O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-11-3 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this article, the term: (1) “Account” means a demand deposit account, checking or negotiable order of withdrawal account, savings account, time deposit account, or a money market mutual fund account. (2) “Child support enforcement agency” means the entity within the department and its contractors that are authorized to enforce a duty of support. (3) “Court order for child support” means any order for child support issued by a court or administrative or quasi-judicial entity of this state or another state, including an order in a criminal proceeding which results in the payment of child support as a condition of probation or otherwise. Such order shall be deemed to be a IV-D order for purposes of this article when either party to the order submits a copy of the order for support and a signed application to the department for IV-D services, when the right to child support has been assigned to the department pursuant to subsection (a) of Code Section 19-11-6, or upon registration of a foreign order pursuant to Article 3 of this chapter. (4) “Department” means the Department of Human Services. (5) “Dependent child” means any individual under the age of 18 who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States. (6) “Duty of support” means any duty of support imposed or imposable by law or by court order, decree, or judgment.

(7) “Financial institution” means every federal or state chartered commercial or savings bank, including savings and loan associations and cooperative banks, federal or state chartered credit unions, benefit associations, insurance companies, safe-deposit companies, trust companies, and any money market mutual fund. (8) “IV-D” means Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act. (9) “Medical insurance obligee” means any person to whom a duty of medical support is owed. (10) “Medical insurance obligor” means any person owing a duty of medical support. (11) “Money market mutual fund” means every regulated investment company within the meaning of Section 851(a) of the Internal Revenue Code which seeks to maintain a constant net asset value of $1.00 in accordance with 17 C.F.R. Section 270.2A-7. (12) “Obligee” means the individual to whom the payment of a support obligation is owed. (13) “Obligor” means the individual owing a duty of support. (14) “Parent” means the natural or adoptive parents of a child and includes the father of a child born out of wedlock if his paternity has been established in a judicial proceeding or if he has acknowledged paternity under oath either in open court, in an administrative hearing, or by verified writing. (15) “TANF” means temporary assistance for needy families.

History

Ga. L. 1973, p. 192, § 3; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1537, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 23; Ga. L. 2003, p. 415, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-2/HB 228; Ga. L. 2010, p. 245, § 1/HB 1118; Ga. L. 2014, p. 457, § 10/SB 282; Ga. L. 2017, p. 646, § 1-16/SB 137. U.S. Code. Section 851(a) of the Internal Revenue

Code, referred to in paragraph (11), is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 851. Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act, referred to in this Code section, is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS “Parent.” - Divorce decree, and the decree’s finding that the parties had no children, a finding which was apparently incorporated into the decree simply because it was a provision of the parties’ agreement, was not a judicial proceeding establishing paternity within the meaning of “parent” in the Child Support Re-

covery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq. Department of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 263 Ga. 756, 439 S.E.2d 474, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 63 (1994). Grandmother was not a “parent” of the child within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(8) or O.C.G.A. § 19-11-3. Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga. 645, 533 S.E.2d 695,

2000 Ga. LEXIS 542 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1087, 121 S. Ct. 804, 148 L. Ed. 2d 691, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 370 (2001). Adopting parent on equal footing as biological. - Georgia law specifically provides that a decree of adoption creates the relationship of parent and child be-

tween each petitioner and the adopted individual as if the adopted individual were a child of biological issue of that petitioner. Hastings v. Hastings, 291 Ga. 782, 732 S.E.2d 272, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 750 (2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 2.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1984–2017 · leading case: Fleeman v. Dep't of Human Resources, 430 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
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Fleeman v. Dep't of Human Resources, 430 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 12× “"[T]hat legislative enactment is not intended to be exclusive, but rather is in addition to and cumulative of all existing laws governing matters of paternity and child support.”
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 19-11-3 (7) defines “parent” as “the natural or adoptive parents of a child.”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 4× “1 We disagree with the Court of Appeals majority which held that Fleeman is not the child’s “parent,” as used in OCGA § 19-11-5 because of the definition of that word set forth in OCGA § 19-11-3 (5): the natural or adoptive parents of a child and includes the father of a child…”
Falkenberry v. Taylor, 607 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 4× “Accordingly, the Act simply does not contain any basis for continuing to distinguish between the procedure available where the child is receiving public assistance and that which is available in the absence of any such assistance.”
Cox v. Dep't of Human Resources, 334 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 4× “" (c) OCGA § 19-11-3 (5) of the Act provides: "As used in this article, the term .”
Burns v. Swinney, 314 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 2× “, criminal proceeding for nonsupport, OCGA § 19-11-3 (Code Ann. § 99-903b), divorce, alimony and child support decree, OCGA § 19-11-5 (Code Ann.”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Carlton, 329 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that establishment of paternity is jurisdictional and must be done in a manner provided by OCGA § 19-11-3 (5) before an action for support can be maintained against the putative father.”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Siggers, 463 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “The definitive Code section explicitly identifies and defines a “[c]ourt order for child support,” OCGA § 19-11-3 (1), but that term is not used in OCGA § 19-11-12.”
Hastings v. Hastings, 732 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 19-8-19 (a) (2). Both the legislature and our courts have repeatedly confirmed that an adoptive parent stands on the same footing and has the same rights and obligations as a biological parent.”
Sutter v. Turner, 325 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “The language of the statute is quite clear as to the party who is authorized to sue the one who supplied the alcoholic beverages to Turner.”
Denney v. Denney, 797 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “756, 758 (2) (b) ( 439 SE2d 474 ) (1994) (concluding that under OCGA § 19-11-3 (5), a judicial proceeding in which paternity has been established includes “one in which the paternity was clearly raised and litigated by the parties, and determined by the finder of fact”).”
Denney v. Denney (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “756, 758 (2) (b) ( 439 SE2d 474 ) (1994) (concluding that under OCGA § 19-11-3 (5), a judicial proceeding in which paternity has been established includes “one in which the paternity was clearly raised and litigated by the parties, and determined by the finder of fact”).”
— 19-11-3(7) — 1 case
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). “” OCGA § 19-11-3 (7) defines “parent” as “the natural or adoptive parents of a child.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.