O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-5-23 (2019)

Command of search warrant

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The search warrant shall command the officer directed to execute the same to search the place or person particularly described in the warrant and to seize the instruments, articles, or things particularly described in the search warrant.

History

Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 7.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Standards required for description of place and suspect. - To be valid, a search warrant must contain a description of the person and premises to be searched with such particularity as would enable a prudent person executing the warrant to locate the person and premises definitely and with reasonable certainty. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980). Premises description is sufficient if on its face it enables a prudent officer executing the warrant to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980). Description of premises when owner’s name not given. - When the name of the owner or occupant is not given, the description of the premises must be exact. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980). Search area to be described. - Warrant should not leave the place to be searched to the discretion of the officer. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980). Evidence needed to search automobile next to house in warrant. - In order to authorize a search of a vehicle parked within the curtilage of the premises which are to be searched pursuant to a warrant, there must be some evidence to connect the vehicle with the premises. Albert v. State, 155 Ga. App. 99, 270 S.E.2d 220 (1980). Search warrant for residence permits searching guest rooms. - Warrant authorizing the search of a residence justifies the search of rooms which are part of the residence and under control of the proprietor of the residence, and evidence discovered may be used against a

temporary gratuitous guest of the residence. Jones v. State, 127 Ga. App. 137, 193 S.E.2d 38 (1972). No retroactive validation of void warrant. - Void search warrant cannot be validated and property illegally seized introduced in evidence merely because the officers were in fact reliably informed and did in fact recover contraband, nor can a deficiency be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issued. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980). Telephone call to magistrate to correct warrant justified. - When both the affidavit and the warrant recited probable cause to believe drugs would be found on the person of the named defendant and on the premises under defendant’s possession, custody, and control, namely hotel room 327, the search of room 337 of that hotel constituted a reasonable search under the warrant, without amendment, upon the discovery before the warrant’s execution that the defendant was registered in room 337, and the actions of the officer in phoning the issuing magistrate and obtaining authorization to make the correction were reasonable and proper. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980). Using redial feature of phone during execution of warrant. - Pretermitting whether the court erred in admitting the evidence the detective garnered from the employer by hitting automatic redial on the defendant’s phone and reaching the defendant’s employer, who informed the detective of the defendant’s location, such evidence obtained did not contribute to the verdict inasmuch as

there was an eyewitness to the crimes and other evidence linking the defendant with the murder and assaults. Veasley v. State, 275 Ga. 516, 570 S.E.2d 298 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1002, 123 S. Ct. 1904, 155 L. Ed. 2d 832 (2003). ‘‘Buy money’’ need not be attached. - Failure to attach a photocopy of the ‘‘buy money’’ to the affidavit did not violate

the particularity requirement describing items to be seized since the warrant specified ‘‘monies derived from the sale of controlled substances.’’ Smith v. State, 207 Ga. App. 463, 428 S.E.2d 403 (1993). Cited in Hunt v. State, 180 Ga. App. 103, 348 S.E.2d 467 (1986); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 S.E.2d 365 (2002).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, § 299 et seq. ALR. - Propriety and legality of issuing only one search warrant to search more than one place or premises occupied by same person, 31 A.L.R.2d 864.

Books, documents, or other papers: seizure under search warrant not describing such items, 54 A.L.R.4th 391. Sufficiency of description in warrant of person to be searched, 43 A.L.R.5th 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1984–2021 · leading case: State v. Thornton, 322 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. 1984).
State v. Thornton, 322 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 4× “See also OCGA § 17-5-23. The search and seizure was totally unreasonable, lacking in probable cause, and the trial court was correct when it held that "the face of said search warrants contain irregularities affecting substantial rights of the accused," in that he was illegally…”
Hunt v. State, 348 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “192, 196 (48 SC 74, 72 LE 231) (1927), insofar as the Fourth Amendment goes, and as required by OCGA § 17-5-23. The state statute contains the same "particular description" language as in the Fourth Amendment, and appellants do not contend that a different degree of…”
State v. Rocco, 566 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “The Superior Court of Hall County granted the motion and suppressed the drugs, finding that the search was illegal because the officers did not have the warrant in their physical possession at the time the search began.”
Veasley v. State, 570 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. 2002). · cites it 2× “192, 196 (48 SC 74, 72 LE 231) (1927); OCGA § 17-5-23, we find it did not contribute to the verdict inasmuch as there was an eyewitness to the crimes and other evidence linking Veasley with the murder and assaults.”
Johnson v. State, 766 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 17-5-23. The warrant delineates the scope of the search and directs the execution within such boundaries.”
Bullard v. State, 706 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “551, 557 (124 SC 1284, 157 LE2d 1068) (2004); see also OCGA § 17-5-23. But a warrant may meet this requirement by cross-referencing other included documents.”
City of Hapeville v. Sylvan Airport Parking, LLC d/b/a Peachy Airport Parking (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 8× “Peachy Airport Parking interpreted the citation to refer to Section 17-5-23 of the city’s code of ordinances, which provides: Where a business or profession is operated at more than one place or where the business includes more than one line, the business or profession shall be…”
Gregory Bernard Johnson v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 17-5-23. The warrant delineates the scope of the search and directs the execution within such boundaries.”
Smith v. State, 428 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “See generally OCGA § 17-5-23. 2. In their second enumeration, the Smiths contend that the trial court erred in allowing the confidential informant to testify to the meaning of garbled words on the audiotape.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.