Freedom of contract generally.

- Absent a limiting statute or controlling public policy, parties may contract with one another on whatever terms the parties wish, and the written contract defines the full extent of the parties' rights and duties. In the absence of a public policy question, parties may contract to waive numerous and substantial rights. Basic Four Corp. v. Parker, 158 Ga. App. 117, 279 S.E.2d 241 (1981).

Power of parties to contract as parties please is modified by O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 8, T. 13 and O.C.G.A.

§ 11-2-302(1). - While it was a general rule in this state that parties may contract as the parties please subject to exceptions of former Code 1933, § 20-501 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 8, T. 13), former Code 1933, § 109A-2-302 (see O.C.G.A. § 11-2-302(1)) modified this general rule that parties were free to make whatever contracts the parties please so long as there was no fraud or illegality, by giving courts discretion to refuse to enforce sales contracts under Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, in whole or in part, which the courts find to be unconscionable. Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974).

Illegal contracts are unenforceable whether malum in se or malum prohibitum.

- In applying rule that no recovery can be had in action to enforce an illegal contract, no distinction is recognized between a contract whose object is malum in se and one whose object is malum prohibitum. Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Swanson, 102 Ga. 754, 28 S.E. 601, 39 L.R.A. 275 (1897); McAndrew v. Taylor, 15 Ga. App. 555, 83 S.E. 967 (1914).

Courts of equity will not aid either party to executed immoral or illegal contract. Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 372, 45 S.E. 262 (1903).

An illegal contract if executed will be left to stand, if executory, will not be enforced.

- Insofar as illegal contracts have been executed or performed, a court will not disturb the contracts, but will leave parties where it finds the parties; and insofar as such contracts are not executed or performed, a court will afford no aid whatever to enforce the contracts. City Council v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 32 S.E. 907 (1899); Beard v. White, 120 Ga. 1018, 48 S.E. 400 (1904).

Contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is void, and if such contract is executory, neither party can enforce the contract, but if executed, the contract will be allowed to stand. Quinton v. Millican, 196 Ga. 175, 26 S.E.2d 435 (1943).

If a contract is illegal as against public policy, the contract's invalidity will be a defense while the contract remains unexecuted. If such a contract is in part performed, and money has been paid in pursuance of the contract, no action will lie to recover the money back. Jones v. Faulkner, 101 Ga. App. 547, 114 S.E.2d 542 (1960).

Courts will not interpose to grant any relief to parties to illegal contract.

- When parties are engaged in illegal transactions, whether malum prohibition or malum in se, courts of this state will not interpose to grant any relief; in such cases the rule is for the court to leave parties where it finds the parties, no matter whether illegality of contract appears from plaintiff's case or is set up by way of defense. Sheehan v. City Council, 71 Ga. App. 233, 30 S.E.2d 502 (1944); Jones v. Lowman, 85 Ga. App. 743, 70 S.E.2d 122 (1952).

Neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a contract founded upon illegal or immoral consideration. Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977).

Courts will not enforce contracts outlawed by public policy and good morals.

- Aid of courts of justice cannot be invoked to enforce alleged rights which depend upon contracts outlawed by sound public policy and good morals. Glass v. Childs, 9 Ga. App. 520, 71 S.E. 920 (1911); Jones v. Crawford, 21 Ga. App. 29, 93 S.E. 515 (1917).

When parties to an illegal or immoral contract are in pari delicto, courts will not interpose, but will leave parties where the courts find the parties. McAndrew v. Taylor, 15 Ga. App. 555, 83 S.E. 967 (1914).

Courts will not assist in recovery, under illegal contract, of property sold or its value. Wright Co. v. Haralson, 52 Ga. App. 27, 182 S.E. 55 (1935).

Law will not enforce a contract, performance of which is made penal. The crime is punished and the criminal must likewise lose the fruits of the illegal act. Lewis v. Brannen, 6 Ga. App. 419, 65 S.E. 189 (1909); Jones v. Bell Isle, 13 Ga. App. 437, 79 S.E. 357 (1913).

Courts may grant injunctions to prevent enforcement of illegal contract to injury of third parties.

- A court of equity will interpose by injunction to prevent members of illegal combination from enforcing an illegal agreement to the hurt and injury of one engaged in competitive business. Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353, 106 Am. St. R. 137, 69 L.R.A. 90, 2 Ann. Cas. 694 (1905).

