O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS It is public policy of this state to maintain family relation and to permit the settlement of matrimonial differences for that purpose. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (1938); McClain v. McClain, 237 Ga. 80, 227 S.E.2d 5, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1157 (1976). Termination of alimony in event of remarriage. - Provision for permanent alimony which provided that in the event

the wife should obtain a divorce and should marry again, or should marry again in the event of the death of her husband, the alimony should terminate was not violative of law and contrary to public policy in that it was in restraint of marriage. Watson v. Burnley, 150 Ga. 460, 104 S.E. 220, 1920 Ga. LEXIS 203 (1920). Agreement incorporated into a divorce decree providing for termination of the former wife’s equity in real property upon

her remarriage does not act as a restraint on marriage. Gordin v. Gordin, 249 Ga. 371, 290 S.E.2d 921, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 824 (1982). Fact that a termination-upon-remarriage provision in a final judgment and decree originated in the jury’s verdict rather than from an agreement of the parties is a distinction without legal significance. A trial court does not err by allowing the jury to return the verdict including the termination provision, or in entering judgment on the verdict. Gordin v. Gordin, 249 Ga. 371, 290 S.E.2d 921, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 824 (1982). When agreement to divorce held void. - Any agreement between husband and wife, prior to a separation, that they will live separate and apart, or that either or both will obtain a divorce, and any agreement to otherwise promote a dissolution of the marriage relation, is against public policy and void, and consideration founded thereon is illegal, but a contract between husband and wife, providing for the wife’s maintenance, made after a separation has taken place, is valid and enforceable. Craig v. Craig, 53 Ga. App. 632, 186 S.E. 755, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 347 (1936). Contract for attorney’s fee void when contingent on procuring divorce. - Contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent upon the attorney procuring a divorce for the attorney’s client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony to be obtained is void as against public policy. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (1938). Contract for attorney’s fee void when fee to be paid from alimony recovered. - Contract by wife to pay her solicitors part of alimony to be recovered by her in a suit for divorce, as compensation for their services in such suit, is void as against public policy. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (1938). Attorney may recover reasonable value of services when contract void. - When an attorney’s contract for compensation for services rendered a married woman was void as against public policy, the attorney could recover what the attor-

ney’s services were reasonably worth. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (1938). Foreign judgment given full faith though based on separation agreement void in this state. - Although a North Carolina judgment which was incorporated into a Georgia divorce decree on the issues of alimony, child support, and custody was based on a separation contract which included a provision not to contest a later divorce which contract was clearly void as against the public policy of this state, the North Carolina alimony judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and the trial court did not err in incorporating it in the divorce decree. Cannon v. Cannon, 244 Ga. 299, 260 S.E.2d 19, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1215 (1979). Apprenticeship of female not void when she becomes 18 as being in restraint of marriage. Dent v. Cock, 65 Ga. 400, 1880 Ga. LEXIS 212 (1880). Employment contract not void when restraint on marriage reasonable. - Employment contract which provided that a woman employee was to be employed as a teacher only so long as she did not marry was not void because the contract provision was a reasonable one and the restraint on marriage was incidental to the primary lawful purpose of the contract. Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 70 Ga. App. 233, 28 S.E.2d 83, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 291 (1943). Limitation of appointment to such time as executrix remains widow is not void as an illegal restraint against marriage. Bruce v. Fogarty, 53 Ga. App. 443, 186 S.E. 463, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 150 (1936). Provision in will prohibiting share in estate if daughter married designated individual was not “in terrorem” but was specific valid restraint not tending to discourage marriage. Taylor v. Rapp, 217 Ga. 654, 124 S.E.2d 271, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 353 (1962). Statute has nothing to do with adoption standards. - Public policy of the state as enunciated by the General Assembly is to consider the best interest of the child when determining whether he or she should be adopted, O.C.G.A. § 198-18(b); in stating that marriage is en-

couraged, O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6 forbids most efforts to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, limitation, or otherwise, and § 19-3-6 has nothing to do with the standards the courts must apply in determining whether to allow a child to be adopted. In re Goudeau, 305 Ga. App. 718, 700 S.E.2d 688, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 803 (2010). Meretricious relationship defense did not apply to a promise to marry. - Because the object of a promise to

marry was not illegal or against public policy, O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6, the fact that a man and woman were living together before and after a marriage proposal was only collateral to the promise to marry, and the meretricious relationship defense provided by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 was inapplicable to the promise to marry. Kelley v. Cooper, 325 Ga. App. 145, 751 S.E.2d 889, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 979 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Marriage, § 114 et seq. C.J.S. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 245, 246. ALR. Conditions, conditional limitations, or

contracts in restraint of marriage, 122 A.L.R. 7. What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation, 93 A.L.R.3d 523.