O.C.G.A.

§ 18-2-1 gives generic meaning of term "creditor." - While generic meaning of term "creditor," was defined by former Civil Code 1910, § 3215 (see now O.C.G.A. § 18-2-1), it was used in former Civil Code 1910, § 2220 (see now O.C.G.A. § 14-4-63) in its more circumscribed and ordinary meaning as denoting a holder of an obligation arising ex contractu. Howard v. Long, 142 Ga. 789, 83 S.E. 852 (1914).

Liability for conversion included.

- Relationship of debtor and creditor is defined broader than is generally supposed, and would seem to include liability for wrongful conversion of property for which trover would lie. Banks v. McCandless, 119 Ga. 793, 47 S.E. 332 (1904).

Liability for trespass.

- Words "liable and bound by law to pay another an amount of money, certain or uncertain," certainly were broad enough to embrace a person liable to pay for trespass, and that before amount of trespass, or extent of damage, was ascertained; for the words were, "an amount of money, certain or uncertain." Powell v. Westmoreland, 60 Ga. 572 (1878).

Relation between stock certificate holder and issuing association.

- True relation between holder of certificate of stock in loan and building association and association is neither more nor less than that of debtor and creditor. Cook v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 104 Ga. 814, 30 S.E. 911 (1898); Cashen v. Southern Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 114 Ga. 983, 41 S.E. 51 (1902).

Right to set aside fraudulent transfers.

- Former Civil Code 1933, §§ 28-101, 28-102, 28-201, and 28-202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 18-2-1,18-2-20,18-2-22 and18-2-23 [see now, also, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70]) provide creditors with the right to set aside fraudulent transfers, and this remedy was available to any creditor at time of transfer who thereafter reduces the creditor's claim to judgment lien. United States v. Hickox, 356 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1966).

Renunciation of lien privileges.

- Judgment creditor may lose, surrender, or waive benefit of creditor's lien by renunciation of privileges secured by such lien. Law v. Coleman, 173 Ga. 68, 159 S.E. 679 (1931).

Principal of dissolved corporate business still subject to unliquidated claim.

- Unliquidated tort claims by a customer against a car dealership survived as a debt owed to the customer by the principal of the dealership, to whom the dealership had conveyed the dealership's assets while insolvent; furthermore, the principal's responses to and filing of summary judgment motions, and participation in the lawsuit in other ways, waived any objections to the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Hodge v. Howes, 260 Ga. App. 107, 578 S.E.2d 904 (2003).

Guarantors considered debtors for purposes of confirmation statute.

- Lender's compliance with the requirements contained in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 was a condition precedent to the lender's ability to pursue a guarantor for a deficiency after a foreclosure had been conducted, but the guarantors had the contractual ability to waive the condition precedent requirement. "Debtor" included guarantors as of the time the promissory note was in default. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith, 298 Ga. 818, 785 S.E.2d 505 (2016).

Cited in Watson v. Whatley, 218 Ga. 86, 126 S.E.2d 621 (1962); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Kunes, 230 Ga. 888, 199 S.E.2d 776 (1973); Redman Indus., Inc. v. Tower Properties, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003).

Debtor/creditor relationship between bank and depositor.

- When money is placed in bank on general deposit, title passes immediately to the bank, and the relation of the debtor and creditor is thereby created between the bank and the depositor. Foster v. People's Bank, 42 Ga. App. 102, 155 S.E. 62 (1930).

Ordinarily, when checks or drafts are endorsed and deposited in a bank, the presumption is that the title does not pass and the relation of debtor and creditor does not exist until the collection has been made. Foster v. People's Bank, 42 Ga. App. 102, 155 S.E. 62 (1930).

When checks or drafts are received on deposit by the bank with the intention that the checks or drafts be treated as cash, title passes immediately to the bank and the relationship of the debtor and the creditor is established between the bank and the depositor. Foster v. People's Bank, 42 Ga. App. 102, 155 S.E. 62 (1930).

Spouse owed alimony is "creditor."

- Willful failure to provide for maintenance and support of spouse and children creates a lawful demand which, when legally enforced, was called alimony, and spouse to whom alimony was due is a creditor within the meaning of this section. Carter v. Bush, 216 Ga. 429, 116 S.E.2d 568 (1960).

Proceeding by spouse to set aside conveyance.

- Under former Code 1933, §§ 28-101 and 28-201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-1 and18-2-22 (repealed)), wife may bring equitable proceeding to cancel and set aside conveyance of property made by her husband with intent to defeat recovery by her of alimony, and such proceeding will lie against grantee of husband, who took with knowledge of such intention or with reasonable grounds to suspect such intent. A different result is not required by Ga. L. 1950, p. 365, (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-5-7), relating to filing of lis pendens notice, since the grantee was not an innocent purchaser. Wood v. McGahee, 211 Ga. 913, 89 S.E.2d 634 (1955).

ALR.

- Acceptance of cashier's check from debtor as absolute or conditional payment, 36 A.L.R. 470; 42 A.L.R. 1353, 45 A.L.R. 1487.

Title to commercial paper deposited by customer of bank to his account, 99 A.L.R. 486.

What is an action for "debt" within attachment or garnishment statute, 12 A.L.R.2d 787.

Rule denying relief to one who conveyed his property to defraud his creditors as applicable where the threatened claim which occasioned the conveyance was paid or was never established, 21 A.L.R.2d 589; 6 A.L.R.4th 862.

Creditor's acceptance of obligation of third person as constituting novation, 61 A.L.R.2d 755.

Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457.

Liability of creditor for excessive attachment or garnishment, 56 A.L.R.3d 493.

Rule denying recovery of property to one who conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable where the claim which motivated the conveyance was never established, 6 A.L.R.4th 862.

Spouse's liability, after divorce, for community debt contracted by other spouse during marriage, 20 A.L.R.4th 211.