Introduction of facts not in record is what is forbidden.

- What the law forbids is the introduction into a case, by way of argument, of facts not in the record, and calculated to prejudice the accused. Brooks v. State, 55 Ga. App. 227, 189 S.E. 852 (1937); Bradley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 865, 219 S.E.2d 451 (1975).

What the law forbids is introduction into case by way of argument of facts which are not in the record and are calculated to prejudice a party and render trial unfair; the language used in argument may be extravagant, but figurative speech is a legitimate weapon in forensic warfare if there are facts admissible in evidence upon which the speech may be founded. Stancil v. State, 158 Ga. App. 147, 279 S.E.2d 457 (1981); Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 357, 343 S.E.2d 140 (1986).

Introduction of facts not in record requires application of remedies.

- It is the introduction of facts before the jury which are not in evidence that requires the application of remedies such as mistrial or rebuke. Thompson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 567, 258 S.E.2d 180 (1979); Turner v. State, 152 Ga. App. 354, 262 S.E.2d 618 (1979).

Section does not prevent counsel from commenting on and drawing deductions from evidence.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 concerns the introduction of facts not in evidence, but does not prevent counsel from commenting on and drawing deductions from the evidence; a prosecutor's comments in the presence of the jury about the Jackson-Denno hearing were not improper when because the prosecutor did not disclose the Jackson-Denno findings, but merely commented that the prosecutor did not believe there was evidence of threats, harassment, or intimidation when the defendant gave a statement to police, and there was no error since the prosecutor did not introduce new facts into evidence, and the trial court made no comments about the hearing, but later instructed the jury on the jury's duty to decide if the defendant understood the rights and made the statement voluntarily. Elliott v. State, 275 Ga. App. 359, 620 S.E.2d 584 (2005).

Introduction of facts not in record not reasonable and permissible inferences from the evidence already before the jury. Thompson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 567, 258 S.E.2d 180 (1979).

Proper basis for jury verdict.

- Verdict of a jury should be based only on legal evidence properly submitted to the jury, not remarks of counsel, which are not in evidence nor drawn from evidence, irrelevant and immaterial to the vital issue, and which are used ostensibly only for the purpose of prejudicing the minds of the jury against the defendant. Hammond v. State, 51 Ga. App. 225, 179 S.E. 841 (1935).

Use of "highly probable test."

- Proper standard for a determination as to whether an uncorrected argument of counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice to the defendant is the "highly probable test"; i.e., that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 704, 285 S.E.2d 45 (1981).

When no timely objection is interposed during improper closing argument, the test for reversible error is not simply whether or not the argument was objectionable, or even if the argument might have contributed to the verdict, but whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial. Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 547, 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998).

Proper for prosecutor to testify.

- If a prosecuting attorney seeks merely to rebut defense testimony regarding something the prosecuting attorney personally is supposed to have heard or observed, it is not an abuse of discretion to allow a prosecuting attorney to testify. Watson v. State, 176 Ga. App. 610, 337 S.E.2d 54 (1985).

Statements prohibited, but not acts.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 prohibits statements of prejudicial matters not in evidence, but does not prohibit acts. Patten v. State, 184 Ga. App. 152, 361 S.E.2d 203 (1987).

Nonprejudicial statements are not grounds for reversal.

- If the remark or statement is not such as would be likely to prejudice the defendant's rights in regard to whether the defendant has had a fair trial, the error will not be reversible. Ingram v. State, 97 Ga. App. 468, 103 S.E.2d 666 (1958); Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 357, 343 S.E.2d 140 (1986).

Control of improper statements made by witnesses.

- So far as improper statements by witnesses are concerned, there is no statute bearing directly on the subject. Cases must be governed by analogizing the law embodied in this section, and by reference to the fundamental rules of law guaranteeing fair and impartial trials. Felton v. State, 93 Ga. App. 48, 90 S.E.2d 607 (1955).

Because the prosecutor did not deliberately elicit a witness's response relating to the defendant's character and tried to stop the witness even before the defense objected, and because the trial court acted immediately, struck the comments, and gave a curative instruction, the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not error. Ryan v. State, 276 Ga. App. 87, 622 S.E.2d 446 (2005).

Defense counsel's right to argue punishment avoided by state's witnesses.

- Trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from arguing the extent of the benefit the state's witnesses received by agreeing to testify against the defendant, and such error was not harmless; the defense had a right to encourage the jury to infer from that evidence that the witnesses had bias and interest in the case that could compromise the witnesses credibility. Palma v. State, 280 Ga. 108, 624 S.E.2d 137 (2005).

Remedy for questions which are inherently improper and prejudicial.

- If a question standing alone is inherently improper and prejudicial, the remedy is a motion for a rebuke or for a mistrial. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934), appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935).

Questioning by defense counsel of investigator did not merit mistrial.

- Trial court was not required to declare a mistrial under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 when defense counsel cross-examined an investigator about similar crimes. Defense counsel had not made an improper argument, but merely attempted to introduce evidence into the record for strategic reasons by questioning a witness. Gary v. State, 291 Ga. App. 757, 662 S.E.2d 742 (2008).

Since the jury had not yet been sworn, mistrial was not a viable remedy since, in response to defense counsel's question whether any of the prospective jurors had ever been the victim of a crime, one person answered that their store or home had been burglarized six times "by some of your best clients." Petty v. State, 179 Ga. App. 767, 347 S.E.2d 663 (1986).

No error in not declaring mistrial for violation of granted motion in limine.

- Court did not err in not declaring a mistrial when a state's witness referred to the defendant's actions as "rape" after the court had granted defendant's motion in limine to refrain from the use of that word. Gaines v. State, 179 Ga. App. 623, 347 S.E.2d 673 (1986).

Harmless error.

- Trial court's error in allowing the prosecutor to inject evidence of the "buddy syndrome" at the defendant's trial for child molestation was harmless error since the error did not contribute to the judgment. McCann v. State, 200 Ga. App. 256, 407 S.E.2d 482 (1991).

If the record showed that defense counsel was able to argue substantially on a contested issue prior to its objection by the state, the court's error in limiting defense counsel's closing argument was harmless. Prejean v. State, 209 Ga. App. 411, 433 S.E.2d 628 (1993).

In a prosecution for shoplifting, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial after the state improperly commented on the right to remain silent as the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, eyewitness testimony and videotaped evidence of the crime, and the prosecutor's compliance with an instruction to not make any further comment on the defendant's silence. Ekanger v. State, 279 Ga. App. 421, 631 S.E.2d 459 (2006).

Despite the prosecutor's improper argument during closing, and the trial court's failure to perform the court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, no reversible error resulted from the failure as it was highly improbable that the error contributed to the verdict. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 521, 640 S.E.2d 274 (2007).

Although the trial court erred in not fulfilling the court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 when the prosecutor's remark regarding what the defendant had told deputies was a misstatement of the evidence, the error was harmless because it was highly probable that the trial court's error did not contribute to the verdicts; the improper statement, consisting of one sentence, was interrupted by defense counsel's prompt objection, the trial court immediately observed that the jury would remember the evidence, and the trial court charged the jury fully as to what constituted evidence, including instructing the jurors that evidence did not include the attorneys' opening statements or closing arguments. Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 112, 178 L. Ed. 2d 69 (U.S. 2010).

Prosecutor's argument went slightly beyond the trial testimony by describing a video game as involving the use of "bludgeoning objects to kill somebody," and the trial court erred by failing to rebuke counsel and to instruct the jury to disregard the unauthorized argument, as was required by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, but the error was not reversible error because it was highly probable that the prosecutor's minor misstatement of the evidence, particularly in light of the trial court's subsequent statement to the jury that the jury had to determine what evidence was actually presented, did not contribute to the sentencing verdict. Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854, cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 522, 178 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2010).

While the prosecutor's comment that "the next time he does this, he might shoot somebody" was improper, the defendant was not entitled to relief because, even assuming the trial court's response fell short of satisfying O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, it was highly probable that any error in failing to comply with § 17-8-75 based upon a single comment did not contribute to the verdict. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013).

Trial court's error in failing to remedy the impact of the prejudicial statements by the prosecutor, if any, was harmless. Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, including the defendant's custodial confession, it was highly probable that the trial court's error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict. Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 190, 758 S.E.2d 808 (2014).

Trial court's failure to rebuke the prosecutor for making statements within the hearing of the jury regarding prejudicial matters not in evidence was harmless because the prosecutor's closing argument indicating that the prosecutor could predict from the outset of the case that the defendant would either assert a claim of self-defense or a claim that someone else committed the act could not have misled the jury as a claim of self-defense was not pursued by the defendant; the jury instructions stated that the closing arguments of the lawyers did not constitute evidence; and it was highly probable that neither the statement by the prosecutor, nor any alleged failure of the trial court to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 contributed to the verdict. Ware v. State, 302 Ga. 792, 809 S.E.2d 762 (2018).

When defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's statement in closing argument as an improper comment on the defendant's right to remain silent, presuming that the trial court's response amounted to a ruling on the defendant's objection, any error from the trial court's failure to act pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 was harmless considering the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt; and the trial court's instruction to the jury that the statements of counsel during closing arguments did not constitute evidence. Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 583, 814 S.E.2d 302 (2018).

Double jeopardy did not bar retrial.

- Prosecutorial misconduct did not bar a retrial of the defendant under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, when the defendant alleged that the state made many statements of fact outside the record during closing argument in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 as the defendant did not allege that the prosecutor intended to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct. Wadley v. State, 317 Ga. App. 333, 730 S.E.2d 536 (2012).

Comments not prejudicial.

- Since the defendant did not answer any of the complained-of questions posed by the prosecutor, and the subject matter of those questions was already in evidence, the questions did not amount to forbidden prejudicial statements within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013).

Noncompliance with statute did not contribute to verdict.

- In light of the substantial evidence against the defendant, as well as the jury instructions given, it was highly probable that neither the statement by the prosecutor in closing argument, nor any alleged failure of the trial court to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, contributed to the verdict. Anderson v. State, 302 Ga. 74, 805 S.E.2d 47 (2017).

