Court's duty to reshape informal jury verdict.

- Jury may express their meaning in an informal manner, and the court has the right to put it in such form and shape as to do justice to the parties, according to the pleadings and the evidence. Davis v. Wright, 194 Ga. 1, 21 S.E.2d 88 (1942).

Amendment to conform to reasonable intendment of verdict.

- Authority given the trial judge to amend judgment to conform to the reasonable intendment of the verdict constitutes an exception to the rule of this section. Turley v. Turley, 244 Ga. 808, 262 S.E.2d 112 (1979).

Polling of jury.

- Judge may poll the jury as to the intendment of the jury's verdict. Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, 249 S.E.2d 637 (1978).

Adding interest after jury's denial of interest.

- It is error for the trial court to add interest after the jury has denied interest in the jury's verdict. Hoffman v. Clendenon, 150 Ga. App. 98, 256 S.E.2d 676 (1979).

Trial court was without authority to add additional interest after the jury dispersed since it was clear that the jury intended to award interest, but found that the plaintiff was entitled to less than the maximum amount the court charged could be awarded. Voxcom, Inc. v. Boda, 221 Ga. App. 619, 472 S.E.2d 155 (1996).

Intention of jury.

- When intention of the jury is not apparent on the face of the verdict, the court has no power to amend the verdict. Polk v. Fulton County, 96 Ga. App. 733, 101 S.E.2d 736 (1957).

When the intention of the jury is apparent on the face of the verdict, the verdict's form may be amended to conform to the apparent intention. Polk v. Fulton County, 96 Ga. App. 733, 101 S.E.2d 736 (1957).

When the jury's intendment appears plainly from record of the proceedings in the case, the trial court does not abuse the court's discretion in fashioning the court's judgment to conform to that intendment. Gateway Leasing Corp. v. Heath, 168 Ga. App. 858, 310 S.E.2d 549 (1983).

Illegal portion of a verdict may be separated and stricken under former Code 1933, § 110-112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-8). Hardin v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 150 Ga. App. 277, 257 S.E.2d 300 (1979).

As the illegal portion of the jury's verdict was determinable and separable from the rest and the trial court properly wrote off the illegal portion of the verdict and reduced the principal amount of the judgment, there was no cause to grant a guarantor's request for a new trial. Fletcher v. C. W. Matthews Contr. Co., 322 Ga. App. 751, 746 S.E.2d 230 (2013).

Expressing legal meaning of jury's finding.

- When a jury, by the consent of the parties, is allowed to disperse after making the jury's verdict, and returns into court, it was not error in the court to allow an alteration to be made, which alteration expressed the legal meaning of the finding. Jones v. Smith, 64 Ga. 711 (1880).

Amending verdict after dispersing temporarily.

- After dispersal for the night, with the intention of returning the verdict found in the morning, the court properly allowed an amendment in the morning to make the verdict correspond with the statement of the foreperson. Barnes v. Strohecker, 17 Ga. 340 (1855).

Ordering jury back in session to clarify difference.

- After the jury in a justice of the peace court reached a verdict while the court was recessed, and dispersed, and when the court reconvened the jury reassembled in the jury box, and the verdict was read, and when the foreperson of the jury thereupon stated that the jury had intended to find for the defendants, instead of for the plaintiff and after the justice of the peace polled the jury and ascertained that the jury intended to find for the defendants, and the justice instructed the jury as to the identity of the parties as plaintiff and defendants, the justice did not err in ordering the jury back to the jury room to make a verdict. McGahee v. Samuels, 61 Ga. App. 773, 7 S.E.2d 611 (1940).

Error in using "plaintiff" instead of "defendant" when the meaning is clear has been held to be immaterial as a mere lapsus linguae. Polk v. Fulton County, 96 Ga. App. 733, 101 S.E.2d 736 (1957).

Ordering jury to find verdict contrary to the jury's intent.

- It was error for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for a different amount from that which the jury had informed the court before the jurors dispersed that the jurors had intended to find. Monroe v. Alden, 61 Ga. App. 829, 7 S.E.2d 424 (1940).