Burden is on party attacking legality of a contract to show that the contract is illegal. Gower v. Ozmer, 55 Ga. App. 81, 189 S.E. 540 (1936).

State claim not applicable in class action.

- Defendant banks' motion to dismiss class action suit was granted where despite court's supplemental jurisdiction, plaintiffs' state actions were dismissed and the claims failed under both Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3104 et seq. and 21-4302 and O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 et seq., because the case did not involve gambling debt or gaming contracts. Thompson v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n (In re Mastercard Int'l, Inc. Internet Gambling Litig.), F. Supp. 2d (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2004).

Cited in Citizens Bank v. N.C. Hoyt & Co., 25 Ga. App. 222, 102 S.E. 837 (1920); Clemons v. Payne, 26 Ga. App. 142, 105 S.E. 623 (1921); Smith v. Smith, 154 Ga. 702, 115 S.E. 73 (1922); De Loach v. W.D. Eyre & Co., 46 Ga. App. 155, 167 S.E. 123 (1932); Washington County v. Sheppard, 46 Ga. App. 240, 167 S.E. 339 (1933); Eatonton Oil & Auto Co. v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 145, 185 S.E. 296 (1936); Scott v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 467, 192 S.E. 920 (1937); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Reid, 60 Ga. App. 119, 3 S.E.2d 121 (1939); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F. Supp. 723 (M.D. Ga. 1942); Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950); Smith v. Patterson, 82 Ga. App. 595, 61 S.E.2d 679 (1950); Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield, 83 Ga. App. 593, 64 S.E.2d 356 (1951); Simmons v. Noble, 84 Ga. App. 255, 65 S.E.2d 834 (1951); Bowman v. Fuller, 84 Ga. App. 421, 66 S.E.2d 249 (1951); Jones v. Faulkner, 101 Ga. App. 547, 114 S.E.2d 542 (1960); Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960); Prosser v. Horis A. Ward, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 205, 180 S.E.2d 270 (1971); Morris v. Durbin, 123 Ga. App. 383, 180 S.E.2d 925 (1971); Morris v. Jones, 128 Ga. App. 847, 198 S.E.2d 354 (1973); Garber v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 366, 206 S.E.2d 86 (1974); Camp Concrete Prods. v. Central of Ga. Ry., 134 Ga. App. 537, 215 S.E.2d 299 (1975); Gilreath v. Argo, 135 Ga. App. 849, 219 S.E.2d 461 (1975); Austin v. Benefield, 140 Ga. App. 96, 230 S.E.2d 16 (1976); Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980); Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Lindenberg v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.R.D. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Merren v. Plaza Towers Ltd. Partnership, 161 Ga. App. 543, 287 S.E.2d 771 (1982); Boddy Enters., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 171 Ga. App. 551, 320 S.E.2d 374 (1984); DOT v. Brooks, 254 Ga. 303, 328 S.E.2d 705 (1985); Bryant v. PMC Capital Inc., 244 Ga. App. 313, 535 S.E.2d 319 (2000); Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003); Stoudemire v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 333 Ga. App. 374, 776 S.E.2d 483 (2015).

Criterion for determining whether contract is entire or severable.

- In determining whether a contract is entire or severable, the criterion is to be found in the question whether the whole quantity, service, or thing - all as a whole - is of the essence of the contract. If it appears that the contract was to take the whole or none, then it is entire. Scott v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 467, 192 S.E. 920 (1937).

Contract containing invalid waiver, unconnected with purposes of contract, is severable.

- Contract based on legal and binding consideration and containing an attempted waiver of a right which cannot be waived because contrary to public policy, which waiver is wholly unconnected with purposes of the contract, is severable, and the part which is legal is nevertheless enforceable. Brenau College v. Mincey, 68 Ga. App. 137, 22 S.E.2d 322 (1942).

Contract based on legal consideration which contains legal and illegal promises, valid as to former.

- When agreement consists of single promise, based on single consideration, if either is illegal, the whole contract is void. But where agreement is founded on legal consideration containing a promise to do several things or to refrain from doing several things, and only some of the promises are illegal, those promises which are not illegal will be held to be valid. Roberts v. H. C. Whitmer Co., 46 Ga. App. 839, 169 S.E. 385 (1933); Scott v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 467, 192 S.E. 920 (1937); Martell v. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 114 Ga. App. 646, 152 S.E.2d 579 (1966).