Cited in Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615 (1852); Sims v. Ferrill, 45 Ga. 585 (1872); Blackman v. State, 78 Ga. 592, 3 S.E. 418 (1887); Johnson v. State, 88 Ga. 606, 15 S.E. 667 (1891); Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. 669, 31 S.E. 571 (1898); Evans v. State, 115 Ga. 229, 41 S.E. 691 (1902); Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S.E. 1 (1905); Reese v. State, 3 Ga. App. 610, 60 S.E. 284 (1908); Clary v. State, 8 Ga. App. 92, 68 S.E. 615 (1910); Miller v. State, 8 Ga. App. 540, 69 S.E. 922 (1911); Carswell v. State, 10 Ga. App. 30, 72 S.E. 602 (1911); Hinsman v. State, 14 Ga. App. 481, 81 S.E. 367 (1914); Jones v. State, 14 Ga. App. 568, 81 S.E. 801 (1914); Cofield v. State, 14 Ga. App. 813, 82 S.E. 355 (1914); Gazaway v. State, 15 Ga. App. 467, 83 S.E. 857 (1914); Cason v. State, 16 Ga. App. 820, 86 S.E. 644 (1914); Mays v. State, 18 Ga. App. 241, 89 S.E. 174 (1916); White v. State, 19 Ga. App. 230, 91 S.E. 280 (1917); Garrett v. State, 21 Ga. App. 801, 95 S.E. 301 (1918); Brown v. State, 148 Ga. 264, 96 S.E. 435 (1918); Palmer v. State, 23 Ga. App. 84, 97 S.E. 460 (1918); Mitchell v. State, 24 Ga. App. 135, 99 S.E. 889 (1919); Jones v. State, 24 Ga. App. 129, 99 S.E. 893 (1919); Dixon v. State, 26 Ga. App. 13, 105 S.E. 39 (1920); Lewis v. State, 59 Ga. App. 387, 1 S.E.2d 62 (1939); Hayes v. State, 199 Ga. 251, 34 S.E.2d 97 (1945); Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S.E.2d 849 (1945); Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 336, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948); Pressley v. State, 207 Ga. 274, 61 S.E.2d 113 (1950); Ralls v. State, 87 Ga. App. 655, 75 S.E.2d 26 (1953); Heard v. State, 210 Ga. 108, 78 S.E.2d 38 (1953); Payne v. State, 89 Ga. App. 568, 80 S.E.2d 93 (1954); Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 95 S.E.2d 792 (1956); McFarlin v. State, 95 Ga. App. 425, 98 S.E.2d 99 (1957); Bailey v. State, 95 Ga. App. 859, 99 S.E.2d 311 (1957); Martin v. State, 98 Ga. App. 136, 105 S.E.2d 250 (1958); Moore v. State, 222 Ga. 748, 152 S.E.2d 570 (1966); Martin v. State, 223 Ga. 649, 157 S.E.2d 458 (1967); Lingo v. State, 224 Ga. 333, 162 S.E.2d 1 (1968); Willingham v. State, 118 Ga. App. 321, 163 S.E.2d 317 (1968); McBride v. State, 119 Ga. App. 418, 167 S.E.2d 374 (1969); Gore v. State, 124 Ga. App. 398, 184 S.E.2d 24 (1971); Spann v. State, 126 Ga. App. 370, 190 S.E.2d 924 (1972); Wingfield v. State, 231 Ga. 92, 200 S.E.2d 708 (1973); Ramsey v. State, 232 Ga. 15, 205 S.E.2d 286 (1974); Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733, 209 S.E.2d 18 (1974); Martin v. State, 132 Ga. App. 658, 209 S.E.2d 103 (1974); Reed v. State, 134 Ga. App. 47, 213 S.E.2d 147 (1975); Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 216 S.E.2d 782 (1975); Crumley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 394, 217 S.E.2d 464 (1975); Westbrooks v. State, 135 Ga. App. 807, 218 S.E.2d 908 (1975); Hughes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 927, 222 S.E.2d 645 (1975); Reid v. State, 137 Ga. App. 495, 224 S.E.2d 482 (1976); Greeson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 572, 226 S.E.2d 769 (1976); Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 228 S.E.2d 371 (1976); Thurston v. State, 139 Ga. App. 647, 229 S.E.2d 124 (1976); Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 230 S.E.2d 869 (1976); Gillespie v. State, 140 Ga. App. 408, 231 S.E.2d 154 (1976); Gamble v. State, 141 Ga. App. 304, 233 S.E.2d 264 (1977); Ransom v. State, 142 Ga. App. 325, 235 S.E.2d 748 (1977); Sheets v. State, 143 Ga. App. 510, 239 S.E.2d 196 (1977); Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41 (1978); Bethea v. State, 149 Ga. App. 312, 254 S.E.2d 468 (1979); Fleming v. State, 149 Ga. App. 781, 256 S.E.2d 56 (1979); Boatright v. State, 150 Ga. App. 283, 257 S.E.2d 314 (1979); Rivers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 380, 259 S.E.2d 650 (1979); Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541, 265 S.E.2d 868 (1980); Gregoroff v. State, 158 Ga. App. 363, 280 S.E.2d 373 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Spicer v. State, 159 Ga. App. 826, 285 S.E.2d 258 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 845, 285 S.E.2d 584 (1981); Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 498, 287 S.E.2d 399 (1981); Ferry v. State, 161 Ga. App. 795, 287 S.E.2d 732 (1982); Garrett v. State, 160 Ga. App. 877, 288 S.E.2d 592 (1982); State v. Abdi, 162 Ga. App. 20, 288 S.E.2d 772 (1982); Bryant v. State, 249 Ga. 242, 290 S.E.2d 75 (1982); Dempsey v. State, 162 Ga. App. 390, 291 S.E.2d 449 (1982); Bramlett v. State, 162 Ga. App. 584, 291 S.E.2d 739 (1982); Phillips v. State, 162 Ga. App. 471, 291 S.E.2d 776 (1982); Ritter v. State, 163 Ga. App. 158, 293 S.E.2d 547 (1982); Luckett v. State, 163 Ga. App. 90, 294 S.E.2d 200 (1982); Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982); Johnson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 501, 297 S.E.2d 38 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983); Wilbanks v. State, 165 Ga. App. 876, 303 S.E.2d 144 (1983); Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918 (1983); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); Estes v. State, 169 Ga. App. 685, 314 S.E.2d 700 (1984); Harrell v. State, 253 Ga. 474, 321 S.E.2d 739 (1984); Smith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 6, 321 S.E.2d 771 (1984); Sprayberry v. State, 174 Ga. App. 574, 330 S.E.2d 731 (1985); Milford v. State, 178 Ga. App. 792, 344 S.E.2d 505 (1986); Baker v. State, 179 Ga. App. 802, 348 S.E.2d 128 (1986); Hunt v. State, 180 Ga. App. 103, 348 S.E.2d 467 (1986); Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir. 1986); Louis v. State, 185 Ga. App. 472, 364 S.E.2d 607 (1988); Grant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 497, 364 S.E.2d 628 (1988); Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573 (1988); Oller v. State, 187 Ga. App. 818, 371 S.E.2d 455 (1988); Polk v. State, 192 Ga. App. 888, 386 S.E.2d 682 (1989); Marshall v. State, 193 Ga. App. 314, 387 S.E.2d 602 (1989); Mantooth v. State, 197 Ga. App. 797, 399 S.E.2d 505 (1990); Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991); Edwards v. State, 200 Ga. App. 580, 408 S.E.2d 802 (1991); Bailey v. State, 200 Ga. App. 621, 409 S.E.2d 230 (1991); Brown v. State, 204 Ga. App. 176, 418 S.E.2d 776 (1992); Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246, 430 S.E.2d 754 (1993); Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 187, 433 S.E.2d 366 (1993); Remediation Servs., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 209 Ga. App. 427, 433 S.E.2d 631 (1993); Rivers v. State, 265 Ga. 694, 461 S.E.2d 205 (1995); Wilkes v. State, 221 Ga. App. 390, 471 S.E.2d 332 (1996); Pope v. State, 221 Ga. App. 578, 472 S.E.2d 111 (1996); Ortiz v. State, 222 Ga. App. 432, 474 S.E.2d 300 (1996); Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997); Joseph v. State, 231 Ga. App. 399, 498 S.E.2d 808 (1998); Perry v. State, 232 Ga. App. 484, 500 S.E.2d 923 (1998); Billups v. State, 234 Ga. App. 824, 507 S.E.2d 837 (1998); Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 517, 541 S.E.2d 112 (2000); Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598, 581 S.E.2d 7 (2003); Hernandez v. State, 291 Ga. App. 562, 662 S.E.2d 325 (2008); Whatley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009); Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (2009); Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 731 S.E.2d 653 (2012); Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 641, 748 S.E.2d 896 (2013).

No duty of defense counsel to request additional remedies.

- Nowhere in O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 is there a requirement for defense counsel to specifically request additional remedies after interposing an objection to the improper statements made by a prosecutor; to the contrary, the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 refers to the trial court's independent duty, after defense counsel's objection, to rebuke the prosecutor, give an appropriate curative instruction, or grant a mistrial in the event that the prosecutor has injected into the case prejudicial statements on matters outside of the evidence. O'Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 702 S.E.2d 288 (2010).

Argument should be confined to facts and authorized inferences.

- Counsel should confine counsel's argument to the facts and such authorized inferences arising from the facts as are properly before the court and the jury. Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 197 S.E. 82 (1938).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in restricting the defendant's closing argument as the defendant attempted to inform the jurors about facts the defendant thought the jurors should know about, but were not in evidence and the law only permitted the defendant to discuss the facts and authorized inferences that flowed from the evidence properly before the jury. Brown v. State, 256 Ga. App. 603, 568 S.E.2d 727 (2002).

Voluntary statement of a witness differs from counsel's statements.

- Voluntary statement made by a witness stands on a different basis with reference to a mistrial from that covered by this section, which has reference to the conduct of attorneys, who are officers of the court. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968).

Mistrial more likely if district attorney directly elicits improper remarks.

- Mistrial is more likely to be the solution required in those instances when the solicitor (now district attorney) directly elicits the improper evidence than in those instances where the witness volunteers the testimony. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968).

Not every remark justifies reversal.

- Not every remark of counsel, although the remark strains at the evidence, will justify reversal. Koza v. State, 158 Ga. App. 709, 282 S.E.2d 131 (1981).

Defendant's claim that the defense counsel was ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to object to evidence that the defendant's parental rights were terminated failed as the record did not reflect that such evidence was ever admitted; the state objected to the defendant's evidence showing that the children had moved from foster home to foster home on relevance grounds, asserting that the jury was not present to decide a parental termination case, and therefore did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, which prohibits counsel from making statements of prejudicial matters not in evidence. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga. App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

There are two types of improper statements made in argument of counsel, to wit: statements that can be cured by the court's rebuking counsel, or giving needed instructions to the jury, or both, and irrelevant statements so inflammatory and prejudicial that the statement's injurious effect cannot be eradicated from the minds of the jurors by instruction from the court to disregard the statements. Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. 671, 27 S.E.2d 307 (1943); Washington v. State, 80 Ga. App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949).

Attorneys should be allowed all reasonable latitude in the argument of cases to the jury, provided the attorneys do not go outside the facts legitimately appearing from the trial, and lug in extraneous matters as if those matters were a part of the case. Waller v. State, 80 Ga. App. 488, 56 S.E.2d 491 (1949).

Considerable latitude in imagery and illustration exists.

- Solicitor general (now district attorney) may argue to the jury the necessity for enforcement of the law and may impress on the jury, with considerable latitude in imagery and illustration, the jury's responsibility in this regard. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. 126, 269 S.E.2d 18 (1980); Stancil v. State, 158 Ga. App. 147, 279 S.E.2d 457 (1981); Williams v. State, 159 Ga. App. 772, 285 S.E.2d 232 (1981).

False logic does not call for mistrial or rebuke.

- In determining whether an argument is improper, it should be borne in mind that flights of oratory and false logic do not call for mistrials or rebuke. It is the introduction of facts not in evidence that requires the application of such remedies. Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. 671, 27 S.E.2d 307 (1943).

All reasonable latitude should be allowed attorneys in their argument to the jury on the facts and on inferences and deductions sustained by the evidence. It is not necessary that they be logical. False logic does not call for objections, rebukes, or mistrials. It is the introduction of facts not in the record which requires the application of such remedies. Cawthon v. State, 71 Ga. App. 497, 31 S.E.2d 64 (1944).

District attorney may draw illogical or unreasonable deductions.

- Prosecution in closing argument is permitted to draw deductions from the evidence and these deductions may be illogical, unreasonable, or even absurd so long as there is evidence from which such deductions can be made. Abner v. State, 139 Ga. App. 600, 229 S.E.2d 83 (1976); Adams v. State, 260 Ga. 298, 392 S.E.2d 866 (1990); Rogers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 739, 423 S.E.2d 435 (1992).

It is permissible for the district attorney in argument to draw deductions from the evidence which may be illogical, unreasonable, or even absurd. Sharp v. State, 153 Ga. App. 486, 265 S.E.2d 837 (1980).

It is up to opposing counsel, not the court, to reply to illogical argument.

- Fact that the deductions are illogical is a matter for reply by adverse counsel and not for rebuke by the court. Gray v. Cole, 20 Ga. 203 (1856); Taylor v. State, 83 Ga. 647, 10 S.E. 442 (1889); Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 209, 47 S.E. 545 (1904); Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S.E. 1016 (1914).

While counsel should not be permitted in argument to state facts which are not in evidence, it is permissible to draw deductions from the evidence, and the fact that the deductions may be illogical, unreasonable, or even absurd is a matter for reply by adverse counsel and not for rebuke by the court. Bradley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 865, 219 S.E.2d 451 (1975); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Murphy v. State, 203 Ga. App. 152, 416 S.E.2d 376 (1992).

Counsel should not state prejudicial facts not appearing from the evidence or not fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. State, 10 Ga. App. 798, 74 S.E. 306 (1912); Pelham & H.R.R. v. Elliott, 11 Ga. App. 621, 75 S.E. 1062 (1912).

Portions of counsel's closing argument concerning a matter on which there was no evidence on the record were properly excluded from the jury's consideration upon objection from opposing counsel. Seabrooks v. State, 164 Ga. App. 747, 297 S.E.2d 745 (1982), aff'd, 251 Ga. 564, 308 S.E.2d 160 (1983).

Prosecutorial comment on defendant's failure to testify constitutes reversible error if: (1) there was a manifest intent to comment on the failure to testify; and (2) the remark was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Japhet v. State, 176 Ga. App. 189, 335 S.E.2d 425 (1985).

Reference to defendant's silence.

- Prosecutor's reference during the prosecutor's opening statement to the defendant's silence upon arrest did not require mistrial since the trial court admonished the prosecutor to stay away from the subject and otherwise cured the error. Cheney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 66, 503 S.E.2d 327 (1998).

Prosecutor's two improper comments on the defendant's pre-trial silence were not reversible error as the trial court took corrective measures after the first comment and the defendant failed to request a curative instruction or a mistrial after the second comment. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 987, 126 S. Ct. 571, 163 L. Ed. 2d 478 (2005).

