O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77 (2019)

Relief for creditor against fraudulent transfer or obligation

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this article, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Code Section 18-2-78, may obtain:

(1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;

(2) An attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter 3 of this title; and

(3) Subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:

(A) An injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;

(B) Appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or

(C) Any other relief the circumstances may require.

(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

History

Code 1981, § 18-2-77, enacted by Ga. L. 2002, p. 141, § 3; Ga. L. 2015, p. 996, § 4A-1/SB 65.

Annotations

Law reviews. For annual survey on business associations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 19 (2018).

For annual survey on real property law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Pleadings adequate for fraud. - Actual fraud was adequately pled by alleging badges of fraud sufficient to infer the fraudulent nature of transfers to insiders; moreover, insolvency resulting in constructive fraud also was adequately pled. Ralls Corp. v. Huerfano River Wind, LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87414 (N.D. Ga. 2014). Claims survived motion to dismiss. - When an investor asserted fraudulent transfer and related claims against accounts in the names of the former wife and widow of a consultant who allegedly defrauded the investor, the claims survived a motion to dismiss because the investor: (1) stated viable claims; (2) did not have to anticipate affirmative defenses; and (3) did not admit such defenses. Speedway Motorsports, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bank, 315 Ga. App. 320, 727 S.E.2d 151, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 366 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1329, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 50 (Ga. Jan. 7, 2013). Improper dismissal for failure to state a claim. - Trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because it was too soon in the case to conclude, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs could not present evidence satisfying the statutory elements of O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et. seq., seeking to void the transfer of assets. Lyle v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742, 841 S.E.2d 182, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 190 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C1327, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 789 (Ga. Oct. 19, 2020), cert. denied, No. S20C1103, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. Oct. 19, 2020). Transfer prior to death. - Although the transfer of a house was accompanied by some badges of fraud, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in enjoining further disposition of the house, pending adjudication of the merits of wrongful death and fraudulent transfer claims since the transferor gave the house to the transferor’s three minor grandchildren in Florida three months before the transferor murdered the decedent. Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 151, overruled in part, SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking &

Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 270 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict under the plaintiff’s theory of fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy as some evidence authorized the jury to find that a deed conveying the property owner’s sole interest to the real property to the owner and one defendant as joint tenants with right of survivorship without any money exchanged prior to death was to evade the plaintiff before a promissory note was paid. Bloom v. Camp, 336 Ga. App. 891, 785 S.E.2d 573, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 238 (2016). Suit against non-transferees of property barred. - Judgment creditor could seek relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., against the judgment debtor, as well as any recipient of the transfers the debtor made, O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-77 and 18-2-78, but the creditor could not pursue the judgment debtor’s mother and sister or their corporation because they did not receive any interest in the properties from the judgment debtor. RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland, 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 130 (2017). Interlocutory injunction proper. - Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in entering an interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo pending adjudication of the merits of the creditor’s action against the debtors alleging breach of contract and fraudulent transfers in violation of the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., because at least seven statutory badges of fraud listed in the UFTA (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-74(b), were implicated, and the creditor also presented evidence as a non-statutory badge of fraud of the debtors’ pattern of maintaining just enough funds in certain accounts to satisfy the debtors’ financial covenants at the end of each quarter and then transferring the funds away shortly thereafter; under the UFTA, O.C.G.A. § 18-22-77(a)(3)(A), the trial court was

authorized to enter an interlocutory injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property. SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 270 (2011). Concrete injury. - District court correctly held that the relators lacked Article III standing to pursue a state law fraudulent transfer claim against the company owner; the False Claims Act (FCA), O.C.G.A. § 23-3-120 et seq., itself did not confer standing on relators, as the FCA

did not assign relators the right to pursue additional claims that arose from or were related to the qui tam action. Relators also could not establish standing under Georgia’s Uniform Voidable Transfers Act (UVTA), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., as it would be inconsistent with case law to hold that the UVTA could create a concrete injury where none existed. United States v. Mortg. Inv’rs Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4499 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2632, 209 L. Ed. 2d 757, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2458 (2021).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 90 et seq.

