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Call Now: 904-383-7448Participation in any proceedings under this article shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding.
(Ga. L. 1958, p. 34, § 27.)
- Statute does not provide the petitioner with blanket immunity from jurisdictional exercise by respondent state's court. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).
O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 provides a nonresident petitioner immunity from the jurisdiction of the responding state's courts if the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., procedures have been invoked for its legitimate ends - the enforcement of the duties of support. Earley v. Earley, 165 Ga. App. 483, 300 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
When there was no evidence that a nonresident former husband had initiated a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., proceeding for an illegitimate end, he was immune under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 from personal jurisdiction in an action by his former wife to domesticate a Virginia divorce decree and have him held in contempt for nonpayment of support. Riersgard v. Morton, 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748 (1997).
- There is no authorization for the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., to be used to force respondent to meet obligation other than under terms of valid court order. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).
- Statute precludes counterclaim based on theory that the plaintiff, by initiating the proceeding, submits to jurisdiction generally. Thibadeau v. Thibadeau, 133 Ga. App. 154, 210 S.E.2d 340 (1974); Register v. Kandlbinder, 134 Ga. App. 754, 216 S.E.2d 647 (1975).
O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 precludes counterclaims based merely on the theory that the plaintiff, by initiating the procedure on behalf of the named defendants, has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of the responding state for other purposes. Earley v. Earley, 165 Ga. App. 483, 300 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
- "Proceedings" are not "proceedings" under the statute when the proceedings constitute a tort upon a resident respondent. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).
When institution of proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.) results in implication of a tort upon the respondent, jurisdiction is not merely ancillary to the petitioner's initiation of proceedings under those provisions, but rather would be based upon the commission of a tortious act in this state. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).
- 6 C.J.S., Appearances, § 46. 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 91, 108. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 204 et seq.
- Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1958 Act) (U.L.A.) § 31.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-01-21
Citation: 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 204, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 18, 1997 WL 20154
Snippet: legitimate end and is therefore not immune under OCGA § 19-11-72 from the exercise of jurisdiction by this court