Failure of the foreperson to sign a verdict amounted at most to an informality which was properly amended. Avera v. Tool, McGarrah & Toudee, 74 Ga. 398 (1884).

Jury foreperson may be called back to date the verdict after the jury has been discharged. Fowler v. Aldridge, 108 Ga. App. 358, 133 S.E.2d 48 (1963).

When modification of verdict in substance permitted.

- When a jury makes a mistake in writing a verdict, and the verdict as returned into court does not express or contain the true finding of the jury, the jury, before dispersing, may change or modify the jury's verdict in matter of substance so as to express the true intention and finding of the jury. Monroe v. Alden, 61 Ga. App. 829, 7 S.E.2d 424 (1940); Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, 249 S.E.2d 637 (1978).

Verdict not to be amended after received and recorded.

- Verdict may not be amended in substance after the verdict has been received and recorded, and the jury has dispersed; this is nonetheless true in a case wherein the court had directed what the verdict should be. McGahee v. Samuels, 61 Ga. App. 773, 7 S.E.2d 611 (1940); Harlan v. Ellis, 198 Ga. 678, 32 S.E.2d 389 (1944); Morris v. Morris, 242 Ga. 591, 250 S.E.2d 459 (1978); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 898, 262 S.E.2d 151 (1979).

After dispersal of the jury a judge has no power to add to or take from the jury's findings, and has not the power, by amendment or reformation, to supply substantial omissions or make substantial changes in the verdict as rendered by the jury. Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862 (1952); Parrish Bakeries of Ga., Inc. v. Wiseman Baking Co., 104 Ga. App. 573, 122 S.E.2d 260 (1961); Bass v. Barrett, 190 Ga. App. 314, 378 S.E.2d 722 (1989).

Jury found a breach of the duty of good faith, but did not find that a broker was the procuring cause of a lease negotiated by a corporation, or that the broker was entitled to recover in quantum meruit, which left the verdict for breach of the duty of good faith that the broker had abandoned; the broker was not allowed to redraft the verdict form that it presented to include a finding on procuring cause or quantum meruit, and, thus, the corporation was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Quantum Trading Corp. v. Forum Realty Corp., 278 Ga. App. 485, 629 S.E.2d 420 (2006).

Under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-7, a verdict could be amended in mere matter of form after the jury has dispersed; however, after a verdict was received and recorded and the jury has dispersed, a verdict could not be amended in a matter of substance either by what the jurors say the jurors intended to find or otherwise. Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (2006).

Even when jury has found punitive but not general damages.

- After the jury disperses, and the verdict has been received and recorded, it may not be amended in a matter of substance, even if the jury has found punitive but no general damages. Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, 249 S.E.2d 637 (1978).

Reassembling jury after verdict received and recorded.

- When a jury has rendered an imperfect verdict, by not finding all the issues submitted to the jury, it was held that after the verdict had been received and recorded, and the jury discharged from further consideration of the action, that the court erred, after the expiration of four days, in reassembling the jury and amending the verdict according to what the jury stated was their intention to find. Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga. 201, 52 Am. Dec. 393 (1850); Read Phosphate Co. v. Wells, 18 Ga. App. 656, 90 S.E. 358 (1916).

Motion for new trial required.

- When the jury found for the plaintiff punitive damages and attorney's fees, but no actual damages, the trial judge erred in granting the defendants' motion to strike the jury's findings as surplusage and in entering a judgment for the defendants since a verdict may not be set aside or substantially changed except upon a motion for new trial, or its equivalent. Parrish Bakeries of Ga., Inc. v. Wiseman Baking Co., 104 Ga. App. 573, 122 S.E.2d 260 (1961).

Instructing jury to correct jury's verdict.

- If a judge is not satisfied that the verdict as returned is proper, before receiving the verdict the judge may require the jury to return to the room and correct the jury's verdict under proper instructions from the court. Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, 249 S.E.2d 637 (1978).

Erroneous modification of the jury verdict.