Because a prosecutor's conduct violated one of the most basic rules of prosecutorial procedure, specifically, producing documents in discovery showing that the defendant refused to speak with police and requested a lawyer after being advised of Miranda, and hence intentionally goading the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. Anderson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 166, 645 S.E.2d 647 (2007).

Mistrial was not warranted upon a motion made the day after the prosecutor's prefatory comments concerning the defendant's desire not to be interviewed were made; further, the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comments and the jury was already aware from the officer's response during cross-examination that the defendant declined to make a statement. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 646 S.E.2d 219 (2007).

Reference to defendant's failure to rebut evidence of guilt.

- Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's motion for mistrial after the state started to comment in closing argument that the defendant had not rebutted the cell phone evidence that placed the defendant near decedent's residence on the morning decedent was killed as the state was not commenting on the defendant's right to remain silent, but instead was making reference to the defendant's stipulation as to the cell phone evidence; the comment was not improper since the state had the right to argue that a defendant failed to rebut certain evidence of guilt. Pullin v. State, 258 Ga. App. 37, 572 S.E.2d 722 (2002).

Because a prosecutor's comments were directed at defense counsel's failure to rebut or explain the state's evidence and the prosecutor made a permissible analogy, there was no prosecutorial misconduct; consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Duffy v. State, 271 Ga. App. 668, 610 S.E.2d 620 (2005).

Prosecutor's comments during closing argument that the defendant's story was not credible and if the defendant was innocent then why did the defendant flee from the police were not comments on the defendant's exercise of the defendant's right to remain silent; a prosecutor's argument that evidence of guilt has not been contradicted or rebutted is permissible and is not a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Comment on defendant's "future dangerousness."

- Although the statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument could be construed as a mention of the defendant's future dangerousness, and therefore improper, the prosecutor's argument, when taken as a whole, was not addressing that issue but rather seeking to explain the reasons for the victim's recantation at trial; therefore, the comment did not warrant an order granting a mistrial. Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga. App. 768, 629 S.E.2d 442 (2006).

Mistrial may be refused when the argument is merely illogical. Sable v. State, 14 Ga. App. 816, 82 S.E. 379 (1914); Phillips v. State, 149 Ga. 255, 99 S.E. 874 (1919).

Any reasonable inference may be drawn from evidence admitted without restriction as to the evidence's applicability to the issues involved. Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. App. 669, 31 S.E. 571 (1898); Holmes v. State, 7 Ga. App. 570, 67 S.E. 693 (1910); McLeod v. State, 22 Ga. App. 241, 95 S.E. 934 (1918).

If the remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument were logically inferable from the evidence presented, the presentation of the inferences as if the inferences were coming from the defendant did not amount to an impermissible comment upon the defendant's decision not to testify. George v. State, 260 Ga. 809, 400 S.E.2d 911 (1991).

Counsel is permitted, in the sound discretion of the court, to argue all reasonable inferences and deductions which may be drawn from the evidence. Fowler v. State, 201 Ga. App. 417, 411 S.E.2d 335 (1991).

Legitimacy of an inference is a question for the jury. Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S.E. 613 (1893).

Instruction by the court to limit comments strictly to what is in evidence does not improperly restrict the comments of counsel. Lancette v. State, 151 Ga. App. 740, 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979).

Surreptitious attempts to get facts not proven before the jury.

- For counsel to attempt surreptitiously to get before the jury facts by way of supposition, which have not been proven, is highly reprehensible. The practice should be instantly repressed by the court, without waiting to be called upon by the opposite party. Grayhouse v. State, 65 Ga. App. 853, 16 S.E.2d 787 (1941).

State will not permit the prosecuting officer to use any unfair means in the trial to the prejudice of the accused. Grayhouse v. State, 65 Ga. App. 853, 16 S.E.2d 787 (1941).

District attorney's duty to refrain from making unauthorized statements.

- It is especially the duty of a solicitor (now district attorney) to cautiously refrain from making statements in the solicitor's (now district attorney) argument to the jury which are unauthorized, and which will tend to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 197 S.E. 82 (1938).

Knowing use of illegal evidence by prosecution.

- When a prosecuting attorney knowingly injects into evidence an illegal element to the prejudice of the defendant, a mistrial is often the only complete and satisfactory remedy. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968); Perry v. State, 154 Ga. App. 559, 269 S.E.2d 63 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Joiner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 61, 497 S.E.2d 642 (1998).

Counsel may not complain of error that counsel procured or aided.

- Induced error is impermissible. Counsel cannot complain on appeal of an order or ruling that the counsel's own conduct procured or aided. Mosley v. State, 150 Ga. App. 802, 258 S.E.2d 608 (1979).

Improper remark of one counsel is no excuse for an improper reply thereto, when no objection was made against the latter. Bennett v. State, 86 Ga. 401, 12 S.E. 806, 22 Am. St. R. 465, 12 L.R.A. 449 (1890); Nixon v. State, 14 Ga. App. 261, 80 S.E. 513 (1914).

Remarks as to what is expected to be proved generally.

- In making a preliminary statement to the jury of facts which the solicitor (now district attorney) intends or expects to prove, the solicitor (now district attorney) should confine remarks to facts which, under the rules of law governing the admissibility of evidence, the solicitor (now district attorney) will be allowed to prove. Gossett v. State, 6 Ga. App. 439, 65 S.E. 162 (1909).

In opening a case, it is not improper to state what the solicitor (now district attorney) expects to prove by a witness, and to argue reasons for the admission of such testimony. Corbitt v. State, 7 Ga. App. 13, 66 S.E. 152 (1909).

It is not improper to state what one intends to prove and to argue reasons for admission; a prosecutor may state a fact to clarify the circumstances surrounding the introduction of a document to which the defendants object, and may also recite what the prosecutor is trying to establish in response to an objection. Thayer v. State, 189 Ga. App. 321, 376 S.E.2d 199 (1988).

District attorney may not state to the jury the district attorney's personal belief in the defendant's guilt. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983).

Remark that evidence will be introduced which affords inference of guilt.

- It is not improper for counsel in opening case to state that counsel will rely in part on proof of conduct affording an inference of guilt. White v. State, 127 Ga. 273, 56 S.E. 425 (1907).

Writing "guilty" on chalkboard.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the assistant district attorney to write "GUILTY" on the chalkboard during closing argument. Blue v. State, 170 Ga. App. 304, 316 S.E.2d 862 (1984).

Prosecution may discuss and criticize defendant's statement.

- Prosecuting attorney has the right to discuss and criticize, within proper bounds, a defendant's statement, although the prosecuting attorney has no right to criticize the defendant's failure to make any statement at all. Fitzgerald v. State, 51 Ga. App. 636, 181 S.E. 186 (1935).

Statement by counsel for the state that counsel believes defendant to be guilty.

- Prosecuting attorney, over objection, should not be permitted to express an opinion that the accused is guilty. Broznack v. State, 109 Ga. 514, 35 S.E. 123 (1900); Moore v. State, 10 Ga. App. 805, 74 S.E. 315 (1912).

It is improper for counsel for the state, on the trial of a criminal defendant, to state to the jury counsel's belief that the defendant is guilty. Forster v. State, 60 Ga. App. 598, 4 S.E.2d 498 (1939).

While a district attorney may draw conclusions from facts proven, it is improper for the district attorney to urge the district attorney's personal belief as to the defendant's guilt. Hoerner v. State, 246 Ga. 374, 271 S.E.2d 458 (1980).

Prosecution's statement of belief that defendant is guilty.

- If the solicitor (now prosecuting attorney) states in the solicitor's argument that if the solicitor ever expressed an opinion, this case would be one that the solicitor would like to express the solicitor's opinion and that the solicitor thought the defendant was guilty, and the defendant moves for a mistrial on the ground that the solicitor has expressed the solicitor's opinion that the defendant was guilty, but the court merely overrules the motion, and neither rebukes the solicitor nor instructs the jury to disregard such argument, nor in any way expresses the court's disapproval, it is reversible error to refuse a new trial after a verdict of conviction. Forster v. State, 60 Ga. App. 598, 4 S.E.2d 498 (1939).

Defense counsel's statement that counsel believes defendant is innocent.

- Court may charge the jury to disregard a statement by counsel for the defendant that defense counsel believes the defendant is innocent. Smith v. State, 95 Ga. 472, 20 S.E. 291 (1894).

Counsel's statement of belief as to witness' veracity is improper.

- It is improper for counsel to state to the jury counsel's personal belief as to the veracity of a witness. Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980).

Counsel may urge the jury to deduce a witness's veracity from proven facts. Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 266 S.E.2d 218, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 879, 101 S. Ct. 227, 66 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1980).

Improbable statement of a witness may be commented upon. Cobb v. State, 27 Ga. 648 (1859).

Interest of a witness in the result of the trial may be commented upon. Moore v. State, 97 Ga. 759, 25 S.E. 362 (1896).

Credibility of a witness may be attacked in the concluding argument, although in the opening argument, counsel has not given notice of an intention to do so. Taffe v. State, 90 Ga. 459, 16 S.E. 204 (1892).

Disagreement between counsel as to testimony of witness.

- If a disagreement arose between counsel as to the testimony of a witness, the judge may leave the matter to the recollection of the jury. Fort v. State, 3 Ga. App. 448, 60 S.E. 282 (1908).

Assumption that counsel's own testimony proven when testimony conflicts.

- When the testimony is conflicting, counsel may assume that the facts testified to by counsel's witnesses were proven. Hatcher v. State, 18 Ga. 460 (1855).

Purpose and effect of impeaching evidence may be discussed. Memmler v. State, 75 Ga. 576 (1885).

Right of cross-examination is subject to limitations to prevent abuse. Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979).

Control of the cross-examination of a witness is to a great degree within the discretion of the trial court and will not be controlled unless abused. Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979).

Evidence as to silence of the accused at time of arrest.

- Evidence as to silence on the part of the defendant at the time of the defendant's arrest should be excluded when objected to, for the defendant is then entitled to remain silent, and the prosecution may not use against the defendant the fact that the defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege. Newton v. State, 154 Ga. App. 98, 267 S.E.2d 641 (1980).

Reference to fact that prisoner did not make a statement.

- Mistrial is required if there is a reference to the fact that the prisoner did not make a statement. Barker v. State, 127 Ga. 276, 56 S.E. 419 (1907); Griffin v. State, 3 Ga. App. 476, 60 S.E. 277 (1908).

Omission in the statement of the accused may be commented upon. Tolbert v. State, 12 Ga. App. 685, 78 S.E. 131 (1913).

Failure of the accused to produce witnesses to rebut evidence introduced by the state may be commented upon. Ponder v. State, 18 Ga. App. 727, 90 S.E. 376 (1916).

Argument of inferences to be drawn from defendant's failure to produce witnesses.

- Although a prosecutor is prohibited from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify, a prosecutor can argue to the jury the inferences to be drawn from the defendant's failure to produce witnesses who are competent to testify and who allegedly would give evidence favorable to the defendant. Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 266 S.E.2d 218, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 879, 101 S. Ct. 227, 66 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1980).

Mistrial may be refused when deductions from the evidence are admitted. Carraway v. State, 16 Ga. App. 161, 84 S.E. 615 (1915); Swearengen v. State, 18 Ga. App. 763, 90 S.E. 653 (1916).

Effect of prosecutor's inaccurate statement.

- If the statement by the prosecutor, although inaccurate, is effectively shown by the defendant's incriminating admissions, the trial court does not err in overruling the motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct or in failing to rebuke the prosecutor. Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 260 S.E.2d 40 (1979).

Prosecutor's characterization of evidence as incriminating.

- If appellant, convicted of aggravated assault with intent to rape, alleged that the trial court erred by denying the appellant's motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to certain evidence as being incriminating, and the transcript showed the comment was made in the presence of the jury during argument on one of the appellant's objections and after the defense counsel referred to the evidence as being exculpatory, the court did not err in refusing to rely upon O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 because the evidence in question was admitted in evidence and, further, the comment was a reply to appellant's argument. Hawkins v. State, 195 Ga. App. 739, 395 S.E.2d 251 (1990).

Comment on defendant's plea of guilty to another crime.

- Although technically speaking it is error for the solicitor general (now district attorney) to make a statement regarding the defendant's guilty plea to a different crime, it is not sufficient for reversal for the judge to have refused to declare a mistrial when defendant admits on the stand the crime in question. Thornton v. State, 94 Ga. App. 169, 94 S.E.2d 94 (1956).

Closing commentary on defense witnesses' absence proper.

