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O.C.G.A.Title 17Chapter 8

O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 (2020)

Argument to or in front of jury as to possibility of clemency

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1983–2024 55citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 55 opinions since 1983, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (7 cases).

(a) No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by the court or jury because pardon, parole, or clemency of any nature may be granted by the Governor, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or other proper authority vested with the right to grant clemency.

(b) If counsel for either side in a criminal case argues to or in the presence of the jury as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section, opposing counsel shall have the right immediately to request the court to declare a mistrial, in which case it shall be mandatory upon the court to declare a mistrial. Failure to declare a mistrial shall constitute reversible error.

(c) This Code section shall be construed as setting forth requirements in addition to other requirements of law.

History

Ga. L. 1955, p. 191, §§ 1-3. U.S. Code. - Closing arguments, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29.1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For note, ‘‘Can’t Do

the Time, Don’t Do the Crime?: Dixon v. State, Statutory Construction, and the Harsh Realities of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in Georgia,’’ see 22 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 519 (2005).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION CLEMENCY PROBATION AND PAROLE DEATH PENALTY MISTRIAL General Consideration Constitutionality. - Ability or inability to obtain early release does not relate to the defendant’s character, the defendant’s prior record, or circumstances of the defendant’s offense; thus, policy forbidding argument about such matters does not run afoul of either U.S. Const., amend. 8 or 14, and the trial court did not err in refusing to allow such argument. Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188, 103 S. Ct. 837, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1983). Construction with § 17-10-31.1. - Provision of former O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31.1 expressly authorizing argument to the jury on the issue of parole in the sentencing phase of death penalty trials conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 which imposed an absolute bar on such argument; however, former § 17-10-31.1 prevailed since it was the more recent enactment. Jenkins v. State, 265 Ga. 539, 458 S.E.2d 477 (1995). O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 has not been implicitly repealed. Quick v. State, 256 Ga. 780, 353 S.E.2d 497 (1987). Purpose of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 is to

prevent prosecutors from arguing that jury should give more severe sentence to compensate for possible pardon, parole, or other clemency. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982). Policy underlying O.C.G.A. § 178-76. - This section establishes the policy of the law that the jury should not be influenced in a criminal case in the rendition of their verdict by a consideration of the fact that the penalty imposed by the jury might be commuted by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E.2d 564 (1957); Cash v. State, 231 Ga. 285, 201 S.E.2d 625 (1973). If the state simply reminds the jury that the jurors are not concerned with punishment and not that the defendant might not be required to suffer the full penalty of the law imposed by the court because of pardon, parole, or clemency, the prosecutor’s comments do not violate this section. Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Freeman v. State, 245 Ga. App. 384, 537 S.E.2d 776 (2000).

General Consideration (Cont’d) Test for reversible error. - When no timely objection is interposed during improper closing argument, the test for reversible error is not simply whether or not the argument was objectionable, or even if the argument might have contributed to the verdict, but whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial. Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 547, 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998). Discussion of defendant’s future being in jeopardy. - When the prosecutor in closing argument stated that the defendant’s life was not in jeopardy, only the defendant’s immediate future, although the Supreme Court disapproved of the prosecutor’s comment, it did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 because it did not specifically refer to pardon, parole, or other clemency, and under the circumstances, the trial court’s curative instructions were sufficient. Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 249, 368 S.E.2d 313 (1988). Prosecutorial comment not violation. - Prosecutor’s comment to the jury during final argument that ‘‘if [the defendant] is ever on the street again in his whole life, there is no doubt but that he’ll commit crimes like this again’’ did not violate subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. Finney v. State, 253 Ga. 346, 320 S.E.2d 147 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S. Ct. 1854, 85 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1985). Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument merely served to remind the jury that the jurors were to be concerned with the defendant’s guilt only, not the defendant’s punishment, and thus, did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. Joyce v. State, 235 Ga. App. 167, 509 S.E.2d 85 (1998). Prosecutor may request jury not to consider possible penalties. - Closing argument by the state’s attorney informing the jury that the jury should not take into consideration any possible penalty should the jury convict is not in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. Mitchell v. State, 167 Ga. App. 306, 306 S.E.2d 322 (1983). Ineffective assistance of counsel claim procedurally barred. - Defen-