When a contract contains mutual, binding, legal promises independent of two allegedly illegal, void provisions, the contract is severable, and legal portions are not annulled by illegal ones and can be enforced, disregarding the latter. Martell v. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 114 Ga. App. 646, 152 S.E.2d 579 (1966).

Bail bond compensation in excess of statutory maximum.

- Excessive portion of a bail bond charge can be severed from the legal part such that, under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1, the legal part of the bail bond contract (the amount of compensation up to the statutory maximum) is not invalidated by the illegal part (the amount of the compensation in excess of the statutory maximum). Borison v. Christian, 257 Ga. App. 257, 570 S.E.2d 696 (2002).

Usurious loans.

- A usurious loan is not void and unenforceable as an illegal contract even though the interest charges are violative of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18; usurious interest can be severed from the principal amount of the loan under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-10. Pave Way Constr. Co. v. Parrish, 187 Ga. App. 428, 370 S.E.2d 495, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 370 S.E.2d 495 (1988).

Section may be inapplicable when illegality is collateral or remotely connected with contract.

- This rule has been held inapplicable where object of contract is not illegal or against public policy, but when illegality is only collateral or remotely connected with contract. Shannondoah, Inc. v. Smith, 140 Ga. App. 200, 230 S.E.2d 351 (1976).

Enforceability of obligation supported by independent consideration, but indirectly connected with illegal transaction.

- Obligation supported by independent consideration will be enforced, though indirectly connected with an illegal transaction, when plaintiff does not require aid of illegal transaction to make out plaintiff's case. Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 133 U.S. 433, 10 S. Ct. 450, 33 L. Ed. 747 (1890); Sewell v. Norris, 128 Ga. 824, 58 S.E. 637, 13 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1118 (1907); Mechanics Realty & Imp. Co. v. Leva, 16 Ga. App. 7, 84 S.E. 222 (1915).

Contract is unenforceable when party seeking enforcement must rely upon an illegal transaction to establish the case. Brooke v. Kennedy, 172 Ga. 461, 158 S.E. 4 (1931).

Collateral federal law infractions.

- When the alleged infractions of federal law were collateral to the object of an otherwise legal, moral contract for the lease of an automobile, severable issues existed such that the entire contract was not void. Adams v. Trust Co. Bank, 206 Ga. App. 554, 426 S.E.2d 36 (1992).

Meretricious relationship defense did not apply to a promise to marry.

- Because the object of a promise to marry was not illegal or against public policy, O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6, the fact that a man and woman were living together before and after a marriage proposal was only collateral to the promise to marry, and the meretricious relationship defense provided by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 was inapplicable to the promise to marry. Kelley v. Cooper, 325 Ga. App. 145, 751 S.E.2d 889 (2013).

Contract to share expenses of cohabitation.

- Although a simple agreement between parties to share living expenses is not per se an illegal or immoral contract, a specific agreement between parties regarding living expenses to be incurred in connection with their state of unmarried meretricious cohabitation is founded on or grows out of immorality or illegality within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1. Liles v. Still, 176 Ga. App. 65, 335 S.E.2d 168 (1985).

Woman's action for damages against man with whom she cohabited for 14 years was barred by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1, when evidence showed that parties' arrangement envisioned a meretricious relationship rather than a simple agreement to share living expenses. Samples v. Monroe, 183 Ga. App. 187, 358 S.E.2d 273 (1987).

Contracts for sale of unregistered federal securities.

- Sales agents who sold billboards that buyers leased back to a shell company as part of a massive Ponzi scheme were unjustly enriched because the investment contracts the buyers entered were construed as selling unregistered securities in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c), which rendered the securities void as immoral under 15 U.S.C. § 78cc and O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1; although not personally accused of knowing malfeasance, the sales agents were ordered to disgorge their sales commissions and bonuses to an equity receiver appointed to represent the investment company's interests by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Hays v. Adam, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2007).

Test for determining whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of enforcement at law is whether plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to establish plaintiff's case. McAndrew v. Taylor, 15 Ga. App. 555, 83 S.E. 967 (1914).

Contract in violation of the state constitution is illegal and unenforceable, even if plaintiff has fully performed plaintiff's part of the agreement. Penitentiary Co. v. Rountree, 113 Ga. 799, 39 S.E. 508 (1901).

Contract violating civil statute not enacted for purpose of raising revenue is void.