- Trial court erroneously modified the jury verdict by awarding any overpayment of marital debt to the wife. In ordering that $19,861 of the house sale proceeds be paid toward non-existent debts and that the resulting overpayment then be returned to the wife, the trial court completely undermined the jury verdict by giving the wife a windfall of approximately $19,000 that the jury did not intend while denying the mother-in-law the proceeds from the house sale awarded to her in the verdict. Blevins v. Brown, 267 Ga. App. 665, 600 S.E.2d 739 (2004).

Decree substantially modifying verdict.

- Judge cannot accomplish the same result as amending a verdict in manner of substance by entering a decree different from the verdict of the jury, thereby eliminating certain substantial findings of the verdict, and substantially modifying or changing other findings of the jury. Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862 (1952); Parrish Bakeries of Ga., Inc. v. Wiseman Baking Co., 104 Ga. App. 573, 122 S.E.2d 260 (1961).

Substitution for verdict which was contrary to instructions.

- When the verdict is palpably contrary to the instructions, the judge has no power to discard the verdict and substitute another in the verdict's place. McCrary v. Gano, 115 Ga. 295, 41 S.E. 580 (1902).

Amending directed verdict.

- After the court has directed a verdict, the court should not amend the returned verdict at the instance of the party whose attorney prepared the verdict. McCrary v. Gano, 115 Ga. 295, 41 S.E. 580 (1902).

Requiring affidavits of jurors as to findings of fact.

- At a hearing of the defendant's motions for new trial, a court errs in allowing and considering affidavits of jurors as to what findings the jurors had made in reaching the jurors' verdicts since the effect of such affidavits is to amend the verdict into special findings of fact, and special verdicts are only permissible in equity cases. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 91 Ga. App. 131, 85 S.E.2d 182 (1954).

Statement of single juror as to jury's intent.

- It is improper to amend the judgment on the basis of what one of the jurors says the jury intended. Turley v. Turley, 244 Ga. 808, 262 S.E.2d 112 (1979).

Personal property award added to the jury's verdict by a court in the court's final judgment is improper, because a trial court is not authorized to award any additional property after the jury's verdict. Garner v. Garner, 242 Ga. 446, 249 S.E.2d 200 (1978).

Creating trust to effectuate jury's intent.

- When, in a divorce case, the jury clearly intended to create a trust for the purpose of providing support for a minor child during the minor's minority and the jury also intended that there be monthly payments from the trust for the use of the child, but the husband failed to take any substantive steps to set up the trust, there was no error in the trial court naming a trustee and providing the necessary provisions to effectuate the trust for the purpose of providing monthly child support, such as requiring the husband to make the payments necessary to keep current on his obligations for his share of the debts, encumbrances, and maintenance of the trust property. Aycock v. Aycock, 251 Ga. 104, 303 S.E.2d 456 (1983).

Damage award could not be amended.

- When the trial judge attempted to amend the jury's verdict, after the jury had dispersed, regarding a matter of substance, the award of damages, this action exceeded the authority vested by law in the trial judge to "mold" the verdict and, thus, could not be sustained. Force v. McGeachy, 186 Ga. App. 781, 368 S.E.2d 777 (1988).

After the insured's home was severely damaged by fire, and the insured was awarded a jury verdict against the insurer for the insured's loss, the trial court erred in increasing the amount of damages for the loss of the plaintiff's home, but did not err in refusing to modify the jury's set-off for mortgage payments made by the insurer as this would have been an unauthorized "molding" of the jury's verdict. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Durham, 194 Ga. App. 867, 392 S.E.2d 53 (1990).

Trial court did not err by refusing to enter a judgment molding with a jury's verdict to correct an alleged illegality and inconsistency in the damages award because under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-7 the trial court had no authority to mold the verdict since an increase in damages was a matter of substance, not mere form; a plumbing contractor was not without a potential remedy if the contractor believed that the jury's verdict was incorrect because, after the return of the verdict but before the dispersal of the jury, the plumbing contractor could have argued that the jury's damage award was illegal and internally inconsistent and could have requested the trial court to give additional instructions and permit the jury to consider the matter again, and alternatively, after the jury was dispersed, the plumbing contractor could have asked for a new trial on the issue of damages or to conditionally grant a new trial under the court's power of additur under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12. Gill Plumbing Co. v. Jimenez, 310 Ga. App. 863, 714 S.E.2d 342 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1826, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 966 (Ga. 2011).