dant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument that life did not mean life was procedurally barred because the defendant did not raise it in the motion for new trial and did not obtain a ruling on the motion by the trial court. Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 751 S.E.2d 399 (2013). Harmless error. - Even if a prosecutor’s remarks about the defendant’s credibility and statement that if the jury convicted the defendant of a lesser charge the jury ‘‘would be letting this defendant off the hook,’’ could be interpreted as improper, the court held it was highly improbable in light of the evidence that the remarks changed the result of the trial, and any error in the prosecutor’s argument was therefore harmless. Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 547, 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998). Prosecutorial comment improper, but harmless. - Although harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor’s remark that the defendant had served only 14 of 20 years for a prior conviction was highly improper. Moore v. State, 242 Ga. App. 249, 529 S.E.2d 381 (2000). Reference to drug rehabilitation not violation of section. - Trial court was not required to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor asked the jurors if the jurors believed that the defendant would be rehabilitated rather than go back to drugs if the defendant were released from jail since the prosecutor did not specifically refer to pardon, parole, or other clemency. Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521, 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S. Ct. 1912, 95 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1987). Attack on witness not violation. - State counsel’s contested closing argument attacking the credibility of testimony that had been given by the defendant’s psychiatric expert did not work a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 as no reference was made to the possibilities of pardon, parole, or other clemency. McGill v. State, 263 Ga. 81, 428 S.E.2d 341 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 prohibits only the argument that a defendant not serve the

full amount of the defendant’s sentence; the statute does not prohibit even making an argument in this regard concerning a witness. Thus, the defendant was entitled to cross examine the witness on the deal made with the prosecution to secure the witness’s testimony in an effort to ascertain the witness’s motive to testify, bias, or any interest in cooperating with the prosecution. Hernandez v. State, 244 Ga. App. 874, 537 S.E.2d 149 (2000). Objection and motion for mistrial after prosecutor’s argument ended was untimely. - Defendant’s objection and motion for mistrial, made after the prosecutor’s improper closing argument that life did not mean life ended, were not timely and were not preserved for appeal. Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 751 S.E.2d 399 (2013). Cited in Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 157, 91 S.E.2d 16 (1956); McKuhen v. State, 216 Ga. 172, 115 S.E.2d 330 (1960); Terhune v. State, 117 Ga. App. 59, 159 S.E.2d 291 (1967); Hunt v. State, 133 Ga. App. 548, 211 S.E.2d 601 (1974); Willingham v. State, 134 Ga. App. 144, 213 S.E.2d 516 (1975); Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4, 225 S.E.2d 448 (1976); Smith v. State, 146 Ga. App. 428, 246 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Spraggins v. State, 243 Ga. 73, 252 S.E.2d 620 (1979); Washington v. State, 245 Ga. 117, 263 S.E.2d 152 (1980); Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984); Jackson v. State, 173 Ga. App. 851, 328 S.E.2d 741 (1985); Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988); Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989); Pitts v. State, 259 Ga. 745, 386 S.E.2d 351 (1989); Saunders v. State, 198 Ga. App. 666, 402 S.E.2d 542 (1991); Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 793, 499 S.E.2d 642 (1998); Bentley v. State, 262 Ga. App. 541, 586 S.E.2d 32 (2003); Daniel v. State, 292 Ga. App. 560, 665 S.E.2d 696 (2008). Clemency Grants of clemency. - Statute is not limited to clemency granted by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles or the Governor, but clemency that may be granted by any authority authorized by law including clemency granted by the trial court in permitting the service of the sentence on probation. Cash v. State, 231 Ga.