- Prosecutor's comment in closing argument concerning the absence of foretold defense witnesses was not an improper character attack as the comment was confined to the written statement properly admitted into evidence by the defense. Alexander v. State, 263 Ga. 474, 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993).

Announcement that witness is to be prosecuted for same offense.

- It is improper for a solicitor general (now district attorney) to announce in the hearing of the jury that the solicitor intends to prosecute a witness for the same offense. Lewis v. State, 89 Ga. 396, 15 S.E. 489 (1892).

Placing of defendant's character before jury when case does not involve it.

- It is error to allow, over objection of the defendant, prejudicial and irrelevant matter to go before the jury in a trial, which tends to place the defendant's character and conduct before the jury, if the nature of the case does not involve such character. Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464, 164 S.E.2d 238 (1968).

Prosecution's statement that defendant's character may not be discussed unless put in issue.

- Whether or not the statement of a solicitor general (now district attorney), made to the jury in the solicitor's argument, that the solicitor is not allowed to discuss the character of the defendant unless the solicitor puts the solicitor's character in issue, when the solicitor has not, is in any respect prejudicial and harmful to the defendant, a prompt instruction by the court that the jury should disregard the argument thus made, and the further clarification by the court of the law on character, would render the statement completely harmless. Harris v. State, 212 Ga. 186, 91 S.E.2d 492 (1956).

Comment on bar against compelling defendant's spouse to testify.

- It is erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant to allow state's counsel to state to the jury that if the law of Georgia would permit counsel to call the defendant's spouse as a witness, counsel would do so. Askins v. State, 210 Ga. 532, 81 S.E.2d 471 (1954).

Defendant's manner of dress at trial.

- Prosecution's argument as to the conduct of a defendant in the defendant's manner of dress during the defendant's trial is not such improper conduct as to require a reversal of the trial judge in refusing a mistrial, especially when the judge makes a statement to the jury that the solicitor's (now district attorney's) argument is out of order and is not to be considered. Locklear v. State, 52 Ga. App. 87, 182 S.E. 534 (1935).

If district attorney makes improper personal reference to defense counsel, the trial court errs in not taking remedial action. Estep v. State, 129 Ga. App. 909, 201 S.E.2d 809 (1973).

Statement of facts in reply to criticism of opposing counsel.

- Counsel, in reply to a criticism by opposing counsel, has no right to state facts by way of explanation of counsel's own conduct disclosed by the evidence. Hodgkins v. State, 89 Ga. 761, 15 S.E. 695 (1892).

Remark that court could have directed a not guilty verdict were it not for state's case.

- It is error requiring the grant of a new trial for a trial court to simply overrule, without remedial instructions to the jury, the defendant's objection to the solicitor general's (now district attorney) use of the following language in the solicitor's concluding argument to the jury: "If a case had not been made out against the defendant, then the court could and would have directed a verdict of not guilty." Washington v. State, 80 Ga. App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949).

Certified copy of the brief of the evidence may be read. Cribb v. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S.E. 396 (1903); Hanley v. State, 128 Ga. 24, 57 S.E. 236 (1907).

Reading from law reports, see Glover v. State, 15 Ga. App. 44, 82 S.E. 602 (1914); Nix v. State, 149 Ga. 304, 100 S.E. 197 (1919).

Counsel may not read briefs of literary or historical matter which perform the office of evidence, and do not merely serve to illustrate the facts. Quattlebaum v. State, 119 Ga. 433, 46 S.E. 677 (1904).

Quotation by district attorney of passages from the Bible.

- In the absence of any motion for a mistrial, or the invoking of some ruling or instruction by the court with reference thereto, or even of any objection at the time, there is no merit in the ground of the motion for new trial complaining for the first time of the argument of the solicitor general (now district attorney) quoting passages from the Bible as to the punishment for homicide. Wheat v. State, 187 Ga. 480, 1 S.E.2d 1 (1939).

For case in which prosecution repeatedly asked certain questions of a witness, see Loughridge v. State, 181 Ga. 261, 182 S.E. 12 (1935).

Remarks aimed toward popular prejudice.

- Court should not treat remarks aimed toward popular prejudice as a deduction from the evidence, and hence a ground of a motion for new trial failing to aver that remarks of this character are not supported by the evidence would not be defective. Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 138 S.E.2d 741 (1964).

For remark that conviction would be a lesson to the general public, see Collins v. State, 86 Ga. App. 157, 71 S.E.2d 99 (1952).

Reference to historical figures.

- Prosecutor did not err during the defendant's trial on a charge of armed robbery by making reference to the defendant's name and stating that "Jesse James lived up to his name." James v. State, 265 Ga. App. 689, 595 S.E.2d 364 (2004).

Use of crime statistics to argue for strict enforcement of the law.

- On the trial of an indictment for murder, it is error to allow the solicitor general (now district attorney), over objections of defendant's counsel, to argue to the jury statistics compiled by "reliable authorities" showing the number of murders committed in Georgia in a year and to argue to the jury in consequence thereof to strictly enforce the law in the case on trial and to impose the capital penalty. Fair v. State, 168 Ga. 409, 148 S.E. 144 (1929).

Comment or prevalence of crime in the county.

- Counsel should not in counsel's argument refer to the prevalence of crime in that part of the county where the jury is organized. Thomas v. State, 129 Ga. 419, 59 S.E. 246 (1907).

Arguments dealing with community safety and general crime prevention.

- Closing arguments by the district attorney which appeal to the safety of the community and general prevention of crime are proper. Burke v. State, 153 Ga. App. 769, 266 S.E.2d 549 (1980).

Comment by prosecution that "too many pardons have been granted in Georgia."

- See Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943).

Counsel's repeated use of a racial epithet, even if counsel meant this line of argument as a trial tactic on the defendant's behalf, should have been stopped with a strong reprimand by the trial court because failure to reprimand or appropriately instruct the jury gave the imprimatur of judicial tolerance to the factor of race being at least subliminally relevant to consideration of guilt or innocence. Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga. App. 279, 329 S.E.2d 601 (1985).

Improper questions also subject to court's control.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 has been applied not only in situations when counsel have made improper statements or prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury during a trial, but it also has been applied when the remarks are made in the form of a question. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983).

If irrelevant and prejudicial information inferable from an improper question of the prosecutor was jettisoned, and the jury was immediately instructed that a question does not constitute evidence, the directives of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 were obeyed. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

Argument that death penalty set aside if not warranted.

- Prosecutor's argument, over objection, that the jury should impose the death penalty and assume that the death penalty will be set aside if not warranted, absent curative instructions, requires reversal. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).

Conduct during closing argument involving gun in murder trial.

- In a prosecution for murder, the victim's gun was properly in evidence and thus was a proper subject for the prosecutor's final argument, and the prosecutor's conclusion that the victim could hardly have missed the appellant with a pistol shot at such close range was within the considerable latitude in imagery and illustration granted a district attorney in final argument. Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 330 S.E.2d 353 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S. Ct. 225, 102 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1988).

Asking jury to speculate as to murder victim's wishes.

- In a prosecution for murder, a prosecutor's demonstration during closing argument that a small person could easily pull the trigger of the victim's alleged pistol constituted the introduction of new evidence to respond to the appellant's evidence that the trigger was extremely difficult to pull. This was error because the appellant had no chance to rebut the prosecutor's demonstration that could easily have been performed during trial when both sides could have fleshed out the evidence's implications thoroughly. Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 330 S.E.2d 353 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S. Ct. 225, 102 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1988).

Trial court did not err in sustaining an objection to defense counsel's closing argument in which defense counsel asked the jury to speculate whether the deceased victim would have wanted the victim's friend (defendant) convicted of murder, since there was no evidence that the victim would not have wanted the defendant to be convicted, nor was it a necessary inference from evidence of any friendship. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).

Comment on seating arrangement at defense counsel table not error.

- Prosecuting attorney's remark regarding the alleged implications of the seating arrangements at the defense counsel table approaches but is not outside the parameters of the wide latitude accorded counsel for the state and does not impermissibly allude to facts which are not in evidence. Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 79, 310 S.E.2d 912 (1984).

Prosecutor's remarks on potential future drug victims not error.

- Prosecutor's hypothecation to jurors that student observers in the courtroom were potential victims of defendant's drug traffic did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Black v. State, 167 Ga. App. 204, 305 S.E.2d 837 (1983).

Prosecutor's comments on the potential effects of crack cocaine use were reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence and did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Hunt v. State, 219 Ga. App. 741, 466 S.E.2d 894 (1995).

Prosecutor's comment to jurors that the jurors could take part in the war against drug trafficking by convicting the defendant did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Black v. State, 167 Ga. App. 204, 305 S.E.2d 837 (1983).

Reference to purchases made with proceeds of crime.

- When there was testimony in evidence that the defendant had purchased a number of items with the proceeds of the crime, the state was entitled to refer to these purchases in the state's closing argument notwithstanding that the items themselves were not admitted in evidence. Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 82, 365 S.E.2d 99, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879, 109 S. Ct. 195, 102 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1988).

Prosecutor's comments that "you get an attorney."

- Prosecutor's comments that in this country, "you get an attorney," were ambiguous as to whether the defendant's counsel was appointed instead of retained, and did not constitute statements of prejudicial matters which were not in evidence as would be precluded by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 692 S.E.2d 828 (2010).

Argument that prosecutor's office carefully considered death penalty.

- If the prosecutor told the jury that the prosecutor's office made a careful decision that this case warranted seeking the death penalty and went on to describe why that decision was made, focusing on the individual characteristics of this crime and this defendant, allowing the jury to assess for itself the appropriateness of a death sentence, the trial judge's corrective instructions were sufficient to counter any unfairness that might have otherwise resulted. Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S. Ct. 1359, 94 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1987).

Prosecutor's closing argument which called the jury's attention to certain notorious cases involving violent criminal acts was within permissible bounds. Bell v. State, 208 Ga. App. 201, 430 S.E.2d 124 (1993).

Prosecutor's statements during closing argument were within the wide leeway granted to counsel to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75(c), including that a former girlfriend whom the defendant forced to purchase a gun was fearful of the surroundings and that another girlfriend was a battered woman, such that there was no cause to grant a new trial. Varner v. State, 285 Ga. 300, 676 S.E.2d 189 (2009).

Prosecutor's comments did not warrant mistrial.

- See Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 166, 296 S.E.2d 598 (1982).

Although the prosecuting attorney referred to facts not in evidence during closing argument, the query merely sought to raise possible explanations of the fact that the burglary car was not the defendant's car, and the suggestion that the jury could deduce that the defendant was using a car other than the defendant's own was a fair comment and not improper. Murphy v. State, 203 Ga. App. 152, 416 S.E.2d 376 (1992).

Even if a prosecutor's remarks about the defendant's credibility and statement that if the jury convicted the defendant of a lesser charge the jury "would be letting this defendant off the hook" could be interpreted as improper, the court held it was highly improbable in light of the evidence that the remarks changed the result of the trial, and any error in the prosecutor's argument was therefore harmless. Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 547, 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998).

Prosecutor did not violate a prior stipulation in making a reasonable inference from the evidence that either the defendant or the defendant's accomplice could have stepped in the victim's blood and left the footprint while they were leaving the victim's house after the murder; the statement did not violate the state's narrow stipulation which merely eliminated a single pair of the defendant's boots as the source of the footprint, and there was no stipulation or evidence that the seized boots were the ones the defendant wore the night the crime was committed. Messick v. State, 276 Ga. 528, 580 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 880, 124 S. Ct. 302, 157 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003).

Comments about outstanding warrants.

- Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 in failing to rebuke the prosecutor and declare a mistrial after the court allowed the prosecutor to, in violation of a previous ruling, elicit testimony about whether there were outstanding warrants against the defendant at the time the defendant was arrested; the cited exchange did not demonstrate the alleged misconduct as the exchange showed the state's careful questioning of the witness in order to avoid disclosing whether there were such warrants. Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial on the ground that the state made improper arguments in closing because the challenged comments referred to evidence in the case, which was the defendant's refusal to submit to testing and other manifestations of impairment, and, thus, were not improper under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75; considering the strength of the state's evidence, it was highly unlikely that the prosecutor's closing argument contributed to the guilty verdict. Crusselle v. State, 303 Ga. App. 879, 694 S.E.2d 707 (2010).

Requiring slides from opening argument be taken down.

- Trial court did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte after the prosecutor showed the jury slides during the prosecutor's opening statement because when the defendant objected, the trial court took immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down, and the defendant did not seek additional relief in the form of a curative instruction or a mistrial; the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that the slides were inappropriately argumentative for opening statement, and the trial court instructed the jury before opening statements and again after the close of the evidence that the prosecutor's opening statements were not evidence. Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56 (2011).

