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2018 Georgia Code 17-6-50 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 17-6-50 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 17-6-50

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 6. Bonds and Recognizances, 17-6-1 through 17-6-114.

ARTICLE 2 SURETIES

17-6-50. Persons deemed professional bondsmen; criminal background investigation information to be provided to clerk of court.

  1. Bondsmen or persons who hold themselves out as signers or sureties of bonds for compensation are declared to be professional bondsmen.
  2. A professional bondsperson is one who holds himself or herself out as a signer or surety of bonds for compensation who must meet the following qualifications:
    1. Is 18 years of age or over;
    2. Is a resident of the State of Georgia for at least one year before making application to write bonds;
    3. Is a person of good moral character and has not been convicted of a felony or any crime involving moral turpitude; and
    4. Is approved by the sheriff and remains in good standing with respect to all applicable federal, state, and local laws and all rules and regulations established by the sheriff in the county where the bonding business is conducted.
  3. The sheriff of the county in which the bonding business is conducting business or is seeking approval to conduct business shall initiate a criminal background investigation to ensure that a professional bondsman has not been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude in this state or any other jurisdiction. The sheriff shall require the professional bondsman to furnish two full sets of fingerprints which the sheriff shall submit to the Georgia Crime Information Center. The center shall submit a full set of fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check.
  4. It shall be the duty of each professional bondsman approved by the sheriff in accordance with this part to provide the clerk of each court before which one or more of such professional bondsman's principals are required to appear with the business name, complete address, telephone number, and e-mail address of the chief operating officer or his or her designee of such professional bondsman for the purpose of receiving any notices that may be sent pursuant to Code Section 17-6-71. Each professional bondsman shall have the duty to keep such information current and accurate. It shall be the duty of each clerk of court to keep, maintain, and update such information as provided by a professional bondsman.

(Ga. L. 1921, p. 243, § 5; Code 1933, § 27-502; Ga. L. 1994, p. 532, § 3; Ga. L. 2002, p. 942, § A; Ga. L. 2009, p. 688, § 1/HB 147.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Construction.

- Because the two requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50(b)(3) are stated in the conjunctive, the mere fact that a bondsman was never convicted of crimes for which the bondsman was arrested was not dispositive, and the lack of prior convictions did not necessarily equate to good moral character. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

"Good moral conduct."

- Term "good moral conduct" in O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50(b)(3), referring to the qualifications of a professional bondsman, is sufficiently definite to apprise an individual purporting to serve as a professional bondsperson that he or she cannot engage in unauthorized acts of law enforcement. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

Approval of sureties.

- Applicants for a certificate to operate as a bail bond company failed to state a procedural due process violation under O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-15 and17-6-50 because Georgia law gave the sheriffs broad discretion to determine who was an acceptable surety to write bonds in their respective counties and the provisions did not require a sheriff to accept any specific applicant. A.A.A. Always Open Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Dekalb County, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2005).

Standing to challenge requirements of statute.

- Applicant to become a professional bondsperson whose prior felony convictions were not removed by an order restoring the applicant's civil and political rights, issued by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, lacked standing to assert that the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50 that a professional bondsperson have no felony convictions conflicts with the Board's constitutional authority. Harrison v. Wigington, 269 Ga. 388, 497 S.E.2d 568 (1998).

Cited in Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section applies to limitation on public officials.

- O.C.G.A. § 45-11-8, prohibiting elected officials from engaging in the bail bond business, pertains to the definition found in O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-85.

Restoration of civil and political rights does not negate a conviction for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50(b)(3), nor does it negate the separate necessity for finding that the applicant is of good moral character. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-10.

Approval of sureties.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 27-901, 27-902, and 27-801 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-1,17-6-2, and17-7-90) provided for the approval of sureties by sheriffs or judicial officers. Qualifications, such as solvency and reliability, may be inquired into before approval. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-83.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Bail and Recognizance, §§ 47, 48, 49.

C.J.S.

- 8 C.J.S., Bail; Release and Detention Pending Proceedings, §§ 2 et seq., 160.

ALR.

- Qualification of surety on bail bond as affected by lien or encumbrance on his real property, 56 A.L.R. 1097.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes regulating bail bond business, 13 A.L.R.3d 618.