285, 201 S.E.2d 625 (1973). This section applies to those statements concerning clemency by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles or other executive officers. Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 893, 218 S.E.2d 622 (1975). Probation and Parole Trial court’s flat refusal to answer a question about parole is not improperly suggestive and is not error. Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. 721, 261 S.E.2d 635 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S. Ct. 1666, 64 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1980). O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 covers parole in misdemeanor cases. - While this section makes argument by counsel before the jury that the defendant may be paroled or the defendant’s sentence reduced a mandatory ground for mistrial, the terms of the section are broad enough to cover the action of the trial court in paroling a defendant in a misdemeanor case. Cain v. State, 113 Ga. App. 477, 148 S.E.2d 508 (1966). Sending of blank probation sentence to jury room together with blank misdemeanor sentence. - To send a blank probation sentence out to the jury room along with the blank misdemeanor sentence and as a part of it is indubitably a clear indication to the jury that it is at least possible, if not probable, that the defendant will not be sentenced to imprisonment, and is a fact which the jury might well take into illegal account in determining whether the defendant was guilty or innocent. This is the very thing which it was the intention of the General Assembly to prevent. Cain v. State, 113 Ga. App. 477, 148 S.E.2d 508 (1966). Defendant is not permitted to refer to the possibility of parole in arguing to the jury, and later obtain a new trial based upon such argument, after an unfavorable verdict. Tamplin v. State, 235 Ga. 20, 218 S.E.2d 779, vacated in part on other grounds, 235 Ga. 774, 221 S.E.2d 455 (1975). While O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 benefits defendants in many cases, the statute’s prohibition is not limited to cases where the prosecutor would argue parole in order to obtain a more severe sentence. Instead, the statute proscribes all use of parole in

Probation and Parole (Cont’d) argument. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 340 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 245, 93 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1986). Defendant’s parole eligibility is not, and ought not be, an issue considered by the jury in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case, and the jury should not be encouraged to add stipulations, conditions, or recommendations of no parole to the jury’s verdict, nor should the jury be instructed, implicitly or explicitly, that a defendant’s release on parole is a matter governed solely by the illimitable discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole. Quick v. State, 256 Ga. 780, 353 S.E.2d 497 (1987). Failure to object and reference to parole as precluding defendant from obtaining new trial. - Defendant is not permitted to introduce evidence of a prior parole, fail to object to the state’s argument to the jury of the possibility of parole, argue a reference to parole and later obtain a new trial based upon such argument after an unfavorable verdict. Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 263 S.E.2d 109, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S. Ct. 253, 66 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1980). Argument of rules and regulations regarding time to be served before parole may be applied for. - Court does not err in refusing to allow the defense attorney to argue to the jury the rules and regulations of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles regarding time served by the accused before the accused can make application for parole. Golden v. State, 213 Ga. 481, 99 S.E.2d 882 (1957). Jury charge that probation sentence may be invoked for misdemeanor punishment. - If the trial court charges that there could be a probation sentence invoked for misdemeanor punishment, there is no reversible error if the trial court later recharges the jury to disregard this instruction. Fraley v. State, 120 Ga. App. 427, 170 S.E.2d 729 (1969). Instruction regarding revocation of parole. - After the jury asks the court whether a prisoner who commits another felony after serving the minimum term fixed by the sentence and being paroled would be returned to serve the remainder