- Where terms of a contract directly involve infraction of a civil statute, not enacted for purpose of raising revenue, and such infraction is penalized by a fine, or imprisonment, or both, the contract is void and unenforceable. Couch v. Blackwell & Assocs., 150 Ga. App. 739, 258 S.E.2d 552 (1979).

Sale of stolen goods, although to bona fide purchaser for value, transfers no lawful interest in the property and does not divest title of true owner. Middle Ga. Livestock Sales v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 123 Ga. App. 733, 182 S.E.2d 533 (1971).

Contracts of maintenance or champerty, express or implied, are void and unenforceable. Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933).

Deed in consideration of grantee's promise to live in concubinage with grantor is absolutely void. Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 375, 45 S.E. 260 (1903).

Note given for agreement to settle or prevent criminal prosecution is void.

- Although one may legally take a promissory note as compensation for a personal injury, if injury was a crime, such as by our law the parties cannot settle between themselves, and if there be any attempt, by giving of a note, to suppress a prosecution for the offense, it vitiates the whole agreement, even though note is for less than actual damages received. Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 (1869).

A negotiable promissory note given in whole or in part upon agreement, express or implied, to settle or prevent a criminal prosecution is void, unless case falls within some express statute authorizing settlement. William-Hester Marble Co. v. Walton, 22 Ga. App. 433, 96 S.E. 269 (1918); Commercial Credit Co. v. Fry, 31 Ga. App. 488, 122 S.E. 77, cert. denied, 31 Ga. App. 811, 122 S.E. 260 (1924).

Agreement in violation of statutory requirements void.

- Purported agreement between a police officer and county human resources director that the officer would withdraw an appeal of the officer's termination if disciplinary materials were removed from the officer's employee file to preserve the officer's Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (P.O.S.T.) certification was void and unenforceable because it would have violated not only the P.O.S.T. Council's regulations but also the record-keeping requirements of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-15 and the prohibition of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-7.2(a)(2) against knowingly making "misleading, deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of being a peace officer or in any document connected therewith." Maner v. Chatham County, 246 Ga. App. 265, 540 S.E.2d 248 (2000).

Agreement between a county and a developer was unenforceable under O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-1 and13-8-2 because the agreement violated the prohibition in O.C.G.A. § 36-71-4(d) against the prepayment of impact fees; the agreement calculated the payment of impact fees not in reference to the issuance of building permits but as a sum certain for the purpose of retiring the county's debt for improving the county's water/sewer system. Effingham County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Park West Effingham, L.P., 308 Ga. App. 680, 708 S.E.2d 619 (2011).

Personal guarantor may not avoid liability under contract by claiming illegality as to third persons.

- Personal guarantor may not avoid liability under a contract on ground that its making constituted an illegal act to the detriment of third persons. Hullender v. Acts II, 153 Ga. App. 119, 264 S.E.2d 486 (1980).

Reading which would result in unenforceable contract unsustainable.

- Upon a de novo review of the plain terms outlined in an employment contract, a former employer was not entitled to receive commission payments from its former employee, a licensed sales agent, for deals closed with the employee's subsequent employer, as any contrary reading would result in an unenforceable contract, under O.C.G.A. § 43-40-19(c); hence, summary judgment was properly granted to the employee on that issue, and the former employer's claim for money had and received also failed. Richard Bowers & Co. v. Creel, 280 Ga. App. 199, 633 S.E.2d 555 (2006).

Agreement to repay loan between cohabitating couple.

- Defendant lived with plaintiff for a period of time and made a written agreement to repay plaintiff for loans the plaintiff made to the defendant. The fact that defendant was married during the course of the parties' relationship did not make the agreement void as a contract to do an illegal thing. Boot v. Beelen, 224 Ga. App. 384, 480 S.E.2d 267 (1997).

Action by trustees.

- Because the alleged illegalities cited by a trustee were incidental to the purpose of trustee's contracts with the investors, those contracts did not require a securities violation or usurious interest rate; thus, it followed that the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the trustee's recission claim. Douglas v. Bigley, 278 Ga. App. 117, 628 S.E.2d 199 (2006).

Selection of appraiser.

- Realty sales contract that contained a clause stating that an appraiser selected by the parties would be appointed to set a fair market value if the parties were unable to agree on valuation was not void as illegal for being immoral, impossible to perform, or against public policy under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 because any potential illegality in the contract's manner of appointing an appraiser was incidental to the contract. Stephens v. Trust for Pub. Land, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

Agreement to advertise.