C.J.S. 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 150 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 2003–2025 · leading case: Interfinancial Midtown, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 806 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Interfinancial Midtown, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 806 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 14× “To support this argument, appellants point to the specific remedies provided by the Act, which they claim are the entire universe of what can be recovered.”
Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 4× “The Georgia UFTA broadly defines a “claim” as any “right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,” OCGA § 18-2-71 (3), and it specifically authorizes injunctive relief against further disposition of assets or other property that may be needed to satisfy a…”
RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 807 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See former OCGA §§ 18-2-77, 18-2-78. However, the provisions applicable here defined a “creditor” only as “a person who has a claim,” see former OCGA § 18-2-71 (4), and “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,…”
Ralls Corp. v. Huerfano River Wind, LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014). · cites it 4× “This is enough to adequately state a claim for actual fraud and for relief against Lucy Zhang and USIRE under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77. 21 c. Whether Ralls Adequately Alleged Constructive Fraud The Georgia UFTA also provides a cause of action for constructive fraud.”
SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “The appellants contend that even if the evidence was sufficient to show that the challenged transfers were made with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor,” OCGA § 18-2-74 (a) (1), the trial court nevertheless erred in entering the interlocutory…”
RES-GA Diamond Meadows, LLC v. Robertson (In re Robertson), 576 B.R. 684 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77(a)(l). The statute makes the transfer voidable, rather than void.”
Alliant Tax Credit 31, Inc. v. M. Vincent Murphy, III, 924 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2019). “See O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77 (2010). Alliant claimed that the Murphys' divorce settlement and Vincent's asset transfers to Defendants were ruses to evade Vincent's creditors and thus sought to void those transfers.”
Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 807 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “The UFTA authorizes the avoidance of “transfers,” see former OCGA § 18-2-77 (a), it defines a “transfer” as “disposing or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset,” former OCGA § 18-2-71 (12), and it defines an “asset” as “property of a debtor.”
Merrill Ranch Props., LLC v. Austell Et Al., 784 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “16 The relief available to a creditor under Georgia’s UFTA against a fraudulent transfer is set out in OCGA § 18-2-77, and includes, among other things, avoidance of the transfer to the *728 extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim and attachment against the asset…”
Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Compucredit Holdings Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011). · cites it 6× “Among the remedies available, Plaintiffs would be entitled to an “attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee” if they have otherwise established them UFTA claim, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77. Plaintiffs allege that Rosencrants…”
Miller v. Lomax, 596 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 18-2-77; 18-2-78. Setting aside the question of reasonably equivalent value, a jury could conclude that Ray’s did not receive the challenged transfers in good faith inasmuch as its sole director and its chief executive officer at the time of the transfers was Thomas…”
Quebell P. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733 (11th Cir. 2006). “, and plaintiffs request to have the district court appoint a receiver pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77(3)(B), and O.C.G.A. § 9-8-3.”
— 18-2-77(3)(B) — 1 case
Quebell P. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733 (11th Cir. 2006). “, and plaintiffs request to have the district court appoint a receiver pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77(3)(B), and O.C.G.A. § 9-8-3.”
— 18-2-77(a) — 2 cases
U.S. Capital Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Ga. 2015).
Palmer v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2021).
— 18-2-77(a)(1) — 2 cases
— 18-2-77(a)(2) — 1 case
— 18-2-77(a)(3) — 2 cases
Anderson v. Patel (In re Diplomat Constr., Inc.), 512 B.R. 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014).
Palmer v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2021).
— 18-2-77(a)(3)(A) — 1 case
Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Compucredit Holdings Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011). “Among the remedies available, Plaintiffs would be entitled to an “attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee” if they have otherwise established them UFTA claim, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77. Plaintiffs allege that Rosencrants…”
— 18-2-77(a)(3)(C) — 1 case
Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Compucredit Holdings Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011). “Among the remedies available, Plaintiffs would be entitled to an “attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee” if they have otherwise established them UFTA claim, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77. Plaintiffs allege that Rosencrants…”
— 18-2-77(a)(l) — 2 cases
RES-GA Diamond Meadows, LLC v. Robertson (In re Robertson), 576 B.R. 684 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017). “O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77(a)(l). The statute makes the transfer voidable, rather than void.”
Howell v. Fulford (In re S. Home & Ranch Supply, Inc.), 515 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014).
— 18-2-77(b) — 2 cases
Scarver v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2021).
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