Return after dispersal of verdict which is too uncertain.

- When by consent the jury in a criminal case disperses after agreeing upon the jury's finding, and thereafter return into court a verdict which is too uncertain or indefinite to support a judgment, it is beyond the power of the court to order this verdict to be so amended as to cure the defects therein. Any action by the court in attempting to thus amend such a verdict should be treated as a mere nullity. Wells v. State, 116 Ga. 87, 42 S.E. 390 (1902).

Conforming verdict to language of Code section charged.

- When the jury returned a verdict of "involuntary manslaughter," without specification, the trial court does no more than conform the verdict to the pleadings and the evidence when the court asks the foreperson to conform the verdict to the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a), unlawful act-involuntary manslaughter, when there is no evidence of lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter. Brown v. State, 166 Ga. App. 765, 305 S.E.2d 386 (1983).

Amendment of guilty verdict to guilty but mentally ill not permitted.

- Since the jury was instructed on possible verdicts of guilty and guilty but mentally ill and returned a verdict of guilty, amendment of the verdict from guilty to guilty but mentally ill would constitute an impermissible substantive change. Hollis v. State, 215 Ga. App. 35, 450 S.E.2d 247 (1994).

No amendment of guilty but mentally ill verdict.

- Trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider a verdict of guilty but mentally ill on a misdemeanor count of making harassing telephone calls as that verdict is available only in felony cases. Converting, on appeal, the verdict to guilty would have constituted an impermissible substantive change in the verdict, violative of O.C.G.A. § 17-9-40, and therefore the verdict had to be reversed. Levin v. State, 222 Ga. App. 123, 473 S.E.2d 582 (1996).

Juror's affidavit should not have been considered to impeach a verdict.

- Habeas court erred in setting aside a murder conviction based on claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge an alternate juror, who was seated after the juror had been excused and had researched the case on the Internet, because the juror's affidavit should not have been considered to impeach the verdict, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-40, and the research was not the type of conduct that deprived the petitioner of a fair trial. O'Donnell v. Smith, 294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (2013).

Cited in Rolle v. State, 177 Ga. App. 79, 338 S.E.2d 519 (1985).

C.J.S.

- 89 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 1074 et seq., 1166 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of court to mold or amend verdict with respect to the parties for or against whom it was rendered, 106 A.L.R. 418.

Entry of final judgment after disagreement of jury, 31 A.L.R.2d 885.

Court's power to increase amount of verdict or judgment over either party's refusal or failure to consent to addition, 56 A.L.R.2d 213.

Competency of juror's statement or affidavit to show that verdict in a civil case was not correctly recorded, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132.

Jury's discussion of parole law as ground for reversal or new trial, 21 A.L.R.4th 420.

Propriety and effect of jurors' discussion of evidence among themselves before final submission of criminal case, 21 A.L.R.4th 444.

Propriety of reassembling jury to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change verdict after jury has been discharged, or has reached or sealed its verdict and separated, 14 A.L.R.5th 89.