertaining to customer as violation of customer's rights under state law, 33 A.L.R.5th 453.

Application of "plain-feel" exception to warrant requirements - state cases, 50 A.L.R.5th 467.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in driveways, 60 A.L.R.5th 1.