Prosecutor's comments about defendant's obscene gestures.

- Trial court discharged the court's duties properly when the court allowed the prosecutor to state, during closing arguments, that the defendant had made an obscene gesture to someone in the courtroom during the course of the trial because the defendant offered no evidence that the gesture was incorrectly attributed to the defendant. Jeffers v. State, 290 Ga. 311, 721 S.E.2d 86 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant a mistrial because there was no indication that either the jury or the trial court heard the prosecutor's remark that the defendant was "swaying" during the defendant's horizontal gaze nystagmus test nor was the remark recorded; the trial court explained to the jury, both in the court's preliminary and closing instructions, that evidence consisted only of witness testimony and exhibits and that the jurors were to decide the case for themselves, based solely on the testimony heard from the witness stand and any exhibits admitted into evidence. Travis v. State, 314 Ga. App. 280, 724 S.E.2d 15 (2012).

Improper question to defense witness was harmless error.

- Question posed to a defense witness asking whether the witness was aware that the defendant told the defendant's mother "I didn't shoot that man, mama, three times, I only shot him twice" was improper and warranted a rebuke from the trial court; however, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 987, 126 S. Ct. 571, 163 L. Ed. 2d 478 (2005).

When an improper argument is made, the adversary must act.

- Defendant's counsel's failure to object or to move for a mistrial upon the prosecutor's improper, impermissible, and prejudicial use of similar transaction evidence of uncharged crimes was not within the realm of being a reasonable trial tactic as such statements were not only improper, the statements were pervasive and harmful to the defendant's case. Accordingly, counsel was ineffective in failing to request a mistrial. Collier v. State, 266 Ga. App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (2004).

When the defendant said the trial court erred because the court took no corrective action when the prosecuting attorney alluded to facts not in evidence when questioning the victim, the defendant was not entitled to appellate review of this issue as no objection was made in the trial court at the time the allegedly prejudicial comment was made. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 317, 609 S.E.2d 643 (2004).

Party may not take chance on favorable verdict and complain later.

- Party cannot during the trial ignore what the party thinks to be an injustice, take the party's chances on a favorable verdict, and complain later. Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951); Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. 511, 175 S.E.2d 840 (1970).

Waiver of the irregularity will result unless objection or motion is made. Fuller v. State, 10 Ga. App. 34, 72 S.E. 515 (1911); Livingston v. State, 17 Ga. App. 136, 86 S.E. 449 (1915); Nix v. State, 149 Ga. 304, 100 S.E. 197 (1919).

Judge is not required to grant a mistrial on the judge's own motion if defense counsel waives an objection and fails to specify what further form of relief, if any, is desired. Vernon v. State, 152 Ga. App. 616, 263 S.E.2d 503 (1979).

Actions which counsel may take in response to improper argument.

- When improper argument is made by counsel, counsel for the opposite party, in order to make the action of the judge in reference to the same the basis for a review, may object to the argument, and rest simply on the objection. If the court fails to take any notice of the objection and allows the argument to proceed, this conduct may be reviewed. Brooks v. State, 55 Ga. App. 227, 189 S.E. 852 (1937); Washington v. State, 80 Ga. App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949).

When improper argument to the jury is made by an attorney for one of the parties, it is necessary in order to make the argument a basis for review that opposing counsel should make objection to such argument or invoke some ruling or instruction with reference thereto by the court, but it is not essential that a motion for mistrial should be made. Brooks v. State, 55 Ga. App. 227, 189 S.E. 852 (1937); Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939).

In addition to making an objection, counsel may move for appropriate instructions to the jury, or for a reprimand or rebuke of counsel in order that the jury may be impressed with the grave nature of the impropriety which has taken place, or, if the impropriety is of a very grave character, counsel may move for a mistrial, and upon the refusal of the court to do that which ought to have been done on the motion made, whatever the motion's nature may be, the conduct of the judge will then be a subject for review. Washington v. State, 80 Ga. App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949).

When improper argument is made to the jury by an attorney for one of the parties, it is necessary, in order to make the argument a basis for review, that opposing counsel make proper objection to the argument at the time made or invoke some ruling or instruction from the court respecting the argument, either by way of reprimanding counsel, or of instructing the jury to disregard the argument, or of declaring a mistrial. Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221 (1951).

Effect of objection to improper argument and of ruling thereon generally.

- Simple objection to an improper argument is in effect a request of counsel for the complaining party for the court to require opposing counsel to desist from further improper argument. The effect of a proper ruling by the court on a simple objection also is to inform the jury as to whether or not the argument was improper. When the argument is improper and the court rules in effect that the argument is not, such ruling may be prejudicial. Johns v. State, 79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949).

Mere objection to improper argument is insufficient to invoke a ruling.

- Mere objection to improper argument of counsel, without more, is not sufficient to invoke a ruling of the court. In the absence of a specific motion either for a mistrial, or that the jury be instructed to disregard the argument, it is not error to fail to grant a mistrial or to instruct the jury. Holt v. State, 147 Ga. App. 186, 248 S.E.2d 223 (1978); Carroll v. State, 147 Ga. App. 332, 248 S.E.2d 702 (1978); Hinton v. State, 233 Ga. App. 213, 504 S.E.2d 49 (1998).

Failure to object to closing argument.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a portion of the state's closing argument because counsel stated that the prosecutor was heard using the newspaper analogy in other cases and counsel strategically decided not to object, choosing instead to comment on the prosecution's theatrics in closing as a way to turn the prosecutor's remarks to the appellant's advantage. Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015).

Trial court did not err in failing to give a curative instruction following the state's allegedly improper closing argument because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75; and the record did not support the defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly implied that the defendant's trial counsel was under the influence of drugs. Clary v. State, 344 Ga. App. 710, 812 S.E.2d 31 (2018).

Mere objection which is sustained does not constitute a motion for mistrial. Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 398, 280 S.E.2d 419 (1981).

Failure to renew request for admonishment or to challenge curative instruction.

- Regarding the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that the defendant had stated that the defendant was a pimp because the defendant did not renew the defendant's request for an admonishment or otherwise challenge the curative instruction given by the court as inadequate, any issue concerning the propriety of the prosecutor's comments was waived; and, if defense counsel believed that the trial court's curative action in sustaining the objection was insufficient, defense counsel should have sought additional relief. Mackey v. State, 342 Ga. App. 791, 805 S.E.2d 596 (2017).

Improper remarks must be properly excepted to in order to warrant new trial.

- If defendant fails to properly except to allegedly improper remarks of judge and solicitor general (now district attorney) during examination of witnesses by a motion for mistrial, the allegedly improper remarks are insufficient to support a motion for new trial. Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761, 184 S.E. 291 (1936).

If no objection is made to solicitor's (now district attorney's) comment on defendant's failure to testify, the grant of a new trial is not required. Lunsford v. State, 60 Ga. App. 537, 4 S.E.2d 112 (1939).

Unless the court's attention is called to improper arguments and a ruling invoked upon the trial, the point may not be raised in a motion for new trial. Such a motion presents nothing for decision by the Supreme Court when no objection is shown to have been made at the trial. Morris v. State, 200 Ga. 471, 37 S.E.2d 345 (1946); Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 299 S.E.2d 531 (1983).

If the trial judge's attention is not called to improper argument during the trial, it will not constitute a good ground of a motion for new trial. Morris v. State, 200 Ga. 471, 37 S.E.2d 345 (1946).

New trial is not required on account of improper argument unless a ruling thereon be invoked by timely objection. Dix v. State, 153 Ga. App. 868, 267 S.E.2d 293 (1980).

Defendant's motion for mistrial was properly denied since in the trial court no motion for mistrial was made specifically based upon ground which is asserted on appeal to have been violative of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Whatley v. State, 165 Ga. App. 13, 299 S.E.2d 87 (1983).

Trial court did not err by allowing the state to make improper and prejudicial comments during the defendant's trial on drug-related offenses as defense counsel only objected to the prosecutor's statement recounting defendant's previous conviction and did not object to the two questions posed by the prosecutor, which questions implied that the prosecutor personally believed that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Thus, the issue of whether those two questions constituted improper remarks was waived on appeal. Heard v. State, 291 Ga. App. 550, 662 S.E.2d 310 (2008).

Because the defendant either failed to object or had an objection sustained as to questions or statements made by the prosecutor, there was no ruling by the trial court that was adverse to the defendant for the court of appeals to review; the court of appeals will not reverse a conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct when the defendant did not take proper exception or when the defendant received a favorable ruling on any objection or requested corrective action. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in finding that the court did not have a sua sponte duty to intervene and prevent the prosecutor's statement regarding the codefendants' pleas of guilty was waived because no objection was made during trial. Tucker v. State, 313 Ga. App. 537, 722 S.E.2d 139 (2012).

Defendant waived the argument that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to state, during closing arguments, that the defendant had made an obscene gesture to someone in the courtroom during the course of the trial because there was no contemporaneous objection to the argument. Jeffers v. State, 290 Ga. 311, 721 S.E.2d 86 (2012).

Necessary allegations in motion for new trial.

- Motion for a new trial based upon a remark, alleged to be improper and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, which was made by the solicitor (now district attorney) in the solicitor's argument to the jury should allege that the movant made a motion for a mistrial before the verdict was rendered, or that the court refused to grant a mistrial, or that it is probable that the injury was not eradicated by the instructions to the jury to disregard the remarks. Meadow v. State, 45 Ga. App. 240, 163 S.E. 915 (1932).

Special ground for new trial complaining of an alleged improper and prejudicial statement made by the solicitor (now district attorney) during the trial and in the presence of the jury which fails to show or allege that a motion to declare a mistrial was made, or that any objection whatsoever to the statement was made to the court at the time, or subsequently, during the trial fails to show any error of commission or omission by the court. Dukes v. State, 57 Ga. App. 835, 197 S.E. 69 (1938).

Improper remarks to be considered on appeal must be properly excepted to.

- Alleged improper statements made by the solicitor general (now district attorney) in the presence of the jury, and testimony of a witness, neither of which is objected to upon the trial, will not be considered by the Supreme Court. Aycock v. State, 188 Ga. 551, 4 S.E.2d 221 (1939).

To enforce by review the performance of the duty imposed by this section upon the trial judge, the law in the form of a rule of procedure requiring an objection during the trial must be observed. Morris v. State, 200 Ga. 471, 37 S.E.2d 345 (1946).

Contentions may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Mayfield v. State, 153 Ga. App. 459, 265 S.E.2d 366 (1980).

Defendant failed to object to any statements made by the prosecution that allegedly commented on matters not admitted into evidence in the defendant's child molestation and sexual battery trial; therefore, the defendant waived the right to argue about those statements pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 on appeal. Carson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 21, 576 S.E.2d 12 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (2015).

Because the overwhelming evidence presented against the defendant supported the convictions, and the defendant failed to assert a timely and contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's opening statement comments, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motions for a new trial and a mistrial. Brooks v. State, 284 Ga. App. 762, 644 S.E.2d 891 (2007).

Improper remarks must be subject of motion for reprimand.

- Appellate court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court overruling a motion for mistrial on the ground that the court in overruling the motion failed to reprimand the solicitor (now district attorney) for an improper question since no request was made that the solicitor be reprimanded and the objectionable query was never answered by the witness. Nelson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 746, 90 S.E.2d 91 (1955).

Improper remarks are not ground for reversal if court's attention not called thereto.

- If the solicitor (now district attorney) in the course of argument uses certain language which is calculated to excite prejudice against the defendant, but it does not appear that the attention of the court was called thereto or any ruling was invoked on the subject, either by way of reprimanding counsel, or of instructing the jury, or of declaring a mistrial, such impropriety in argument will not furnish a ground for a reversal by the Supreme Court. Benton v. State, 185 Ga. 254, 194 S.E. 166 (1937).

No duty to reprimand counsel absent motion.

- When the defendant's objection to a question by the prosecution was sustained but there was no motion for mistrial or rebuke of counsel, it was not the court's duty to reprimand counsel without such a motion. Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 197 S.E.2d 720 (1973).

Trial court was not required sua sponte to prevent the state from making improper remarks during the state's closing argument because the defendant did not object to the closing argument; O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 only requires the judge to act when counsel makes a timely objection. Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (2010).

Failure to object to reference to confession which is not in evidence.

- See Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939).

Error in failing to do more than caution prosecutor deemed waived.

- Because the defendant did not move for a mistrial or curative instructions at any point in the trial, the contention that the trial court erred in failing to do more than caution the assistant district attorney to comply with the court's ruling was deemed waived. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 646 S.E.2d 219 (2007).

