O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) “Child support obligee” means an individual to whom the payment of a child support obligation is owed and includes a custodial parent or caretaker of a child to whom such support obligation is to be paid or a governmental agency entitled by law to enforce a child support obligation on behalf of such parent, caretaker, or child. (2) “Child support obligor” means an individual owing a duty of support to a child or children, whether or not such duty is evinced by a judgment, order, or decree. (b) A child support obligee shall be regarded as a creditor, and a child support obligor shall be regarded as a debtor, as defined in Code Section 18-2-1, for the purposes of attacking as fraudulent a judgment, convey613
ance, transaction, or other arrangement interfering with the creditor’s rights, either at law or in equity.
History
Code 1981, § 19-6-35, enacted by Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 13.
Annotations
Law reviews. For article on the 1997 enactment of
this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Standing to enforce arrearage judgment. - Habeas court erred by denying a mother’s motion for a new trial following an order discharging the payment of restitution and child support arrearage to her by the purported biological father of her minor child because the
judgment discharging the payment of the pre-existing arrearage was a judgment against her, making her a party to the action and directly aggrieved to have standing to challenge the judgment. Bennett v. Etheridge, 302 Ga. 33, 805 S.E.2d 38, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 762 (2017).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
5
cases, 2000–2017 · leading case:
Pate v. Pate, 631 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2006).
Pate v. Pate, 631 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2006).
· cites it 4× “In 1997, the Legislature enacted OCGA § 19-6-35 to comply with federal requirements that states adopt measures enabling child support recipients to void those transactions whereby child support obligors circumvent their child support obligations.”
Cavin v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 4× “Not only is a judgment unnecessary under OCGA § 19-6-35 (b) which expressly provides that child support obligees are creditors, but under OCGA § 18-2-22 all that is needed is a claim, not a judgment.”
Hall v. Hall, 780 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “And OCGA § 19-6-35 (a) defines child support obligors and obligees as follows: (1) “Child support obligee” means an individual to whom the payment of a child support obligation is owed and includes a custodial parent or caretaker of a child to whom such support obligation is to…”
Bennett v. Etheridge, 805 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 2× “835, 839 (2) (a) ( 708 SE2d 273 ) (2011) (obligee under judgment requiring payment of child support may pursue all available remedies for enforcing judgment); OCGA § 19-6-35 (“[cjhild support obli-gee” means person to whom payment of a child support obligation is *35 owed and…”
Bennett v. Etheridge (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 2× “3 ) (2011) (obligee under judgment requiring payment of child support may pursue all available remedies for enforcing judgment); OCGA § 19-6-35 (“[c]hild support obligee” means person to whom payment of a child support obligation is owed and includes a custodial parent; “child…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.