of the sentence, and after the court tells the jury that the court cannot give the jury any instructions regarding a parole, but then proceeds to instruct the jury that the prison authorities have certain rules and regulations which the authorities have formulated and under which the authorities release a prisoner after the prisoner has served a minimum sentence provided the prisoner complies with certain conditions, and that the prison is thereafter permitted to serve the difference between the minimum and maximum sentence outside the confines of the prison, the latter portion of the instructions violates this section. Berry v. State, 107 Ga. App. 643, 131 S.E.2d 115 (1963). Comments about possible probation. - After the district attorney commented during closing argument: ‘‘Of course, he [Defendant] doesn’t want to get up on the stand and say, ‘Well, a little of these drugs were mine.’ What he wants to admit to is that the misdemeanor - the probationary amount of marijuana was his because he figures, ‘I’ll get something . . .,’ ’’ it was held that although probation is a judicial, rather than an executive function, it is not a matter for the jury, and the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard the offending remarks and directed the district attorney not to comment further in this regard, and that it could not be said as a matter of law that the defendant was harmed in any way by the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. Steele v. State, 181 Ga. App. 695, 353 S.E.2d 612 (1987). Commenting on inability, as well as ability, to make parole. - Policy of not allowing argument or charge on matters concerning parole forbids comment with regard to the defendant’s inability to make parole, as well as the defendant’s ability to do so. Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188, 103 S. Ct. 837, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1983). Meaning of life without parole. - Trial court may charge the jury on the meaning of life without parole but is not required to charge the jury that life without parole ‘‘means what it says’’ or to discourage the jury from considering parole eligibility. McClain v. State, 267 Ga.

378, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1106, 118 S. Ct. 2485, 138 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1997). Prospect of parole in burglary prosecution. - In burglary prosecution, motion for mistrial was properly denied after the prosecuting attorney commented on the policy of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles regarding early release of prisoners because sentences in noncapital felony cases are imposed by the trial judge and not the jury. Cave v. State, 171 Ga. App. 22, 318 S.E.2d 689 (1984). Questions from jury about parole. - If, and only if, the jury asks to be instructed about the possibility of parole, the court should mention the issue only to the extent of telling the jury in no uncertain terms that such matters are not proper for the jury’s consideration. Quick v. State, 256 Ga. 780, 353 S.E.2d 497 (1987). Violation of section not defective representation. - Violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 by raising the issue of the possibility of parole, by itself, does not constitute deficient representation by defense counsel. Parker v. Turpin, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff ’d sub nom. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2001). Death Penalty O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 does not apply to cases of waiver of the death penalty by the prosecution. Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 893, 218 S.E.2d 622 (1975). Remarks that death penalty, rather than life sentence, should be imposed. - When in a resentencing trial the remarks to the jury by the district attorney made no reference to parole of any nature, but were simply an attempt to convince the jury that the only appropriate punishment in the case was a sentence of death since, if a life sentence were imposed, the defendant would have another chance to do harm, even if in prison, such remarks were not improper. Redd v. State, 242 Ga. 876, 252 S.E.2d 383, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S. Ct. 2870, 61 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1979). Comment that case was not death penalty case. - Prosecutor’s comment to the jury venire that the defendant’s case

was not a death penalty case did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76; the comment did not reflect upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the defendant did not demonstrate harm from the statement. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 644 S.E.2d 116 (2007). Discussion of past parole in capital sentencing hearing not error. - In the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the prosecutor’s discussion of the defendant’s past parole did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S. Ct. 3340, 92 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1986). Mistrial Upon objection to argument which contravenes O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76, mistrial is mandatory; however, prosecutors must make explicit reference to pardon, parole, or other clemency. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982). Guilty plea exchange offer admissible at sentencing. - After a mistrial was granted at the behest of the defendant, a retrial was not barred by principles of double jeopardy because the government had not intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial by the inadvertent mistestimony of the state’s private investigator. Mobley v. State, 262 Ga. 808, 426 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 870, 114 S. Ct. 198, 126 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1993). Failure to move for mistrial. - After the defendant objected to improper argument and asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the argument, but did not move for a mistrial, the trial court did not err by merely sustaining the objection and giving curative instructions. Hammond v. State, 260 Ga. 591, 398 S.E.2d 168 (1990). O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 does not require that a mistrial be declared even without a request. Hammond v. State, 260 Ga. 591, 398 S.E.2d 168 (1990). When the defendant’s counsel objected to an improper argument by the prosecutor based on O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 and the trial court sustained the objection and

