...Co., supra, which held that a similar policy exclusion barred a claim for negligent supervision where plaintiff’s claims arose out of an employee’s conduct which was excluded under the policy. Id. at 262. Dunn’s claim in the present litigation is grounded on OCGA § 18-2-22, which provides in pertinent part: *215The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void: (1) Every assignment or transfer by a debtor, insolvent at the time, of re...

...rt of McGuire or Nemchik as its agent which would require the denial of their motions for summary judgment. 2. Appellants further contend that the McGuire security deed constituted a fraudulent conveyance under subsections (2) and (3) of former OCGA § 18-2-22. That statute "was repealed on July 1, 2002, when Georgia enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, OCGA § 18-2-70 et seq., but this repeal did not extinguish causes of action that arose under OCGA § 18-2-22 before that date. [Cit.]" Gerschick v. Pounds, 281 Ga.App. 531, 532(1), 636 S.E.2d 663(a), fn. 8 (281 Ga.App. 531, 636 S.E.2d 663) (2006). In relevant part, former OCGA § 18-2-22 provided as follows: The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void: ......

...were entitled to assume that the ultimate purchasers of Lot 6 from PHDC would be informed of the McGuire security deed and, in the absence of any different indication, that Sissine would not engage in a criminal misrepresentation. As for former OCGA § 18-2-22(3), a critical requirement of that subsection is that the deed be without any valuable consideration....

...cGuire security deed and the April 5, 2002 settlement. See Bradley v. Tattnall Bank, 170 Ga.App. 821, 828(2), 318 S.E.2d 657 (1984). "[T]he performance of services can constitute valuable consideration" which precludes the application of former OCGA § 18-2-22(3)....

...Hill, Jr., for appellants. A. Jack Kemp, for appellees. SMITH, Justice. We granted the writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Kesler v. Veal, 182 Ga. App. 444 (356 SE2d 254) (1987), to decide if a conveyance which if found to be fraudulent in law under OCGA § 18-2-22 will support an award of damages....

..., and on May 25, 1982 a verdict was entered against him in the amount of $550,000. Subsequently this action, filed on behalf of the victim's minor children to set aside the deeds to H. V. on the ground that the conveyances were fraudulent under OCGA § 18-2-22, was heard....

...had or made with intention to delay or defraud creditors, where such intention is known to the taking party; a bona fide transaction on a valuable consideration, where the taking party is without notice or ground for reasonable suspicion of said intent of the debtor, shall be valid; ..." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 18-2-22. The legislature obviously did not intend the taking party to be liable for general and punitive damages under OCGA § 18-2-22 based solely upon the fraudulent conveyance without proof of bad faith, actual fraud, or conspiracy on his part....

...Kesler are not allowed and we reverse in part. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., Weltner and Hunt, JJ., who dissent. WELTNER, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. 1. The majority correctly states that the terms of OCGA § 18-2-22 *680 refer only to a fraudulent transferor, and provide no express remedy against a transferee. That, however, cannot settle the issue of a fraudulent transferee's liability to one injured by the fraud. 2. The following statutes are applicable to the issues in this case: (a) OCGA § 18-2-22 declares the following acts to be fraudulent as against creditors: "Every conveyance of real ......

...[3] There was evidence that it was always intended that title would be in her name because she paid for the car. The trial court granted C & S's motion for directed verdict on liability on the basis of Chambers v. C & S Nat. Bank, supra, and the Court of Appeals relied upon Chambers in affirming. OCGA § 18-2-22 provides: "The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void: ......

...s one without any valuable consideration." C & S relies upon Chambers v. C & S Nat. Bank, 242 Ga., supra at 501, quoting from Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Aldridge, 233 Ga. 318, 321 (210 SE2d 791) (1974), where we said: Under Code § 28-201 (3) [now OCGA § 18-2-22 (3)], "the only facts necessary to be shown in order to render the deed from [the husband] to his wife fraudulent in law, are the indebtedness, the insolvency of the debtor, and that the deed was voluntary....

...As shown above, satisfaction of an existing loan may constitute valuable consideration. Under the evidence here, a jury would have been authorized to find that the conveyance from husband to wife was supported by "valuable consideration" within the meaning of OCGA § 18-2-22, supra....

...[3] It is unclear whether this was $2,000 cash down or was represented by her assumption of an outstanding $2,000 loan. [4] Thus, the debtor's testimony that the conveyance was "voluntary on his part" and of his "own free will" does not establish that the conveyance was "voluntary" within the meaning of OCGA § 18-2-22 (3), supra....

...the sufficiency of the evidence. Both enumerations charge that Beckwith failed to produce any evidence that Merrell conveyed the property with intent to defraud or that McCart had actual knowledge of or grounds to suspect an intent to defraud. OCGA § 18-2-22 makes null and void: (1) Every assignment or transfer by a debtor, insolvent at the time, of real or personal property or choses in action of any description to any person, either in trust or for the benefit of or on behalf of creditors, w...

...318 (210 SE2d 791) (1974) (debtor is insolvent when, after conveyance, property retained by the debtor is not ample to pay existing debts). Accordingly, the court did not err in denying Merrell's motion for directed verdict and the jury was authorized to find that the conveyance was fraudulent under § 18-2-22....

