O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Except as provided in Code Section 18-4-22, when a garnishee fails or refuses to file a garnishee answer by the forty-fifth day after service of the summons of garnishment, such garnishee shall automatically be in default. The default may be opened as a matter of right by the filing of a garnishee answer within 15 days of the day of default and payment of costs. If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, judgment by default may be entered at any time thereafter against such garnishee for the amount remaining due on the judgment
obtained against the defendant as shown in the plaintiff’s affidavit of garnishment.
History
Code 1981, § 18-4-21, enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 8, § 1/SB 255.
Annotations
Law reviews. For note discussing default by the garnishee, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90 are included in the annotations for this Code section. When claim for default arises. - Claim arises against the garnishee at the time the garnishee falls into default by failing to file answers in a continuing garnishment proceeding, and is separate and distinct from any claim which may have existed prior to that time. Fazio v. Growth Dev. Corp. (In re Growth Dev. Corp.), 168 B.R. 1009, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1890 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90). Garnishee failed to amend the defective answer as permitted by law and, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90, the garnishee was automatically in default. Because the garnishee failed to establish the presence of a nonamendable defect on the face of the record or pleadings, the court abused the court’s discretion by granting
the motion to set aside the default judgment. Oxmoor Portfolio, LLC v. Flooring & Tile Superstore of Conyers, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 640, 740 S.E.2d 363, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 250 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90). Former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-91 only applicable to default judgments under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90. - Because a debtor’s principal had answered a garnishment action by a judgment creditor, denying that the principal held any money or assets of the debtor, and the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the creditor after holding an evidentiary hearing on the merits, it was error for the trial court to have reduced the judgment pursuant to the principal’s motion under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-91, as such was only applicable when a default judgment was obtained pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90. United Maint., Inc. v. Wilson, 265 Ga. App. 683, 595 S.E.2d 376, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 357.
Notes of Decisions
City of Atlanta v. Gilmere, 314 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 1984).
· cites it 4× “We granted the City’s petition for writ of certiorari, positing the following question: “Whether OCGA § 18-4-21 (Code Ann. § 43-306) waives municipal immunity from lawsuit when the judgment serving as the basis for issuance of the summons of garnishment arises out of liability…”
Rivers v. Rivers, 823 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 5× “§ 18-4-21; see also OCGA § 18-4-43 (a) (cross-referencing OCGA § 18-4-21 ). "If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, judgment by default may be entered at any time thereafter against such garnishee for the amount remaining due on the…”
Harp v. Winkles, 335 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. 1985).
· cites it 12× “The city answered, claiming that Winkles’ wages were exempt under OCGA § 18-4-21 (Code Ann. § 46-306) because the judgment which was the basis of the garnishment arose out of liability incurred in the scope of employment while responding to an emergency.”
City of Atlanta v. Gilmere, 310 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 6× “In its order thereon, the court stated that “[a]fter hearing argument of counsel and the stipulation of the parties that the liability in the underlying judgment ‘arises out of liability incurred in the scope of the (defendant’s) employment while responding to an emergency’ ”…”
Tamie Rae Rivers v. Steven B. Rivers (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 5× “§ 18-4-21; see also OCGA § 18-4-43 (a) (cross-referencing OCGA § 18-4-21). “If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, judgment by default may be entered at any time thereafter against such garnishee for the amount remaining due on the…”
Kemron Env't Servs., Inc. v. Prospira Paincare, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 2× “And again, by the clear terms of OCGA § 18-4- 16 See OCGA § 18-4-21 (“Except as provided in Code Section 18-4-22, when a garnishee fails or refuses to file a garnishee answer by the forty-fifth day after service of the summons of garnishment, such garnishee shall automatically…”
Strickland v. Alexander, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
· cites it 2× “In Harp , the debtor filed a traverse to the creditor’s affidavit asserting the emergency responder exemption under O.C.G.A. § 18-4-21. 255 Ga. at 43 , 335 S.”
City of Atlanta v. Gilmere, 320 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “406 ( 314 SE2d 204 ) having interpreted OCGA § 18-4-21 (formerly Code Ann. § 46-306 (Ga.”
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