Mistrial (Cont’d) instructed the jury accordingly, counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial did not constitute ineffective assistance since the defendant was not deprived of a fair sentencing trial. Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 452 S.E.2d 745, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 100, 133 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1995). Denial of motion for mistrial appropriate. - Testimony to which the defendant objected came from the defendant’s wife, who stated that during hostage negotiations the defendant mentioned a parole officer; such testimony did not ad-

dress the possibility of pardon, parole, or other clemency for the instant charges and thus did not violate O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. Freeman v. State, 252 Ga. App. 217, 555 S.E.2d 879 (2001). Prosecutor did not make a specific reference to pardon, parole, or other clemency in the prosecutor’s closing arguments to the jury in the defendant’s trial for felony murder and malice murder; thus, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 that required a mistrial because the trial court gave a sufficient curative instruction. Curles v. State, 276 Ga. 237, 575 S.E.2d 891 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 326. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 2419. 67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq. ALR. - Prejudicial effect of statement

or instruction of court as to possibility of parole or pardon, 12 A.L.R.3d 832. Double jeopardy as bar to retrial after grant of defendant’s motion of mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 997.

CHAPTER 9 VERDICT AND JUDGMENT GENERALLY Sec.

Article 1 General Provisions Sec.

When direction of verdict of acquittal authorized; when motion for directed verdict of acquittal allowed; effect of motion upon defendant’s right to present evidence and right to jury trial; assent of jury not required. Jury to judge law and facts and give general verdict; imposition of sentence; form and construction of verdicts. Recommendations for mercy in capital cases other than those of homicide; effect of no recommendation for mercy in capital cases generally and where defendant under age of 17 at time of commission of offense. Validity of judgment rendered by court having no jurisdiction of person or subject matter.

Article 3 Amendment and Impeachment of Verdict

Amendment of verdict after dispersion of jury. Use of affidavits of jurors relating to verdict [Repealed]. Article 4 Motions in Arrest

Article 2

Rendition and Receipt of Verdict

knowledge as to facts, witnesses, or parties. Receipt of verdicts. Expression of approval or disapproval of verdict of jury by judge. Commending or complimenting of jury by judge.

Action by juror on private

Jurisdiction of motion; notification of opposing party. Time and grounds for motion generally. Defects in pleadings or record aided by verdict or amendable not subject to motion. Motion not relating to merits of offense charged not to be granted.

Cross references. - Amount of mental conviction required, § 24-14-3. RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Interrogation or poll of jurors, during criminal trial, as to whether they were exposed to media publicity pertain-

ing to alleged crime or trial, 55 A.L.R.6th 157.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Cross references. - Default judgments in state court cases, Uniform State Court Rules, Rule 15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Verdict as affected by agreement in advance among jurors to abide by less than unanimous vote, 73 A.L.R. 93. Juror’s reluctant, equivocal, or conditional assent to verdict, on polling, as