Validity of statute abolishing commercial bail bond business, 19 A.L.R.4th 355.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-6-50

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Harrison v. Wigington, 497 S.E.2d 568 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 13, 1998 | 269 Ga. 388

...ical Rights." Thereafter, Ms. Harrison applied to become a professional bondsperson in Rockdale County. Jeff Wigington, in his capacity as the Sheriff of Rockdale County, determined that Ms. Harrison did not meet the qualifications set forth in OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3), which provides that a professional bondsperson must be of "good moral character" and have no convictions for "a felony or any crime involving moral turpitude...." Ms. Harrison and Alibi Bonding Co., Inc. (Plaintiffs) filed suit against Sheriff Wigington and Rockdale County (Defendants), challenging the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3)....
...II(a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which provides that the Board is vested with the power "to grant ... pardons, and ... to remove disabilities imposed by law...." According to Plaintiffs, the Board has removed Ms. Harrison's disabilities and, to the extent that OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) authorizes the continued use of her felony convictions as a bar to her becoming a professional bondsperson, that statute is in conflict with the Board's constitutional authority....
...based. Crumley v. Head, 225 Ga. 246, 247(3), 167 S.E.2d 651 (1969). Because it is clear that Ms. Harrison's felony convictions were not removed by any action of the Board, the Plaintiffs lack standing to assert that the statutory requirement of OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) that a professional bondsperson have no felony convictions conflicts with the Board's constitutional authority. Compare Georgia Peace Officer Standards & Training Council v. Mullis, supra. OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) is subject to a constitutional attack on that ground only by one who can demonstrate that his or her felony convictions have been removed by an action of the Board. Therefore, we need not address the merits of Plaintiffs' principal constitutional attack. The trial court's conclusion that OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) does not conflict with the Board's constitutional authority must be affirmed on the procedural ground that Plaintiffs have no standing to make that assertion....
...be passed upon if there is any other ground in the case upon which this court can properly rest the decision. [Cit.]" Aiken v. Richardson, 209 Ga. 837, 839(4), 76 S.E.2d 393 (1953). 2. Plaintiffs further assert that, even if they cannot attack OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) on the ground that the requirement that a professional bondsperson have no felony convictions conflicts with the Board's constitutional authority, the statute is invalid because the requirement of "good moral character" is unconstitutionally vague. However, even if that standard was unconstitutionally vague, Ms. Harrison would not be qualified to become a professional bondsperson because of her felony convictions. It is clear that she must meet both requirements of OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3), since the statute specifies that a professional bondsperson must possess a good moral character and have no felony convictions. See Club Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of Carrollton, 265 Ga. 528, 532(6), 457 S.E.2d 816 (1995). There is nothing to indicate that the intent of the General Assembly was to employ the word "and" in OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3) other than in its normal conjunctive meaning....
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Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 554 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2001 | 274 Ga. 487, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2934

...Thus, Pryor had the burden of showing that the Sheriff's refusal to allow it to continue to write bonds was a gross abuse of his discretion. The Sheriff's discretion is not absolute, but is circumscribed by the statutes from which his authority derives. See Jarvis v. J & J Bonding Co., supra. OCGA § 17-6-50 establishes the qualifications of "professional bondspersons." If Pryor met those statewide qualifications, then the refusal to permit it to conduct business on the county level cannot be upheld....
...s a manifest abuse of discretion. [Cits.]" Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 239 Ga.App. 168, 172, 520 S.E.2d 917 (1999). Therefore, we must determine if the evidence demanded a finding that Pryor satisfied the requirements set forth in OCGA § 17-6-50 for approval as a "professional bondsperson." OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(4) provides that Pryor must remain "in good standing with respect to all applicable ......
...this alternative basis for upholding the Sheriff's decision. A "professional bondsperson" must be one who is "of good moral character and [who] has not been convicted of a felony or any crime involving moral turpitude...." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(3)....
...was not arbitrary or capricious, and that, therefore, a writ of mandamus will not lie. [Cit.]" Dickerson v. Augusta-Richmond County Comm., supra at 613(1), 523 S.E.2d 310. While Pryor urges on appeal that "good moral character" is unconstitutionally vague, it did not attack the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-6-50(3) in the trial court....