Defendant must renew objection or motion for mistrial if court's action unsatisfactory to request further jury instructions.

- If the defendant's counsel deems the instruction or admonition to the jury, plus the reprimand or the rebuke of offending counsel, inadequate to remove the harmful effect, it is incumbent on the defendant to request further instructions or renew the defendant's motion for a mistrial in order to preserve a basis for appeal. Pitts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 845, 234 S.E.2d 682 (1977).

If the defendant is not satisfied with the court's action in response to the improper question or remark of prosecuting counsel, it is incumbent upon the defendant to renew an objection and motion for mistrial. The defendant's failure to do so precludes complaint on appeal. Delaney v. State, 154 Ga. App. 772, 270 S.E.2d 48 (1980); Barksdale v. State, 161 Ga. App. 155, 291 S.E.2d 18 (1982).

Failure to renew objections and motion for mistrial after corrective instructions makes the denial of the motion for mistrial not subject to review. Whitaker v. State, 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980).

Duty of judge to prevent improper argument generally.

- It is only when prejudicial matters which are not in evidence are stated in the argument that it becomes the duty of the court to interpose and prevent, or to hear objections and rebuke counsel, or to instruct the jury, or to declare a mistrial. Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. 671, 27 S.E.2d 307 (1943).

This section forbids improper arguments and imposes a duty upon the trial judge to interpose and prevent such arguments. Morris v. State, 200 Ga. 471, 37 S.E.2d 345 (1946).

It is the duty of the court, with or without objection, to interpose, prevent, and rebuke improper argument, and to endeavor by proper instructions to remove from the minds of the jury improper impressions made by unfair argument. Josey v. State, 89 Ga. App. 215, 79 S.E.2d 64 (1953).

This section places an affirmative duty upon the trial judge to prevent on the judge's own motion argument by counsel calculated to invoke prejudice against the adverse party. Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 138 S.E.2d 741 (1964).

Trial court has a duty, even without a motion therefor, to see that the trial is fairly conducted, and when improper remarks are made in the presence of the jury, it is the absolute duty of the judge to intervene and stop it and by all needful instructions remove the improper impressions which the state's counsel has sought to create in the minds of the jurors. Winget v. State, 138 Ga. App. 433, 226 S.E.2d 608, overruled on other grounds, Quick v. State, 139 Ga. App. 440, 228 S.E.2d 592 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 requires that when statements of prejudicial matters not in evidence are made the court must interpose, and the court shall also rebuke counsel and give such instructions as will remove the improper impression, or, if necessary, grant a mistrial if the plaintiff's attorney is the offender. Morris v. State, 160 Ga. App. 505, 287 S.E.2d 405 (1981).

If counsel makes improper remarks, the court has a duty to rebuke counsel so as to remove the improper impression or give adequate instructions to the jury so as to remove the prejudicial effect of the remark. However, the remark must both have been heard by the jury and not go to matters in evidence. Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983).

Questions and responses alluding to prior arrests impermissibly placed a defendant's character in issue, and since the trial court failed to take any corrective action in fulfillment of the court's duty defendant was denied a fair trial. Richardson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 10, 403 S.E.2d 877 (1991).

Trial court erred by failing to fulfill the court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 to rebuke the prosecutor and instruct the jury in order to remove any improper impression that could have been left in the jury's' minds, and the court of appeals erred in concluding that the defendant waived review of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by failing to give a curative instruction after the defendant objected to the state's closing argument by failing to obtain a ruling on the defendant's request for a curative instruction; the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 speaks in terms of the trial court's duty to give a curative instruction when a proper objection is made to the state's introduction of improper argument on matters that are not in evidence, and a mere objection is sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. O'Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 702 S.E.2d 288 (2010).

Statement by counsel that counsel expects to prove patently inadmissible matters.

- While technically this section applies to argument by counsel on matters not in evidence, the same harm results if counsel makes the statement that counsel expects to prove patently inadmissible matters before the introduction of evidence, and it is as much the duty of the court upon objection made to rebuke counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds, or to grant a motion for mistrial. Pilcher v. State, 91 Ga. App. 428, 85 S.E.2d 618 (1955).

Improper comment on irrelevant evidence.

- Since the defendant was accused of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4, the trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 in admonishing the defense counsel not to suggest that the defendant's penetration of the victim and the resulting injury had been insignificant; the evidence was irrelevant as § 16-6-4 did not distinguish between degrees of vaginal injury. Pickett v. State, 277 Ga. App. 316, 626 S.E.2d 508 (2006).

Duty of court upon motion for mistrial being made.

- If unwarranted and prejudicial remarks not referring to any matter in evidence in the case are made, and a motion for mistrial is based on such remarks, the court has the duty of eradicating the effect of the remarks from the jury's mind by ruling the remarks out, reprimanding counsel, and instructing the jury to disregard the remarks. Ordinarily, this cures the error. Emerson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 323, 82 S.E.2d 882 (1954).

No duty after objection sustained.

- After an objection to an improper question or statement is sustained, the court has no duty to rebuke counsel or give curative instructions absent a further request from the complaining party. Garner v. State, 199 Ga. App. 468, 405 S.E.2d 299 (1991).

Defendant was not entitled to curative instructions or a mistrial by virtue of the prosecution's question of the defendant as to whether his ex-wife was "ex-wife number five or six" since the defendant's objection to the question was sustained and the defendant made no further motion. Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580, 439 S.E.2d 471 (1993).

Merely "ruling out" a statement is insufficient. Collins Park & B.R.R. v. Ware, 112 Ga. 663, 37 S.E. 975 (1901); Holmes v. State, 21 Ga. App. 150, 94 S.E. 69 (1917).

Because the court did not hear a remark by the district attorney and did not believe that the jury had done so, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983).

Limitations on judge's duty.

- When prejudicial matters not in evidence are made in the hearing of the jury, on objection the court shall rebuke counsel or, among other measures, order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender. However, it is not within the court's discretion to dismiss the indictment, nor is it the court's duty to interpret the stated objection and speculate that the defendant intended to move for a mistrial. Redmond v. State, 252 Ga. 142, 312 S.E.2d 315 (1984).

Even assuming that the prosecutor's argument that one of the jailhouse informants might have appeared nervous based on the saying that "snitches get stitches" was improper under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 because the trial court sustained the defendant's objection, and the defendant did not request a rebuke or any other corrective action after the defendant's objection was sustained, the trial court had no duty to rebuke the prosecuting attorney. Cheley v. State, 299 Ga. 88, 786 S.E.2d 642 (2016).

Provision for rebuke of counsel and instructing jury is mandatory.

- Provision that the court shall rebuke counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from the jury's minds is mandatory. Ingram v. State, 97 Ga. App. 468, 103 S.E.2d 666 (1958).

Court's discretion.

- Extent of a rebuke and instruction is within the discretion of the court. Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 232 S.E.2d 89 (1976); Brooks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 543, 314 S.E.2d 115 (1984); O'Kelley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 503, 333 S.E.2d 838 (1985).

Whether to grant a mistrial after taking precautionary measures is within the court's discretion. Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738, vacated in part on other grounds, 244 Ga. 27, 257 S.E.2d 543 (1979).

Extent of a rebuke and instructions is within the discretion of the court, and when the improper remark is cured by timely corrective action calculated to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial, then the court does not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. High v. State, 153 Ga. App. 729, 266 S.E.2d 364 (1980).

Abuse of discretion not shown.

- Trial court employed language appropriate to the situation and evidenced no abuse of discretion after trial counsel made a disparaging remark about the assistant district attorney. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by not declaring a mistrial as the court issued a curative instruction after the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument by twice referring to the defendant's possession of marijuana as a misdemeanor, rather than the charged offense of possession of marijuana less than an ounce. Dix v. State, 307 Ga. App. 684, 705 S.E.2d 903 (2011).

In the defendants' trial for robbery and murder, even if the prosecutor's question to a bereaved witness as to whether the witness had observed the defendants laughing while the jury was not present was improper, the trial court fully complied with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 and did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 808 S.E.2d 696 (2017).

Even if defendant's character is placed in issue.

- Ordinarily, when illegal testimony is placed in evidence, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant a mistrial when sufficient corrective instructions are given in ruling out the testimony. This is true even when the illegal testimony has the effect of placing the defendant's character in issue, especially if the testimony is volunteered by the witness and not directly elicited by the solicitor (now district attorney). Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968).

Court must be presumed to be listening to argument.

- It must be presumed that the court in performing the court's duty to interpose and prevent prejudicial argument is listening to the argument and has heard the remarks. Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 138 S.E.2d 741 (1964).

Overruling motion for mistrial overruled without hearing argument complained of.

- When a motion for mistrial is made based on improper argument reasonably calculated to appeal to or evoke racial prejudice, and the trial court has not heard the argument, but overrules the motion without inquiring to ascertain what the improper argument was, and therefore without knowing the facts upon which the motion was based and without determining whether corrective action is needed, one fails to perform the duty imposed and exercise the discretion contemplated by the statute. Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 138 S.E.2d 741 (1964).

What action by the court is sufficient depends on circumstances of the case.

- In some cases of misconduct by a solicitor (now district attorney) the injurious effect may be averted by appropriate action and instructions from the court, but what would be sufficient in any case would depend on the character of the misconduct, the nature of the case, and the action or instructions from the court relied on to counteract the injurious effect of the misconduct. These may differ in each case. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968).

Motion for mistrial raises question of what less drastic action would be sufficient.

- Motion for mistrial raises the question of what ameliorative action less than summarily cutting off the trial is obligatory on the judge under the circumstances. Gore v. State, 110 Ga. App. 344, 138 S.E.2d 471 (1964).

Cautionary instructions are usually sufficient.

- Usually, cautionary instructions to the jury by the judge, when matters of procedure must be left to the judge's sound discretion, will suffice to cure irregularity and remove prejudice. Grayhouse v. State, 65 Ga. App. 853, 16 S.E.2d 787 (1941).

Curative instruction may in effect amount to rebuke of counsel.

- If the instruction by the court to the jury to disregard the remarks is full, the instruction in effect amounts to a rebuke of counsel. London v. State, 142 Ga. App. 426, 236 S.E.2d 158 (1977); Crawford v. State, 203 Ga. App. 215, 416 S.E.2d 820 (1992).

Improper remark of prosecutor not cured by instruction.

- General curative instruction given by the trial court after the prosecutor made an improper statement about the defendant's link to an earlier gang-related shooting during closing arguments was an inadequate curative measure and did not serve to remove the improper impression for the jurors' minds as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013).

Prejudice may be such that neither instruction nor rebuke will suffice.

- There are instances when the character of the prejudice, precipitated by the injection into the trial of extrinsic matters with no evidentiary basis, is such that cautionary instructions to the jury and rebuke of counsel, either or both, fail to remove the harm done, when, in the interest of fair and impartial trials, mistrials must result. Grayhouse v. State, 65 Ga. App. 853, 16 S.E.2d 787 (1941).

Instruction to the jury to disregard improper remarks amounts to a rebuke of counsel. Martin v. State, 196 Ga. App. 145, 395 S.E.2d 391 (1990).

Objection without motion not grounds for mistrial.

- Sustained objection to an improper question, answer, or remark by opposing counsel without a motion for mistrial will not constitute grounds for reversal, especially if the improper matter has been stricken with curative instructions. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 765, 261 S.E.2d 487 (1979).

Certainty that no injury to the accused would result.

- It is not erroneous to refuse to grant a mistrial on account of misconduct of the solicitor (now district attorney) if it is certain that no injury could have resulted therefrom to the accused. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968).

Grant of mistrial may be the only effective remedy in some cases.

- Mistrial should be declared if the remarks are injurious to the defendant, and cannot be cured by instructions. Wallace v. State, 126 Ga. 749, 55 S.E. 1042 (1906); Hunter v. State, 133 Ga. 78, 65 S.E. 154 (1909); Manning v. State, 13 Ga. App. 709, 79 S.E. 905 (1913); Morrow v. State, 18 Ga. App. 12, 88 S.E. 911 (1916).

Misconduct of counsel may be such that its effect cannot be overcome, and misconduct so prejudicial that the verdict of the jury must have been influenced thereby, and is not cured by an admonition to the jury, or by sustaining an objection thereto, or by rebuke or admonition of counsel, or by withdrawal by counsel. In such cases, the court should grant a mistrial. Emerson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 323, 82 S.E.2d 882 (1954).

If judge takes curative action, no new trial or mistrial granted unless such action fails.

- It is improper for counsel to remark upon the force or effect of evidence while it is being submitted to the jury, but when the remark is not prejudicial or inflammatory, is withdrawn by counsel, and the court gives proper instructions to the jury, a mistrial is not required. Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944).