ground for mistrial or new trial in criminal case, 25 A.L.R.3d 1149. Lesser-related state offense instructions: modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
REDGreene v. State, 469 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1996).
cites § 17-8-76 24×subsections: (a) 6× (b) 2×cited by 68 cases
Reversed by Greene v. Georgia (1996): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“This was Greene's only motion for mistrial based upon OCGA § 17-8-76 and on no other occasion did the prosecutor mention the word "parole.”
The case’s holding
A prospective juror may be excluded for cause if their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties.
Later courts cite it for
“a thorough review of the voir dire of each of the six prospective jurors” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENMcGill v. State, 428 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. 1993).
cites § 17-8-76 16×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“On appeal, appellant urges that a portion of closing argument by counsel for the State was violative of OCGA § 17-8-76. However, no objection was raised below.”
The case’s holding
A sequential jury charge regarding felony murder and voluntary manslaughter is harmless error if a finding of malice murder precludes a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.
Later courts cite it for
“by finding that appellant had committed the homicide with malice, the jury necessarily found that he had committed the homicide without the provocation sufficient to authorize a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENVogleson v. State, 552 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 17-8-76 15×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“The State moved for mistrial specifically based on a violation of OCGA § 17-8-76 [41] and claimed manifest necessity.”
The case’s holding
A trial court violates the Confrontation Clause by barring cross-examination of an accomplice about the sentence he avoided through a plea deal with the State.
4
GREENHammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 17-8-76 12×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“On direct appeal to this court Hammond argued that his sentence should be reversed based on OCGA § 17-8-76, which provides, inter alia, that if the state argues to the jury that the defendant may not be required to serve his entire sentence because of the possibility of parole,…”
The case’s holding
Ineffective assistance of counsel is not established when overwhelming evidence and curative instructions negate a reasonable probability that a different sentencing outcome would have occurred.
Later courts cite it for
“defendant's lack of remorse is relevant to sentencing” · 1 citing court
5
GREENHammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009).
cites § 17-8-76 6×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. When asked later why he did not ask for a mistrial Hammond’s counsel stated that he was “afraid that [he] just let it slip by.”
The case’s holding
State court decisions deserve AEDPA deference when a trial court rejects one prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the state supreme court affirms on the other.
Later courts cite it for
“a state trial court rejects a claim on one prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test and the state supreme court, without disapproving that holding, affirms on the other prong, both of those state court decisions are due aedpa deference” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENQuick v. State, 353 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 17-8-76 12×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“" The defendant objected to the charge, and in his 10th enumeration of error, contends that the charge given here violates the policy of this state forbidding "argument or charge" on the possibility of parole, Horton v.”
The case’s holding
A trial court should only mention parole eligibility if the jury asks and only to state that such matters are not proper for jury consideration.
Later courts cite it for
“if, and only if, the jury asks to be instructed about the possibility of parole, the court should mention the issue only to the extent of telling the jury in no uncertain terms that such matters are not proper for the jury's consideration.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENMobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. 1993).
cites § 17-8-76 12×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“OCGA § 17-8-76. We have held that a state may not use against a death-penalty defendant his unsuccessful attempt to plead guilty, see Thomas v.”
The case’s holding
A defendant may present evidence of a conditional plea offer to the jury, and the state may respond by arguing that a death sentence is appropriate.
Later courts cite it for
“if the defendant wishes to inform the jury that he offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence, the state reasonably and properly may argue that nothing less than a death sentence was appropriate.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENCowart v. State, 751 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 2013).
cites § 17-8-76 4×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“Cowart contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor violated OCGA § 17-8-76 during her closing argument.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may exercise discretion to treat errors raised in a brief as amendments to a motion for new trial.
Later courts cite it for
“the decision as to which of the two felony murder verdicts should be deemed vacated - a decision that may affect which other verdicts merge and thus what other sentences may be imposed - is left to the discretion of the trial court on remand.” · 9 citing courts
9
GREENHernandez v. State, 537 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 17-8-76 14×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“The State argued that the defense violated OCGA § 17-8-76 and that the State therefore had an absolute right to a mistrial.”
The case’s holding
A mistrial declared over a defendant's objection requires manifest necessity, which is absent where cross-examination exposing a witness's bias was constitutionally protected and curable short of mistrial.
10
GREENCurles v. State, 575 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 2003).
cites § 17-8-76 12×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“During the State’s closing argument, Curies objected and moved for a mistrial based on comments which he claims violated OCGA § 17-8-76. That Code section prohibits an attorney in a criminal case from arguing that “a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the…”
11
GREENHammond v. State, 398 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. 1990).