...a similar policy exclusion barred a claim for negligent supervision where plaintiff's claims arose out of an employee's conduct which was excluded under the policy. Id. at 262, 466 S.E.2d 4. Dunn's claim in the present litigation is grounded on OCGA § 18-2-22, which provides in pertinent part: The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void: (1) Every assignment or transfer by a debtor, insolvent at the time, of real or...

...Sandy Springs has neither followed the statutory procedure for collecting its judgment nor shown peculiar facts that justify the equitable relief it seeks. 4. A bona fide purchaser for value is protected against outstanding equitable interests in land of which the purchaser has no notice. See OCGA §§ 23-1-19, 23-1-20, 18-2-22(2)....

...Judgment was entered accordingly and, following the denial of her motion for new trial, Mrs. Dearing appealed. 1. A.R. III's case was predicated on two grounds: First, Mr. Dearing made the conveyance with the intention to delay or defraud creditors, and his intention was known to Mrs. Dearing. OCGA § 18-2-22(2). Second, Mr. Dearing was insolvent when he made the conveyance, and it was voluntary, not for a valuable consideration. OCGA § 18-2-22(3)....

...And it is for the jury to say whether the husband and the wife carried their burden in this regard. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Aldridge, 233 Ga. 318, 210 S.E.2d 791 (1974). The evidence was more than sufficient to establish the existence of fraud under OCGA § 18-2-22(2)....

...Dearing was insolvent or rendered insolvent at the time of the conveyance; (2) she established that she had an equitable interest in the marital residence; and (3) she provided valuable consideration for the conveyance. We disagree. As we noted in Division 1, A.R. III's theory of the case was based upon both OCGA § 18-2-22(2) and OCGA § 18-2-22(3)....

...III to prove insolvency, voluntariness of the deed, and lack of consideration. However, no such showing was required with regard to subsection (2). See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Aldridge, *567 supra at 319, 320, 210 S.E.2d 791 (deed may be set aside under paragraph two of OCGA § 18-2-22 even though grantor was not insolvent)....

...ing out of an automobile accident that seriously injured both Michael Langston and Allen. The Langstons amended their complaint to have Allen's conveyance of her residence to her daughter, Juanita Coots, [1] set aside on the basis of fraud. See OCGA § 18-2-22....

...Davies-Elliott, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 498(1)(a), 452 S.E.2d 132 (1994). Because there was some evidence from which the jury could properly find that Allen's conveyance of her property to her daughter was not made with the intention to defraud her creditors in violation of OCGA § 18-2-22(2), the trial court did not err by denying appellants' motion for j.n.o.v....

...Whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent is a question of fact for the jury. Goodman, supra, 247 Ga. at 606(1), 277 S.E.2d 908. Because the evidence adduced did not demand a verdict that Allen was insolvent at the time of the conveyance and could not pay her debts, see OCGA § 18-2-22(3), the trial court did not err by denying the Langstons' motion for j.n.o.v....

...of material fact as to the question of fraudulent intent. Further, the fact that Carden paid the entire note to the creditor, without the necessity for suit, is of no value to him, as the critical inquiry is his intent at the time of transfer. OCGA § 18-2-22 provides: "The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void ......

..."The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others and as to them shall be null and void:... (3) Every voluntary deed or conveyance, not for a valuable consideration, made by a debtor who is insolvent at the time of the conveyance." OCGA § 18-2-22....

...ng that the trust was valid and did not constitute a fraudulent transfer. Jordan has appealed from that decision. 1. In his verified complaint, appellant alleged that the creation of the testamentary trust was a fraudulent transfer violative of OCGA § 18-2-22, which, in specified circumstances, deems fraudulent against creditors a debtor's transfer, assignment, or conveyance of real or personal property....

...Caswell was released from further liability on the judgment by virtue of a settlement agreement executed in bankruptcy court. In light of the admission in judicio that Mrs. Caswell was not Jordan's debtor, her establishment of a testamentary trust was not a debtor's act that could be deemed fraudulent against Jordan under § 18-2-22....

...disagree with the latter holding. 1. A bona fide transfer by a debtor for “valuable consideration, where the taking party is without notice or ground for reasonable suspicion of [the debtor’s intent to defraud creditors] shall be valid.” OCGA § 18-2-22 (2)....

Hunstein, Justice. After a bench trial, the trial court, pursuant to OCGA § 18-2-22 (2) and (3), declared a conveyance of residential property from Mark Smith to his wife, Angie Smith, null and void and set it aside, allowed a judgment lien of Mark Smith’s judgment creditor, Travis Pruitt & *348Associates, P.C., to atta...

...fficient grounds for reasonable suspicion of his intent existed. See Merrell v. Beckwith, 263 Ga. 779 (1) (439 SE2d 488) (1994). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by declaring the conveyance null and void and setting it aside pursuant to OCGA § 18-2-22 (2). We therefore do not find it necessary to reach appellants’ enumeration regarding the factual findings to support the trial court’s ruling regarding the application here of OCGA § 18-2-22 (3). 2....