If the trial judge acts immediately, and in the exercise of the judge's discretion takes such action as in the judge's judgment prevents harm to the accused as a result of improper statements by the prosecution, a new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that such action failed to eliminate from the consideration of the jury such improper statements. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972); Pullen v. State, 146 Ga. App. 665, 247 S.E.2d 128 (1978); Vernon v. State, 152 Ga. App. 616, 263 S.E.2d 503 (1979).

In passing on a motion for mistrial because of an improper statement of the prosecutor, the trial judge may take such action as in the judge's judgment will prevent harm to the defendant, and a new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that such action failed to eliminate the statement from consideration by the jury. Hoerner v. State, 246 Ga. 374, 271 S.E.2d 458 (1980).

After the trial court rebuked offending counsel and instructed the jury appropriately, a new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that the court's action failed to eliminate from the consideration of the jury such improper remark. White v. State, 159 Ga. App. 545, 284 S.E.2d 76 (1981); Jordan v. State, 159 Ga. App. 716, 285 S.E.2d 71 (1981).

Although the prosecutor, during closing argument, remarked to the jury that the grand jury had found sufficient evidence to bring the case to trial, the judge's prompt and corrective measures in admonishing counsel and instructing the jury were sufficient to eliminate the necessity of declaring a mistrial. Stoker v. State, 177 Ga. App. 94, 338 S.E.2d 525 (1985).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for mistrial, after the prosecution's statement possibly left the jury with the false impression that defense counsel's opening statement was improper, although the trial court gave curative instructions only, an additional statement rebuking the prosecutor was not necessary. Crawford v. State, 203 Ga. App. 215, 416 S.E.2d 820 (1992).

Trial court three times instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks regarding money in the defendant's prosecution for drug offenses. Since an instruction to the jury to disregard improper remarks amounts to a rebuke of counsel and in light of the curative instruction and the inadvertent nature of the prosecutor's remark, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial. Myers v. State, 268 Ga. App. 607, 602 S.E.2d 327 (2004).

Trial court properly issued a curative instruction after an inadvertent reference to the defendant's status on bond, avoiding a mistrial as to this issue; the defendant's request for a curative instruction was granted after a reference to the "drug problem" the defendant and the defendant's ex-spouse shared waived any error in the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial as to this issue. Hill v. State, 285 Ga. App. 503, 646 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

Jury must be instructed to remove improper impressions.

- When a motion for a mistrial is made, the court may grant the mistrial or take other corrective measures less than granting of a mistrial if the latter are sufficient for the purpose, but the court should by all needful and proper instruction to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from the jury's minds. Stanley v. State, 94 Ga. App. 737, 96 S.E.2d 195 (1956).

Curative instructions are not mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 when a motion for mistrial is denied. Foshee v. State, 256 Ga. 555, 350 S.E.2d 416 (1986).

Improper remark of prosecutor cured by instruction.

- When the trial court under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 instructed the jury to disregard a statement by state's counsel relative to the fact that some of the witnesses would say the same thing as the witnesses that are called, and the court rebuked state's counsel for making that statement, even if the remark by the state's counsel was improper, the error was cured by the trial court's instruction. Hilburn v. State, 166 Ga. App. 357, 304 S.E.2d 480 (1983).

Trial court does not err in denying a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney asks the defendant why the defendant did not bring any witnesses in the courtroom to back up the defendant's explanation of the criminal episode, when the trial court correctly and fully cures any misimpression that the defendant bears the burden of proving the defendant's innocence, by instructing the jury that the defendant may or may not bring in witnesses, as the defendant chooses, but regardless of whether the defendant brings in witnesses, the burden is always on the state to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. State, 166 Ga. App. 765, 305 S.E.2d 386 (1983).

Trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard remarks amounting to a misstatement of evidence was complete and, in effect, amounted to a rebuke of the prosecuting attorney, and the minimal impact of the statement did not require reversal of a murder conviction. Ward v. State, 252 Ga. 85, 311 S.E.2d 449 (1984).

Because the prosecutor's misstatement regarding blood on the porch was arguably no more than an overstatement (most of the blood had been washed off the porch) of the evidence, the mistaken attribution of testimony was insignificant in light of the fact that several witnesses had given similar testimony regarding the defendant's statements of anger toward the victim, defendant's mother. The trial court told the jury in preliminary jury instructions and the prosecuting attorney reminded the jury in closing argument that the argument of counsel was not evidence; therefore, it was highly probable that the trial court's error in failing to sustain the defendant's objections to improper argument by the prosecution and to perform the jury's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 to instruct the jury regarding improper statements by counsel did not contribute to the verdict; thus, the defendant's conviction for murder was affirmed. Fincher v. State, 276 Ga. 480, 578 S.E.2d 102 (2003).

Denial of a motion for a mistrial was proper given the trial court's prompt, detailed curative instruction to the jury; it was unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant's silence. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005).

In a joint prosecution, a second defendant was not entitled to a mistrial based on the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument to the jury as the trial judge was authorized to admonish the prosecutor and instruct the jurors that the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate, were not proper for their consideration, and were to be disregarded. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 121, 645 S.E.2d 608 (2007).

While the trial court did not necessarily rebuke the prosecutor, because the court did give curative instructions informing the jury that a cell phone used in the state's closing argument was not evidence, the demonstration was not to be considered, and the demonstration was completely irrelevant to the case, the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial as a result; further, the appeals court agreed with the trial judge that the improper demonstration did not prejudice the defendant because enough other evidence existed for the jury to come to the jury's conclusion without relying on the improper demonstration. Cook v. State, 287 Ga. App. 81, 650 S.E.2d 757 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1874, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. 2008).

Prosecutor's improper comment on a defendant's failure to explain the presence of a gun and cash in the defendant's car immediately following a robbery was cured by the trial court rebuking the prosecutor at length and giving the jury curative instructions. Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 797, 706 S.E.2d 170 (2011).

Prosecutor's remark not improper.

- In defendant's trial for sexual assault of a victim who was a stripper, the prosecutor's statement during closing that the jury could all hypothesize that the defendant didn't tell the defendant's family about where the defendant was that night (at a strip club), was simply a proper argument to urge the jury not to discount the victim's credibility; the statement did not improperly place the defendant's character in issue, and a mistrial was properly denied. Savage v. State, 264 Ga. App. 709, 592 S.E.2d 188 (2003).

Considering the nature of the state's improper reference, the other evidence in the case, and the trial court's and counsel's actions in dealing with the impropriety, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial; O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 did not apply because the state did not state prejudicial facts that were not in evidence and did not inject into the case illegal elements but simply made an inadvertent reference to the nature of a hearing at which the victim's statement differed from the victim's testimony at trial. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

Instruction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 was not required as the state's references in closing argument were to the psychologist's forensic findings and the inferences thereto, not to any opinion as to the veracity of the victim. Thompson v. State, 321 Ga. App. 756, 743 S.E.2d 446 (2013).

Mistrial may be refused if remark withdrawn and jury instructed.

- It is not error to refuse to grant a mistrial on account of the improper remark of the solicitor general (now district attorney) in the solicitor's argument to the jury, after the solicitor expressly withdraws the remark and the court instructs the jury not to consider the remark. Goodman v. State, 122 Ga. 111, 49 S.E. 922 (1905).

Withdrawal of remark and apology may be insufficient.

- Mere apology and withdrawal of the improper remarks by counsel, if there is no reprimand by the court, will not be sufficient to prevent a mistrial if it appears that the remarks were such as to prejudice a fair trial. Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464, 164 S.E.2d 238 (1968).

Case in which judge's statement insufficient to remove solicitor's (now district attorney's) remarks from consideration.

- See Duncan v. State, 51 Ga. App. 97, 179 S.E. 638 (1935).

Instruction on improper remarks as to self-incrimination.

- Although no person can be compelled to self-incriminate, an improper comment thereon may be cured by an instruction to the jury. Alcorn v. State, 21 Ga. App. 148, 94 S.E. 46 (1917).

Failure to rebuke for question that was not crucial.

- There was no error in either the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial or in not rebuking the prosecutor for asking an allegedly improper question, particularly when the trial judge found that the question was not of a crucial nature. Martin v. State, 196 Ga. App. 145, 395 S.E.2d 391 (1990).

When new trial required.

- When a motion for mistrial is made because of counsel's improper statement and there is no rebuke of counsel by the court and no charge to the jury to disregard such statement, the grant of a new trial is required. Hammond v. State, 51 Ga. App. 225, 179 S.E. 841 (1935).

When argument of counsel is manifestly improper and prejudicial to the defendant, and the trial court neither grants a mistrial, nor rebukes counsel, nor by needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavors to remove the improper impressions from the jurors' minds, and the verdict later reached by the jury is adverse to the defendant and is not demanded by evidence, a new trial is required. Baggett v. State, 77 Ga. App. 24, 47 S.E.2d 769 (1948); Brown v. State, 77 Ga. App. 245, 48 S.E.2d 565 (1948).

When the court after objection fails to rebuke counsel and endeavor by needful instructions to remove the prejudicial effect of the remarks from the minds of the jury or to order a mistrial, a new trial is required. Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 138 S.E.2d 741 (1964); Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464, 164 S.E.2d 238 (1968).

With regard to the defendant's trial and conviction for possession of methamphetamine and giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, although the prosecutor's argument was improper and the trial court erred by failing to rebuke the prosecutor as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75, the error was harmless since the improper argument consisted only of one comment not directly related to the defendant's case, the trial court twice told the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence, and there was ample evidence of the defendant's guilt. As such, the trial court's failure to perform the court's duty under § 17-8-75 did not contribute to the verdict. Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 657, 662 S.E.2d 767 (2008).

Failure to give curative instruction harmless error.

- Trial court's error in failing to give a curative instruction in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 17-7-85 was harmless because it was highly probable that the trial court's error did not contribute to the verdict; the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel did not constitute evidence, and despite the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on two of the counts against the defendant that were later dead docketed. O'Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 702 S.E.2d 288 (2010).

Prosecutor's statements were outside of the evidence because the slides the prosecutor introduced were shown during opening statement before either side had put on any evidence; however, it was highly probable that the trial court's alleged error in failing to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 by not rebuking counsel or specifically instructing the jury to disregard the slides did not contribute to the guilty verdicts because it was doubtful that the slides qualified as prejudicial within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 since the slides reflected evidence that the prosecutor expected to and, ultimately did, get admitted during the trial and argument that would be, and ultimately was, properly made during closing argument, so the same information later reached the jury appropriately. Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56 (2011).

Defendant waived the right to complain about an assistant district attorney's remarks on appeal because the trial court's alleged error in failing to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 did not contribute to the verdicts, and the assistant district attorney's closing comments did not entreat the jury to place themselves in the victim's shoes. Gomez v. State, 315 Ga. App. 898, 728 S.E.2d 691 (2012).

It was error to refuse to rebuke the assistant district attorney for asking an allegedly improper question during cross-examination of the defendant when it was not "a statement of prejudicial [matter]." Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983).

Aggravated child molestation conviction was reversed after a prosecutor elicited improper testimony that the defendant had been molested as a child, and the trial court failed to rebuke the prosecutor or give a curative instruction; since the evidence of guilt was far from overwhelming, this error was not harmless. Tyler v. State, 266 Ga. App. 221, 596 S.E.2d 651 (2004).

Prosecutorial conduct harmless even if not waived on appeal.

- As the defendant sought no additional relief for the prosecutor's improper argument following the last curative instructions, the defendant waived the argument on appeal; moreover, the strength of the eyewitness evidence against the defendant, coupled with the contemporaneous curative instructions, rendered any prosecutorial misconduct harmless. Garcia v. State, 271 Ga. App. 794, 611 S.E.2d 92 (2005).

Trial court's actions in rebuking defense counsel out of the presence of the jury after counsel misstated the evidence during closing argument, and then informing the jury that counsel had been rebuked, were appropriate; the trial court's actions did not amount to an erroneous comment on the evidence. Lassic v. State, 278 Ga. 701, 606 S.E.2d 266 (2004).

Comments by trial judge during defense counsel's closing argument.

- Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial judge's comments were limited in scope, were for the purpose of controlling the trial conduct and ensuring a fair trial, did not involve the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence, and did not express an opinion on the evidence as to what was proved or not; comments by the trial judge during defense counsel's closing arguments were for the purpose of preventing misstatements to the jury concerning matters not in evidence and were not improper under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75. Mathis v. State, 276 Ga. App. 205, 622 S.E.2d 857 (2005).

Harmless error.