Trial court's award of a substantial sum in litigation expenses to the wife in a divorce proceeding worked a change "in matter of substance" of the jury's allocation of resources between the parties, when such allocation was based upon the jury's expectation that no party would be required to pay litigation costs incurred by the other party. Stone v. Stone, 258 Ga. 716, 373 S.E.2d 627 (1988).

Equitable division of marital residence.

- In a divorce action, the trial court erred in granting a new trial on a sole issue of equitable division of the marital residence. If a motion for a new trial is granted, all issues of the allocation of economic resources must be determined de novo. Griggs v. Griggs, 260 Ga. 249, 392 S.E.2d 11 (1990).

Trial court could not amend judgment to eliminate party's interest.

- In a breach of contract case arising out of an LLC operating agreement, it was not clear that the jury intended to extinguish a former LLC member's interest in the operating agreement by the jury's verdict awarding the former member damages, and under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-7,9-12-9, and9-12-14, the trial court could not vary the judgment from the terms of the verdict. Kaufman Development Partners, L.P. v. Eichenblatt, 324 Ga. App. 71, 749 S.E.2d 374 (2013).

Cited in Corbett v. Gilbert, 24 Ga. 454 (1858); Mullins v. Christopher, 36 Ga. 584 (1867); Patterson v. Murphy, 63 Ga. 281 (1879); Shelton v. O'Brien, 76 Ga. 820 (1886); Brooke v. Lowry Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. 493, 81 S.E. 223 (1914); Nicholson v. Smith & Son, 29 Ga. App. 376, 115 S.E. 499 (1923); United States v. 340 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 457 (S.D Ga. 1944); Gibbs v. Forrester, 204 Ga. 545, 50 S.E.2d 318 (1948); Reagan v. Reagan, 220 Ga. 587, 140 S.E.2d 841 (1965); Moon v. Moon, 222 Ga. 650, 151 S.E.2d 714 (1966); Saint v. Ryan, 114 Ga. App. 489, 151 S.E.2d 826 (1966); Thompson v. Ingram, 226 Ga. 668, 177 S.E.2d 61 (1970); Bradley v. Bradley, 233 Ga. 83, 210 S.E.2d 1 (1974); Wadlington v. Wadlington, 235 Ga. 582, 221 S.E.2d 1 (1975); Roswell Road-Perimeter Hwy. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Schurke, 137 Ga. App. 145, 222 S.E.2d 847 (1975); Ace Parts & Distribs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 Ga. App. 4, 245 S.E.2d 314 (1978); Miller v. Roses' Stores, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 158, 259 S.E.2d 162 (1979); Cotts v. Cotts, 245 Ga. 138, 263 S.E.2d 163 (1980); Todhunter v. Price, 248 Ga. 411, 283 S.E.2d 864 (1981); Taylor v. Smith, 159 Ga. App. 797, 285 S.E.2d 200 (1981); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Gorlin, 194 Ga. App. 574, 390 S.E.2d 923 (1990); French Quarter, Inc. v. Peterson, Young, Self & Asselin, 220 Ga. App. 852, 471 S.E.2d 9 (1996); Rental Equip. Group, LLC v. Maci, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 155, 587 S.E.2d 364 (2003); Surles v. Cornell Corr. of Cal., Inc., 290 Ga. App. 260, 659 S.E.2d 683 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 75B Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 1612 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 89 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 1074 et seq., 1166 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of court to mold or amend verdict with respect to the parties for or against whom it was rendered, 106 A.L.R. 418.

Entry of final judgment after disagreement of jury, 31 A.L.R.2d 885.

Court's power to increase amount of verdict or judgment over either party's refusal or failure to consent to addition, 56 A.L.R.2d 213.

Competency of juror's statement or affidavit to show that verdict in a civil case was not correctly recorded, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132.

Propriety of reassembling jury to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change verdict after jury has been discharged, or has reached or sealed its verdict and separated, 14 A.L.R.5th 89.

Propriety of reassembling jury to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change verdict after discharge or separation at conclusion of civil case, 19 A.L.R.5th 622.