District attorney required to represent Virginia resident in support action.

- Statute clearly makes it mandatory upon the district attorney to represent resident of Virginia in action brought by her against her husband under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.). Fact that his work load is heavy does not relieve him of this duty. Slaton v. Campbell, 229 Ga. 59, 189 S.E.2d 69 (1972).

To receive support payments custodian must have lawful custody.

- When statute requires furnishing of support for dependent children to person having custody of those children, it is reasonably restricted to that person having lawful custody by virtue of a court order or with the consent of the obligor parent. To hold otherwise would be to reward a physical custodian who is acting in actual defiance of and contrary to an order of the court of the responding state. Hethcox v. Hethcox, 146 Ga. App. 430, 246 S.E.2d 444 (1978).

Types of fee under article.

- Filing fee and service fee are only fees contemplated by wording of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.). 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 47.

Use of assistant by district attorney.

- Assistant whose duties are general does not disqualify solicitor general (now district attorney) from receiving fee. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 75.

Collection of fee not prohibited by § 45-7-3. - Prohibition contained in Ga. L. 1973, p. 701, § 1 as amended by Ga. L. 1978, p. 4, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 45-7-3) forbidding the district attorney from receiving compensation out of state funds, other than the district attorney's salary and county supplements, does not prohibit state's paying $50.00 to county for every petition filed pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.) which had been handled by the district attorney in that county and for which an order granting or denying support had been entered. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-16.

No additional fee in contempt proceeding for violation of support order.

- Contempt proceeding for violating an order of support issued in a case under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.) is in the nature of a civil contempt proceeding to obtain compliance with an order of support for the benefit of the plaintiff, and as such would be a continuation of the main cause; being a continuation of the main cause, a solicitor (now district attorney) would not be entitled to receive an additional fee of $50.00 for successfully representing the plaintiff. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 76.

When and how fee is received.

- Solicitor general (now district attorney) is entitled to payment of fee provided in Ga. L. 1958, p. 34, § 10 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-53) when the case has been successfully concluded, and an order for payment of the fee has been processed as provided in Ga. L. 1958, p. 34, §§ 15 and 15A (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-11-58 and19-11-59). 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 75.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 322 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 175, 203.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1958 Act) (U.L.A.) § 12.