- Trial court specifically instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel were not evidence. Given the evidence, along with the trial court's instruction to the jury, it was highly probable that the trial court's error in failing to perform the court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 did not contribute to the verdict. Holsey v. State, 316 Ga. App. 801, 729 S.E.2d 465 (2012).

Grant of mistrial is in court's discretion.

- Whether mistrial should be granted for improper argument of opposing counsel is largely discretionary. Waller v. State, 80 Ga. App. 488, 56 S.E.2d 491 (1949).

This section leaves to the discretion of the trial court the decision to grant a mistrial. Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 526, 236 S.E.2d 493 (1977).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial after the state alluded to the defendant's father testifying at a probation revocation hearing as considering the evidence introduced at trial, the nature of the character evidence about which the defendant complained, and the trial court's immediate curative instruction, the appellate court could not say that the trial court abused the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by failing to rebuke the state's prosecutor for presenting a slide that hospital records showed the defendant's history of alcohol abuse or by failing to declare a mistrial because the defendant did not object after the court provided the curative instruction. Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 783 S.E.2d 344 (2016).

Inadvertent information that defendant seeing psychiatrist did not warrant mistrial.

- Because the state did not intentionally elicit information from a witness that the defendant was seeing a psychiatrist, and such information did not necessarily inject one's character into evidence, the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial; moreover, even assuming the comment did improperly put the defendant's character into evidence, the trial court's curative instruction was sufficient. Morita v. State, 270 Ga. App. 372, 606 S.E.2d 595 (2004).

In response to the defendant's attempt to make various pronouncements and address the victim's spouse, prompting the prosecutor to object, and the court to admonish the defendant in the presence of the jury, the actions did not warrant a mistrial as the actions properly took issue with the defendant's statements and conduct in a fair and objective manner and the trial court did not employ any measure which could be said to have compromised the jury's ability to remain impartial. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 44, 644 S.E.2d 850 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128 S. Ct. 384, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2007).

Issue of mistrial waived on appeal.

- Because the record showed that the defendant acquiesced in the trial court's decision to give curative instructions regarding testimony given by a state's witness which the defendant claimed reflected prior criminal conduct that improperly placed the defendant's character in issue, and did not again move for a mistrial after the instructions were given, the defendant waived the issue for purposes of appeal. Northern v. State, 285 Ga. App. 303, 645 S.E.2d 701 (2007).

Abuse of discretion generally.

- In passing upon a motion for a mistrial on account of alleged improper argument or remarks to the jury, the trial judge is vested with broad and sound discretion, and the trial judge's ruling will not be controlled unless manifestly abused. Grayhouse v. State, 65 Ga. App. 853, 16 S.E.2d 787 (1941); Smith v. State, 204 Ga. 184, 48 S.E.2d 860 (1948); Parks v. State, 208 Ga. 508, 67 S.E.2d 716 (1951); Domingo v. State, 213 Ga. 24, 96 S.E.2d 896 (1957); James v. State, 215 Ga. 213, 109 S.E.2d 735 (1959); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3223, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1976).

If improper statements have been made by counsel in the presence of the jury, it is the duty of the judge to endeavor to remove from the minds of the jury improper impressions made by unfair arguments. In determining the proper method, the judge is vested with sound discretion, and the judge's rulings thereon will not require a new trial, unless it manifestly appears that the judge's discretion was abused. Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. 671, 27 S.E.2d 307 (1943).

Grant or refusal of motions for mistrial is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and this discretion will not be interfered with unless manifestly abused. If the trial court immediately upon the happening of an irregularity gives cautionary instructions to the jury, the appellate court will not disturb the trial court's judgment refusing a motion for mistrial. Cox v. State, 109 Ga. App. 797, 137 S.E.2d 516 (1964).

Matter of granting a mistrial is largely within the discretion of the trial court and unless it is apparent that a mistrial was essential to preservation of the right of fair trial, that discretion will not be controlled. Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968); Cochran v. State, 144 Ga. App. 820, 242 S.E.2d 735 (1978).

If, during oral argument, an assistant district attorney makes statements deemed by the defendant to be improper and upon a motion for mistrial being made the trial court immediately instructs the jury not to consider such argument, no harmful error appears in the overruling of the motion for mistrial unless it is manifest that an abuse of the trial court's discretion has occurred. White v. State, 159 Ga. App. 545, 284 S.E.2d 76 (1981).

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 commits to the judge's discretion the decision to order a mistrial when counsel has made statements of prejudicial matters not in evidence before the jury. This discretion will not be interfered with on appeal unless manifestly abused. Welch v. State, 251 Ga. 197, 304 S.E.2d 391 (1983).

Trial court did not run afoul of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 in permitting the state to explain the absence of the testimony of the other accomplice, which, during the state's opening statement, the state had told the jury to expect as: (1) the state informed the trial court, outside the hearing of the jury and before making a statement to the jury, that the state's witness had changed the witness's mind about testifying and that the state wanted to let the jury know why the witness would not be testifying; (2) the state made the statement as a statement of fact, without any attempt to argue the evidence or prejudice the case; (3) the appellate court found no case in which § 17-8-75 has been applied in a situation in which a party informed the trial court of the content of a statement it intended to make and received the consent of the trial court to make such a statement; (4) the state did not act with an improper motive, bad faith, or with intent to subvert the defendant's constitutional rights; and (5) the truthful statement was not harmful under the facts of this case. Clemons v. State, 265 Ga. App. 825, 595 S.E.2d 530 (2004).

Discretion not abused in denying mistrial if counsel rebuked and jury instructed.

- When the court immediately rebukes counsel and instructs the jury to ignore the improper comments, the denial of the motion for mistrial is not an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 526, 236 S.E.2d 493 (1977).

If counsel has made statements regarding prejudicial matters not in evidence before the jury, the trial court has the discretion to order a mistrial. The trial court's refusal to do so, however, coupled with appropriate curative instructions and admonishment of state's counsel, absent manifest abuse, will not be reversed. Schirato v. State, 260 Ga. 170, 391 S.E.2d 116 (1990); Willingham v. State, 212 Ga. App. 457, 442 S.E.2d 4 (1994); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 957, 122 S. Ct. 2659, 153 L. Ed. 2d 834 (2002).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in declining to grant a mistrial after an improper statement by the prosecutor as the court immediately sustained the defendant's objection, rebuked the prosecutor, and instructed the jury not to consider the statement. Campbell v. State, 329 Ga. App. 317, 764 S.E.2d 895 (2014).

Prosecutor's expression of opinion on guilt of defendant.

- Refusal to grant a mistrial because of the improper remarks of the prosecutor is within the discretion of the trial court, and the decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest abuse. This is true even after the prosecutor expresses an opinion on the ultimate issue, the guilt of the defendant. Henderson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 513, 356 S.E.2d 241.

Remark that witnesses were credible because the witnesses had not been impeached.

- Trial judge did not abuse the judge's discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor's argument that two of the state's witnesses were credible because the witnesses had not been impeached with prior inconsistent statements. Forney v. State, 255 Ga. 316, 338 S.E.2d 252 (1986).

Defendant's plan to comment on specific cases of mistaken identity.

- Trial court properly disallowed defense counsel's plan to comment on specific cases of mistaken identity which defense counsel personally knew about from experience or had read about, presumably from newspaper articles, and limited the argument to experiences common to everyone since the evidence would have been totally irrelevant if offered during the trial because the comments were not related to this case, and since the facts may well have been in dispute. Watson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 82, 348 S.E.2d 557 (1986).

Denial of mistrial after offer of curative instructions declined.

- If counsel for a codefendant improperly placed a defendant's character in evidence and the defendant's counsel declined the trial court's offer to give curative instructions to the jury, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Daily v. State, 195 Ga. App. 4, 392 S.E.2d 554 (1990).

Counsel not ineffective for failing to request mistrial.

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and it was highly probable that any improper argument did not contribute to the verdicts. Lloyd v. State, 280 Ga. 187, 625 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

Trial court ruling prohibiting comment on spouse's plea agreement.

- With regard to a defendant's drug conviction, the trial court did not err in prohibiting further comment by defense counsel about the terms of the plea agreement of the defendant's spouse as the state had objected and the terms of the plea agreement had not been admitted into evidence. Dingler v. State, 293 Ga. App. 27, 666 S.E.2d 441 (2008).

C.J.S.

- 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 193 et seq.

ALR.

- Statement by prosecuting attorney in presence of jury implying that defendant had made incriminating statements to him not in evidence, as ground of reversal or new trial, 52 A.L.R. 1022.

Counsel's appeal to racial, religious, social, or political prejudices or prejudice against corporations as ground for a new trial or reversal, 78 A.L.R. 1438.

Prosecuting attorney urging jury against compromising upon verdict carrying a lesser penalty than that incident to offense or degree of offense of which defendant is shown to have been guilty, 95 A.L.R. 566.

Motion for mistrial, or other similar motion, as condition of reviewing improper argument of counsel, 108 A.L.R. 756.

Offering improper evidence, or asking improper question, as ground for new trial or reversal, 109 A.L.R. 1089.

Comments by prosecuting attorney regarding jury's right or privilege to recommend or fix punishment, 120 A.L.R. 502.

Statements, comments, or conduct of court or counsel regarding perjury, as ground for new trial or reversal in civil action or criminal prosecution other than for perjury, 127 A.L.R. 1385.

Prejudicial effect of argument or remark that adversary was attempting to suppress facts, 29 A.L.R.2d 996.

Prejudicial effect of admission of evidence as to communist or other subversive affiliation or association of accused, 30 A.L.R.2d 589.

Prejudicial effect of trial court's denial, or equivalent, of counsel's right to argue case, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney's misconduct in physically exhibiting to jury objects or items not introduced as evidence, 46 A.L.R.2d 1423.

Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney's remarks, in opening statement to jury, that another defendant has been convicted or has pleaded guilty, 48 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Prejudicial effect of counsel's addressing individually or by name particular juror during argument, 55 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Remarks or acts of trial judge criticizing, rebuking, or punishing defense counsel in criminal case, as requiring new trial or reversal, 62 A.L.R.2d 166.

Prejudicial effect of prosecutor's comment on character or reputation of accused, where accused has presented character witnesses, 70 A.L.R.2d 559.

Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney's argument to jury that people of city, county, or community want or expect a conviction, 85 A.L.R.2d 1132.

Propriety and effect of attack on opposing counsel during trial of a criminal case, 99 A.L.R.2d 508.

Comment or argument by court or counsel that prosecution evidence is uncontradicted as amounting to improper reference to accused's failure to testify, 14 A.L.R.3d 723.

Prejudicial effect of statement of prosecutor as to possibility of pardon or parole, 16 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Counsel's reference in criminal case to wealth, poverty, or financial status of defendant or victim as ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 36 A.L.R.3d 839.

Propriety and prejudicial effect, in criminal case, of placing jury in charge of officer who is a witness in the case, 38 A.L.R.3d 1012.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's remarks as to victim's age, family circumstances, or the like, 50 A.L.R.3d 8.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument to jury indicating his belief or knowledge as to guilt of accused - modern state cases, 88 A.L.R.3d 449.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument giving jury impression that defense counsel believes accused guilty, 89 A.L.R.3d 263.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument to jury indicating that he has additional evidence of defendant's guilt which he did not deem necessary to present, 90 A.L.R.3d 646.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument giving jury impression that judge believes defendant guilty, 90 A.L.R.3d 822.

Double jeopardy as bar to retrial after grant of defendant's motion of mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 997.

Prosecutor's reference in opening statement to matters not provable or which he does not attempt to prove as ground for relief, 16 A.L.R.4th 810.

Propriety of attorney's communication with jurors after trial, 19 A.L.R.4th 1209.

Failure to object to improper questions or comments as to defendant's pretrial silence or failure to testify as constituting waiver of right to complain of error - modern cases, 32 A.L.R.4th 774.

Communication between court officials or attendants and jurors in criminal trial as ground for mistrial or reversal - post-Parker cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 890.

Postretirement out-of-court communications between jurors and trial judge as grounds for new trial or reversal in criminal case, 43 A.L.R.4th 410.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of comments by counsel vouching for credibility of witness - state cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 602.

Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to self-interest or prejudice of jurors as taxpayers as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 60 A.L.R.4th 1063.

Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to racial, national, or religious prejudice as ground for mistrial, new trial, reversal, or vacation of sentence - modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 664.

Negative characterization or description of defendant, by prosecutor during summation of criminal trial, as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial - modern cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 8.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's negative characterization or description of witness during summation of criminal trial - modern cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 209.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between court officials or attendants and jurors, 31 A.L.R.5th 572.