...Spencer relies upon a post-trial affidavit from one of the jurors stating she overheard two white jurors making racially derogatory comments about the defendant during the jury's deliberations. The general rule is that "affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict." OCGA § 17-9-41....

...With regard to this issue, Humphreys submitted with his motion for new trial the affidavits of one juror and of two investigators who interviewed a second juror, which allege that the jury misunderstood the law. However, because the proposed affidavit of the juror does not fall within any exception to OCGA § 17-9-41 (providing that jurors' affidavits "may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict"), the trial court correctly declined to consider it. See Gardiner v. State, 264 Ga. 329, 332(2), 444 S.E.2d 300 (1994) (holding that the limited exceptions to OCGA § 17-9-41 do not include jurors' misapprehension regarding the law)....

...However, here, unlike in Valenzuela, a review of the record shows that the sole evidentiary support for the alleged bailiff or juror misconduct consists of affidavits given by four jurors. "The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict." OCGA § 17-9-41....

...State, 265 Ga. 653, 654(3), 461 S.E.2d 222 (1995). See also Spencer v. State, supra at 643(3), 398 S.E.2d 179. Thus, in addition to applying the incorrect standard to Todd's claim, the habeas court also considered evidence which is inadmissible under OCGA § 17-9-41. There are constitutional limitations to the application of OCGA § 17-9-41, as where members of the jury intentionally gather extrajudicial and prejudicial evidence and communicate such information to the other jurors....

...parole. "To allow such inference would be to allow the jurors to do by indirection that which they could not do directly, namely, impeach their verdict." Morakes v. *914 State, 201 Ga. 425, 434(4), 40 S.E.2d 120 (1946). The majority holds that OCGA § 17-9-41 is inapplicable because "fair trial concerns are implicated" by the jurors' affidavits....

...However, the majority concedes that the affidavits would be inadmissible to show that "the jurors had discussed among themselves the issue of the defendant's eligibility for parole...." Thus, the majority apparently concludes that a constitutional violation occurs and OCGA § 17-9-41 is rendered inapplicable, simply because the bailiff is alleged to have had some part in discussions which Todd had no constitutional right to prevent. There are important public policy considerations which underlie OCGA § 17-9-41, including the necessity of keeping inviolate the sanctity of juror deliberations, the desirability of promoting the finality of jury verdicts and the protection of jurors from post-trial harassment....

...State, 260 Ga. 528, 397 S.E.2d 695 (1990) is distinguishable for that same reason. In Morris v. State, 257 Ga. 781, 784(4), 364 S.E.2d 571 (1988), the State conceded the existence of communications between the bailiff and jurors, and the applicability of OCGA § 17-9-41 was not considered....

...The holding in Watkins, supra, is based upon misconduct of the jurors themselves, who violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by intentionally gathering prejudicial extra-judicial evidence as to his guilt. Under the majority's holding, OCGA § 17-9-41 is meaningless so long as a juror's post-verdict affidavit implies any oral communication on the part of a bailiff. Even if consideration of the jurors' affidavits was not otherwise precluded by OCGA § 17-9-41, those affidavits still would not authorize the grant of habeas relief unless they demonstrated a "substantial denial" of Todd's constitutional rights....

...laimed that her vote for the guilty verdict resulted from coercive pressure applied by other members of the jury. The proffered testimony was not within any exception to the general rule that jurors are incompetent to impeach their own verdict. OCGA § 17-9-41; Oliver v. State, 265 Ga. 653, 654(3), 461 S.E.2d 222 (1995). The purpose of OCGA § 17-9-41 "is plainly to prohibit after-the-fact picking at the negotiating positions of the jurors and of their attempts to persuade one another." Aguilar v....

...460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (holding that defendant must testify to obtain review of trial court's in limine ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment under Fed.R.Evid. 609). [17] See OCGA § 17-8-4. [18] Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128, 218 S.E.2d 856 (1975). [19] Id. [20] OCGA § 17-9-41....

...nd April 23, 1998, respectively. The appeals were all docketed in this court on July 30, 1998, and were all submitted for decision on briefs on September 21, 1998. [2] Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [3] OCGA § 17-9-41....

...iating positions of the jurors and of their attempts to persuade one another. Id. at 832. The events in this case do not fall within any exception to the rule that "affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict." OCGA § 17-9-41....

...In my opinion, therefore, a remand is not necessary and both the judgment of conviction and the death sentence entered by the trial court should be affirmed. As the majority points out, the general rule in this state is that jurors are incompetent to impeach their own verdict. OCGA § 17-9-41; Oliver v....

...840, 842, 439 S.E.2d 656 (1994). [31] Sears contends that jury misconduct occurred during the sentencing phase deliberations when the foreman and perhaps other jurors threatened the lone holdout juror and when the bailiff had improper communications with the jury. [32] See O.C.G.A. § 17-9-41....

...Defendants assert that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the post-verdict affidavits of several jurors offered to demonstrate instances of alleged juror misconduct during the course of the trial. The general rule is that “affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.” OCGA § 17-9-41....

...ng a verdict. See OCGA § 17-9-40 (“after [the jury's verdict] has been received, recorded, and the jury dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance, either by what the jurors say they intended to find or otherwise”); former OCGA § 17-9-41 (“The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not impeach their verdict.”)....

...will be granted if "there is a reasonable possibility that the improper evidence collected by jurors contributed to the conviction." [7] The trial court recognized its authority to consider the juror affidavit under the exception to the rule of OCGA § 17-9-41 but declined to do so....

...The case was docketed on November 5, 2008, and submitted for decision on the briefs. [2] Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). [3] See OCGA § 17-9-41 ("The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.")....

...But the foreman maintained that there had been "very little discussion." Accepting that this exchange of information among the jurors can be characterized as juror misconduct or an irregularity, it does not provide a basis for a new trial. Jurors are not permitted to impeach their *224 own verdict. OCGA § 17-9-41....

...Appellee was also tried for and acquitted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. Appellant’s trial counsel Steven H. Sadow and Bobby Lee Cook also represented him on his direct appeal. See also former OCGA § 17-9-41 which was repealed effective January 1, 2013, and which provided as follows: “The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.” The excerpts from the trial transcripts show that during the testimony of Officer R....

...345, 351, 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998) (corrections officer and fire-fighter married to police officer); Mosher, 268 Ga. at 557, 491 S.E.2d 348 (firearms instructor who previously worked as a sworn police officer with three different departments). [8] See OCGA § 17-9-41....

...not use the post-trial affidavit of a juror to meet his burden to show that the jury was in fact misled by the court's failure to charge on unanimity. "The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict." OCGA § *568 17-9-41....

...of due diligence does not require so extensive an investigation, particularly under the circumstances presented here. We first note that, before the revision of the Georgia Evidence Code, jurors generally were not permitted to impeach their verdict. See former OCGA § 17-9-41....

...Moreover, the circumstances of this case do not warrant an exception to the rule that jurors are not permitted to impeach their own verdict. Williams v. State, 252 Ga. 7 (1) (310 SE2d 528) (1984) (rule prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdict is deeply rooted in Georgia law); OCGA § 17-9-41....