cites § 17-8-76 8×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“) OCGA § 17-8-76. During his closing argument to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor argued that Hammond should not be given a life sentence because: There is no life without parole in Georgia.”
The case’s holding
A court may remand a case to the trial level to resolve issues regarding the effectiveness of trial counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“for review of the proceedings on remand and for the statutory sentence review, unless the proceedings on remand obviate the need for further appellate review.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENRobbins v. State, 907 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. 2024).
cites § 17-8-76 12×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“(a) Robbins contends that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a 8 mistrial on the ground that the State violated OCGA § 17-8-76 in its closing argument. In the relevant part, OCGA § 17-8-76 provides: (a) No attorney at law in a…”
13
GREENCalifornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
cites § 17-8-76 2×cited by 1,070 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“, Ga. Code Ann. § 17-8-76 (1982) (prohibiting argument as to possibility of pardon, parole, or clemency).”
The case’s holding
A state may constitutionally instruct a capital sentencing jury regarding the governor's power to commute a life sentence without parole.
Later courts cite it for
“the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.” · 57 citing courts
14
GREENFinney v. State, 320 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 17-8-76 6×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“In his sixth enumeration, Finney contends the prosecutor’s closing argument violated OCGA § 17-8-76 (a), which provides: “No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not err in denying independent psychiatric experts, admitting victim photographs to show lack of remorse, or refusing to excuse jurors who can consider life.
15
GREENTurpin v. Todd, 493 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. 1997).
cites § 17-8-76 4×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“OCGA § 17-8-76 (a); McGruder v. State, 213 Ga.”
The case’s holding
A petitioner overcomes procedural default by demonstrating an objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel and that the error caused actual prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim that has been procedurally defaulted.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENDavis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 869 (Ga. 1986).
cites § 17-8-76 4×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“A 1955 act provided that: “No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by the court or jury because pardon, parole, or clemency of any nature may be…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may refuse to allow a witness to testify if the witness intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for nearly all questions.
Later courts cite it for
“does not relate to the defendant's character, prior record, or to the circumstances of the offense .” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENNickerson v. State, 545 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 17-8-76 4×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“ccordingly, the trial court did not err in finding Nickerson’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to it; (e) Finally, Nickerson contends his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to an argument by the State that “he would not suffer the full…”
The case’s holding
Trial counsel's failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“trial counsel's failure to pursue a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENMoore v. State, 529 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 17-8-76 6×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“8 Moore also claims that when the prosecutor said that Moore had served only 14 of 20 years for a prior conviction, his counsel should have objected on the ground that such a statement violated OCGA § 17-8-76. That Code section provides that an attorney in a criminal case shall…”
The case’s holding
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails if the alleged deficiencies constitute valid trial strategy or result in harmless error.
19
GREENPutman v. State, 572 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 17-8-76 8×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“Putman claims the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for mistrial pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-76 made after the prosecutor argued during closing that finding Putman guilty of second degree vehicular homicide as a lesser offense would be the equivalent of “giving the…”
20
GREENJenkins v. State, 458 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 17-8-76 6×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 17-8-76
“1 (d), 2 by expressly authorizing argument to the jury on the issue of parole in the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, conflicts with OCGA § 17-8-76 (a), 3 which imposes an absolute bar on such argument.”
The case’s holding
Expert mental health testimony derived from an evaluation is admissible only if the defendant cooperates in an evaluation by an expert selected by the state.
Later courts cite it for
“the rule for construing statutes which may be in conflict is that the most recent legislative expression prevails.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320032024

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga.27Ga. Ct. App.19N.D. Ga.3SCOTUS311th Cir.2Tex. Crim. App.1
By subsection
(a)7 cases
Greene v. State, 469 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1996).“This was Greene's only motion for mistrial based upon OCGA § 17-8-76 and on no other occasion did the prosecutor mention the word "parole.”
Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009).“O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76. When asked later why he did not ask for a mistrial Hammond’s counsel stated that he was “afraid that [he] just let it slip by.”
Turpin v. Todd, 493 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. 1997).“OCGA § 17-8-76 (a); McGruder v. State, 213 Ga.”
Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
William Boyd Tucker v. Walter D. Zant, 724 F.2d 882 (11th Cir. 1984).
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(b)1 case
Greene v. State, 469 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1996).

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Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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