- Even if the sale of defendants' product violated federal copyright law, an agreement under which a contractor would advertise the product through mass electronic mailings was not void under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 because the agreement's object or purpose was not illegal; the alleged illegality was not required by the contract and was incidental to contract performance, and thus the contractor could recover against the defendants for breach of contract. Smith v. Saulsbury, 286 Ga. App. 322, 649 S.E.2d 344 (2007).

Agreement not to report on professional conduct unenforceable.

- Doctor's claim that a hospital promised not to report the doctor's conduct to the National Practitioner Data Bank if the doctor complied with the psychiatrist's treatment plan was rejected as any such agreement would violate federal law requiring a hospital to conduct periodic appraisals of their medical staff under 42 C.F.R. § 482.22(a)(1) and to report the doctor's resignation to the data bank under 42 U.S.C. §§ 11133 and 11134; any such agreement was unenforceable under O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-1 and13-8-2 as against public policy to provide quality health care. Taylor v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 14, 596 S.E.2d 179 (2004).

Gambling contract, or one based upon a gaming consideration is void and unenforceable. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Side bet placed upon ultimate outcome or final result of any game whatever constitutes gaming. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Betting that one game competitor, among many, will win is a side bet upon a game. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Betting upon a game of golf is gaming. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Agreement to purchase lottery ticket enforceable.

- An agreement by parties in Georgia to purchase a Kentucky lottery ticket and share the proceeds if the ticket won was not a gambling contract unenforceable as against public policy. Talley v. Mathis, 265 Ga. 179, 453 S.E.2d 704 (1995).

Fact that gaming contract is made by insurance company does not render contract valid.

- Fact that loser of bet is an insurance company and that contract is made by such company does not render such contract valid and not a gaming contract. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Georgia courts have jurisdiction if gaming contract is made or bet is laid in Georgia.

- Fact that loser of bet resides in England and that money is paid from that country does not necessarily render matter not within the jurisdiction of courts of this state; it is sufficient if gaming contract is made or bet is laid in State of Georgia. Tatham v. Freeman, 51 Ga. App. 477, 180 S.E. 871 (1935).

Agreement to purchase stock.

- Agreement which an investor concluded with a person who was employed by a company that offered to sell stock to the company's employees during an initial public offering, wherein the employee offered to purchase stock in the employee's own name for the investor, was illegal, and the trial court correctly ruled that the investor was not entitled to profits the investor lost because the employee did not buy the stock. McCondichie v. Groover, 261 Ga. App. 784, 584 S.E.2d 57 (2003).

Medical contracts.

- Contract for massage services between a chiropractor and patient was void because massage is not an authorized treatment modality under the law limiting chiropractic treatment. Siegrist v. Iwuagwa, 229 Ga. App. 508, 494 S.E.2d 180 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 933, 119 S. Ct. 344, 142 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1998).

Contract as to reimbursement of medical services.

- Workers' compensation insurers/payors were not entitled to dismissal of a breach of contract claim by medical care providers as the claim provided fair notice of the allegations, and the contract rights did not violate any law or public policy with respect to assertions as to promised reimbursement rates for services provided. Aetna Workers' Comp Access, LLC v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., 322 Ga. App. 641, 746 S.E.2d 148 (2013).

Collection of tax issue moot.

- Trial court's reaching a determination that contracts were void was improper because the trial court was not called upon to decide whether various contracts were enforceable. However, because the injunction imposed by the court provided for the proper collection and remittance of a city's hotel occupancy taxes should online travel companies elect to continue to act as third-party tax collectors, the error was effectively moot and provided no basis for reversal. City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 289 Ga. 323, 710 S.E.2d 766 (2011).

Alleged illegal rebate provision was severable from an agency contract.

- Trial court properly denied a real estate firm's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of illegality of the agency contract because the alleged offending rebate provision was severable from the contract and, therefore, did not render the entire agency contract void and unenforceable. Dewrell Sacks, LLP v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 324 Ga. App. 219, 749 S.E.2d 802 (2013).

Classification of crime as one involving moral turpitude requires more than statutory prohibition for public welfare purposes.

- Crime involving moral turpitude has been held to be one which is mala in se, that is, bad within itself, and not evil merely because some statute prohibits the act as a matter, perhaps, of public welfare. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 477.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, §§ 51, 52. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 155 et seq.

ALR.

- Innocence of the person threatened as affecting the rights or remedies in respect of contracts made, or money paid, to prevent or suppress a criminal prosecution, 17 A.L.R. 325.

Validity of agreement to pay an officer or employee of a bank or trust company to disclose the existence of, or to assist one to establish, a deposit, 18 A.L.R. 979.

Agreement or understanding between attorney and client to use money for unlawful purposes as affecting their rights inter se, 20 A.L.R. 1476; 26 A.L.R. 98.

Right to recover purchase price of articles or substances susceptible of illegal use in manufacture of beverages, 29 A.L.R. 1058.

Contract for services in connection with attempt to prevent a criminal investigation or prosecution, 33 A.L.R. 779.

Validity and enforceability of agreement to pay for disclosure of assets belonging to another or to estate, 42 A.L.R. 1146.

Failure to procure occupational or business license or permit as affecting validity or enforceability of contract, 42 A.L.R. 1226; 118 A.L.R. 646.

Validity of contract to influence third person with respect to disposal of property at death or by gift during lifetime, 61 A.L.R. 646.

Removal or attempted removal of one from field of competition by inducing him to enter another's employment as violation of anti-monopoly act, 74 A.L.R. 289.

Noncompliance with conditions prescribed by statute as affecting validity of contract, under usury laws, for payment of premium on loan of building and loan association, 74 A.L.R. 973.

Waiver of usury by renewal or other executory agreements, 74 A.L.R. 1184.

Sunday law as applicable to contracts signed by guarantor or surety on Sunday but delivered to obligee on weekday, 112 A.L.R. 1200.

Failure of purchaser of stock from existing corporation, or of subscriber thereto, to pay for same as affecting his right to dividends, 122 A.L.R. 1048.

Validity and enforceability of contract which was contrary to statute or public policy when made, as affected by subsequent change of law, 126 A.L.R. 685.

Validity of lease or other contract which contemplates or provides for acts by a party that at the time of the contract would be contrary to zoning regulations, 128 A.L.R. 87.

Rule that denies remedy in case of an illegal contract as applicable to an action of conversion, replevin, or detinue for property possession of which was obtained by defendant, or by a third person through whom he claims, as the result of such a contract with the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest, 132 A.L.R. 619.

Validity of contract to influence administrative or executive officer or department, 148 A.L.R. 768.

Statute providing for apportionment between lessor and lessee of a tax imposed upon the producer of oil, gas, or other natural production as violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of the obligation of contracts, 160 A.L.R. 980.

Enforceability, as between parties, of an executory agreement made in fraud of creditors, 172 A.L.R. 1121.

Recovery of money or property entrusted to another for illegal purpose, but not so used, 8 A.L.R.2d 307.

Court rules limiting amount of contingent fees or otherwise imposing conditions on contingent fee contracts, 77 A.L.R.2d 411.

Construction and effect of lease provision relating to attorneys' fees, 77 A.L.R.2d 735.

Purchaser's right to set up invalidity of contract because of violation of state securities regulation as affected by doctrines of estoppel or pari delicto, 84 A.L.R.2d 479.

Validity of contractual stipulation or provision waiving debtor's exemption, 94 A.L.R.2d 967.

Validity of agreement to pay royalties for use of patented articles beyond patent expiration date, 3 A.L.R.3d 770.

Validity and propriety of arrangement by which attorney pays or advances expenses of client, 8 A.L.R.3d 1155.

Enforceability of transaction entered into pursuant to referral sales arrangement, 14 A.L.R.3d 1420.

Failure of artisan or construction contractor to comply with statute or regulation requiring a work permit or submission of plans as affecting his right to recover compensation from contractee, 26 A.L.R.3d 1395.

Rights between landlord and tenant as affected by zoning regulations restricting contemplated use of premises, 37 A.L.R.3d 1018.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability, 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Spouse's secret intention not to abide by written antenuptial agreement relating to financial matters as ground for annulment, 66 A.L.R.3d 1282.

Recovery back of money paid to unlicensed person required by law to have occupational or business license or permit to make contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 637.

Recovery for services rendered by persons living in apparent relation of husband and wife without express agreement for compensation, 94 A.L.R.3d 552.

Property rights arising from relationship of couple cohabiting without marriage, 3 A.L.R.4th 13, 69 A.L.R.5th 219.

Failure of building and construction artisan or contractor to procure business or occupational license as affecting enforceability of contract or right of recovery for work done - modern cases, 44 A.L.R.4th 271.

Contractual jury trial waivers in state civil cases, 42 A.L.R.5th 53.